Rereading the historical record indicates that it is no longer so easy to argue that history is simply prior to its forms. Since the mid-1990s a new wave of research has formed around wider debates in the humanities and social sciences, such as decentering the subject, new analytics of power, reconsideration of one-dimensional time and three-dimensional space, attention to beyond-archival sources, alterity, Otherness, the invisible, and more. In addition, broader and contradictory impulses around the question of the nation - transnational, post-national, proto-national, and neo-national movements – have unearthed a new series of problematics and focused scholarly attention on traveling discourses, national imaginaries, and less formal processes of socialization, bonding, and subjectification. New Curriculum History challenges prior occlusions in the field, building upon and departing from previous waves of scholarship, extending the focus beyond the insularity of public schooling, the traditional framework of the self-contained nation-state, and the psychology of the schooled individual. Drawing on global studies, historical sociology, postcolonial studies, critical race theory, visual culture theory, disability studies, psychoanalytics, Cambridge school structuralisms, poststructuralisms, and infra- and transnational approaches the volume holds together not despite but because of differences and incommensurabilities in rereading historical records.

Audience: Scholars and students in curriculum studies, history, education, philosophy, and cultural studies will be interested in these chapters for their methodological range, their innovations and their deterritorializations.
New Curriculum History
EDUCATIONAL FUTURES
RETHINKING THEORY AND PRACTICE
Volume 33

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New Curriculum History

Bernadette Baker, Editor
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
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The University of Glasgow Department of Special Collections for reprint of two figures in David Hamilton’s chapter “On the Origins of the Educational Terms Class and Curriculum”: Figure 1, A sixteenth century schoolroom taken from a German broadsheet, translated into English and published in 1575 (Euing Broadside Ballad No. 1) and Figure 2, Earliest known appearance of the term “curriculum” in a version of Peter Ramus’ Professio Regia, published posthumously in 1576.
BERNADETTE BAKER

BORDERS, BELONGING, BEYOND: NEW CURRICULUM HISTORY

The passion to eradicate alterity from the earth is also the passion for the home, the country, the dwelling, that authorizes this desire and rewards it. In its nationalism, parochialism and racism it constitutes a public and private neurosis. So, unwinding the rigid understanding of place that apparently permits me to speak, that guarantees my voice, my power, is not simply to disperse my locality within the wider coordinates of an ultimate planetary context. That would merely absolve me of responsibility in the name of an abstract and generic globalism, permitting my inheritance to continue uninterrupted in the vagaries of a new configuration. There is something altogether more precise and more urgent involved. For in the horror of the unhomely pulses the dread for the dispersal of Western humankind: the dread of a rationality confronted with what exceeds and slips its grasp.

Iain Chambers, *Culture After Humanism*, p. 196.

For Iain Chambers, understanding the redefinition of social life and hence of social theories is not aided by splitting the analytical register simply between global and local. This is especially problematic if global is taken to mean the dispersal of an already-dominant or privileged version of the local within wider coordinates that ensure the continuation of forms of representation and frames of reference that are familiar and over-exposed. The chapters in *New Curriculum History* take up the challenge posed by Chambers, collectively confronting the dread of a rationality confronted with what exceeds and slips its grasp. Finding purchase and continually slipping away from the strictures of the taken-for-granted and of fixity, *New Curriculum History* embodies the dueling reverberations of its non-localizable domains – in some ways, a shaping by its pasts and in others, contributions irreducible to dominant narratives about the field of education and “its” histories.

That is, the idea for the volume is and is not indebted to previous waves of scholarship in a subfield of the discipline of education called curriculum history. Curriculum history as part of an educational field was an offshoot of initially a USA-based and Rights-based development, both counter-reaction to the binds of the (in)famous Tyler rationale and more broadly a move into de-objectifying and denaturalizing discourses as part of a wider reformulation of discourses of equality, what is today referred to in curriculum studies as the Reconceptualization. The subfield was itself made possible by broader movements, then, both social and academic in the humanities and social sciences, in which since the 1950s especially there has been a questioning of the objectivity and neutrality attributed to the sciences and in particular the quantitative and numerical. Such openings, which
BAKER

permitted curriculum history to form in the late 1960s, to be named more regularly as such in the 1970s and ‘80s, and to travel as a nomenclature especially through the 1990s and 2000s, have generally made possible analyses of the politics of knowledge within the framework of nation-state school systems, analyses previously subjugated. Such openings in terms of curriculum history are difficult to dissociate from the pathbreaking work of Herbert Kliebard (e.g., 1987, 1970), as well as Barry Franklin (e.g., 1994, 1974), Ivor Goodson (e.g., 1987), David Hamilton (e.g., 1990), William Pinar (2004, 1995), Thomas Popkewitz (e.g., 2001, 1987), and William Watkins (e.g., 1994), to name a familiar few. Studies of elementary and primary school content were often organized implicitly or explicitly through the lenses of critical theory, specifically derivatives of Habermasian and Freirian frameworks, as applied to history and focused on vested interests, perpetual struggle and conflict, and social control themes. Studies of the formation of secondary school subjects took a somewhat different bent indebted more to political sociology of knowledge, illustrating how what might operate under the sign of mathematics, language instruction, or science, for instance, was not only non-neutral and non-universal, but also a rather “psychologized” version of a wider discipline, a kind of content built for and transformed by the school, becoming something else once it was headed for such an institution and for the (differentiated) child or youth.

In Anglophone-dominant settings, curriculum historical analyses drawing more on new variants of social history than foundationalist histories of education were published within the UK, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia in the 1970s and ‘80s as well. Such studies, as Green and Cormack note in this volume, raised the difficulty of generalizing across regions, provinces, or states. In *Understanding Curriculum: An Introduction to the Study of Historical and Contemporary Curriculum Discourse* (1995), one of the most encyclopedic and important accounts of curriculum studies more broadly and of historical treatments of events in the United States more specifically, Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, and Taubman have noted, however, there has been little attention to synoptic views of educational research in which Reconceptualist innovations were even referenced, to historical processes more specifically, and to scholarly production in the field at large. While the emphasis on the politics of knowledge from 1970s onwards raised crucial questions about the non-neutrality of what was selected to be passed on to future generations, the broader education field remained rather bound by psychological discourses sheared from any analyses of power relations, however defined. With the redefinition of what was permissible in terms of posing questions and amid variegated strategies of truth-production, however, curriculum studies could crystallize into new domains such as curriculum theory, curriculum history, and curriculum planning of a less technicist and more culturally-nuanced kind. Curriculum studies can now be conducted and debated as the “cultural studies of education” with research into overt (formal or written content), hidden (incidental or implied learnings), and null (what could have been taught but was not) curricula taken-for-granted. Such formations had to become legitimate sites for posing questions in ways that decades past did not allow, a process that in some cases stifled the careers of those who raised such questions. Significantly, curriculum studies now involves analyses that exceed compulsory schooling and education-based literature, provocatively daring researchers, as
Pinar’s (2004) informative analysis of contemporary currents in *What is Curriculum Theory?*, to speak of the schools sparingly.

The aim of this volume is not to replicate, though, what is already well-mapped in USA-based literature and debates where there is more than one nodal point of curriculum history associations and networks, nor is it to establish a canon of old and new. As Franklin’s insightful Epilogue to this volume indicates, the difficulty of characterizing “national scenes” can be as great or as stultifying as trying to address “international” ones. This stepping to the side of standard literature reviews and maps of a curriculum history subfield might seem a bizarre, even ahistorical and difficult orientation to sustain in a volume with such a title. But the exigencies of contemporary renovations in educational research raise other difficulties that are perhaps more able to be honored or at least acknowledged by maintaining and affirming an aporetic approach to the repetitive and limiting concern for quiddity.

The chapters in this volume are not reducible to the parameters of the subfield that formed in the 1970s and ‘80s. One cannot say, for instance, that USA-based publications, debates, and concerns regarding curriculum history drive every chapter, lie at the origin of all observations, or inspire the historical analyses herein, even if the nomenclature “curriculum history” emerged there within a vibrant, multicultural, and tense politics. The chapters that this volume brings together might be described as occupying the same space not through reducibility in origin but through their contestation of the very idea of origin, of the taken-for-granted, and of Truth, digging somewhere within that nexus between modernity/nationalism, knowledge-production, and schooling’s forced project, with “curriculum” as the intellectual center, the meeting point of macrophysical trends, policies, and systems and the microphysics of teacher-child interaction – interactions that include the possibility of love (and what thwarts it) as Tavares’ chapter reminds us, a microphysical and immediate level that is often ignored in educational policy analyses focused in implicitly Darwinistic ways on “the public sphere” as the historical sphere of the masculine, of conflict, and of competition for money and influence.

Yet, this narrative and framing itself bespeaks a particularly “Occidentalist preoccupation” with a certain series of “sociological” transformations and categories that enable the social projects of “modernity” and “nationalism” to be named, to slide easily by, as though obvious, uncontested, and universally understood as central to contemporary “global” arrangements. It might be more to the point to say that, rather, the chapters’ unique conditions of production, theoretical frameworks, senses of time, and geopolitical pressures elevate different concerns within each, giving rise to the appropriateness of an aporetic “approach” here.

Aporia in ancient Greek refers to “difficulty,” literally something “that stops us in our tracks,” not “yet another alter of thought, not its origin or first principle, but its productive and reproductive ‘moment’” (Faubion, 1998, p. xviii). In modern Greek usage aporia (singular aporos) indicate a state of impasse, nonpassage, or logical contradiction that can never be permanently resolved, a state of constant shimmering around a borderline (Derrida, 1993).

This volume paradoxically indexes, then, a difficulty if not an irresolvability, locating its impossible-to-reduce “heritage” in transnational curriculum inquiry, which can be inclusive of or intersect with curriculum studies as a subfield in the
USA, yet goes beyond the concerns that arise there. Significantly, then, the volume has formed around a recognition of transnational curriculum inquiry more as a task than as a subfield, around the refusal of centralization tendencies of field-formation, and the avoidance of second-order normativity embedded in the a priori definition of terms such as education, curriculum, knowledge, and power, which are not universal concepts. In flowing from, in, and around the enactment of transnational curriculum inquiry the chapters “collectively” illustrate a fragmentation, the multiple, available versions of “international,” “transnational,” and “cosmopolitan,” the rhizomatic play of temporary alliances and ruptures, where not all versions of the trans- or international meet on the one horizon or plane.

As a task, such transnational curriculum inquiry from which *New Curriculum History* draws its spirit, confronts among other things several immanent and pointed problematics:

- The issues, ethical considerations, and decisions that arise when one considers whether “knowledge” is reducible to “place”;
- The dilemma of naming-as-presencing – the saying and unsaying of what Beck (2000) calls “container theories” of nation, culture, traditions, populational categories, self, etc.;
- The problem of Occidentalism-as-arbiter, the play of logocentrism, and the encountering of irresolvability in everyday educational practices.

As well as forging unexpected analytical pathways, uncleaving old assumptions, offering unique foci and possibilities for the fields of both education and history, including what counts as a “primary document” and its treatment, the volume accepts not simply the by-now clichéd homage to the importance of history and to historical projects that can be made use of tactically today, but also the importance of recovery, counter-memory, and post-time as ways of understanding how mainstream History as an arbitrary discipline (capital ‘H’) has an indebtedness to those formations/preoccupations referred to as modernity, nationalisms, and colonialisms that have elevated stories about the past as a privileged strategy of Knowing Thyself – the coming-into-being, then, of an historical consciousness of a particular kind as a requirement for the social contract of “civilization.”

The circularity inherent in the above, of using history to critique History, of questioning the often-automatically progressivist meaning given to the passage of linear time (while using nonetheless tensed language), of being fixed to a chair while discussing flows and travel, of critiquing rationality using logically sequenced arguments, in short, the logocentrism of the modern humanist subject, is a sentiment extended and reoriented by Fernando Coronil – one in which bifocality (at the very least) operates. Coronil’s sensibility of the simultaneous possibilities and the limits, the advantages and the costs, of writing and narrating history through postcolonial studies in Latin America is one that comes close to the inspiration for drawing this volume together. The narratives attributed to and/or taking on the guise of being about the past might help in understanding contemporary modes of world-forming, while at the same time such narratives risk dominating what constitutes a strategy and route to “understanding” and have bequeathed a particular kind of “world.”
As the offspring of a tense marriage between anti-imperial critique and metropolitan privilege, postcolonial studies is permeated by tensions that also affect its reception, provoking sharply different evaluations of its significance and political implications. While some analysts see it as an academic commodity that serves the interests of global capital and benefits its privileged practitioners (Dirlik, 1994), others regard it as a paradigmatic intellectual shift that redefines the relationship between knowledge and emancipatory politics (Young, 2001). This debate helps identify what in my view is the central intellectual challenge postcolonial studies has raised: to develop a bifocal perspective that allows one, on the one hand, to view colonialism as fundamental process in the formation of the modern world without reducing history to colonialism as an all-encompassing process and, on the other hand, to contest modernity and its Eurocentric forms of knowledge without presuming to view history from a privileged epistemological standpoint. [I]n this light, the apparently simple grammatical juxtaposition of “post” and “colonial” in “postcolonial studies” serves as a sign to address the murky entanglement of knowledge and power. The “post” functions both as a temporal marker to refer to the problem of classifying societies in historical time and as an epistemological sign to evoke the problem of producing knowledge of history and society in the context of imperial relations (Coronil, 2004, p. 225).

Does one really, then, need to know Hhistory in order to Know Thyself? And is Knowing Thyself always and everywhere the goal? Coronil’s lucid depiction of bifocality might lead one to question, then, whether that love of or significance attributed to History or to history is a line “moderns” have been implicitly sold, so that some forms of subjectivity and belonging could be forged and others blocked or foregone. Rather than prophesying the death of History, such bifocality and narratives about historical narratives, about the arbitrary status of historical production and literary conventions of writing, what Munslow (2006) identifies, for instance, as the differential deployment of metaphor, irony, synecdoche, and trope that separate constructionist, reconstructionist, and deconstructionist historiography, begs the question of how borders, including species, disciplinary, national, populational, and so forth are sustained, which borders are clung to so tightly and by whom, under what forms of encouragement, pressure, or denial, and for what purposes (e.g., borders to join or to separate, and why?)

In regard to the arbitrariness of borders, scholars such as Foucault (1966/1973) have already delineated the coming-into-being of a variety of classificatory regimes in continental Europe in terms of Renaissance, classical, and modern epistemes. In a Renaissance episteme, the principle of knowing (in terms of divination) was resemblance, in the classical age following, knowledge-production (in terms of Enlightenment proto-sciences) was achieved via the separation of words from things and their arrangement in orderly tables, while in a modern episteme it was the search for historical origins that formed the basis of the organization of knowledge within separated disciplines. Aware of the circularity of bringing dividing practices to an
analysis of dividing practices, Foucault argues further that it was not until this could be more fully separated from that there was such a “thing” as knowledge at all.

Disagreement over the order of things in so-called Occidental traditions that Foucault documents make the generalizability of the term curriculum suspect, alluding to how delimited and arbitrary the links between curriculum, knowledge, authority, method, and belief in the “perfection” of human beings are. Such arbitrary affinities are worth drawing out a little further to set the stage for how borders, belonging, and beyond are thus involved in the generation of *New Curriculum History*.

**BORDERS: PROVINCIALIZING ‘CURRICULUM’**

The term curriculum is not easily translatable into many languages. David Hamilton’s painstaking historical study of the re-emergence of the terms class and curriculum in European languages, which is reprinted here as Chapter One, illustrates a series of pivotal associations between key educational concepts whose religious heritage is discernible and which still have reach today. First, the chapter artfully illustrates the strangeness of reorganizing schools into separate classes relative to the looseness of medieval practices, meaning that every learning was now construed to have a time and a place. Second, it demonstrates how from the Latin term *currere* referring initially to a race track or course (which, significantly, one is to understand as circular), the term *curriculum* was revived in university records of the late 1500s and early 1600s to resolve problems in authority between civic and religious bodies, particularly Calvinist, with the word curriculum taking on new meaning of methodical, linear sequencing of the life course, with overtones of disciplining and ordering. Third, such institutional changes and conceptual linkage between class, curriculum, and method, bridged by Ramus’ redefinition of dialectics, emerged just at the point when education became opened to wider sections of the population, a more expected process delivered through a series of Protestant decrees about reading the Bible for oneself. One upshot, as Hamilton notes, was that for good or for ill in the wake of such institutional and intellectual realignments, schooling became more amenable to external scrutiny.

There are many more important insights that Hamilton’s fine-grained research offers, but one especially has been made little of, yet it is crucial for several reasons: the generalizability assumed in Ramus’ version of dialectics, where the analytical strategy was thought able to be templated, lifted out, and applied across different texts so that the truths of great orators or scholars might be discerned, could arguably be considered one of the pivotal strategies worthy of closer examination in what is today referred to as theories and theses of globalization. Hamilton’s hypotheses that the amenability of Ramism to Calvinism and their linking in the Low Countries facilitated the uptake of curriculum as a reborn educational concept (referring to a quest for the natural perfection of human being within a disciplined and ordered wider life course) bespeaks both the richness that curriculum history offers when the conditions of possibility for its own formation are interrogated and what is missed in the wider subjugation of educational research relative to other disciplines in the Academy.
The conjoining, modification and traveling of discourses that are patiently documented in Hamilton’s original theorization opens onto many debates today about the nature of how things move, the fears or pleasures regarding potential homogenization and standardization, the non-availability of neutrality, and as such, what versions of the international, transnational, cosmopolitan, and global matter to whom and why. In short, what kinds of provincialisms circulate within the linking of class, curriculum and method as formal educational concepts, what kinds of limits might the non-translatability of the term curriculum into many other languages indicate about this provincialism, as well as where it attempts to arrive, and what might be made of its travel, of how the possibilities would be named (e.g., As an instance of imperialism? Internationalization? Something else altogether?).

Such efforts to historicize and to problematize “curriculum” intersect, as the above has alluded to, with contemporary postcolonial studies research that examines among other things how borders have been formed. What is often missed in postcolonial studies’ acknowledgments of specificity and efforts to provincialize (and essentialize/generalize) “Europe” or “America,” though, is how claims to “real science” and to an “independent nation” emerged as contemporaneous and interlinked processes in the nineteenth century. However, more recent efforts to conjoin globalization studies, postcolonial studies, and science and medicine studies, such as the work of Warwick Anderson, Itty Abraham, and Roy MacLeod have elaborated this intersection, underscoring how an alliance between realism, rationality, and colonialism shaped developmentalized views of world-forming. This has led to calls for new kinds of scope and analytical concerns and frameworks, and also to debates over the politics of such a “broadening.”

For instance, in introducing a new area called postcolonial technoscience Warwick Anderson (2002, p. 644) argued that “The postcolonial study of science and technology suggests a means of writing a ‘history of the present’, of coming to terms with the turbulence and uncertainty of contemporary global flows of knowledge and practice. As Stacy Leigh Pigg puts it, ‘we now need to find out more about how science and technology travel, not whether they belong to one culture or another.’” For Anderson, then, the messiness and ambiguity of the term postcolonial was to be preserved as productive, but “doing” postcolonial technoscience meant at base that metropole and colony should be brought into the same analytical plane, not simply for the purposes of symmetry but because a carrier or medium between locations should be identified if we are to understand how things have traveled and why those things. For Itty Abraham, however, if colony is positioned as Third World or as having “alternative” knowledges, the same analytical framework as before is still in place and still a problem – geopolitical entities are treated as stable, speaking for themselves, and place becomes a metonym for stereotypes and for knowledge. For Abraham, the assertion of certain practices as real science has other baggage: modernity, nation and later, state have been dependent upon specific notions of science which, once transplanted to “the colonies,” become contradictory, complicated – and exposed:
Modernity, nation, and later, state all pass through and are interpellated in the institutions and cultures of modern western science. However, colonial and later postcolonial science was always a contradictory formation. Though science presents itself as universal knowledge, it is never able to do so unambiguously in a location distant from its putative origins in Western Europe. Science’s conjoint history with colonial and imperial power implies a constant representation of its condition in order to pass as universal knowledge in the colony (Abraham, 2006, p. 211).

Such debates are not simplistic identity-politics battles about who matters the most, nor born from strategies of reading that assume to read critically means only to ask “Where am I in the text?”, with the expectation that one should always be in, and be at the center of, everything that one reads. Rather, debates about borders, here especially between science and non-science, nation and colony, truth and falsity, modern and backward, between time periods and disciplines, and so forth are at the least about permissible or otherwise kinds of bonding, of blame, of credit, of processes of attribution and subjectification, of distribution and starvation, of wisdom and of cruelty.

The Table of Contents for this volume, then, reflects such complexities. Its organization is in a sense both periodized and conceptual - the periodization is, roughly, analyses that pre-exist the timeframe of nineteenth century nationalisms, analyses of curriculum and nation-formation across nineteenth- and early-twentieth-centuries, and analyses of “post”-nationalist effects in late- twentieth- and early-twenty-first century reforms. Conceptually, the volume is not reducible to or pivoting only on questions of the nation in historiography, however, but on the politics of borders, which in the social sciences have become linked to the politics of causality, of knowledge, of rationality, and of the role of education in modernist projects of governance. The volume thus redefines the range and the scope in processes of attribution in history-writing challenging and extending, for example, what is invoked to explain, describe, or map a series of events, what constitutes an event or which things “pop up” for notice, and what border-making, classificatory regimes, and seepage might be observed in play in different moments. At the same “time,” the conceptual loci and politics of post-time means that one remains cognizant, questioning, and skeptical of the contradictory formation, dependency upon, and role of linear time in both the volume, its chapters, and in history-writing in general. As Spivak notes, “Time often emerges as an implicit Graph only miscaught by those immersed in the process of timing” (2000, p. 38).

Part One overtly offers attempts at such redefinition of borders grounded in conceptions of linear time, of three-dimensional space, of timespace, reflecting on the conditions of possibility around the discursive/institutional shifts that now make it possible to have a field called education and a subfield called curriculum history at all. This entails tracing not just formal, compulsory education as a modernist project, but preparation in other domains for such subjectification processes to take hold: Hamilton's work as indicated above maps how the words curriculum and class can even be in English vocabularies and educational institutions, Baker's how certain conceptions of West, modernity/nation, and mind could become linked to debates
over the politics of childrearing and knowledge (and forgotten), Autio’s how post-Gnostic modernist formations elevated (shifting) conceptions of instrumentalism and rationality in seemingly oppositional curriculum models, and Tröhler’s how language, mentality and civic-ness or citizenship were part of new efforts to forge a Republic in the face of loss of absolutist forms of authority. Together, the chapters in this section offer insights into different strategies of governance that various efforts to subjectify children, youth, tutors, teachers, and/or scholars have entailed, whether in a university, a formal school setting for children, a youth club, or other pedagogical locations, such as hospitals, that have not been considered directly part of the domain of curriculum history. More than governance, however, they point to challenges to some of the analytical strictures of conventional historiography by honoring the not-always documentable sensibilities that can still be discerned in educational arrangements today and that have their heritage, too. In Tröhler, for instance, we see never-before studied archival documents of a movement that in retrospect failed at the level of endurance but whose discourses perhaps remain in play, in Autio a new understanding of the horizons that Gnosticism provided to Descartes and that Descartes provided to education, an engagement that curriculum history has not mined before, and in Baker, a new set of primary documents from the archives of medical, psychical, and psychoanalytical experiments that enabled education to appear as a field dedicated to mind studies, subsequently burying its fascination with the apparently bizarre. This broadening of both the documents under study and reconsideration of how things might travel even in the absence of “material” or identifiable carriers refuges, in turn, what constitutes “acceptable” conceptualizations of reality. As Timothy Mitchell puts it:

To put in question these distinctions, and the assumptions about agency and history that they make possible, does not mean introducing a limitless number of actors and networks, all of which are somehow of equal significance and power. Rather, it means making this issue of power and agency a question, instead of an answer known in advance. It means acknowledging something of the unresolvable tension, the inseparable mixture, the impossible multiplicity out of which intention and expertise must emerge. It requires acknowledging that human agency, like capital, is a technical body, is something made. Instead of invoking the force and logic of reason, self-interest, science or capital and attributing what happens in the world to the working of these enchanted powers and processes, we can open up questions…of what kinds of hybrid agencies, connections, interactions, and forms of violence are able to portray their actions as history, as human expertise overcoming nature, as the progress of reason and modernity, or as the expansion and development of capitalism (Mitchell, 2002, p. 53).

Presuming that borders are about belonging can be considered on the one hand a cut to the chase of modern structures of subjectivity and at the same time a risky and dreaded dispersal of Occidentalist preoccupations. Attention to specificity in time and place of emergence, of why one is thinking just that thing just now and how in those terms, is an extension of Victorian cultural diagnosis and fascination with
“mental states” (Winter, 1998). The popularization of the notion of provincializing, for instance via the work of Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), solves some problems and creates others, as Chakrabarty rightfully notes. We have to dig deeper, then, for the sources of shifts in the conceptualization of reality that fertilized the possibility for modern, compulsory (in terms of attendance), formal educational systems that have been the prior focus of curriculum history, arriving in particular at that moment when West is asserted as different from the rest, when, for instance, religion, science, and philosophy became separate disciplines and when madness and reason move into an oppositional position in regard to truth-production. The following section initiates such a digging.

BELONGING: TIMESPACE OF THE NATION

An orthodox king-and-battle history assumes a static old-fashioned definition of the Thai nation-state and applies it to the past. An alternative history proposes dynamism and process but only according to certain scholastic criteria found outside the history it describes. Indeed, scholars have tried throughout the history of European nation-states to determine the true and natural constitution of a nation, that is, the truth of the identity of it. The entire history of a nation presumes the existence of such an entity or presupposes a definite qualification of it, as if its identity were already given.

Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped*, p. 14

While the literature of postcolonial studies, in addition to what might be called poststructural and continental philosophy, psychoanalytics, Cambridge school structuralism, mentalité historiography, critical theory, and historical sociology have influenced the chapters in this volume, such literatures did not eventuate in a vacuum. If debates over how to do postcolonial technoscience have eventuated, such as between Anderson and Abraham cited above, others have emerged which put into question the prerogative of one of the most cherished categories of educational analysis: the nation-state. While for Anderson and Abraham we only have modernity, colonialism, and nation because we have something called science, for Winichakul we only have modernity, colonialism, nation, and *science* because of something further—belief in one-dimensional time and three-dimensional space.

Whereas Benedicte Anderson (1991) points to the new temporal consciousness that helps to formulate the sense of community in historical lineage, (as distinct from previous imagined communities), that is, how the new sense of homogeneous, linear time shaped the imagined community of the nation-state, Winichakul highlights another technology, describing the technology of territoriality which created nationhood spatially. For Winichakul, then, belief in linear time provided the connective sinews, the form of sequencing that permitted previously disjunctive communities to appear a homogeneous and unified mass while never having met, that is forming around the same sense of time, just different special days marking the calendar. This was one invention, but there was another, what he calls the geo-body, the technology of territoriality and mapping that allowed a second form of
sequencing to take hold. The displacement of indigenous cosmography by modern geographical spatial concepts produced the idea that we are all a part of the same whole, just differently located on the map. The geo-body helped to produce the social institutions and practices that created nationhood, in a similar way that the re-emergence of the term class as a subdivision of pupils helped produce the idea of the modern school. The transformations wrought by the geo-body in “South East Asia” have been enormous, yet “No study has been done on the relationships - either the transformation or shift or confrontation - between the premodern geographical discourse and the modern one. The absence of definite boundaries of the premodern realm of Siam is not taken seriously, as if it were due to some practical or technical reason” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 18).

Most studies of premodern Thai concepts of “space” indicate that maps were not always conceived as travel aids but as ways of representing relations between sacred entities tied to Buddhist doxologies. Most studies also tend to focus on the Buddhist cosmography known as the Traiphum cosmography. Traiphum, literally meaning three worlds, was an important doctrinal tradition within Theravada Buddhism. The best known text of this tradition is Traiphum Phra Ruang, believed to be the major treatise of the Sukhotahi kingdom in the upper Chao Phraya valley in the thirteenth century. Of the thirty-one levels in the three worlds the human level is simply one. In this text, beings are classified by merit and designated to live in particular levels according to their store of merit from previous lives. The store of merit can be accumulated or diminished by one’s deeds and account for one’s next birth. By this logic, one’s present existence is the outcome of the previous one. Crucially, Winichakul notes that while the surviving texts give concrete descriptions of the three worlds and especially the human one, as well as movements of the sun, moon, and seasonal changes, space is conceptualized in the Traiphum as a qualitative manifestation of existence, merit, and the relation between sacred entities.

However, the human world of the Traiphum has been treated by social scientists as if it were the native’s view of the planet earth, a distorted or primitive one, contaminated by false belief or lack of knowledge. Winichakul is doubtful, though, whether the symbolic representation was in fact designed to represent the planet earth. The fact that depictions of earth are varied e.g., square and flat and round, does not indicate the development of local knowledge of the earth or the lack of it. More probably, it suggests that the materiality of the human world can be imagined in more than one way, whereas the spiritual meaning of the three worlds must be obeyed. Under this view, the spiritual dimension is the “reality” of the Traiphum space, and the most important knowledge needed to be transmitted correctly.

Winichakul points out that in addition to the Traiphum maps of Buddhist cosmographical worlds there were at least four other kinds of spatial conceptions in premodern Thailand including local maps used for trade and military purposes that represented the earth’s profane or material surface and that drew on Chinese influences in the drawing techniques. Different maps with different ideas about “space” thus co-existed and the crucial point here is that this suggests that there was not simply one way to represent the world but rather that there was more than one world, more than one imaginal domain.
The question the study directly poses, then, is this: “what dramatic effects ensue when people stop imagining space in terms of orderly relations of sacred entities and start conceiving it with a whole new set of signs and rules?” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 36). The history thus elaborates the impact of drawing lines and the related encoding of desire, of the production of nation and ethnicity as political entities whose boundaries define “identity.”

Boundary lines are indispensable for a map of a nation to exist - or to put it another way, a map of a nation presupposes the existence of boundary lines. Logically, this inevitably means that boundary lines must exist before a map, since a medium simply records and refers to an existing reality. But in this case, the reality was a reversal of that logic. It is the concept of a nation in the modern geographical sense that requires the necessity of having boundary lines clearly demarcated. A map may not just function as a medium; it could well be the creator of the supposed reality...The boundary of a nation works in two ways at the same time. On the one hand, it sets a clear-cut limit on a sovereign unit; on the other, it imposes a sharp division between at least two units of space...Consequently, many conceptions and practices of interstate relations must be changed to conform with the new geography of a country. The indigenous concepts must be displaced (Winichakul, 1994, p. 56).

The imaginability of a nation in terms of linear time and a map involves a number of changes, then, beyond vocabulary— in concepts-in-motion, in human practices concerning the domain and limits of a country. The most important precondition for Winichakul is the conception of boundary lines of which “premodern Siamese” had no experience, lines which distinguish one unit of sovereign space from another. Being represented by this code meant entering a new kind of earth space, which had another set of rules and conventions, another mode of relations. If a map is more than a recording or reflecting medium, the transformation may be more complex than anyone might expect. Modern geography, for Winichakul is not objective, then, but it has real effects and is a kind of mediator.

Just like the re-emergence of the term curriculum, where the new practice of sequencing educational experiences to be all-of-a-piece required boundary lines between classes and content, so too did boundary lines create the units for sequencing national territory as though all were part of the same whole. This may seem irrelevant today but the distinction from premodern mapping techniques in South East Asia is instructive in at least two ways. First, in premodern techniques, the object was not to understand one’s self as a smaller unit within a wider whole that constituted the background for one’s present location: “Premodern maps had no interest in the accuracy of measurements and required no scientific, empirical methods. A map merely illustrated the fact or truth that had been known already, either cosmography, moral teaching, or a traveling route. A modern map, on the contrary, dismisses the imaginary and sacred approaches to the profane world. It constitutes the new way of perceiving space and provides new methods of imagining space which prevent the ‘unreal’ imagination and allow only legitimate space to survive after the decoding process” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 55). Second, the
importance of the shift into a global plane of reference is that the spatial reality that
the modern map purports to present is never directly experienced in its totality – it is
impossible to do so – no-one can be the earth, so the modern map is an indispensable
mediator in perceiving and conceptualizing such macrospace as though it is a
totality, a function that none of the premodern maps ever performed. This is
equivalent of asking, then, why the galaxy is not represented in most of the
depictions of planet earth, such as in social studies textbooks or geography lessons:
“The isolation of a peace of the earth’s surface from the entire globe might be
compared to the isolation of the earth from the whole galaxy in our minds today. In
other words, the classification of a local geography and the whole globe as separate
categories in the indigenous knowledge about space is comparable to the separate
classification in modern science today of geography and astronomy or astrophysics”
(Winichakul, 1994, p. 31).

On Winichakul accounts, then, it would not be enough to ask when does Thailand
become Thailand or the West the West and the East the East, or where do the borders
fall in which period. Both questions remain within a Newtonian physics and modern
conception of geography that presumes what should be explained – that is, the
revolution into linear time, the assumption that space is only three dimensional, the
presumption that there is only one world totality, and that Being can only be defined
by understanding the self as one small part of macrospace.

Part Two of New Curriculum History implicitly springboards from the openings
and complexity of such scholarship that re-examines nation studies, unpacking the
links between multiple modernities and the formation of nationalisms as the new,
main mode of belonging especially where schooling was concerned, but not strictly
there. Whereas Part One was not exclusively concerned with the nation-state as the
only possible framework because the analyses cross (geo-discursive) timespaces in
which there were no nation-states as we know them today, the arbitrariness of
nation-formation is more specifically elaborated and obvious in Part Two. The
analyses draw out what happens when national imaginaries are invoked as the
dominant form of belonging, whether desired or not, as the only mechanism through
which to lodge a political complaint, to get something done, or paint a picture of past
and future. The implications of such new formations for “curriculum” are elucidated,
especially when “it” becomes the site of governance of the individualized “self’s”
uptake of those imaginaries, or in several cases in this section, resistance to them in
favor of other versions of belonging.

The “America” in Watkins, Richardson, Tavares, and Kliebard, for instance, is
not necessarily the same “place” in discursive terms even though references to “it”
as a geopolitical and Constitutional entity seem stable. In Watkins, Black curriculum
orientations are opposed to the implicit whiteness of American curriculum theory,
and such orientations have their own trajectories, born both out of the historical
insults endured in the New World and its normalization of slavery, peonage,
tyrranny, and duress, and the creativity and survival skills demonstrated by African
American scholars who differently negotiated such legacies and their oppressive
structures. For Kliebard, the struggle for the American curriculum is not a story
about race but about interest groups formed around humanism, social meliorism,
developmentalism, and social efficiency whose conflicting vested interests generate
the politics of knowledge that crystallized amid a fledgling compulsory institution’s spread. For Richardson, the America spoken of is not an a priori unified territory – there are distinct regionalities, settlement, and habitation patterns which sat both in contrast and sometimes in competition to be at the forefront, to dominate the index for a new national imaginary post-Civil War. This means that curriculum debates such as adopting classical versus scientific curricula were never just about the content or the east coast, but the value-systems and lifestyles associated with prior settlement patterns and with projection of a future, idealized nation. For Tavares, the nation is not internal unto itself and history of its formations and gradations can be told through attention to visual displays, exhibitions, and art as well as written documents. The American invasion of the Philippine Isles in the late 1800s provides a context for rethinking how co-existent forms of racial subjection in interior and exterior synergy operated within the auspices of nation-building and its pheno-typically-based caste systems, subjections that endure and that are artfully overturned as well. For Dussel, the site of production makes other kinds of differences. The analysis is not dedicated to deconstructing what is seen as authentically Argentinian curriculum reform or the dominant discourses currently in place, but rather provides an archaeology of what fell away, of what could never become associated with the nation in well-known or popular senses or in terms of endurance, hence the historical retrieval. These chapters not only offer new vocabularies, new concepts, new methodologies but also new archives, such as in Tavares’ turn to art, exhibitions, and psychoanalytic literature, in Watkins’ engagements with previously ignored Black curriculum scholarship and the redefinition of when USA-based curriculum history might begin and be focused, in Kliebard’s rewriting of inherited tales about progressivism, a questioning of the very existence of a unified and coherent progressive education movement at all, in Richardson’s unique approach to conditions of proof, both rigorous statistical analysis to test possible associations that an historian might intuit from reading primary documents about curriculum debates and big-picture historical sociological events that frame their very possibility, and in Dussel a turn to that which is buried, discontinuous, and which did not work to understand the hybrid and systemic nature of that which was permitted to endure.

Together, the analyses embody and demonstrate what Homi Bhabha calls the play of the pedagogical and the performative in the time of DissemiNation. Pedagogical narratives are the traditional tales told about how a nation was founded, for example, school textbooks, classroom assignments, activities around national holidays. Performative narratives are those of migrants, minorities, and more that puncture the unity presumed in the pedagogical narratives right at their point of inception and then become absorbed into new versions of how the nation began, creating ever-new marginalities in the process. Bhabha points to the endless cycle of rewriting a nation’s history, alluding to how basic historiographical questions are not resolved by purification processes. This alerts us to the arbitrariness of how lines are drawn around very emotional senses of contemporary belonging, and defended against a deconstruction, no matter how theoretically justified. It points to the hybridity that was already in place in order for something to be considered distinctive and
demonstrates how the play of the performative and the pedagogical inheres often in the shift from state to nation-state.

The act of naming countries, or other forms of collectives indebted to arbitrary strategies of grouping and living arrangements, risks ultimately an essentialization which acts to miss the messy and numberless beginnings that have been brought to the solidification of the Me. For Foucault, the act of analysis was not dedicated to this solidification but rather to refusing who we are told we are, to a dissociation of the Me, which does not permit us to qualify what is Greek or English and suggests instead dense networks that are difficult to unravel.

_Herkunft_ is the equivalent of stock or descent; it is the ancient affiliation to a group, sustained by the bonds of blood, tradition, or social status. The analysis of _Herkunft_ often involves a consideration of race or social type. But the traits it attempts to identify are not the exclusive generic characteristics of an individual, a sentiment, or an idea, which permit us to qualify them as “Greek” or “English”; rather, it seeks the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is difficult to unravel… Where the soul pretends unification or the Me fabricates a coherent identity, the genealogist sets out to study the beginning—numberless beginnings, whose faint traces and hints of colour are readily seen by a historical eye. The analysis of descent permits dissociation of the Me, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events (Foucault, 1971/1998, p. 374).

This brings to the fore, then, how the final section of _New Curriculum History_ grapples with such dissociation, offering different illustrations of late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first century curriculum reform that are irreducible to insular and immanentist views of countryhood and continuously interpenetrated by forces that seem to come from beyond the borders and belonging of a singular or specific national timespace.

**BEYOND: QUESTIONS OF LANGUAGE, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND POST-NATIONAL THEORIES OF THE NATION**

I am aware that it is possible to turn a term on its head and imbue it with new meanings, and that the construction of this new discourse of “minority discourse” is intended as just such a project. Nevertheless, in the absence of a political movement such as the Black Power Movement which successfully dislodged the negative associations of black in racist representations, I presently remain skeptical that, irrespective of intent, any moves that perpetuate the circulation of the minority/majority dichotomy will not serve to reinforce the hegemonic relations that inscribe this dichotomy. What category of person is “minoritised” in a specific discourse? Are dominant classes a “minority” since, numerically, they are almost always a minority?… As an alternative, I do not wish to offer some all-embracing panacea, but rather to insist that, in so far as is possible, the conceptual categories we employ should be able to resist hegemonic cooptation. [T]he concept of diaspora that I wish to
propose here is embedded within a multi-axial understanding of power; one that problematises the notion of “minority/majority”. A multi-axial performative conception of power highlights the ways in which a group constituted as a “minority” along one dimension of differentiation may be constructed as a “majority” along another. And since all these markers of “difference” represent articulating and performative facets of power, the “fixing” of collectivities along any singular axis is called seriously into question….Moreover, individuals may occupy “minority” and “majority” positions simultaneously, and this has important implications for the formation of subjectivity.


The refusal of panacea that Brah (2003) maintains while at the same time still having something significant to say about the state of affairs in late twentieth century settings marks both a broader analytical trend in the humanities and social sciences as well as the unique contributions of chapters in Part Three of *New Curriculum History*. Debates over the advent, meaning, and worth of the linguistic turn in a variety of disciplines has raised consideration of the linkage between language, (inter)subjectivity, and post-national theories of the nation, as well as other collectivities – associations that the chapters in this section dexterously move within, against, and beyond. Moreover, such linguistic turn debates, along with postcolonial critiques of nation- and empire-building, have themselves been critiqued and/or relativized from multiple directions, as Green and Cormack’s commentary notes. Wrigley (1996) argues, for instance, that the role of deafness in the constitution of what a nation-state is, what a language or vernacular is, and what an ability is has been forgotten. To that end, he argues that deafness is more epistemological than auditory and that attention to new collectivities formed out of internal forms of exclusion in the process of nation-formation exposes dependencies of discourse, or what might in Derridean (1978) terms be how a system often represses that upon which it most relies.

Colonialism is usually depicted as a cultural hangover incurred while squandering the bounty gained from heroic voyages of discovery and the attendant exploitation of native populations. As with Western domination of other foreign “discoveries,” the relation of Hearing to Deaf cultures has primarily been that of a pastoral colonialism so long naturalized as to have faded into the consensual “normal.” Thus the dominance and oppression are more complex than a simple exploitation narrative of natives versus colonialists might suggest. This economy structured by recognitions makes visible, in critically new ways, a more complex relationship with practices of exclusion and inclusion (Wrigley, 1996, p. 7).

In discussing the emergence of Deaf Awareness and Deaf Nationalist movements and in a chapter titled “Deafness is a big country…” Wrigley explains how the traditional markers of national independence, such as borders, police forces, standing armies and shared territory are not the coordinates of new sensibilities.
But, clearly, deafness is not a country ... or is it? Deafness is democratic in its occurrence. Membership, or “citizenship,” cuts across all boundaries of class, gender, or race. Contrary to how the average individual defines deafness—that is, as an audiological impairment—Deaf people define themselves culturally and linguistically. The global Deaf population is currently about fifteen million — on par with a modest-sized nation. Yet it is a “country” without a “place” of its own. It is a citizenry without a geographical origin….Without claim to a specific place, and without the juridical and policing agencies by which we know nations in the late twentieth century, deafness is not a recognized nation. In keeping with the medical model of the body inherited from the nineteenth century, deafness is commonly viewed as merely a “condition.” But the claim of a distinct “ethnic” identity that has accompanied the resurgence of Deaf Awareness in the past two decades forces a reassessment of this and other identities excluded from the equation of the “normal”...Deaf people – their experiences and representations as “the deaf” – represent a peculiar intersection of issues that resonate in terrains seemingly far removed (Wrigley, 1996, pp. 13–14).

Lennard Davis argues that Europe discovered deafness in the eighteenth century and that prior to it there was little mention of the Deaf as a single populational group. With the invention of the printing press children who were previously considered bound for hell received a promotion – reading the Bible now secured their tenuous inclusion in the categories human and redemption.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the tense battles over whether children labeled deaf and mute were to be taught Sign language (manualism) or to lip read and pronounce (oralism) is indicative of the blank space that nation-state policies positioned such children to be. If which nation could not be marked in voice and accent, then how were such children to be forced to identify with the nation and how would they be recognized as belonging to which group? The historical banning of Sign language and promotion of oralism in many Western democracies, for instance, is today taken as a violation of human rights. Together the Deaf Nationalist, Deaf Awareness, and also Deaf Culturalist movements indicate the limits of old versions of national sovereignty, raising a series of broader philosophical questions regarding world-forming and the elevation of proximity, such as whether “community” is necessary, whether community is always proximate, and significantly for Wrigley, whether community produces new forms of colonialisms within: “The projected or ‘lived’ universalism being claimed by Deaf activists is an attempt to constitute imaginal memories. Such universalism draws on the experience of many deaf people who, in their deafness, find a commonality that, in this frame, transcends other distinctions of race, ethnicity, or nationality. Yet, new claims of homogeneity produce endogenous colonialisms, as well” (Wrigley, 1996, p. 7).

The series of broader philosophical questions raised are approached in different ways by Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida, especially regarding the nature of community.

Nancy (2007) and Derrida (2001) offer adjacent challenges to the bond that ties cultural domination to community identification and claims of scientific rationality.
To that end, they provide an interesting way to engage with debates over whether the spread of such things as spoken vernaculars, compulsory education, inclusive schooling, conceptions of curriculum, or back to basics movements can be considered, as noted above, “international,” “imperialist,” or something else altogether.

Derrida’s readings of cosmopolitanism seem to operate conceptually through penetration into an unknowable beyond. His analyses do not seek to determine yet another set of rules for inventing the future, but work to explore aporia that arrive in the structural aperture between the constituted and the unconditional, “between order and its beyond.” For Nancy, however, this kind of position might be available to Derrida due to a process of world-forming and creation that have already occurred, that which happened at the moment of a withdrawal rather than a penetration into an unknowable beyond. The withdrawal is that of “God,” a flattening and an enabling of the world without another world exterior to it. This is not so much what Nancy mourns but rather describes the conditions of possibility for, elaborating subsequent effects. For Nancy, then, one effect is that immanentist notions of community do not, as their proponents assume, extend political thought by revealing the source of collective organization but instead circumscribe or cut off reflection on the political by attributing to it a restricted and essential foundation.

For Derrida, the upshot is neither necessarily a wholesale rejection of national identification or celebration of a generic globalism, but instead a possibility to speak differently about what constitutes the political and a theory, a deprivileging of the proximate, of the violence of frontiered borders, of the narcissism and prejudice that have so central to the idea of community, and its dependence on the non-rational for claiming its rationalized groupings.

While the phallologocentrism in both accounts might be obvious and no coincidence in political philosophy, both Juergen Schriewer (2006) and Jonathon Culler (1988) have identified important changes in analytical strategies of late-nineteenth century social sciences that enabled such approaches and narratives regarding the complexities of world-forming: a shift in analytical emphasis in Occidentalist-inspired debates from identifying entities or things in terms of origin and essence to the primacy of relations, a change in what comparative thinking could actually mean, then: a move from thinking comparatively in terms of contrasting mutually exclusive, quasi-autarkic entities into comparative thinking via analogies, relations, and functions – a significant shift in the very conceptualization of reality.

The chapters in Part Three defy those versions of comparative thinking that seek the essence of different nationalized versions of schooling via their structure and their functions while tying all versions ultimately to one final form of representation. The linearity of method that relies on Calvinist-Ramist ordo, on sequenced sinews to give something the appearance of totality, and on disciplina, on prescriptive techniques that are easily communicated and lifted out, do not reappear in the comparative strategies undertaken here, for the chapters have eloquently wrestled with the shifting form of what constitutes domestic and foreign, inner and outer, authentic and hybrid in unique official documents and discursive moments. Knowledge is not presumed to lie only in the measurement of deviation from a norm and difference cannot only be difference in relation to the state already existing at the center or in the old. Rather, as Jankie demonstrates, what became the frame of
reference for reform rationales in the newly independent nation of Botswana and what the language of school instruction ought to be was up for grabs – should the frame of reference be the dominant linguistic medium, Batswana, or that shared with some immediate neighboring countries, or the continent of Africa and the dominance of French language, or “the global economy?” Refusing to buy into linguistic turn theories of power, drawing at the same time on postcolonial studies sensibilities of history, and language theorists from different parts of Africa, Jankie’s analysis challenges from new directions mechanical and internalist analyses of educational policy and curriculum reform. As Qi’s analysis also artfully demonstrates, what can fall under the sign “Japan” and “Japanization” shifts quite dramatically in educational policy depending on the “exterior” frames of reference, “internal” debates and points of contrast, and major events such as World War II to the extent that it becomes difficult to see what the difference between “internationalization” and “Japanization” might be in more recent initiatives. What, then, is one “really” pointing to, assuming, or trying to get at when phrases such as “Japanese curriculum reform” slide by as though naturalized, continuous, and self-evident? Qi’s sensitively-rendered analysis points to the wider problem of naming raised earlier, the dilemma of making not just geopolitical entities, but theories of onto-epistemology speak for themselves.

Together, these studies flesh out the aporia inherent to transnational curriculum inquiry as a task. In Anglophone curriculum studies alone, for instance, one can find reference to American Reconceptualization, British sociology of knowledge traditions, German/Scandinavian Bildung/Didaktik theories, and so forth. But as Cormack and Green insightfully note, such analyses are not only often centered on the US and parts of Europe as eternal points of return, but the theoretical frameworks driving classification and labeling have already been contested, opening new questions and possibilities for curriculum historical work focused on the problem of language, which their own research in Australia, as well as Jankie’s and Qi’s eloquently demonstrates.

Because such analyses might not have been possible or considered acceptable in many publication forums prior to the linguistic turn and the interventions and new spaces it opened for rethinking the history of the present this leads us back to another of the dilemma raised at the outset – the role of Occidental-thought-as-arbiter in new curriculum historical research. The assertion of Occident or West as the World, or as template for how World should be depicted and analyzed as Winichakul has demonstrated, is highly problematic from multiple directions, mutating indigenous cosmographies as well as encouraging new kinds of “beyond” or retrievals. As Denis Cosgrove illustrates, ocularcentrism and the shifting format that the desire for a view above other views has taken is not innocuous or innocent.

The dream of human flight sufficiently high to offer a global perspective is an enduring theme of Stoic philosophy, in which seeing attains the dual sense of sight (noείν) as an empirical check against speculation, an assurance of truth in the descriptions of the earth, and of vision, the capacity for poetic grasp beyond mundane or earthbound daily life, for a truer, imaginative knowledge. This is the implication of the whole-earth literature from Cicero, Lucan, Seneca, which offers its male heroes their destiny in synoptic vision. Their
telos combines an imperialistic urge to subdue the contingencies of the global surface with an ironic recognition of personal insignificance set against the scale of the globe and cosmos (Cosgrove, 2001, p. 53).

The view above other views is the propensity to paint a bigger picture that disciplines and orders other pictures within it. Cosgrove characterizes such a move as Apollonian, as “male-centered,” “Eurocentric,” and “transcendent” in its qualities, permitting the conflation of “West” with World, sphere, eye, desire for breast, and with globe, globalism, and globalization. Like the geo-body, the technology of the map, the claim to all-knowingness cannot be underestimated for its transformative effects, especially in social sciences such as education. In William James’ disciplining of Tolstoi in the late nineteenth century publication _Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals_, one of the most reissued Anglophone social science texts for the first three decades of the 1900s, we see the crystallization of that moment in which West and Orient (in this case, USA and Russia) are asserted as the exclusive and central plane of reference for any comparison, with West elevated as more aware of “reality.”

Tolstoi’s philosophy, deeply enlightening though it certainly is, remains a false abstraction. It savors too much of that Oriental pessimism and nihilism of his, which declares the whole phenomenal world and its facts and their distinctions to be a cunning fraud. A mere fraud is just what our Western common sense will never believe the phenomenal world to be. It admits fully that the inner joys and virtues are the essential part of life’s business, but it is sure some positive part is also played by the adjuncts of the show. If it is idiotic in romanticism to recognize the heroic only when I see it labelled [sic] and dressed-up in books, it is really just as idiotic to see it only in the dirty boots and sweaty shirt of some one in the fields. It is with us really under every disguise…But, instinctively, we make a combination of two things in judging the total significance of a human being. We feel it be some sort of a product (if such a product could be calculated) of his inner virtue and his outer place, - neither singly taken, but both conjoined. If the outer differences had no meaning for life, why indeed should all this immense variety of them exist? They must be significant elements of the world as well (James, 1899/1915, p. 284).

But what is at stake in this delimitation of the West as all-knowing and the reformulation of an Apollonian eye in the new millennium? For Cosgrove, what is at stake is the question of authority, a globalism hopelessly bound to exercising and legitimating authority over subordinate social and natural worlds in order to recognize itself as authority. Subordination is, of course, not the only way in which one might come to recognize or organize “authority” and thus this version or strategy for recognition remains tightly tied to the concerns expressed by Iain Chambers and that opened this Introduction.

Today, the globe continues to sustain richly varied and powerful imaginative associations. Globalization – economic, geopolitical, technological, and cultural –
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is widely recognized as a distinguishing feature of life at the second millennium, actualizing the Apollonian view across a networked, virtual surface. Resistance from the solid ground of earth, characteristically located at the spatial and social limits of Apollo’s conventional purview, proclaims limitations of its male-centered Eurocentrism, a globalism hopelessly bound to exercising and legitimating authority over subordinate social and natural worlds. The criticism is well founded, both historically and morally. But the issue is by no means simple. The Apollonian perspective prompts ethical questions about individual and social life on the globe’s surface that have disturbed as often as they have reassured a comfortable Western patriarchy (Cosgrove, 2001, p. 3).

The effort to refigure an Apollonian eye has had two antithetical outcomes for Cosgrove, then, the effects not completely deterministic: one outcome of trying to refigure an Apollonian eye is that it reassures a comfortable Western and Christian patriarchy and another is that it just as often disturbs it. One can see these dual possibilities in contemporary social theory as it impacts transnational curriculum inquiry as a task and new curriculum historical research as particular renditions of it. Moving “beyond” “Occidentalist preoccupations” is taken both as urgent and as impossible, such as in Chakrabarty’s account of the difficulty of moving beyond “Eurocentrism” in writing histories of places outside of Europe. Prior assumptions about the role of schooling as a primarily governmental institution and of curriculum as targeting docile bodies and minds of the young are increasingly disturbed, forced to encounter the unique possibilities that pre-existed, co-exist, and bear no relation to such claims’ frames of reference or theoretical anchors.

In his *Buddhisms and Deconstructions*, for instance, Jin Y. Park (2006) makes this all the more clear: a precise understanding of the nature of self, mind, ego or consciousness is not the key to an understanding of existence, essence, or identity, or vice versa; truths are not simply those things that exist they way they appear; perception is not dependent upon induction into discursive regularities that make appearance possible. To much Anglophone educational research, such utterances will appear counter-intuitive. But beyond the provincialisms is the possibility to dwell outside the comforts of “home,” without desire to see replication of the familiar “self,” slightly tweaked, everywhere else, an invitation Park extends from multiple springboards.

In offering an alternative to Western versions of causality, a strategy to which he refers as dependent co-arising, Park argues that such a notion leads us to the theory of no-self, which is not a theory that no self exists at all. The two comprehensive theoretical bases of Buddhist philosophies (philosophies which he does not disaggregate) in the form of doctrines of dependent co-arising and theory of no-self are indispensable to each other. Dependent co-arising resembles concepts of causation except that it takes place at multidimensional levels. A being is always already the result of simultaneous happenings of different elements that come together to construct what is called a self. Being in the world is thought seriously impaired by one’s determination or desire to grasp something permanent. In an attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of affirming any enduring entity in one’s
being, human being is analyzed in terms of five aggregates of matter, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. None of these can independently exist or represent an entity, nor can they be reduced in meaning to Western philosophical heritages. Together they lead to a concept of no-self that Park argues is commonly misunderstood as opposite of a theory of self.

Because Buddhist traditions are keenly aware of the problem entailed in dualism, no-self theory is not a notion of lack of self for such a notion presupposes the existence of self. The difference in this case is that the theory of enduring self affirms, whereas the theory of no-self – if it is misunderstood as lack of self – negates the existence of self. In both cases, self should exist. The theory of no-self is presented not as a lack of self but as the middle path between affirmation and negation of self. That is, to misunderstand no-self as theory of lack of self presumes dualism where A and not A are opposites. However A and not A are not binary opposites as dualistic thinking assumes but fall into the same category in that both presuppose the existence of A. The (mis)understanding of the theory of no-self can have two opposite outcomes: either one is bound to the confusion of reality and phenomenon, or, one is emancipated from the traditional concept of self.

The illusory nature of self is not simply reducible to Asian, Eastern or specifically Buddhist orientations (all such categories problematic in different ways, as is their presumed opposite “the West”), however. Arguing in support of no-self theories across a variety of discourses, Simon Glynn points out how existential phenomenology, poststructuralism, and Buddhist epistemology converge (all “three” also problematic in terms of grouping and naming research) around the view of a single, discrete self as illusory, with differential consequence within each.

The ego is traditionally held to be synonymous with individual identity and autonomy, while the mind, which is closely associated therewith, is widely held to be a necessary basis of cognition and volition, and the responsibility following therefrom. However, Buddhist epistemology, Existential Phenomenology and Poststructuralism all hold the notion of an independently subsisting self-identical subject to be an illusion. This not only raises problems for our understanding of cognition (for if such a self is an illusion who does the perceiving and who is deluded), and volition (who initiates acts), but also therefore for the notion of responsibility (for in the absence of an independently subsisting subject there appears to be no autonomous agent), while for Buddhism it also raises an additional problem for the doctrine of reincarnation (for in the absence of such a self it is unclear who is supposed to be responsible for failing to overcome desires and attachments, and concomitantly gets reincarnated) (Glynn, 2006, p. 197).

In so-called poststructuralism, critiques of the discrete self led to several other responses which come especially from interrogating the nature/culture opposition, the realization of which, as Derrida (1978) notes and that Cormack and Green in this volume perceptively elucidate, makes language bear within itself the necessity of its own critique. At least two forms of problematization ensued, one called archaeology, an effort to step outside metaphysics in philosophy (often attributed to
Foucault); another was a kind of reflexivity, how social sciences keep using the tools that we also criticize.

In his mapping of both responses in the human sciences, Derrida arrives at that moment in which he does not name something as “post” and that is simultaneously beyond the limits of structuralism, particularly in anthropology. He argues that once such an opposition as nature/culture makes itself felt, a systematic questioning of its history that is neither philological nor philosophical arises as a first possible action. This is what Derrida refers to as archaeology – to deconstitute the founding concepts of the entire history of philosophy. He sees that as both the most daring beginning of a step outside philosophy and the most difficult for it is “much more difficult to conceive outside philosophy than is generally imagined by those who think they made it long ago with cavalier ease, and who in general are swallowed up in metaphysics in the entire body of discourse which they claim to have disengaged it from” (Derrida, 1978, p. 284).

The second possible action is to conserve old concepts – such as the world, subject, self, other, language, discourse - while here and there denouncing their limits. There is a willingness to abandon them as well as to exploit their efficacy, they are used to destroy the old machinery to which they belong and of which they are themselves pieces. “This” Derrida argues “is how the language of the social sciences criticizes itself,” to preserve as an instrument something whose truth value is criticized.

A third strategy or response, as exemplified in Mitchell and collectively also via the chapters of Part Three, might rather resort to describing how social sciences have simply overlooked “the mixed way things happen.”

Overlooking the mixed way things happen, indeed producing the effect of neatly separate realms of reason and the real world, ideas and their objects, the human and the nonhuman, was how power was coming to work in . . . the twentieth century in general. Social sciences, by relating particular events to a universal reason and by treating human agency as given, mimics this form of power. The normal methods of analysis end up reproducing this kind of power, taken in by the effects it generates. In fact, social science helps to format a world resolved into this binary order, and thus to constitute and solidify the experience of agency and expertise. In much of social science this is quite deliberate. It tries to acquire the kind of intellectual mastery of social processes that dams seem to offer over rivers, artificial nitrates over sugarcane production, or DTT over arthropods. It is less important whether one understands how things work, more important how effective are the immediate results. But more careful forms of historical or cultural analysis can do the same thing in less obvious ways, by leaving technics unexamined, or talking about the “social construction” of things that are clearly more than social (Mitchell, 2002, p. 52).

This loss and recuperation of what can be marshaled into an account as a form of evidence or more strongly as explanation obfuscates the tendency of academic disciplines to circle around themselves. Bynum’s (1999) analysis posits, for instance, that the roots of modern Western psychology lie in “the African unconscious” - a
group of philosophies circulating on the African continent before it was named as such and to which he refers as personalism, a way of being in which subject and object are mutually interpenetrable and where it is possible to communicate with ancestors four generations past and one generation into the future. Bynum posits further that the roots of ancient Eastern mysticism lie in personalism as well. Eastern philosophies and therapies draw their key content, such as belief in a universal energy flow like chi or kundalini from personalism. Africa becomes then both the “unconscious” inhabiting the projection/naming of West and East, and West and East are now unconscious of Africa. Bynum’s analysis can be extrapolated to an underscoring of the provincialism of curriculum’s rebirth as a term and central educational concept, indexing the unfolding of a modern desire for “sequencing,” and for the identification of invisible links, influence, or trails between apparent parts indebted to monistic conceptions of a universal fluid or grid that makes transmogrification of forms possible.

Cosgrove notes that the falling away of such ways of seeing that do not elevate a visual portal are part of the very possibility for being called modern: “The victory of ocular vision over other forms of knowledge parallels the history of modern colonialism, and the processes are not unconnected” (Cosgrove, 2001, p. 16). What happens, then, when the specter of a “beyond” is raised and/or when “West” is critiqued from within and without, as this volume demonstrates? One of the things that happens is the effort to resuscitate an Apollonian Eye (and via that, the centrality naively presumed by “the West” about “it’s” self), and simultaneously to resist or ignore it. Cosgrove elaborates, for example, how both ascent and dispersal become two possibilities that crystallize in new versions of an Apollonian eye.

The Apollonian gaze, which pulls diverse life on earth into a vision of unity, is individualized, a divine and mastering view from a single perspective. That view is at once empowering and visionary, implying ascent from the terrestrial sphere into the zones of planets and stars. The theme of ascent connects the earth to cosmographic spheres, so that rising above the earth in flight is an enduring element of global thought and imagination. Belief in the ascent of the soul – that the destiny of human life is transcendence to a heaven above the earth’s surface – connects to the metaphysics of harmony embraced by the somnium. Alternatively, the Apollonian gaze seizes divine authority for itself, radiating power across the global surface from a sacred center, locating and projecting human authority imperially toward the ends of the earth. In the narratives of Christ as God-man, refracted through the heritage of Greece and Rome, these two strands have been braided together into a universalizing teleology of Western Christianity (Cosgrove, 2001, p. xi).

Is New Curriculum History to be considered, then, an instance indexing the spread or dispersal of curriculum history around the world from so-called privileged centers? Is it, rather, an instance of refusal of that very desire for ascent to a fixed point of meaning, and the processes, delimitations, and analytical categories that would entail?
As noted above, the volume builds upon an already significant basis of curriculum historical work that has self-identified as such, prior scholarship which is reprinted here, and which opened educational fields to insights regarding “curriculum” as non-neutral and non-objective, that placed socio-politics in historical work on the agenda – an opening in which the above critical questions can thus also play. It also defies such narratives about origins that would reduce all “critical and effective histories” to a fixed starting point. The commentaries and reflections that follow the reprint of these earlier pieces especially straddle these dual (at least) sensibilities. They are not intended as a rebirth of the author after an apparent Barthesian death or by default an elevation of biographicalized processes of attribution. Rather, they collectively highlight the differential conditions of production available to be wound into and out of our arguments, narratives, and beliefs – what is it that “we” turn to in order to say how or why we studied what we did, were fascinated by this or that, or gave energy here rather than there?

Without the prior raising in the humanities and social sciences of the non-objectivity of sciences at large and education specifically, the chapters in this volume might not have been possible, might not have found an audience, and have minimal space to refuse who we are told we are. The work that this volume does, then, is to offer one, non-unified locus through which different orientations to new curriculum historical work can come into view, one that honors and acknowledges groundbreaking prior research that made contemporary revisioning possible, as Franklin’s Epilogue eloquently notes, and one that also suggests unique themes that bear no relation to prior foci and initial concerns, reorganizing and facing frankly the possibilities and the limits that mark the post-time of New Times.

One of the questions that the chapters in this volume help to elucidate, and that remains in play and in tension in New Times, then, is what becomes of traditional versions of compulsory education as “its” two historic frames of reference are further challenged: the singularity of the nation-state as an authentic and sovereign zone of belonging and scaffolding for educational policy and implementation, and of the individualized self as locus of discrete, unified, and coherent consciousness, assessable and quantifiable. Cosgrove argues that both categories – nation and self – are Western inventions and that “Both ‘West’ and ‘Western’ are themselves historically made and altered constructs, shaping and differentiating an already signified globe” (Cosgrove, 2001, p. x). He also implies what one might expect – a continuous defense and redefinition: “Closely linked to the Apollonian vision and its universal claims is the shifting discourse of the self and human distinction” (Cosgrove, 2001, p. xi). In the end, the point of this volume is not to rescue education from itself or “the rest from the West” or the margin from the center but rather to bring into question how and why some stories that are told have gained such purchase on “our” subjectivities and actions, to the point that retrievals rather than rescues are now required for education to take (on) another look.
REFERENCES


Beyond Compulsory Schooling:
Conditions of Possibility for Curriculum Historical Questions
DAVID HAMILTON

1A. ON THE ORIGINS OF THE EDUCATIONAL TERMS
CLASS AND CURRICULUM

The division of pupils into classes was to constitute one of the principal pedagogic innovations in the entire history of education. (Mir, 1968, Aux Sources de la Pédagogie des Jésuites)

It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of this innovation [the very idea of a ‘curriculum’] in the history of education. (Rashdall, 1936, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages)

I

The discourse of schooling is an historical artefact. But its historical responsiveness is not always evident. Terms like ‘kindergarten’ and ‘teaching machine’ can be readily linked to particular periods of educational history; but other terms, like class and curriculum, have become universalized – their origins and evolution hidden from both educationists and historians alike.

Whenever, for example, historians refer to the ‘curriculum’ of the medieval university they unwittingly impose the language of the present onto the schooling of the past. As a result, the stability of educational practice is overstated; and educationists are left with the impression that teaching and learning are relatively sheltered from the turbulences of historical change.

But are historians solely to blame for this shortcoming? I think not. Responsibility also rests with the educational community at large – for neglecting to provide conceptual reference points against which the pedagogic past might be discerned. In short, historians have failed to discriminate chronologically where educationists have failed to discriminate conceptually. To break this impasse it is necessary, I believe, to bring the common-places of schooling much more to the foreground of educational analysis. They are not a backcloth to educational change: they are its warp and weft.

II

The most extensive discussion of the origins of classes in schooling can be found in Phillipe Aries’ Centuries of Childhood (original edition, 1960). Aries noted that while ‘class’ is absent from medieval accounts of schooling, it had enjoyed a limited currency in classical times (for example, in Quintilian’s Institutes, c. 95AD). Accordingly, Aries claimed that the re-emergence of ‘class’ – in Erasmus’ 1521 description of St Paul’s School (London) – occurred because renaissance reformers

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were ‘fond of borrowing from the ancients’. From this perspective, then, Renaissance practice was continuous with its medieval predecessor: ‘classes’ already existed – they merely awaited a suitable label.2

There are, however, a number of problems with this argument. First, the renaissance reformers chose new labels, not only out of fondness for classical authors, but also because they wished to distance themselves from medieval practice. Secondly, a full version of Quintilian’s *Institutes* had been rediscovered in 1416, so why did ‘class’ take over 100 years to enter the language of schooling? Thirdly, why did Erasmus – a leading humanist – fail to follow Quintilian’s usage in his earlier educational works *De Copia* (1st ed., 1512) and *De Ratio Studii* (1st ed., 1511)? According to a recent translator, both were ‘heavily indebted’ to Quintilian for their ‘content’ and ‘style’;3 and, indeed, the full title of *De Copia* is, itself, ‘after a phrase of Quintilian’.

The earliest known use of class – in a source not reported by Aries – appears in a condensed account of the University of Paris published in 1517 by Robert Goulet, a professor of theology. The last part of Goulet’s *Compendium Universitatis Parisiensis* comprises a series of precepts that, Goulet believed, should be adopted by anyone wishing to found or reform a college. Besides exhorting his readers to follow the mode of living and teaching already practised in Paris, Goulet’s first precept also described the layout of a suitable college: ‘there should be at least twelve classes or small schools according to the exigency of place and auditors’.4

Goulet’s juxtaposition of ‘classes’ and ‘schools’ reflects the coexistence of medieval and renaissance usages. In addition, his account also reflects the fact that, in medieval times, ‘school’ had a double meaning. It could refer to a group of people or to the chamber in which instruction took place. What significance, therefore, should be attributed to the linking of class with ‘small’ school? Was Goulet commenting on the age (and size) of the students? Or were these new chambers (or groups) to be smaller than those used previously for teaching? Moreover, what were the existing college practices that Goulet referred to approvingly? To understand these developments it is necessary to take a closer look at the form taken by medieval schooling.

III

As noted in the previous chapter, a medieval school was primarily an educational relationship entered into by a private teacher and a group of individual scholars. Like guild masters and their apprentices, teachers took students at all levels of competence and, accordingly, organized their teaching largely on an individual basis. Such individualization fed back, in turn, upon the general organization of schooling. First, there was no presumption that every student was ‘learning’ the same passage. Secondly, there was no pedagogical necessity that all students should remain in the teacher’s presence throughout the hours of teaching – they could just as easily study (cf. memorize) their lessons elsewhere. And thirdly, there was no expectation that students would stay at school after their specific educational goals had been reached. Essentially, medieval schooling was a loose-textured organizational form which could easily encompass a large number of students. Its apparent laxity
Gradually, however, these medieval practices underwent a process of reordering – a sequence of events that nurtured the term class. Three centres of innovation seem to have been important: the University of Bologna; the University of Paris; and the fifteenth-century schools associated with the Brethren of the Common Life, a devotional movement active in the Low Countries.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, (mature) students converged on Bologna from all over Europe. They came to learn from an innovative group of jurists (legal theorists) whose revisions of the legal code eased, among other things, the problems faced by landholders wishing to transform their ‘possession’ (or stewardship) of land into a property-relationship of absolute (or free-hold) ‘ownership’.

By comparison, then, with the cathedral schools, Bologna was a much more worldly (i.e. secular) educational setting. Likewise, the pedagogy of the jurists was comparable to that offered by other occupational groupings in the city. Knowledge, skills (etc.) were passed on to candidates who could meet the appropriate fees; and a small number of successful ‘apprentices’ were elevated to membership of the Bologna fraternity (or guild) of jurists.
In other respects, however, the Bologna students were unusual. As outsiders, they were denied the civil rights accorded to the citizens of Bologna. Yet, as senior and powerful figures in their own lands, many were well-equipped – financially, socially and intellectually – to overcome this difficulty. Together, the Bologna students formed their own guild and, through this agency, gradually formalized their relationship with the civic authorities. In turn, they also formalized their links with the jurists. According to one recent historian, this last connection prefigured a ‘formidably rigorous’ regime wherein the teaching was regulated by means of student-controlled appointment of teachers and student-imposed monetary fines for inefficient lecturing.

Although the Bologna students controlled the organization of teaching, their masters retained the right to issue credentials. At the outset, these credentials merely admitted recognized students to the local guild. But after 1219 the masters obtained a papal privilege: the right to confer (with the local consent of the Archdeacon of Bologna) teaching licenses that had ecclesiastical and civic currency throughout the Papal domain. Licensed teachers armed with this privilege – the *jus ubique docendi* – were no longer subject to local restrictions upon tenure and practice. The net effect (if not also the intention) of this papal intervention was an increase in the production of civil and ecclesiastical administrators. To increase its sphere of influence the Church of Rome transformed the Bologna guild of masters and apprentices into an international business school.

As far as the masters were concerned the *jus ubique docendi* gave a boost to the teaching side of their activities; and as far as the students were concerned it provided an incentive not merely to learn but also to acquire the social prestige that flowed from being a graduate (cf. the right to use the title ‘Master’ or ‘Mr.’). Under the influence of such political and social pressures, educational institutions like Bologna began to grow in size, number and authority. In turn, certain of them, notably the University of Paris, yielded to new forms of discipline and management.

### IV

The University of Paris was an outgrowth of the local cathedral or diocesan school, itself a product of an eleventh-century papal decree that the church should train up its own administrators rather than use lay persons. During the twelfth century certain important teachers – notably Peter Abelard (d. 1142) attracted (or brought) large numbers of students (and other teachers) to Paris where they lived and worked outside the direct control of the cathedral chancellor. By 1215, these ‘external’ masters had acquired their own corporate (i.e. self-governing) status. The Chancellor still issued licences; but the masters controlled admission to their own ‘consortium’ of teachers.

During the thirteenth century, however, the division of control between the masters and the Chancellor was cut across by a new organizational structure. Various benefactors – perhaps grateful for the legal counsel they had received from university-trained administrators and advisers – founded ‘colleges’ to provide accommodation for ‘poor’ scholars. Also known as ‘hospices’, ‘pedagogies’ and ‘houses’ (for example, the House of Sorbonne, founded in 1257), these residential
(non-teaching) colleges were not attached to any particular religious grouping but, nevertheless, adopted a comparable discipline or rule.

Initially, the colleges were small. The earliest – founded 1180 – catered for only eighteen students. But, as time passed, the colleges changed in character. First, they took in fee-paying boarders; and, secondly, they began to offer teaching, not only to their own students, but also to those from other residences. Although this gave certain colleges more money and a wider influence, their new clients were less bound by the discipline that, formally, applied only to the ‘poor’ scholars. This combination of a strong power base and a weak internal discipline provided the reason and the excuse for attacks on college autonomy. Critics maintained that the university was failing in its social mission and had become, as a consequence of college laxity, a breeding ground for anti-royalist and anti-state sentiment.

As various historians have indicated, these criticisms had a decisive impact. In the guise of replacing ‘anarchy’ with ‘order’, the autonomy of the chancellor, teachers and colleges was subordinated to the control of lay and secular authorities. In 1446, for instance, the jurisdiction of Parliament was extended to all civil cases within the University – on the grounds that only the King and his court had the right to approve the creation of corporate bodies. By this and other related interventions (for example, the 1453 reforms of Cardinal d’Estouteville), the University of Paris was deprived of both its ‘chief privilege’ and its ‘independence’. Its status changed from that of a ‘mesmeric international university’ to that of a ‘circumscribed national institution’. But this transition was not just a simple slide down the academic league table; rather, it was symptomatic of the fact that the University of Paris was moving out of the orbit of the Roman church and into the hands of national political interests. Local autonomy – allowed within guidelines supplied by a distant authority – was replaced by hierarchical forms of control designed to serve the needs of the national ‘state’.

The relocation of authority that accompanied these changes also penetrated the colleges. Power and privilege became concentrated in their upper echelons (i.e. among the doctors). And, in return, students were (supposedly) placed under constant surveillance. The colleges, that is, became subject to the ‘same regularity’ and the ‘same order’ as obtained in other French civic institutions. In the late fifteenth century, this redistribution of power also showed itself through the internal division of colleges into different student cohorts. By this time, the rapid increase of (younger) day boys had, according to Ariés, ‘completely swamped’ the colleges – rendering them ‘to all intents and purposes big day-schools’. Control through residential requirements could not be applied in these circumstances. Instead, surveillance was to be exerted through closer regimentation of student attendance and student progress. According to Ariés, these reforms had a profound effect on University life. They transformed each ‘collegiate administration’ into an ‘authoritarian system’, and each ‘community of masters and pupils’ into a ‘strict government of pupils by masters.

Moreover, it was at this time that, according to Mir, the modern sense of class was first used – but not named ‘– in the statutes of the College of Montaigu:
It is in the 1509 programme of Montaigu that one finds for the first time in Paris a precise and clear division of students into classes. . . That is, divisions graduated by stages or levels of increasing complexity according to the age and knowledge acquired by the students.12

But even if, as Mir goes on to argue, the College of Montaigu ‘inaugurated’ such a class system in Paris, there is also other evidence that, by 1509, the division of large educational communities into (relatively) smaller cohorts already obtained in the schools of the Brethren of the Common Life.

The Brethren differed from monks and friars in their organization and origins. First, they shared a common life without taking a binding vow; and, secondly, they were ‘essentially products of the medieval municipality. Further, they survived, not by begging, but on the basis of gifts from benefactors, fees from teaching, and income from bookcopying. The attention of educational historians has been drawn to the Brethren largely because they are associated with certain important humanist educators. Besides Erasmus, for instance, the Brethren had a hand in the employment and/or schooling of John Standonck (Principal of Montaigu from 1483 to 1499) and John Sturm (founder of the Protestant Academy of Strasbourg in 1538).13

The early history of the Brethren is unclear.14 But it seems that by the fifteenth century they had begun to take boys into their communities.15 In some cases the boys were ‘given’ to the Brethren as candidates for future internal promotion; in other cases they were merely ‘loaned’ for the purpose of receiving a formal upbringing. Moreover, it also seems that the Brethren’s schools also admitted ‘poor’ scholars who, presumably, could earn their keep by contributing to the book-copying side of the Brethren’s activities.

Besides being part of a regional unit or ‘colloquium’ (for example, the Zwolle Colloquium), each ‘local House or school’ of the Brethren was itself broken down into various internal divisions. It has been claimed, for instance, that during John Cele’s tenure as schoolmaster of Zwolle between 1374 and 1417, the Brethren began dividing their (larger?) ‘schools’ into eight graduated groups. Moreover, Cele is said to have attracted ‘as many as 1200 pupils at a time’ to Zwolle – an enrollment figure which is comparable to those that have been reported for Alkmaar (900 students), Herzogenbusch (1200 students) and Deventer (2200 students).16

The Deventer figures – which are associated with Alexander Hegius’ tenure between 1483 and 1498 –would suggest that each level of the Brethren’s school had an average of 275 pupils. Such a ‘class’ size seems to have persisted into the 1520s since, at a later date, Sturm reported figures of ‘up to 200 pupils’ for each level of the Brethren’s Liege school that he had attended between 1521 and 1524. There is, however, a striking difference between these figures and the ‘classes’ of sixteen pupils reported in Erasmus’ account of St Paul’s School. Equally, the overall size of St Paul’s differed from that of the Brethren’s schools. Its foundation deed of 1509 merely envisaged a total enrolment of 153 ‘children’.17
For these reasons I think caution should be exercised before linking the classes of St Pauls with the earlier sub-divisions in either the colleges of Paris or the schools of the Brethren of the Common Life. In a sense, the earlier cohorts might best be seen as administrative rather than pedagogic units. Within them, pedagogic practices still echoed the medieval individualized methods described earlier. The later Renaissance educators, on the other hand, not only added more finely-tuned controls to the administrative procedures of their predecessors, they also made the resultant groupings (cf. ‘small’ schools) serve pedagogic as well as administrative goals. And it was this new state of affairs – which crystallized out in the second decade of the sixteenth century – that led Goulet and Erasmus to adopt a new language of schooling.

VI

If this is in fact the case, then Ariès argument is in need of some revision. The word ‘class’ emerged not as a substitute for school, but, strictly speaking, to identify the subdivisions within ‘schools’. That is, Renaissance thinkers believed that learning in general, and municipal schooling in particular, would be more efficiently promoted through smaller pedagogic units. In turn, these ‘classes’ became part of the ‘minutely choreographed scripts’ that, so one historian has claimed, were used in sixteenth-century French schools (and elsewhere in Europe) to ‘control the teachers and the children’ so that they might ‘[teach and] learn difficult subjects in record time’.

Overall, then, I would suggest that three social developments came together to underwrite the emergence of the term ‘class’. First, new patterns of organization and control emerged in response to a crisis of fifteenth-century administration and government. Secondly, Renaissance educationist-administrators extended these arguments to the close pedagogic supervision of students. And finally, an unidentified humanist recognized that Quintilian’s earlier (but relatively vague) use of class could be readily adapted to these new circumstances.

All these events and outcomes, I believe, shaped the form of post-medieval schooling. They represented – at least in their conception – an important break with the past. Like contemporaneous proposals for the introduction of universal schooling (and universal taxation), they brought much sharper focus to the linkages between schooling and bureaucratic control, and to the relationship between schooling and the state.

But if the adoption of classes gave life to the idea – expressed in the 1544 prospectus of the College of Nimes – that ‘every learning has its time and its place’, it also brought problems of internal articulation. How could these different fractions of a school be fitted together and managed as whole? The attempts made in the sixteenth century to answer this question form the basis of the second part of this chapter – the emergence of the term ‘curriculum’.
By comparison with class, there seems to be an absolute dearth of discussion on the origins of ‘curriculum’. A convenient starting point, however, is the Oxford English Dictionary, which locates the earliest source of ‘curriculum’ in the records of the University of Glasgow for 1633. The word appears in the testimonial granted to a master on graduation; and is couched in a form that, so the nineteenth-century reprint claims, had been promulgated ‘soon after’ the University was reformed by Protestants in 1577. Is this dictionary citation historically representative? Or does it derive from the fact that the original editor of the OED – James Murray – had been a teacher in Scotland? In fact, the reprinted material on other Scottish and North European universities yields no earlier uses of curriculum – with the seemingly sole exception of the 1582 records of the University of Leiden.

Yet this answer only poses the historical question more sharply. Why Leiden? Why Glasgow? The most obvious connection between these two institutions is that, during the late sixteenth-century, both were heavily influenced by Calvinist ideas.
Indeed, Leiden was founded in 1575 specifically for the purpose of training Protestant preachers, and Glasgow’s reconstitution in the same decade was to meet similar purposes. What, then, might be the connection between Protestantism, Calvinism and curriculum?

As in the case of class, the answer seems to relate to the spread of new assumptions about the efficiency of schooling in particular and the efficiency of society in general. But why did Calvinist educational theory adopt a Latin word meaning a race or racetrack? More specifically, what new educational aspirations were met by the adoption of the term ‘curriculum’?

The answer to the last question is suggested by the original uses of curriculum. At Leiden and Glasgow, and in a subsequent reference in the 1643 records of Glasgow Grammar School (the University’s feeder institution), ‘curriculum’ referred to the entire multi-year course followed by each student, not to any shorter pedagogic unit. In the Leiden case, for instance, it was used in the form ‘having completed the curriculum of his studies’.

To this extent, ‘curriculum’ seems to have confirmed the idea – already reflected in the adoption of ‘class’ – that the different elements of an educational course were to be treated as all-of-a-piece. Any course worthy of the name was to embody both ‘disciplina’ (a sense of structural coherence), and ‘ordo’ (a sense of internal sequencing). Thus, to speak of a post-Reformation ‘curriculum’ is to point to an educational entity that exhibits both structural wholeness and sequential completeness. A ‘curriculum’ should not only be ‘followed’; it should also be ‘completed’. Whereas the sequence, length and completeness of medieval courses had been relatively open to student negotiation (for example, at Bologna) and/or teacher abuse (for example, in Paris), the emergence of ‘curriculum’ brought, I suggest, a greater sense of control to both teaching and learning.

VIII

But of the two tributaries of ‘curriculum’ – ‘ordo’ and ‘disciplina’ – it is the former that figured more strongly in sixteenth-century educational debates. A crucial connection seems to have been the linking of ideas about order with a change in meaning of the term ‘method’. In earlier times, ‘methodus’ had denoted procedures of investigation or analysis, but it had conveyed no sense of providing guidelines that could be rapidly assimilated and easily applied. ‘Method’, that is, existed as a leisurely intellectual art, not a purposive science of technique.

Nowhere was this distinction more evident than in ‘dialectic’ – the branch of philosophy used to analyze the structure of language. Late Renaissance dialecticians, unlike their predecessors, approached dialectic from a practical standpoint. Their dialectic handbooks replaced seemingly inexhaustible and hair-splitting rules with ‘condensed and simplified’ precepts. They wrote for a general audience rather than for ‘professional logicians’. Dialectic was redesigned, therefore, to make it easier for students to extract and to apply the ‘truths’ embedded in the writings and speeches of great thinkers. Accordingly, techniques were reduced to a form that could be easily communicated. And it was this reformulation of dialectic – in the
direction of concise sequencing and ease of communication – that, among other things, gave ‘method’ its new linearity.

Various teacher-dialecticians – of whom Sturm, Melanchthon and Ramus are the best remembered – played an important part in these developments. Sturm’s earliest treatment of method appeared in 1539 – the year after he founded the Strasburg gymnasium. His reference to the practicalities of teaching was quite explicit:

An art is an abundant collection of propositions. But in setting up the various arts a certain, short and direct way, a kind of short cut, has to be used. This the Greeks call method, such as may be used for teaching and communication.

In emphasizing the relevance of presentation and communication (which originally belonged to the study of rhetoric), Sturm began the redefinition of dialectic. In the process, he also pushed back the boundaries of method. Dialectic ceased to apply solely to the study of written and spoken discourse. Instead, it began to denote a set of standard procedures relevant to the solution of all intellectual problems.24

This wider application of method was made explicit in the writings of Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), founder of the Lutheran Gymnasium of Nuremburg (1526). In his *Questions in Dialectic* (1547), for instance, Melanchthon wrote: ‘Method is a habit, that is, a science or an art which finds and opens a way through overgrown and impenetrable places and pulls out and ranges in order the things pertaining to the matter proposed’.

These early suggestions for the realignment of dialectic were finally brought fully into the open through the writings of Peter Ramus (1515-1572), a teacher at the University of Paris and a former student of Sturm’s. First, Ramus reaffirmed the sequential aspects of dialectical method:

Method (he wrote in the 1569 edition of his *Dialectic*) is disposition by which that enunciation is placed first which is first in the absolute order of knowledge, that next which is next, and so on: and thus there is an unbroken progression.

And secondly, Ramus consciously highlighted the intellectual generalizability and pedagogical relevance of the dialectical method – claiming that it was appropriate not merely to the philosophical arts but to ‘every matter which we wish to teach easily and clearly’.

Ramus’ ideas were controversial, not least among those philosophers whose practices he sought to overturn. But there is little doubt – judging from the 150 editions/adaptations of his *Dialectic* published between 1555 and 1600 – that his ideas found a ready and accepting audience, particularly among teachers. By hybridizing the logical canons of dialectic with the communication and presentation rules of rhetoric, Ramist method brought an unprecedented ‘orderliness’ to teaching. Further, it was claimed that, if formalized (or ‘methodized’) in this way, teaching (or schooling) would be rendered more powerful (and/or more efficient). This connection between order, efficiency and improvement became fundamental to late sixteenth-century and early seventeenth-century school reform.25 As Caspar Pfafflad restated the argument in his *De Studiis Rameis* (1597), reformed schooling
(or ‘formal education’) provided the means by which human beings might be brought to their ‘natural perfection’.26

IX

So much for ‘method’; but when and where was it joined by ‘curriculum’? Here the link with Calvinism can be discerned. After Ramus’ death in Paris, his ideas on dialectic spread to Germany which, following the preparatory work of Sturm and Melanchthon, became the ‘real seedbed of Ramism’. Further, the influence of Ramist ideas within Germany was, according to the Jesuit scholar Walter Ong, ‘most intense’ in the areas ‘tinged by Calvinism’. And it was from these particular areas – the Rhineland and its environs – that Ramist ideas descended to the Calvinist sections of the Netherlands.

Ong makes no attempt to explain the mutual attraction of Ramism and Calvinism. But a likely explanation is that the all-encompassing character of Ramus’ pedagogical notions resonated easily with Calvinist ideas about the general need for well-ordered forms of social organization. By the 1570s, Calvin’s followers in Geneva and elsewhere (Calvin had died in 1564) were busy rearranging their own evangelical affairs along such structured lines. A well-ordered school, like a well-ordered church, was seen as essential to the maintenance of Calvin’s ideas (as developed in successive editions of his *institution of the Christian Religion*: viz. 1536, 1543, 1559). According to Tawney, for instance, a ‘rule of life’ was ‘of the very essence of Calvinism’; or, as Calvin put it in 1539, ‘the body of the church, to cohere well, must be bound together by discipline as by sinews’. From this perspective, then, the Ramist idea of method – with its overtones of ‘orderliness’ – could fill the same position of ‘centrality’27 in Calvinist educational proposals as the precept of discipline already held within Calvinist social practice.

This argument about the management and control of schooling may explain the link between Ramism and Calvinism, but where, in fact, did the word ‘curriculum’ appear? Here, unfortunately, the picture becomes a little muddied. While figurative descriptions of life as a ‘race’ or ‘racecourse’ were regular themes in Calvin’s Commentaries (1540-1556), the Latin words consistently used for this purpose – in at least six different passages – were ‘stadium’ and ‘cursus’, not ‘curriculum’. Nevertheless, by the final (i.e. 1559) edition of the *institution* the phrase ‘vitae curriculum’ (or ‘vitae curricula’) appears in Calvin’s writings, though it is still outnumbered by the uses of ‘vitae cursu’ (or ‘vitae cursum’).30 Nowhere, however, does curriculum appear in an educational sense. Neither does it take an educational form in any of the sixteenth-century records – published and manuscript – of the Academy of Geneva (founded 1559). This last state of affairs, which weakens Geneva’s claim to be the ultimate source of curriculum, can be tied to the fact that, from the 1530s, Genevan documents appeared primarily in French, and were translated into Latin only for the consumption of foreign Calvinist communities.30

For this reason, then, there exists the possibility that the educational term ‘curriculum’ originated, not in Geneva, but in the Latin discourse of its late sixteenth-century off-spring congregations. It is at this point that Leiden and Glasgow enter the story. One ‘carrier’ of the curriculum idea (if not the term) might
have been the Scot, Andrew Melville, who spent five years teaching in the Genevan Academy (1569-1574) after earlier sojourns at the universities of St Andrews, Poitiers and Paris (where he came under the influence of Ramus). Following his departure from Geneva – at the request of influential friends in Scotland – Melville, then aged 29, took up the Principalship of the University of Glasgow where, according to a recent history, he assumed ‘responsibility for introducing reforms on Ramist lines’.

It was during Melville’s time at Glasgow (1574-80) that the University underwent the major reorganization referred to earlier. Melville, like Calvin’s successors in Geneva (for example, Theodore Beza), seemed to regard Calvinism in relatively tight organizational, terms. For instance, residence in college was to be compulsory for the Principal; each teacher (or regent) was to be limited to particular areas of study (for example, Latin and Greek); student promotion was to be subject to satisfactory conduct and progress throughout the year; and, in return, the University was to vouch for the completeness of each student’s course through the testimonial in which the word curriculum made its initial appearance in Glasgow.\textsuperscript{31} As another historian of the University of Glasgow has commented, these proposals not only meant that teaching was to follow a ‘rigid plan’, but also that the ‘whole life’ of each student was to be rendered open to teacher supervision.

Much the same pattern seems to have been followed in Leiden. An early influx of teachers imbued with the ‘spirit of Geneva’, soon led to controversy (for example, over civic versus presbytery control of the University). But a compromise charter – still redolent of Calvinism – was eventually agreed in 1576, only six years before the word curriculum appeared in the University’s records.

Although there are still some loose ends in this story (Why did I curriculum replace cursus? Was ‘curriculum’ adopted independently in Leiden and Glasgow?), the general outline seems clear. The educational term curriculum emerged at the confluence of various social and ideological movements. First, under the influence of Ramus’ revisions, the teaching of dialectic offered a general pedagogy that could be applied to all areas of learning. Secondly, Ramus’ views on the organization of teaching and learning became consonant with the disciplinary aspirations of Calvinism. And thirdly, Calvinist fondness for the figurative use of ‘vitae curriculum’ – a phrase that dates back to Cicero (died 43 BC)\textsuperscript{32} – was extended to embrace the new ordered and sequential features of sixteenth-century schooling.

In conclusion, this chapter has argued that as part of the general political turmoil of the sixteenth century the adoption of curriculum and class was indicative of two separate waves of pedagogic reform. First came the introduction of class divisions and closer pupil surveillance; and second came the refinement of pedagogic content and methods. The net result, however, was cumulative: teaching and learning became, for good or ill, more open to external scrutiny and control. Moreover, curriculum and class came onto the pedagogical agenda at a time when schools were being opened up to a much wider section of society.\textsuperscript{13} Municipal schooling – no longer under the jurisdiction of the church – gained in popularity; and, as
important, protestant decrees (for example, the Book of Discipline, published in 1560 by Calvin’s supporters in Scotland), voiced the belief that all children, irrespective of gender or rank, should be evangelized through the medium of schooling. As a result, the medieval educational agenda was not so much extended as substantially recast. And it is to a review of the pedagogic consequences of the new agenda that the remainder of this book is dedicated.  

NOTES


2 Ariès claims ‘the idea (of classes) had preceded the word by a long margin, and it was already familiar when the terminology was established’, ibid, p. 177. For a detailed discussion of the etymology of ‘class’, see Clouatre, D. L. (1984) ‘The concept of class in French culture prior to the revolution’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 45, pp. 2 19–44.

3 Collected Work of Erasmus (1978) (vol. 24), Toronto, p.663. (In the matter of Erasmus’ writings I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my Glasgow colleague, Betty Knott, whose translation of De Copia appears in the same series.)

4 Goulet, R. (1928) Compendium on the University of Paris, Philadelphia, pp. 100–1. (I am grateful to the Charles Patterson van Pelt Library of the University of Pennsylvania for providing a photocopy of the original passage.)

5 It should be noted, of course, that what passes for ‘learning’ is historically contingent. Indeed, a comprehensive discussion of this contingency would be a welcome addition to the literature on schooling.


8 For a general discussion of the links between schooling and administrative reform in the Middle Ages see Murray, A. (1978) Reason and Society in the Middle Ages, Oxford.

9 Bernstein, A. (1978) Pierre D’Ailly and the Blanchard Affair: University and Chancellor of Paris at the Beginning of the Great Schism, Leiden, p. 6. The tension between licensing (by the chancellor) and inception (by the masters) is also discussed in Cobban, A.B. (1975) op cit, p. 82 ff .

10 For a more extensive discussion of the growth of national forms of administration and control, see Anderson, P. (1979) op cit. pp. 16–59 (for example, ‘The absolutist monarchies of the West characteristically relied on a skilled stratum of legists to staff their administrative machines . . . These lawyer-bureaucrats were the zealous enforcers of royal centralism’, p. 28). The general relationship between renaissance educational institutions and the creation of the absolutist state merits further examination. A.T. Grafton and Lisa Jardine suggest, for instance, that humanist schooling had ‘more to do with its appropriateness as a commodity than with its intrinsic intellectual merits’, and that as ‘potential servants of the state’, fluent and docile young noblemen were a ‘commodity of which the oligarchs and tyrants of late fifteenth century Italy could not fail to approve’ (Grafton, A. T. and Jardine, L. (1982) ‘Humanism and the school of Guarino: A problem of evaluation’, Past G. Present, 96, pp. 76–7).
HAMILTON

11 Verger, J. (1976) *op cit*, p. 61. See also Brockliss, L.W.B. (1976) ‘The University of Paris in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’, PhD thesis, Cambridge, University of Cambridge, p. 3 (‘[In the colleges] good organization was above all considered to be the key to success. Traditional corporate ideas were rejected; instead ultimate control was to lie in the hands of one individual (the Rector or Principal) who was to provide for the necessary teaching and supervise the lives of the boarders’).


13 Besides Erasmus, Standonck and Sturm, it has also been claimed that, as a boy in Magdeburg, Martin Luther attended a school run by the Brethren of the Common Life (see Dickens, A.G. (1976) *The German Nation and Martin Luther*, London, p. 77).


15 See, for instance, Hyma, A. (1950) *The Brethren of the Common Life*, Grand Rapids, MI, 1950, p. 1 15ff. There was also a Sisters of the Common Life, who have received much less attention (but see Hyma, chapter 3).


17 See McDonnell, M. (1959) *The Annals of St Pauls*, privately printed, p. 32. Erasmus’ description appears in a letter to Justin Jonas, Aries dates the letter from 1519, though Percy Allen (1922) *Letters of Erasmus*, Oxford, p. 507 suggests that, from internal evidence, 1521 is a more likely year. (I am grateful to Keith Hoskin of the University of Warwick for drawing this detail to my attention, as well as for much other assistance with this chapter.)


20 Molhuysen, P.C. (1913-24) *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Leidsche Universiteit 1574-1871*, Vol. 2, The Hague, p. 96. (This source was located by Maria Gibbons, with whom I wrote an earlier version of this chapter for the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association in Boston, 1980.) The notion that a ‘curriculum’ relates to teaching that takes place over more than one year seems to have survived until the twentieth century: for example, ‘The term “curriculum” is used by this commission to designate a systematic arrangement of subjects . . . extending through two or more years’ (1918 *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education*, Washington, p. 186).

21 Strictly speaking, this chapter’s epigraph on ‘curriculum’ is misplaced. Rashdall’s comment related, in fact, to a ‘complete account’ of a master’s studies dating from 1215. Indeed, to make matters worse, Rashdall’s editors suggest an even earlier provenance for ‘comprehensive yet definite programmes of
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study’ (The Universities of Europe in the Middle Age vol. 1, pp. 439–40). In response, however, I would argue that, compared with those of the sixteenth century, the thirteenth-century regulations had a much weaker sense of sequence and closure. Support for the notion that ‘curriculum’ implies coherence is provided in Gilbert, N. (1960) Renaissance Concepts of Method, New York. Gilbert suggests that Erasmus’ late-renaissance study of theology – Ratio seu Methodus Compendio Parviendi ut Veram Theologiam (1520) – is a typical humanist text insofar as it examines courses of instruction ‘as a whole’ (p. 108).


Cf. Jardine, L. (1974) op cit, 26 (‘[The reformers] identified dialectic . . . with the whole of logic . . . on the grounds that the study of techniques of argument does not depend on the status . . . of the material to which they are applied’).

Links between method and efficiency are noted by both Gilbert and Ong: ‘The emphasis on speed and efficiency sets apart the renaissance notion of method . . . The notion that method can provide a short cut to learning an art did not seem crucial to medical students or educational reformers. Only when the milieu had become more time-conscious did method become the slogan of those who wished to speed up the processes of learning’ (Gilbert, N. 1960, p. 66); ‘Ramus lived in an age where there was no word in ordinary usage which clearly expressed what we mean today by “method”, a series of ordered steps gone through to produce with certain efficacy a desired effect – a routine of efficiency’ (Ong, W. J. (1958) op cit, p. 225).


Ibid, p. 104. Hopfl also claims that the ‘first instance’ of Calvin’s wider use of discipline (i.e. outside references to excommunication) occurred in 1537 (p. 73).

John Calvin’s Commentaries (in Latin), Berlin, 1833-34, vol. 1, 5, 320. See also, Acts 13.25; Acts 20.24; 1 Corinthians 9.24; 2 Timothy 4.7 and 2 Thessalonians 3.1. (I am grateful to Allan Milligan for drawing this source to my attention.)

See Battles, F.L. and Miller, C. (1972) A Computerised Concordance to Institutio Christianae Religionis (1559) of Iohnes Calvinus, Pittsburg, PA. ‘Vitae curriculum (or curricula)’ appears six times; ‘vitae cursus (or curso)’ appears twelve times.

The founding ceremony of the Genevan Academy was conducted in both French and Latin, and a dual-language version of the regulations was published in the same year. By contrast, the 1578 revision of the regulations does not seem to have appeared in Latin until 1593 – a document, incidentally, that cannot be traced in the manuscripts department of the (joint) Public and University Library of Geneva. For data on the Genevan ceremonies and regulations see Bourgeaud, C. (1900) Histoire de l’Universite de Geneve: l’Academie de Calvin, Geneva, pp. 48, 49 and 626.

One datum which suggests that ‘curriculum’ might not have been used in Glasgow until some time after 1577 is the presence of the phrase ‘vite disciplina’ (rather than ‘vitae curriculum’) in the university’s refounding constitution of that year – the Novum Erectio (ibid, p. 433).

Cicero’s use of ‘vitae curriculum’ is recorded, for instance, in the entry for ‘curriculum’ in Cassell’s Latin Dictionary, London, 1893.

17


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18
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DAVID HAMILTON

1B. CLASS AND CURRICULUM

My purpose in this introduction is to answer two questions: Why did I write the paper in the first place? And how have I developed the ideas in the interim?

I began to turn my attention to the history of education in the middle of the 1970s, as a complement to my interest in classroom life. The chapter originally appeared in Towards a Theory of Schooling (Hamilton, 1989), a collection of linked essays about regimes of teaching and learning that had prevailed at different times in western history. The essay republished here, for instance, appeared alongside other chapters with such titles as “On simultaneous instruction and the emergence of class teaching” and “The recitation revisited”. Indeed, the first essay – “setting the agenda” – starts with the words “this book has its own history” and provides an extended account of how I came to configure and link the essays.

My historical inquiries grew from my experiences as a schoolteacher in the 1960s. Throughout, I have been steered by etymological curiosity. When, for instance, had key words – like class and curriculum – first appeared? In my case, however, I had little historical knowledge or training. This greatly affected how I worked. My original purpose was to write something that would help educationists understand their place in history. My inquires were – and still are – motivated by the aphorism “Once you know what you are doing, you are no longer doing it”.

I assumed that my audience – other curious teachers – also had a sense of what it means to be a schoolteacher. But I also recognised that, like me, they had little disciplined awareness of historical writings and/or the circumstances that surrounded the work of their predecessors. I felt, therefore, that I had to dive into the historical literature. Diving, however, is easy, staying afloat and making sense of what I had found proved to be more taxing. At the same time, too, I also realised that my task was not to find historical nuggets that corresponded to my prior assumptions (i.e. prejudices) about schooling. Rather, scientific inquiries must also test and revise interpretations as they unfold.

The net result was that the original essays grew from seeds that began to sprout in 1977. They took 18 years to prepare and another 4 years before I could find a publisher who could retail them at a price my intended audience could afford. One attempt was rebuffed with an anonymous reviewer’s report which concluded: “As it stands I would not buy this book or recommend it to students” (1987). In the event, the (then) senior editor of Falmer Press, Malcolm Clarkson, was more generous. Towards a Theory of Schooling was published in 1989; various chapters subsequently appeared in Spanish and Portuguese; it was translated in its entirety into Japanese in 1994; and, by 2002, it was out of print.

Since 1989, I have remained a Friday afternoon historian, giving particular attention to the period 1500-1650. As a shorthand, I describe this epoch in...
European education as the beginnings of modern schooling; something that I also label as the “instructional turn”. I have been comfortable with this characterisation because it draws attention to three phenomena. First, that schooling is not the same as education; secondly, that schooling and instruction are mutually constitutive; and thirdly, that the label “turn” denotes a slow revolution. Over a prolonged period, measured in decades not years, schools were invented or re-constituted as sites of instruction rather than as places of learning or education. And, by such means, schooling became a technology of modernism.

Put another way, such regimes were intended to steer learners. They were not merely regimes of learning and studying; they were also regimes of power. Indeed, such power over learning rendered them as regimes of instruction.

Although I found it helpful to contrast learning and studying, on the one hand, with instruction, on the other, I gradually realised that this distinction should be treated with caution. Like any dualism, it has appeal as a teaching or preaching device (“on the one hand…on the other hand…”). Yet, in practice, the one-sided association of power with instruction cannot be sustained? Can learning and studying, for instance, take place in the absence of power? Do institutional settings exist – inside or outside the family – where learning takes place in a power-free bubble? To adopt such a perspective, I realised, is to underwrite comparisons of education and schooling that are utopian, romantic, ahistorical and, ultimately, illegitimate. It is preferable, I suggest, to regard schooling and education as processes that combine self-fashioning and other-fashioning. They are better seen, therefore, as a continuum than as discontinuous entities.

I am still, in retirement, continuing this Friday afternoon research: and I am still steered by my etymological curiosity. One of my recent findings, for instance, relates to the word curriculum. Despite the fact that this word does not appear in the standard work, Vocabulary of Teaching and Research Between Middle Ages and Renaissance (Weijers, 1995), it appears in C. Stephen Jaeger’s The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe 950–1200 (1994, pp. 50 & 389). Perhaps it is time to compile another book of essays – On the Beginnings of Modern Schooling.

REFERENCES


Recent Writings


BERNADETTE BAKER

2. WESTERN WORLD-FORMING? ANIMAL MAGNETISM, CURRICULUM HISTORY, AND THE SOCIAL PROJECTS OF MODERNITY

The inference from your letter is, that I have suddenly become a convert to Animal Magnetism, to the whole extent claimed and practiced by Frederick Anthony Mesmer (sic), the founder of the art, and contended for by Wolfart and Kluge, and the other German and French enthusiasts, who have written in explanation and support of the system. This is an error. I am not a positive believer in the system, because I know not what to believe; and yet, I am free to confess, that I have recently beheld phenomena, under circumstances where collusion, deception, fraud, and imposture, were alike out of the question, if not impossible, which have brought me from the position of a positive skeptic to a dead pause. From the evidence of my own senses, I have been compelled if not to relinquish, at least very essentially to modify, my disbelief; and I can no longer deny, although I cannot explain, the extraordinary phenomena produced by the exertion of the mental energy of one person upon the mind of another, while in a state of what is termed magnetic slumber.

William Stone, Superintendent, New York Public Schools, 1837

Stone’s portrayal of an ambiguous zone where he knows not what to believe, confessed in his letter to Dr. Brigham after observing a subject’s response to her magnetizer, would today more likely appear in the annals of psychoanalysis or neuropathology than in curriculum history, political philosophy, or global studies. It bespeaks a counter-memory about epistemic borders between social sciences, borders which do not hold when cast backward, and at the same time reminds the reader of how important excess, liminality, ambiguity, unknowability, and/or “irrationality” have been as concepts to an educational field’s formation. In a similar vein, the irreducibility of contemporary phenomena and causality to neat boxes has been raised around less seemingly occult events and themes. Transnational educational research has convincingly shown, for example, that former theoretical constructs, such as self and nation-state, no longer remain adequate to the task of describing or understanding current issues in schools. Education’s strategies and issues spring from beyond the bounded territoriality of each specific nation-state while the advent of new and irreducible cultural sources of subjectivity especially for children and youth and urgent problems such as eco-disaster produce notions of belonging and responsibility that may include, exceed, and/or reject the symbolic work of union that flag and anthem were thought to achieve. Anglophone political
philosophy now has to take account of such already-enacted complexities but in doing so, mainstream frameworks within the discipline often remain wedded to at least two things: a default positioning of democracy as inherent reference point (and sometimes as a singular form of organization) and a macroscopic Apollonian eye that in the quest to paint the big picture tends to ignore, attenuate, or abject childrearing and child-mind as a serious site of the political, locating such phenomena as domestic, as annoying, and/or as less relevant than, say, Constitutional law, foreign policy, or the budget.

Democracy, whether and whatever it is and has been, also provides the inherent framework in most curriculum historical literature published in English, either at the level of the place being studied or the critique being mounted. For example, curriculum histories published in the US have inadvertently demonstrated how rewriting history “in a democracy” frequently seems to involve not the securing of assent, but the continuous organization of dissent. The recent exchange in *Curriculum Inquiry* regarding discontinuity and lineage captures well this tendency (Hlebowitsh, 2005a, b; Westbury, 2005; Wright, 2005). However, as an organizational template, the limitations of a conflict/consensus binary within the framework and expectation of democratic forms of governance have already been questioned by leading curriculum historians who have departed from this interpretive framework in several respects. As Barry Franklin (2006) has observed

Looking at the period after 1950 and paying attention to curriculum practice offers us a different picture of the history of the curriculum. There were clearly conflicts among reformers of the day regarding such issues as the role of school subjects in the curriculum and the degree to which the curriculum should address the personal needs of youth. But there was also a large degree of commonality among what seemed to be very different curricular orientations when those viewpoints were placed in the schools. In part, this was the result of the fact that efforts to put curriculum policies into effect in real school settings brought into play an array of mediating factors that acted to attenuate their differences.

Accompanying the automatic appeal to an often-undefined notion of democracy is the carryover of a presumed and implicit public/private distinction, which structures the “feel” of contemporary political philosophy and appears in educational policy research as well, where New Times require revisioning of the fabric and components that go into making something appear as political, fundable, or important. This chapter, located in the multidisciplinary domain of curriculum history, offers one way to (implicitly) reexamine how apparently macro and micro realms, big picture and small picture, and public/private have been less historically divorced than might be presupposed and what discursive events have contributed to the possibility of such separation. That is, the chapter is one avenue to remembering how the link between geopolitical regionalization, systems of governance, and theories of mind formation, childrearing, and perception once met on the same plane – a plane that Stone’s confusion points us toward.
Stepping aside, then, from the polarities of a conflict/consensus template and its bedfellow, a struggle/submission framework, in curriculum histories opens onto new possibilities for rethinking the past. Here, that opportunity is taken by attending to literatures that erupted around the advent of animal magnetism, mesmerism, and hypnosis, which currently constitute an understudied and often unnoticed vantage point from which to repoliticize the entification processes integral to classificatory regimes that sprang up around and exceeded such terminology. In the cases examined here, mind and unconsciousness studies were especially elevated in and as such regimes, shaping systems of governance that flowed intensely around the link and/or fluidity between notions of regions and belonging and subjectivities attributed to the young. Such regimes have bequeathed belief in discrete species, nations, disciplines, rationalities, objects, subjects, concepts, and so forth, tied them to governmental, experiential, and interpretive strategies, and helped fabricate attachment to new zones of belonging such as “Western,” “human,” “American,” etc. Such regimes may be thought of as indicative of the social projects of modernity in which a relatively planar, this-worldly surface is in the making, where cosmological visions contract primarily to human-centered relationships rooted in nationalist soil, where as such new modes and possibilities for sequencing, comparison, and normativity are unfolded, where the search for origins constitutes the basis for the organization of knowledge, and in which is embedded a logic of perpetual differentiation, integration, and dynamic renewal that colonialism both supported and inspired.

The claim here is not that belief in the discreteness of entities is inherently “bad” but rather that it is a shifting political construct worth provincializing, especially because the effects of such a disciplining presently establish subtle limits on the ethical, on what constitutes a legitimate approach to complicated and urgent contemporary problems, including what counts as the environment, as knowing, knowledge, and education, and because historically such beliefs have participated in judgment-making regarding developmentalized gradations and regionalisms that have left their mark as misguided “superiority effects” in so-called Occidental traditions. In regard to such traditions, scholars such as Foucault have already delineated the coming-into-being of a variety of classificatory regimes in terms of Renaissance, classical, and modern epistemes. Foucault (1973) argues that in a Renaissance episteme, the principle of knowing (in terms of divination) was resemblance, in the classical age following, knowledge-production (in terms of Enlightenment proto-sciences) was achieved via the separation of words from things and their arrangement in orderly tables, and in a modern episteme it was the search for historical origins that formed the basis of the organization of knowledge within separated disciplines. Aware of the circularity of bringing dividing practices to an analysis of dividing practices, Foucault posits that it is not until this can be more fully separated from that that there is such a “thing” as “knowledge” at all, including knowledge of or attributed to the this-ness of “the West.” This version of reflexivity and circularity is part of the specific ways in which classificatory regimes are achieved and mobilized in the social projects of (multiple) modernities.

So while it almost goes without saying now that from a rich and well-steeped brew of cosmologies in coexistence in the nineteenth century a relatively reduced
assortment of belief-systems came to dominate anglophone literatures now referred to as (social) sciences and claimed as Western, it also appears possible for such observations to remain complicit with the conceptual structures of entification, essentialization, and power-knowledge being contested. Across the second half of the nineteenth century especially, the alliance of scientific rationality, realism and colonialism became a potent, devastating, and perhaps irreversible one, forging synchronic and diachronic planes of comparison that brought further things to notice. For instance, belief in mind, that there was such a thing at all, soared in some locales while such a concept was not present or irrelevant in others – “mind” was and is delimited to only certain cosmologies which have developed a word for “it” and delineated a mechanics. Allied to this observation is how the marked differentiation of “human sensory portals” was not a universally stated concern nor central to systems of “knowledge-production” everywhere – the senses were rarely mentioned overtly, for instance, in Confucianist – classical, neo-, or otherwise – literature nor considered utterly foundational in order to evince maturity or morality. Just as significantly, the distantiation of subject-object as obvious entities was not a unilateral view – in versions of personalism, Shamanism, Bergsonianism to name a few, this discreteness was and is contested. If there was a broth of possibilities in terms of cosmologies in circulation in the nineteenth century, then how and why have a particularly tight set of scripted rationalities become so dominant, especially in those pursuits now referred to as social sciences and in which curriculum history is located?

The literature that flowed around animal magnetism, mesmerism, and hypnosis is an excellent window onto such questions. The aim here is not to take up such questions overtly but rather to trace ways in which animal magnetic discourse participated directly and indirectly in a not-so-neat regionalization and theorization of modernity/nationalism and public/private which involved the attempted generation of a new World-Historical System that, tautologically, emanated from provincial concerns now claimed as or attributed in essentializing ways to the Western North – a regionalization of onto-epistemology, of Being, appearance, (non)closure, and presence, of body/mind/soul, and of knowledge-fields (including religions, sciences, rationalities).

I suggest here that integral to this lustering and positivity of production, to the attempt to flatten and bring into presence a planished surface of nationalized belonging and modern classificatory systems which made appeal to the particularity of history, thereby fortifying a generic, geographied World narrative and global hierarchy, was a politics of negativity that took various forms. The affirmation that appeal to the negative sustains as a political maneuver has been well-documented in the usual “Western” audit trails – across Hellenic, Roman, Abrahamic, and contemporary social (anti)theories (Jantzen, 1995; Turner; 1998; Sells, 1994). As Coole (2000, p. 1) underscores in regard to negativity and politics, the most difficult obstacle with the term negativity is “an insistence on the part of those who use the term that it is neither a concept nor amenable to definition. To track its appearances in order to pin it down would not merely do an injustice to the negative’s many and incommensurable senses (as an essentially-contested concept); it would be an enactment of the very stabilizing, classifying logic that negativity is invoked to defy
and which its practitioner’s reject. To name it would be to destroy it, to render it positive, ideal, and thus to fail at the very moment of apparent success. In this sense negativity bears connotations of alterity, the non-rational and unrepresentable; to ask what it ‘is’ or ‘means’ is already to find oneself implicated in the questions and paradoxes it provokes.” The aura of alterity that persists suggests not just a secret and volatile life of objects and subjects but that negativity “cannot be ontologised as some veiled or marvelous Other for which no adequate conceptual schema or vocabulary (yet) exists, despite the seductiveness of the fantasy and occasional gestures in this direction by its dreamers.” While the term negativity gains its most obvious sense from its opposition to the positive, implying criticism and negation, resistance and transgression, absence and lack, and thus an opposition that is political in more than just a linguistic sense, the limits of this binary formula are quickly apparent. Negativity is not simply negation. The former “is also affirmative and (de)constructive of the positive-negative dualism. This renders negativity a more complex term…. For it has…many non-synonymous substitutes: dialectics, non-identity, difference, différance, the invisible, the semiotic, the virtual, the unconscious, will to power, the feminine,” defying yet provoking philosophical rendition and refusing subordination to aims of rational identification. Negativity, then, is not nothing (Coole, 2000, p. 2).

Until recently, however, curriculum history and educational research more generally has been treated common-sensically as a national affair, looking at “what is” rather than what has fallen away, and refused or escaped ontologization. Nationalizing movements and their accompanying compulsory schooling edicts have been weighed implicitly via the finitude and this-worldliness promoted and most elaborated within a modern episteme, and which innovations in map-making, the compass, and representations of the globe as bounded spherical space encouraged. Such narratives often point to how the solidification of nation-state structures was enforced and/or imitated in one way or another out of specific “European” settings. The spread of nationalized notions of belonging attempted a flattening of available cosmologies and subjectivities into a priori geopolitical units organized around border-maintenance and standing armies, objectivist conceptions of travel, space, and time, and functionalist mentalities. Census-taking, statistics, and populational reasoning were invented and spread as regular administrative practices to the extent that by the late 1800s having a baby became an arm of, concern of, and site of surveillance in many “state bureaucracies” (Foucault, 2000; Hacking, 1990) Such narratives also highlight how within nationalizing processes of the nineteenth century, colonialism, racialized segregation and eradication practices, populate or perish policies, eugenic platforms, and sexuality-monitoring, all of which overlapped at some level while having discourses specific to their domains at others, were part of as well as indexical of the redefinition of belonging along biopolitical lines, where the investment in Life (in fear of Death) circled around staging and purifying reproduction processes and productive capacities of “desirable” populations. Moreover, they trace how largely through imperial expansion, nation-state structures of varying kinds became across the 1800s and early 1900s, the over-arching unit of identification (whether desired or not) for organizing and forging human relationships (Anderson, 1991). The question was not
whether everyone identified as belonging to a nation, but what structures had to be engaged with to survive, to get something done, or to lodge a political complaint, to the point that “A case can even be made to the effect that the rise of modern social theory… is intimately connected to the development of the nation-state and in some ways has been helpful to it” (Day & Thompson, 2004, p. x).

It is not that such narratives are inaccurate but that at the heart of the effort to seal national units as finite totalities were always other possibilities – deterritorializations, lines of flight, see page, and various forms of negation that enabled and now give social analyses, including critical theory and/or “post” literatures, their purchase. Nation-formation, while differentially achieved in unique locations, ultimately created (and sustains) some forms of bonding while cutting off other possibilities. The structural limits and possibilities of such nationalized forms of organization, which were dependent upon the imagination and monitoring of discrete territories existing side by side, were also exposed and elaborated through discussion over other kinds of states, in this case “altered” or “exceptional states,” where potential (non)closure and leakage of subjects, objects, time, and territory were particularly of concern.

Significantly, then, an examination of animal magnetic discourse in anglophone publications undermines the sense of national and cultural particularity that at different points was promoted by and through such discourse, revealing how concepts of species specificity, national unity, racial particularity, ethnic exceptionality, gender exclusivity, fixed ability, and more, could not always convincingly account for issues of cultural belonging or sentiments of Being. Such discursively-constituted attempts at regionalization alongside which and within which various curriculum traditions crystallized in the late nineteenth century (e.g., drawing from Lockean sensationalism, Rousseauean naturalism, Herbartianist Bildung and apperception, Child-study recapitulationism, social efficiency and scientific management movements, and so forth – Baker, 2001), arguing over the order, levels, and details of designing the civilized-child-as-future-nation, met their limits in animal magnetic trials and experiments, mind and unconsciousness studies, and the investigation of psychic phenomena, indicating how notions of authentic and cohesive territoriality, whether of subject, object, time, or land were already out of joint with themselves and impossible to sustain (Leonard, 2005).

*Le magnetismé animal*, a term coined in the late 1700s and attributed now to the physician Franz Anton Mesmer, participated in, invigorated, and frustrated such processes of territorialization, sorting, and classification. Animal magnetism reappears more forcefully in anglophone literature in the 1830s, which is when William Stone enters into the debate unaware, as were many of his contemporaries, of the repetition from fifty years earlier. An attunement to animal magnetic discourse in the nineteenth century suggests the problem of entification, subsequent essentialization, interpenetration, and seepage long before it became passé to discuss globalization. After Puységur’s exploration of a reported trance state when using animal magnetic techniques for healing in southern France, further trials were conducted and reproducibility of potentials tested.

For example, if magnetized subjects became exceptionally obedient, to the point of committing a crime as instructed, what kind of new authority and flattened world could that provide to a
magnetizer’s imagination? If such subjects in a so-called “trance state” could diagnose ailments and prescribe effective cures for the sufferer brought before them, or speak languages fluently they had never apparently studied, or sustain a flame burning on their arm with no visible reaction, or describe the home of a skeptical stranger in a distant city to which they had never been, itemizing objects in their living room, the books on their desk, and the paintings on their wall, then what good were existing medicine, education, torture and standing armies, or a formal border? Would it then become important to prevent such “capacities” from flowering en masse or to mobilize them further in only select groups who saw themselves already as the top of an evolutionary tree?

These were not encoded, secret, or hidden questions of nineteenth century mind studies. They were overtly and avidly discussed. The examples in this chapter thus point to how the advent of animal magnetism, mesmerism, and hypnosis acted directly and indirectly as incitement to discourse (i.e., as site of sustenance of negativity and as motivator for the value attributed to presence-naming) in the attempted formation and (unsuccessful) totalization of onto-theo-philosophical regionalisms such as “the West” and the accompanying aggressive claim on resources and status, in ways that interpenetrated education’s ambiguous field-formation as a social science, that indexed the forging and reformulation of concepts of individual and nation, the specificity of their relation in unique locations and their leakage, and that eventually helped shape the possibility for curriculum history as a domain of expertise in the United States – a naming of country, a delimitation, and a (non)discreteness that bears all the paradoxes of the above and of what is about to be unpacked.

The chapter approaches such discourse networks through analyzing animal magnetic literatures as illustrative of the social projects of modernity. Delanty and O’Mahoney (2002) argue that such projects were constituted through four key dynamics – state-formation, democratization, capitalism, and rationalization of culture – all of which contain the logic of differentiation and integration within them and which account for the recalcitrance of nationalism as both a mobilizing and institutional force of modernity. My concern in this chapter is not with metanarratives and a priori macrosociological patterning, nor is it to trace in minute detail every trajectory referred to herein or that could be marshaled as associated with the topics raised. The chapter draws multidisciplinary sources, including archival ones, “periods,” and “locales” into a dynamic montage that deliberately obfuscates the breadth/depth binary and which the topic of animal magnetism more or less encourages, if not requires. It thus brings into view a series of neglected discourses for curriculum history from the vantage point of contemporary innovations in historiography, especially those which have challenged naïve realism. The approach is not concerned, then, with what Munslow (1997) has called conservative constructionist and reconstructionist historiography that assumes at some level the inherent objectivity of events and a one-to-one correspondence between primary document and reality, nor is it concerned with those limited forms of negativity that pay attention to differential perspectives of discussants, aiming only to trump negativity with agreement. Current critical and/or “post” approaches deploy different strategies of negativity that diverge around appeals to realism,
rationalism, and absolutist morality, with critical theory apparently more comfortable in selective appropriation of such philosophies and “post” literatures seemingly more wary of the costs at their point of inception. In “both” cases, however, something arguably “Western” still seems in play and in place whether critical “or” “post” and I suggest here that a motif of negativity (as opposed to a single concept) is one aspect of that feeling and a vestige of dominant theological thesmatics around which protracted contemporary theoretical debates often play out in repetitive and wearisome ways. A conflict/consensus polarity, and any step to the side of it are, then, part of what is here explored as an effect and ally of particular strategies for lustering and planishing a “wild profusion” of possibilities that coexisted in the disorder of things. As such, the chapter elaborates the differentiation-integration logics of modernity/nation-building, public/private and West/rest formations in terms of specific historical trajectories (including “multiple modernities”) embedded in the elevation of mind studies in particular locales, in the traveling ideals of modernity/nation-building as a cultural project, and in the institutional formations and dynamics that animal magnetic discourse accompanied and imbued. This analysis takes up the spirit of Franklin’s questioning, then, in a different temporal direction to explore how a non-continuous series of eventalizations that preceded education’s status as a discipline in university settings helped to shape the field’s domain at the turn of the twentieth century especially but not only “in” the United States, and to inhabit the “common sense” of classroom practice, the sciences of assent and dissent, and the anxieties that continuously circled around (redefinitions of) Being, appearance, (non)closure, and presence.

HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES: MAGNETIZING PIERRE CAZOT, OR, WHY HASN’T CURRICULUM HISTORY GONE THERE?

Animal magnetism, mesmerism, and hypnosis, re-emerging in anglophone literature of the mid-nineteenth-century decades and formalizing at the turn of the twentieth century, are challenging to unpack given the complexity, profundity, and breadth of onto-theo-philosophical issues to which they were and still are in many instances tied. This includes quite notably across the century, instability in discourses of vision, equivocation around the physiology of the eye, consideration of perception as something beyond the sensory, and argument over what constitutes the material, the spiritual, the mental, and the bodily. A compelling vignette drawn from an official nineteenth century investigation into animal magnetism is illustrative of such issues.

In Paris in 1831 a Report of the Experiments on Animal Magnetism was presented by a Committee of the medical section of the French Royal Academy of Sciences. Described in the Report were tests conducted on one Pierre Cazot, a twenty year old hat-maker portrayed as a family man with character of high repute, a reliable worker, born of an epileptic mother and subjected for ten years to fits which occurred five or six times a week. Cazot was admitted into a Parisian hospital at the beginning of August, 1827. While there he was subjected to what was called synonymously animal magnetism, mesmerism, or somnambulism. It appeared to induce a particular state now associated with hypnosis. Cazot’s reported ability to enunciate the exact
date, time, and severity of his next fit whilst in a somnambulic state was under question and observation. After being put into the proper condition Cazot was asked to forecast his next fit. On the twenty-fourth of August the Committee recorded Cazot’s portrayal of his next two attacks.

Nothing could awaken him [out of a somnambulic state]. We pressed him with questions. How long will your fits continue? For a year – Do you know whether they will follow close upon each other? No – Will you have any this month? I shall have one on Monday the 27th at twenty minutes from three o’clock – Will they be severe? Not half so severe as the one I had last. – Upon what other day will you have another attack? After exhibiting some symptoms of impatience, he answered: Fifteen days hence, i.e. on the 7th of September. – At what hour? At ten minutes before six in the morning. (Colquhoun, 1831/33, p. 171)

After being told by Cazot’s doctor that the first fit occurred as scheduled, the Committee dutifully gathered just before six in the morning on September 7, 1827, to see if he would have the second, reporting:

In order to witness the second fit, your committee met, at a quarter before six of the morning of the 7th of September, in the Salle St Michel of the hospital de la Charité. There we learnt that, upon the previous evening at eight o’clock, Cazot has been seized with a pain in his head which had tormented him all night; that this pain had caused the sensation of ringing of bells, and that he had experienced shooting pains in the ears. At ten minutes to six, we witnessed the epileptic fit, characterized by rigidity and contraction of the limbs, the repeated projection and jerking back of the head, the arched curvature of the body backwards, the convulsive closing of the eyelids, the retraction of the ball of the eye towards the upper part of the orbit…etc. (Colquhoun, 1831/33, p. 173)

Cazot was called upon repeatedly for nearly a year to project and fulfill such prophecies, even after describing what could be done to prevent his next attack. The Committee concluded that upon coming out of somnambulism Cazot had no memory of the dates he named or his actual fits either.8 As proof, they tried to trick him by telling his doctor a wrong date. They wanted to see whether anyone was cheating by informing Cazot in advance when to turn on such massive convulsions for all and sundry to gather around and describe. Whether theorized today as suggestibility, imagination, intuition, precognition, or self-fulfilling prophesy the Committee reported that Cazot always had his fits right on time – except for one.

After being kicked by a horse the following May Cazot fell, hitting his head on the wheel of the wagon and dying from the blow. His prediction of his largest fit ever in the upcoming August could subsequently not be verified. In the final report the Committee theorized how he could miss foreseeing his death but not his fits.

On the basis of this and other experiments, the Report subtly contested two earlier investigations from 1784, which had dismissed animal magnetism as a charlatan
practice. Animal magnetism was a theory of a universal fluid that linked all planetary, solar, animate, and inanimate things. Popularized via Mesmer in the 1780s it provided a monistic depiction and correction of health problems: one fluid, one disease, one cure. Under this etiology of the universe, the healer, rather than a mineral magnet, mobilized and concentrated existing fluid (conceptualized roughly as energy rather than as wet) to get rid of whatever was blocking the fluid’s travel through an object or subject, thereby restoring harmony. In the case of humans, blockages were to be removed through making passes, movements of the hands over or on the body of a reclining patient. The reports of the 1780s put the controversial matter to rest or so it seemed, stating outright that a universal fluid did not exist. These early official investigations, headed in one case by Benjamin Franklin, did note that inexplicable effects were being produced in patients undergoing the mesmeric passes.

In cautious and seemingly embarrassed tones the new Report submitted in 1831 in Paris documents more diverse phenomena than simply Cazot’s performance and plight, which the Committee state they cannot and choose not to explain and which they recommend for further investigation to the Royal Academy. They overtly refuse to enter in upon the question of whether there really is a universal fluid and repeatedly remind the Academy of their initial mistrust and skepticism around such practices, reminding them also of their high moral standing, their experience with clinical procedures, and their very genuine concern for integrity at every stage.

In the early 1830s the report was translated into English relaunching animal magnetism onto the field of popular culture and scholarly debate, the distinction still somewhat latent, sixty years after it had first fascinated continental Europeans and Scandinavians. William Stone’s entry into debate over conditions of truth-production, coming from the point of view of a devout Protestant and school leader, was but one index of this re-entry, of how specific discursive domains evoked different truth issues at particular times, how authorities wanted some things and not others interrogated with respect to truth, and how this established what it was possible to criticize, defend, or leave alone in a given moment – and whether that moment would return. In anglophone publications of the 1830s, -40s and -50s in Canada, the UK, and the United States mesmeric practices would come to notice, being wound into and out of existing belief systems in ways that held enormous implication for spirit/matter debates, the formation of scientific fields, and conditions of truth-production.

In the emergence of educational sciences, such circulations of discourse eventually helped reorient the already-existing racialized, sexualized, and ableized conceptions of human life. For instance, “special and delinquent children” were reinscribed in a shift from a moral structuralism framed by appeals to pauperism and poverty to a neurophysiological functionalism framed by appeals to genetico-national morbidity and problems of consciousness, volition, and suggestibility. In the process, the child genius is launched out of the tree of insanity and into an oppositional position in the field. Amid the shift, compulsory public school attendance is enforced only for some youth, while academic fields work out their respective and messy domains of obligation, roughly psychology to habit and belief;
medicine to diagnosis and correction; education to imitation and emulation; and parapsychology to “extra”ordinary phenomena and psychic energy.

In the US, practices of phrenomesmerism constitute a crossover point in these shifting inscriptions, a mid-century moment in which God-based initiatives, scientific methods, and anti-religious spiritualisms were not so distinct and where demarcations between this-worldly and other-worldly and spirit and flesh were up for grabs. The pivotal role of animal magnetic debates in inciting such crises of authority have been attended to in histories of anthropology (Stocking, 1986; Wallace, 1983), law (Laurence & Perry, 1988); literary criticism (Mills, 2006; Richardson, 2001); medicine (Pattie, 1994; Thornton, 1976), parapsychology (Beloff, 1987; Dingwall, 1967), philosophy (Darnton, 1968), psychiatry (Ellenberger, 1970), psychology and psychotherapy (Chertok & Stengers, 1992; Gauld, 1992; Hale, 1971; Tinterow, 1970), science studies (Waterfield, 2003; Winter, 1998), sociology (Gilman, 1993), and theology (Fuller, 1982), but significantly, not in anglophone histories of education or in curriculum history. The contribution of this vantage point to new curriculum history takes shape, then, in how it elaborates the parameters and intertwining of apparently disparate academic and institutional events in ways that re-member the effects of such discourses for curriculum history, that is, in ways that link the very possibility of a wider educational field called curriculum studies, in part, to the many attempts to write monistic explanatory scripts over and against perceptions of unruly multiplicity, excess, or fluidity.

**IDEALS OF THE CULTURAL PROJECT: AUTHENTICITIES, COMPLICITIES, AND THE REPEITIVENESS OF EURO-AMERICAN NARRATIVE AXES**

The sections to follow are not focused on already-available explanations of educational systems that elevate phallologocentric politico-economic forces such as capitalism or industrialization as master causes, nor are they concerned to over-dramatize the role of certain groups or figures or assume that a neatly-rendered colonizer/colonized binary, even when modified into appeals to ambiguity or liminality, will somehow explain everything. They lay out instead how debates over animal magnetism, mesmerism, and hypnosis interpenetrated the formulation of ideas-practices that circulated within the separation and conflation of educational discourses which were in the process of nationalizing and which were tied to imperial processes, and how these ideas-practices traveled in ways that exceed theses of unidirectional or singular causality. Not unidirectional or singular does not imply, however, smooth and even. The messy beginnings of such ideas-practices in the United States were attributed by scholars at the time most repetitively to literature published on the continent of Europe which seems to encourage or incite a repetition of Euro-American narrative axes. This literature, however, sometimes turned for its citational lineage to “ancient Egyptian” sources, “Hindoo” sacred texts, “Buddha,” “medieval mysticism,” or different aspects of what are now called “the Abrahamic traditions.” Rather than seeing this as “Europe first, then elsewhere” mentality of which Chakrabarty (2000) warns it was rather a kind of Orientalism which projected and raided “the East,” fabricating and positioning Orient in particular as both higher and lower than a fabricated West (Said, 1979) – a “nervous”
awareness if not paranoia that Others in other locations might have figured such “discovery of the unconscious” things out earlier and been using and directing those “capacities” all along.

What is also noticeable in regard to documentary trails is not simply how West or now North was produced through such anxieties but how national imaginaries within Europe and the United States were built off of selective comparison across the apparently closed referential circuits of the Atlantic. In parts of Europe relative to the US the significant difference in “populational problems” implicitly and explicitly shaped the Absolutist urges and Apollonian eye of such discursive locales in unique ways. Once world becomes World, what Jurgen Schriewer (2005) refers to as “the world’s major civilizations” becoming aware of each other for the first time, it is relatively easy to note that not every group decided to formally invade others. That urge is enacted in more systematic ways among particular sectors of nationalized elites, especially in the nineteenth century, and within nationalized settings this urge was itself subjected to enormous dispute – anti-imperialist movements and associations arose, sometimes while ignoring the brutal continuation of various forms of vassalage “at home.”

For instance, nation-building in the United States was forced to confront a “diversity” that dominant scholarship out of England, continental Europe, and Scandinavia seemed to remain in either fear or denial of – Indigenous, African, Asian, and Latina peoples already present on the North American continent were novelties in much scholarship out of Europe across the nineteenth century, especially the former two “groups” who were marshaled quite differently to “the noble savage” discourse in service to superiority effects elsewhere. This is precisely because such “presence” was considered abroad in the so-called New World where exoticism, darkness, and distance could combine to titillate or fascinate, rather than being considered “a problem” on the doorstep or already in the house. The literatures formed out of Belgian, Dutch, English, French, German, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Swedish, empire-building, for instance, were thus focused in terms of “domestic” or “internal” populations more overtly on class-, linguistic- and religious-based distinctions to draw their pictures of “local” savages, requiring the active textual labor, yet relative suppression, of the extent to which racialization, sexualization, and ableization sustained the very idea of who or what counted as home, as an expert or an elite, and as ideally reproducible. In addition to showing that nationality becomes ambiguous at the moment that it is inscribed as a finite totality, such literatures also demonstrated that they were not dedicated to overcoming or eliminating inconsistencies and contradictions that permeated their conceptual structures.

In the literature published in the United States, other theoretical procedures were deployed in welfare policy and nation-building and different versions of classificatory regimes were admitted, encoded, and/or suppressed, including the forced removals, colony-formations, reservation systems, different kinds of slavery and bonded labor, and “voluntary” immigration that had already structured settlement patterns. In addition, the impossibility of solving religious conflict instantiated in the first official doctrine of Church/State separation, the overt constitutional debarring of monarchy, and the acknowledgement and problematization of hundreds of languages,
“Indigenous” and “otherwise,” already present in the nationalized frame by the 1800s provided different bases for organization and foci for what administration could mean. Such “New World” circumstances seemed to inspire among a publishing elite by the mid-1800s a turn toward the apparent homogeneousness of nation-state populations within parts of Europe as an ideal. Specific locales became a site of longing and a resource, a locus of wishful imitation that especially elevated texts out of proto-Germany, France, Switzerland, and England and which inscribed “America” as budding but not quite there yet. The seemingly more overt populational fracturation in the “New World” meant that the unity that was a supposed requirement for nation-building was never present in the founding of the United States, and the matter was overtly discussed as such, named not as American exceptionalism but as a new experiment.

Other efforts toward and other sources for unification were sought, and it is here that post-Civil War, the turn to unification in method, rather than “content” (e.g., pragmatism), and in psychology rather than in “culture” was secured as ways to standardize institutions in which not everyone participated, agreed upon, or got along within. New strategies of confinement replaced old and the racialization of mind especially took on new biologized forms. Not as counterpoint but as accompaniment, in policy and emergent scientific literature, “the individual” became the unit, the vehicle and effect, of dominant notions of Americanness and the nation became composed of individuals precisely because “groups” in existing settlement patterns had relatively little in common and were formed out of unique histories. A unity sought and never found had to be continuously worked on and out across cultural particularities, historical insults and injuries, and cosmologies whose canyon-esque gaps were too profound to reconcile.

This created quite a different field of reception for animal magnetic discourse and the purposes to which it was turned. Animal magnetic discourse was marshaled variously to abolitionist arguments, feminist movements, claims to natural science and natural laws, as well as to Protestant revivalisms that distanced any version of science. This “local” differentiation and debate did not, however, necessarily broaden the citational patterns in “international” terms, a scholarly pattern still evident today. While animal magnetism, mesmerism, and hypnosis were discussed openly especially in Brazil, Haiti, and India, for example, and while entry to the west coast of the US from Asia and the Pacific islands and across the shifting southern border from Mexico exceeded that through the east coast before the twentieth century’s turn, it was predictably not to Asian, Central and South American, African, or Pacific-based published sources that journalistic commentators, animal magnetic enthusiasts, and professors in the US turned. This raises always a series of related questions, of where an event begins or ends, whether it matters, who is attributed ownership and why propertied conceptions matter and to whom, how “far back” one should go in documentary searches (and the problem/reduction of history to written records conceptualized in linear time), what the available webs and strategies of “knowledge-production,” colonization, and dominance of publishing houses made (im)possible, how World was produced, developmentalized, and graded from within the provincialism of Western/Northern discourses?, etc.
The interesting intervention that the coining of animal magnetism, mesmerism, and hypnosis injected into the certitude and self-righteousness of nineteenth- and twentieth-century anglophone fantasies and social criticism was, however, that the very availability of discrete entities – of regions, positions, places, religions, sciences, species, beings, and so forth, upon which to peg acclaim or blame were put at stake. Made use of were “subjects,” in marginalized social positions, such as the young woman who had to be cajoled to be magnetized once more, this time for William Stone and others to observe her, enslaved persons who were not given a choice, people with epilepsy (Cazot as an example) or other “chronic” issues seeking relief, and “delinquent children.” Sometimes such subjects turned the table, out-performing the so-called competent observers in their “magnetic slumber” and forcing recognition of deeply held prejudices. The “impurity” of what seemed to happen in such “states” as hypnosis was not and has never been fully or successfully confronted. The apparent discovery of the unconscious in the late 1700s and the setting of limits and literal naming of the West, which takes place in the late 1800s, became contemporaneous events, fabricating onto-theo-philosophical regionalisms that would be drawn upon in “local” strategies of governance, such as teacher education and curriculum planning, as well as in empire-building, in asserting the “primitivity” of cosmologies that did not elevate scientific rationality nor find “altered states” problematic or frightening.

As such, one can operate from the assumption that how major concepts and categories of education achieved their ontological status and status as ontological cannot be derived from the presumption of inherent meaning or a neat order of things. While the strategies evident in imperialisms out of parts of Europe and those that were forming in the United States differed, what was revealed even in such “closed,” self-referential, and comparative trans-Atlantic citational circuits was how concepts, such as individual and nation, and in what format they could be thought of as related, were up for grabs and differently responded to in specific texts. It suggests further how notions of bordered nationality, of territorial rootedness, of ethnic singularity inevitably led to conceptual aporia (Leonard, 2005). The sections below trace, then, how central ideas-practices such as mind, intelligence, and Will were discernibly structured and endowed with a finite range of possibilities, enabling assimilations of mesmerism to contribute to the “logics” of classification and categories of education and to a series of superiority effects ultimately tied to the attempted fabrication of a planar World-Historical System and the assertion of a global hierarchy.

INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS: MIND STUDIES AND THE EXPERIENCE OF CONFINEMENT

The intersecting yet disjunctive trajectories of various forms of imperialism such as English, French, German, US, etc, in which the apparent discovery of the unconscious plays a part cannot in this space be unpacked separately. It is prudent to note, however, that in anglophone scholarship debates over animal magnetism, mesmerism, and hypnosis did not simply appear as a brief and bizarre moment in the history of psychoanalytics and individualized therapeutics. Psychoanalytics,
including of course Freud’s claim to be its inventor, fed surreptitiously on “colonial encounters” and anthropological reports that “projected” and binarized the qualities of so-called primitive and civilized populations. In the US, psychoanalytics had a much more difficult time taking hold in professional circles because such discourses were redirected or swamped by already existing practices in psychopathology and its closer link to medicine. The research and reports from mind and unconsciousness studies seeped more broadly, however, into normative concepts such as mental measurement and key institutions, such as schools, asylums, centers for juvenile delinquents, and hospitals. Theorization of animal magnetism and its analogues exceeded the confines of any one emergent discipline, formal institution, or geopolitical locale, then, inciting the eruption of “meaning systems” that were necessary to, and in turn transformed by, mass compulsory education, nervous nationalisms, and imperialist endeavors.

Like animal magnetic discourse, much of the history of education and curriculum history in the United States dwells implicitly or explicitly on the centrality of mind – it is the mind of a child that pedagogy is ultimately to be concerned with and that curriculum reforms try to affect as endpoint of the educational process. Even so, in education more generally and curriculum history specifically relatively little attention has been given to mind studies outside of IQ movements. It is by now mundane and yet still crucial to point out that inscriptions of mind have varied in canonized literature that presumes the existence of such a thing. As a case in point, recent analyses in the New Disability History have (re)challenged the prerogative of sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell as the presumed portals to the formation of “mental” concepts and complex linguistic expression (Davis, 1997; Longmore & Umansky, 2001; Wrigley, 1996). Sensory-based mind theory was nothing short of rampant in late-nineteenth century psychologies. Popularized by dominant figures such as G. Stanley Hall, John Dewey, William James, and Edward Thorndike, each with their own version of the specific role of the senses, the general view that ideas are formed through interaction with an object was almost unopposable. Such beliefs were popularized via a Lockean sensationalism in which an exterior object or event was thought to have powers that were then transmitted to the Mind (capital “M” in Locke and with no specific organic location) through interaction. An idea, the object’s replacement or copy in the Mind, is thus stored. The Mind, inscribed as being in natural condition to compare like and unlike ideas, builds up a repertoire that will be ready for the unfolding faculty of reason that appears with maturation (a moral faculty) (Locke, 1689/1975). Despite the controversy at its point of publication in the 1690s, which forced Locke to secretly depart England, his major thesis, distilled and secularized, rests comfortably at the base of nearly every enthusiastic upholding of “hands on” learning, appeal to “the material” or “concrete,” and privileging of realism and practice in educational fields even today. William Stone’s appeal in the 1830s to “the evidence of my own senses” as the last resort for proving that what had taken place had taken place, without a theory to explain why or how it was possible, was indicative of the place that had already been taken by sensationalism – and of its limits. Sensationalist epistemology dominated theories of learning as the explanation for how “the contents of the mind” get “in” there and had already taken hold in competing theories of child...
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development by the 1890s. This elevation could be considered, however, not simply the effect of internal debates among scholars, not just an uptake of Comtean positivism that shaped university-based social sciences in the United States, but also partly the effect of the experience of confinement and the related “diversity problem” that made American nation-building and imperialism a seemingly more complicated task – a task which incited search for a strategy of unification (“mind” or “psychology”) that transcended localized, historical, and decentralized “differences” and that would potentially streamline governance.  

SHIFTING THE SCALE

The focus on public schools and on a structuralist-functionalist orientation to the mind-knowledge couplet in US-based curriculum histories is not a universal feature of a burgeoning transnational curriculum studies field. Nation-building in other locales and curriculum discourse in other traditions did not necessarily begin the engineering of the child with, first, assumptions based on phenotype, then assumptions based on interiority thought related to phenotype, and then institutional allocations in the name of a purified Republican whiteness. Having said that, such patterns of objectification were not restricted to bordered nationality, as though invented simply and only in the US. The presumed links forged between surface and depth seemed more repetitively mobilized and applied in nationalized locales most focused on administration in the colonies and the quelling of dissent between home populations. By the late 1800s, American involvement/invasion in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines had already occurred, with the concept of Manifest Destiny undergirding foreign policy and having reverberation in domestic arrangements. This becomes especially evident in regard to racialization of education and the uneven ways in which the provision of public schooling and compulsory attendance played out, at the same time that such schools were being established in the Philippines as a newly-won colony from Spain.

In addition to the interplay of a national/transnational events, an examination of animal magnetic discourse encourages a shift in scale in curriculum historical research in diachronic terms, too. Shifting the scale means that “attention can be given to the configuration of objects that are otherwise highly dispersed in order to understand patterns that confer the appearance of unity on disparate events and practices, and that define the boundaries and content of discourse” (Richardson, 1994, p. 669). The turn of the nineteenth century is rarely visited in US-based curriculum history, yet its significance must be attended to if the purchase of discourses such as Darwinism, Social Darwinism, and mind and unconsciousness studies are to be understood in curriculum historical work and their ability to confer the appearance of unity on disparate events especially through logoi of sequencing, comparison, and normativity is to be accounted for.

Theo-philosophical speculation over rewriting divine-human-animal-plant relations preceded Darwin’s *Origins of the Species*, emerging in treatises on brain-based “materialism,” in anti-dualist Romantic psychologies, and in searches for literary genius. The early sciences of mind, including sensationalist and associationist psychology of the late 1700s and new brain-based physiological psychologies of
the early 1800s, drew simultaneously from commentaries of “traveler’s reports” and proto-anthropological depictions of phenotype “in the tropics,” as well as phenomenologies of alcohol, drug-taking, and head injury. Alan Richardson has noted that “Neurological research and speculation was carried out in the context of a distinctively international scientific culture, one that seeped readily into the philosophical and literary discourses of the age. Not only national borders, but the equally conventional boundaries between the sciences and the humanities, between legitimate and ‘pseudo’ science, and between intellectual and popular culture all need to be bracketed in order to develop a feeling for the intellectual climate of the Romantic era” (Richardson, 2001, p. 7).

Efforts to reduce mind and/or soul to the brain and nerves, counter-efforts to preserve soul’s immateriality, efforts to inscribe “disability” as a problem of skewed or damaged Will, efforts to locate delay and savagery in and as child mind and thereby authorize publicly funded education, and significantly, efforts to argue that vision was a product of physiology, not of revelation, were repetitively referenced in this climate. This last theoretical turn was prepared for in early neurophysiological research especially, such as in Charles Bell, Erasmus Darwin, Pierre-Jean-George Cabanis, and Johann Gaspar Spurzheim where vision was weighed as to whether it was reducible to viewing, whether viewing was reducible to the eyes, and where the eye was rendered an unstable, unreliable, shifting, ephemeral, and problematic portal, susceptible to ruses such as magic tricks, illusion devices, and hypnosis stage shows, destabilizing trust in what the eye saw and inciting new efforts to objectify perception. In neuroscientific speculation and theories of mind, it seems that no less than the existence of the soul, the necessity of God, and the integrity of the self were in question (Richardson, 2001, p. 12).

The metaphors of medieval Christian “mysticism” especially, of lightness/darkness, interiority, height/depth, and privacy or idiosyncracy of the “spiritual experience” were rearranged via sensationalist and empirical discourses that turned the visible/invisible problematic into something subject to public agreement, embedding verification within the object’s solidity and distancing the unreliability of the subject’s visual portal. The subject/environment scission upon which the philosophy of consciousness and idealist phenomenology were predicated enabled this rearrangement and in some cases reversal of medieval rhetorical devices. Medieval accounts of spirituality particularly within Christian traditions elevated the darkness of the void arrived at in spiritual practices after travels through and toward the light (Turner, 1998). Across nineteenth century debates, darkness becomes more regularly a strategy of negativity – a depth that must be explored, known, and even feared, not simply experienced, and post-Enlightenment it is the shining of the light of reason and consciousness into the murky depths of the dark unconscious that literally permits awareness – a reversal of the medieval elevation. The racialized connotations are obvious but the different ways in which the unconscious was theorized to be “in service” to the “light,” positivity, presence, and naming of solidified objects are not. The validity attributed the exterior object and the non-universality and inconsistency attributed to the subject’s perception and interiority provided a springboard for, on the one hand, the separation of “science” from “mysticism” and public from private, and on the other, the marriage of traditions
today often considered distinct. Love of discrete objects as discrete and of empiricism as a condition of proof was embedded in phenomenological accounts in mind and unconsciousness studies, especially those narrating conversion, drug, or healing experiences. The courtship which inspired a hermeneutics of continuous object-subject interplay, becomes evident (and contested) in different ways in Bildung novels and related pedagogical strategies, such as in the early nineteenth century Herbart (e.g., The Science of Education), as well as in mid-century mental healing and New Thought movements, which had to externalize verification processes in order to prove the cure, while encouraging the idiosyncratic conversion or redemption experiences of the sufferer.

Such early- to mid-nineteenth-century pursuits were accompanied by happenings beyond anatomical dissection, self-reported drug-taking trials, book, journal, and newspaper publication, or the staging of public lectures and demonstrations. In particular they were accompanied by the spread of formal institution-building. In the US, institutionalization draws firstly upon pre-existing segregation by reservation, slavery, and religion in invasion, settlement, and township patterns, and then intensifies again in the 1820s in the east and southeast with what David Rothman (2002) calls the “discovery of the asylum,” which extends to both rural communities and major cities by the 1850s, and which was a discovery based on models from parts of continental Europe and England. Rothman notes that prior to the 1820s people experiencing what today would be called intellectual disabilities came to notice as poverty-stricken not as “disabled,” and were cared for within the family and kinship structures of the town. With the advent of asylums, a new family structure and social practice had begun.

The availability of new kinds of confinement accompanied multiple efforts to reconceptualize mind from the mid-century period onwards. Mind became another kind of entity – a general shift from the spirit to the flesh, from the religious to the biological – interpenetrating decisions about who could be sent to which institutions, under what new rationales, and often in racially segregated settings. The urge to differentiate and its attendant status anxiety was not new but the manner of articulating boundaries between “entities” was, including the prevalence of a pre-Darwinian species-based reasoning, and the proliferation of terminology today associated especially with race, sex, and ability, which shifted the older aristocratic and landed gentry meanings of class and inheritance into more theo-biological, preformationist, and predestined ones.

To this end, the mid-century period is also pivotal to revisit in curriculum historical work for reasons beyond yet related to the Civil War and the reconstruction of “America.” It lay in the aftermath of the Great Awakening and various revivalist events, some of which overlapped with the phrenology, phrenomesmerism and electrobiology that preceded the formation of psychology and education as academic fields within the university. It is important to register, too, the availability of new terminology that travels rapidly in these decades. The terms normal, scientist, and hypnosis all enter English language dictionaries in the 1840s and 50s, carrying with them a slough of new and contested techniques for describing humans who often depicted themselves as in bounded networks of relations amid contagious influences.
The pollutant and contagion metaphors were indexical of a new kind of biopolitics that intensifies in the second half of the nineteenth century but is prepared for much earlier. John Richardson (1999) has demonstrated how in all but ten states a particular pattern of segregated institutional formalization is encountered from the 1820s on, predicated on the availability of the asylum. First, custodial asylums for insanity are built, then custodial asylums often called Schools for the Blind and Schools for the Deaf, then centers for juvenile delinquency and reform schools are founded, and then public school attendance is legally enforced. In 1852, Massachusetts is the first state to convert truancy from a moral into a legal problem and make attendance at a day school compulsory. Other states eventually follow, often for their own local reasons, so that by 1918 all existing states had legislated compulsory elementary school attendance, some of them largely in order to achieve the status of statehood (Richardson, 1993; Tyack, 1976).

New educational identities were not only produced and continually adjusted in the formation of institutions with specialized inhabitants, then, but in law. Such links in processes of purification (the external and internal) become evident not just in the passing but the in content of compulsory attendance legislation. Compulsory attendance legislation had several central features across US states by 1918. As Richardson (1994, p. 695) notes, formalization of common schooling was “a new discourse about education, refining the language of who was a pupil and what constituted a school. While having separate boundary distinctions and properties internal to their own arenas, the institutions stood in relation to each other in ways that defined both rules of access to the public school and the rules of passage through other institutions for delinquent and exceptional youth.” Such laws had three common features:

– all drew on mutual responsibilities of parents and schools, defining the in loco parentis authority of schools;
– all specified physical and mental disabilities as conditions that exempted or excused children from attendance, and;
– all confirmed the authority to expel children from attendance whose behavioral conduct threatened the function of schools. (Richardson, 1994, p. 698)

Richardson (1999) argues that if formalization is viewed as a new discourse, the impact of compulsory attendance becomes visible outside the public school as well, for such laws had as much to do with specifying the conditions for exclusion and exemption as with compelling attendance. The “internal” conditions of possibility for the formation of an educational field, for the localization/reduction of curriculum history primarily to public school policies, textbooks, teaching methods, and child mind thus take on different shades of meaning when a shift in scale and research strategy reorients how education came to be seen primarily as compulsory education that only some could attend and that others did not want to.

The individual-nation couplet has to be understood here, then, as always-already in the plural – there was not simply just one nation being built from within the research activities and institutional processes of American nationalization, while the concept of the individual was formed out of an intersubjectivity that was
the precondition for subjectivity. Both Darwinian evolutionary sequencing and the pollutant and contagion metaphors helped establish what could be seen as new grounds for the “intersubjective,” as well as for status anxiety and populational governance. The urgency of the psychologization of Being and redefinition of the individual as though a discrete, singular, and coherent self facilitated an induction into technologies of responsibilization learned through institutional life – conformity to belief in the meaningfulness of the phenotype-mind compound, the standardization of that compound, and individuation went hand in hand.

As such, the “common” in common schooling becomes rewritten across the nineteenth century. William L. Stone’s role as Superintendent of New York public schools in the 1830s could not have been taken up without his being a devout Protestant, and this was not, well, uncommon – common schooling on the east coast was initially devoted to and rationalized in terms of religious induction into specific Protestant sects. By the turn of the twentieth century common schooling is not simply synonymous with the term public schooling or Protestantism. Common schooling is a trinary system where racially-segregated institutions for the “special” and “delinquent” preceded, and were required for, the legislation of compulsory attendance at public day schools. Without such institutions legislative efforts would have had nothing upon which to peg their hats for where would children who simply refused to attend be put, by whom, and under what claim?

Out of the experience of confinement, then, a special kind of synergy between processes of differentiation emerged, indebted to how perceptions of phenotype, behavior and appearance had become reliant on provincial norms that gave presence to the subject as a discrete object of investigation, a subject whose boundedness and coherence hinged on the link forged between surface and depth, face and mind – a neuro-logics of skin and brain that flattened ontologies only to create new topographies around normative assessments of the human. The earlier patterns of institutionalization (reservations, slave “plantations,” asylums, Schools for Deaf and Blind, reform schools, etc) “purified” who would be compelled to attend a public day school (such as many Native Americans), who would be debarred and/or forced to pay taxes twice to attend (many African Americans) and who would never pass through a school’s door (many children labeled as having some kind of disability).

Once so established and delimited further forms of entification could be pursued or arise, such as special education, focusing on those who Lewis Terman called “high grade defectives,” practiced not in hospices or hospitals but in training schools, reform schools, and separate classrooms that such “defectives” could make it to. Thus, new links and possibilities for governance were forged amid the synergy of forms of confinement both “external” and “internal” to schooling’s forced project, joining and modifying an array of tutelary complexes – and this is not a paradox – into a coordinated, sequenced system of segregated common schooling that simultaneously mimicked and fabricated a new and not-so-new speciesist ontologization of Being.
The effects of the experience of confinement internal and external to common schooling surveyed above do not, however, in or of themselves speak to the black hole that usually accompanies their theorization. That is, why would Stone’s confession be taken by some observers as a sign of his own mental weakness, loss of authority, or gullibility and why would it matter whether the young woman he observed could “really” do the things he described? Why does it matter whether “things” are seen as discrete, whether subject and object are distinct, how “things” are grouped, including people, whether borders leak, what is seen as alike or unalike, or what ways of knowing are deployed? I suggest that the answers do not lie within a study of animal magnetic discourse but that such literatures screamed such questions over and over, inciting a “hysteria” around interpretation and generating such varied and heartfelt responses that it is difficult to unpack late nineteenth century curriculum reforms without attending to them.

When animal magnetism was reignited in the United States in the 1830s the avenues of re-entry were not reducible to a single “class” of interested enthusiasts, but much more diffused in ways that bear out Alan Richardson’s insights about the difficulty of distinguishing popular and high culture at the time. Through characters such as Charles Poyen (1837), the self-proclaimed Professor of Animal Magnetism, through high-status officials such as William Stone, and through controversial phrenologists such as Robert Collyer (1843), self-proclaimed Professor of Mesmerism and Psychography the term came back into newspapers and everyday vocabulary, novels, and journal articles. While, as noted above, mesmeric-based theories of human nature interpenetrated feminist and abolitionist movements this did not necessarily mean liberal, radical, or counter-cultural movements. As Poyen (1837) explained, animal magnetic trials were responsible for conversion-like experiences. After traveling from France, Poyen describes what he observed on his family’s sugar plantation in the Caribbean, where “slaves” could be magnetized just as well as “whites.” The idea of organic equality in regard to mind occurred to him through this process, shifting his position on slavery. If this was considered a monumental insight at the time, then it exposes the depth of what was already in place and the degree to which such scales of Being, linking phenotype and interiority, were both transnational in terms of circulation and locally modified in terms of specific biopolitics. In the United States animal magnetic literature in the mid-century decades also had a distinctly Protestant, overtly discussed anti-Catholic orientation, underpinning the religious devotions of renowned reformers such as Phineas Quimby, Andrew Jackson Davis, and Mary Baker Eddy (Fuller, 1982).

Mid-century, the site of fascination was not just the skull that phrenologists loved to squeeze, but also the epigastric region and the extremities of fingers and toes. Debates emerged over whether the hypnotized subject’s self was “inside” or “out,” discrete from the magnetizer or not, and interpenetrated by a universal fluid that was extra-planetary or not. Reports from the continent, such as the physician’s Petétin’s conversion narrative, were translated and included in public lectures,
informing experiments and trials in the US, which were conducted in the home, sometimes at a university or hospital, and sometimes in a public hall.

M. Petetin, an eminent physician, and honorary and Perpetual President of the Medical Society of Lyons, made a variety of experiments, with a view to verify the fact of the transference of the faculties to the epigastric region. These experiments arose from an accident. He had a cataleptic patient, who appeared to be, for a very long time, in a state of absolute insensibility. No stimulant had any effect upon her; her eyes and ears had entirely lost the power of receiving sensations. M. Petetin, however, was greatly astonished by the accidental discovery, that she heard him perfectly when he spoke upon her stomach. Having satisfied himself of this fact by repeated trials, he afterwards perceived that the case was the same in regard to the senses of sight and smell. (Colquhoun, 1831/1833, p. 211)

Debates over the conditions of proof and validity of such reports also circled around local animal magnetic trials on the east coast, the forerunners of contemporary hypnosis stage shows. Demonstrations in New England, especially in Providence, were reported in local newspapers, including cases where hypnotized subjects were described as sitting still while feats such as having guns fired next to their ear were performed.¹⁴ In the early decades of the 1800s such pursuits were taken sometimes by critics as forms of radical atheism, social revolution, and/or anti-establishment politics. In the mid-century decades such consternation and equivocation around what to believe in regard to such performances lingered but on somewhat different grounds, especially as such events appeared to impact religious commitments in oppositional directions, with some attendees claiming they had found God again because of the marvel of such demonstrations, while others saying they finally became convinced of natural laws that operated independently of belief in a Creator as demonstrated simply through the magnetizer’s hands (Fuller, 1982). There was also the confusion that participants such as William Stone, who was not only Superintendent of New York public schools but also editor of a popular New York-based newspaper, found themselves amidst. Stone eventually published a pamphlet about his observations, defending the fine line he tread. After strident criticism and ridicule of his pamphlet, he subsequently collected case studies from around the country, including instances of how children in the classroom were magnetizing each other for fun. Animal magnetic trials became so controversial that the city of Boston held an investigation into the plausibility of the practice in the 1830s, with the representatives deciding that while they could not confirm or deny the existence of a universal fluid, they could say that something unique was happening to magnetized subjects (Fuller, 1982).

The possibility of permanently confined populations in asylums post-Civil War changed the location and theorization of mesmeric-based studies, however. Without prior confined populations and the stabilized observational grid thought necessary for comparison, experimental studies of children described as backward, vicious, or degenerate and women described as hysterical – the two main targets of psychotherapeutic research – were less convenient. The restricted location
and repetition in “clinical” and “laboratory” studies, which continuously claimed experimental status, distinguished these activities from stage show hypnotism, Christian science, and non-traditional spiritualism and mediumship. Experimental studies in late-nineteenth century continental Europe, such as in Janet and Charcot’s Salpêtrière school in which Binet trained and worked and Freud visited, and its opponent, Bernheim’s Nancy school, and in the US, such as at the Vineland Institute in New Jersey, foregrounded animal magnetism as a key research tool to ascertain how mind worked, particularly in relation to mechanisms now described as unconscious.

The methods developed through laboratory mesmerism assumed mind’s location as always on the inside, as restricted to the head, in most theories, the brain only, and as operating via procedures which were only able to be ascertained under controlled conditions. The term unconscious, coming into novels and brain-based research at the turn of the 1800s took on new meaning by 1900 on the basis of such studies. Under the influence of Janet, Charcot, and Freud especially, unconscious meant not just a lack of awareness, but a repository site – in some accounts a hot, steamy, if not tropical, repressed, sex-laden, and chaotic zone and in others a ruthlessly efficient, automated, cold machine that took care of business so that the conscious mind would not have to (Richardson, 2001). The unconscious as depicted in the first dynamic psychiatry especially, started to resemble colonial and anthropological descriptions of “natives,” “barbarians,” “ primitives,” and also “noble savages” whose darkness, distance, exoticism, servility and/or mysteriousness began to metaphorically occupy recesses of the “white” mind.

Three levels of altered states were often depicted on the basis of studies of confined women who were classified as hysterical and children as degenerate. Similar phenomena were repeatedly reported and debated, converting Stone’s 1830s-style shock into a kind of passé pre-scientism. The naming of levels and states was thought to contain the unruliness of the outcomes, caveats were often placed around the dangers of templating: there may be more than three states; the three states may be mixed in form and displayed suddenly, originally, and separately; they may or may not be produced in succession within a subject and; the order may differ.

- The cataleptic state – motionless unless otherwise instructed; eyes open; fixed gaze as if fascinated; complete insensibility to pain; limbs light when raised by someone else and stay there; retains muscular and sensory activity; tendon reflex disappears; does respond to suggestion and hallucinations.
- The lethargic state – achieved by closing eyelids or putting subject in dark place after (1) above, followed often by emission of a peculiar sound from larynx; complete insensibility to pain; limbs relaxed, flaccid and drop when raised; sometimes sensory organs retain activity; efforts to influence patient by means of suggestion or intimidation are fruitless; tendon reflex is exaggerated; image of death.
- The state of artificial somnambulism – also called magnetic sleep; eyes closed or half-closed; no tendon reflex; different kind of rigidity of limbs – not as relaxed as lethargic state; skin insensible to pain; reacts to mesmeric passes; easy to
induce very complex automatic actions via commands and suggestions; retention of sight, smell, and sound activities. (Binet & Féré, 1888, p. 160)

Alfred Binet, whose primary area of training and study was hypnosis, wrote with Charles Féré one of the most comprehensive treatises on animal magnetism in the late 1800s, as well as publishing his clinical studies on “alterations of personality” and “double consciousness” upon which both William James and Lewis Terman were to rely. In *Animal Magnetism*, Binet and Féré (1888, p. 160) argued that differing results will be obtained “if the patients are subjected to a different *modus operandi*; if, in other words, they do not receive the same hypnotic education [induction procedure].” Either way a compelling consideration remained, construed within a shift from overt sovereign power to the dispersed, disciplinary, and institutionalized pathways of authority characterizing nation-building and welfare states: “The question arises how it should be possible for one person to exert over another the power of making him speak, act, think, and feel as it pleases the experimenter to dictate?” (Binet & Féré, 1888, p. 172).

Binet overtly theorized whether it was ethical to subject “normal” children to hypnosis and laid out educational applications of suggestibility for schoolchildren and soldiers in his *La Suggestibilite*. In anglophone educational applications of animal magnetism, lustered were the concepts of suggestibility and Will, while planished were any occurrences pertaining to clairvoyance, precognition, remote viewing, diagnosis and prescription – happenings that appeared to mangle time and space, that might undermine the hold that emergent experts had on the certification of knowledge, or, that were “future-oriented” and thereby potentially undermining of a teacher’s manipulation and control of an empty space of waiting. This suggests, as Alison Winter (1998, p. 6) has noted, that the existence of a scientific or medical orthodoxy must not be presupposed; the very constitution of this orthodoxy was at issue. Definitions of science were malleable and there was no agreement on what could be said about natural law, nor was it obvious when, where, and how one could say it.

The perception of fluidity and the lusterling and planishing of mesmeric phenomena directly bore on activities now associated with education in at least four ways: behavior management, the contouring of expertise and authority, the role of Will in intelligence testing and child development theories, and the redefinition of public and private. Debates over mind, consciousness, and the unconscious were absorbed into certain practices to the point that a phantasmic retrieval becomes necessary to understand how the “common-sense” of education’s restricted focus to public schools predominantly and curriculum history to policy and/or classroom practice and to child mind could form, and repeatedly circle around particular concerns.

**BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT: SOFT AND HARD VERSIONS**

By the turn of the twentieth century, the impact of animal magnetic trials ranged from what today would be called interventionist strategies for disability-treatment to the reformation of national imaginaries, the former a more direct and obvious
site and the latter more subtle. First, animal magnetic therapy was recommended and tried as a form of disability-treatment and intervention for children labeled vicious and degenerate. The methods circulated in modified forms through institutions in a variety of locales, including Canada, Europe, and the US, were discussed in multiple languages, and attained a reputation as controversial and cutting edge strategies for governance. Stone’s report of a child who had magnetized another in the classroom and who wept terribly because she could not arouse her friend out of the magnetic slumber, fearing she was dead, was no longer the informal kind of description that would be scoffed at or that raised the practice toward association with “occult themes” and possible danger. Rather, “suggestive therapeutics” while perhaps most associated with Edgar Bérillon in the 1880s and 90s was discussed in a flurry of literature at international conferences, in educational, scientific, and medical journals, and in textbooks and pamphlets. In anglophone literature J. Milne Bramwell and Osgood Mason were staunch proponents. The “hypnopedagogic method” was applied to children for whom “ordinary” education proved insufficient to repress “impulsive tendencies” including, for instance, kleptomania, onanism, laziness, restlessness, deceitfulness, incontinence, disobedience, chronic temper tantrums, and nailbiting. It was believed to constitute a “moral orthopaedics” and by 1898 Bérillon in particular claimed to have had a great deal of success with it. Five principles were enumerated:

- Assess the suggestibility of the child through specific tests. Ready responsiveness means that the child is intelligent and docile, easy to instruct and educate.
- Induce state of hypnosis, or a passive state of some kind, preferably before suggestions are undertaken.
- Once hypnotized, impose moral direction by imperative suggestions, expressed with authority and clarity.
- With imperative verbal suggestion one should associate a psycho-mechanical discipline, in order to create a center of psychic arrest. This will render the child incapable of performing the forbidden act. For example, for the chronic masturbator the arms are raised in the air and it is suggested that the arms are paralyzed. The child is then assured that the next time an impulse to onanism arises the paralysis he/she now feels will return immediately. Where the habit is laziness, then it is movement rather than inertia that is imposed.
- The child should be woken quickly and the same phenomena obtained with conscious participation. (Gauld, 1992, pp. 492–93)

Debates raged over whether such practices ought to be used in “regular” classrooms and if so, whether they would “weaken the Will” of children who were not seen as ill, thereby ruining their educability. For the “degenerate” child, then, presumption of a weak Will made them fit for hypnotic therapy. Paradoxically, their suggestibility would indicate their “intelligence,” their potential to be persuaded, transformed, and redeemed through such therapy.

In this way, animal magnetic literatures also contributed to advice for citizen-production through behavior management of “the normals.” For instance, in their chapter titled “The Application of Hypnosis to Therapeutics and Education,” Binet
and Féré discuss the modification of instincts in children through the example of a hen, which disinclined to sit, was made to do so with seemingly no memory of how it was persuaded:

The efficacy of suggestion by teachers may, as we believe, be shown by the possibility of modifying certain instincts by suggestion in the case of animals. One of the present writers repeatedly witnessed a curious practice employed by a farmer’s wife in the district of Caux. When a hen has laid a certain number of eggs in a nest of her own selection, and has begun to sit, if there is any reason for transferring her to some other nest, the hen’s head is put under her wing, and she is swung to and fro until she is put to sleep. This is soon done, and she is placed in the nest designed for her; when she awakes, she has no recollection of her own nest, and readily adopts the strange eggs. By means of this process, hens may sometimes be made to sit which had shown a previous disinclination to do so. This modification of instinct by suggestions seems to show that the educational use of suggestion is not so absurd as some authors assert it to be. (Binet & Féré, 1888, p. 360; emphasis added)

In certain circumstances, then, animal magnetic experiments had a significant impact on how claims about the nature of influence were formulated (Winter, 1998, p. 8). Scholars concerned with the physiology of influence asked what were the processes by which people came to think the same things and what constituted the ethical use of suggestion with children. Studies of “the unconscious” had moved from the mid-century period fascination with catalepsy and lethargy to a more focused concern with hysteria and “sexual deviation” by the twentieth century. New models of mind, dipsychism and polypsychism, for instance, were proposed and new models of education developed to take advantage of the physiology of influence and the study of suggestion (Ellenberger, 1970; Winter, 1998). The redefinition of hypnosis by Bernheim’s Nancy School in France as suggestion induced to enable further suggestion blurred the difference between somnambulic and waking states (Bernheim, 1880). Suggestion became used with such frequency and in such a wide variety of ways that it began to lose any shared reference points (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 151). It is here that the absorption into teaching practices for “normal” citizen-children, with all its loaded racializing meanings, becomes most evident. In the apparent absence of slavery and of corporal punishment, (which in childcentered movements harking back to Rousseau was debarrled), how was a teacher to get “the normals” to do what she wanted?

As Winter (1998, p. 8) has already noted, only in retrospect would it be possible to portray the new mental physiologies developed as unambiguously different from and opposed to mesmerism: “The models developed were not only reactions to, but assimilations of mesmerism. They relied on a particular understanding of unconscious mental action, of influencing the Will through the power of looking and verbal commands, and of trances and psychic manipulation.” Assent among a population, and especially in regard to bringing “deviants” back to the fold, could seemingly be forged, then, through what one might learn from hypnotic experiments.
This is borne out, for instance, in how novel and controversial the idea was of suggesting to a child what you wanted them to really do, insofar as suggestion constituted in some analyses an ambiguous middle ground between complete physical force and laissez faire. In 1888 Binet and Féré (1888, p. 171) argued: “Strictly speaking, suggestion is an operation producing a given effect on a subject by acting on his intelligence. Every suggestion essentially consists in action on a person by means of an idea; every effect suggested is the result of a phenomenon of ideation, but it must be added that the idea is an epi-phenomenon; taken by itself it is only the indicative sign of a certain physiological process, solely capable of producing a material effect.” They argued further:

It is possible not only to make suggestions to subjects in the waking state [after coming out of hypnosis], but also to persons who have not been hypnotized at all. Learned men have been agitated by these latter experiments, which have aroused in them doubt and dissatissaction. They have no difficulty in admitting that suggestions may be made to hypnotized subjects, since they are not in normal health, but they cannot understand how they should be made to individuals who are awake, not under hypnotism, and that this should be done by modes of action in daily use in our relations to one another. (Binet & Féré, 1888, p. 171)

In terms of teaching, then, “If it is the characteristic of suggestion to address itself to the subject’s intelligence, it follows that there are as many forms of suggestions as there are modes of entering into relations with another person” (Binet & Féré, 1888, p. 171). In his 1900 book *La Suggestibilité* Binet presents a historical overview of experimental work done in the field of suggestion, including his own contributions. He argued that group experiments produce:

– a division of functions, with some children becoming leaders and others followers;
– an increase in suggestibility; and
– a strong tendency toward imitation, which is the advantage of collective education; imitation and emulation are “powerful stimulants for progress.”

Thus, the ties that bound nationalism to collective compulsory education, compulsory education to imitation and emulation, emulation to evolution, and progress of “humanity” to the separation of leaders and followers, become clearer and the stakes high – the formation of a planar World-Historical System and global hierarchy can be viewed in the “microphysics” of how interaction with a child is interpreted, in how a child (positioned as the weaker) is persuaded to do what the teacher (positioned as the stronger) wants. Whenever mesmeric experiments took place, a national imaginary could be transformed, for the discourses in which such experiments and their outcomes were nested were invested in part in citizen-production and status anxiety. On offer was access to or information about an “unconscious zone” previously considered private, out of reach, or governable and this encouraged new possibilities for the formation of assent and the theorization of disagreement in a classroom. Moreover, at a philosophical level late nineteenth
century mesmerism provided forums for studying the laws by which a nation functioned, or could more efficiently form around the procuring of assent. Mesmeric practices had raised uncomfortably stark issues spoken of in terms of class and gender and also became the occasion for reflections about the basis of racial distinctions and the “natural laws” that had helped one people to “bend” another to its “Will” (Winter, 1998, p. 7). Such practices spread through the “colonies” – parts of Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Haiti, and India, for instance, lending feedback, reinforcement, and complication to the hierarchies with which apparent “centers” were preoccupied. Mesmeric practices thus brought to the surface issues of equality, endowment, and national security that linked hens to children, classrooms to armies, and Africa to the Americas and Caribbean.

CONTOURING OF EXPERTISE AND AUTHORITY

In psychology, physiology, and medicine, wherever a debate between the mystics and the scientifics has been once and for all decided, it is the mystics who have usually proved to be right about the facts, while the scientifics had the better of it in respect to the theories. The most recent and flagrant example of this is “animal magnetism,” whose facts were stoutly dismissed as a pack of lies by academic medical science the world over, until the non-mystical theory of “hypnotic suggestion” was found for them – when they were admitted to be so excessively and dangerously common that special penal laws, forsooth, must be passed to keep all persons unequipped with medical diplomas from taking part in their production. (James, 1897/1960, p. 28)

William Stone’s genuine confusion, the aporia to which it pointed and the lack of available theoretical frameworks for naming what he saw, as well as the impact of the traveling mesmerists shows how little consensus there was about what constituted a legitimate practice of truth-production in the mid-century decades. In the later part of the nineteenth century, important changes took place in the authoritative status of the sciences and medicine. By 1870 new disciplinary divisions had crystallized, brought on by reform in university education and the new laboratories, leaving less space for the lines of inquiry that mesmerism had earlier suggested. Winter (1998, p. 3) argues that as experimenters asked each other how a particular trial was to be conducted and evaluated, they confronted the larger question of who could pronounce upon any scientific and medical controversy. It was vital to determine whether someone was in an altered state (and why), because issues of much greater significance hung in the balance. By 1900, as William James’ critiques indicated, the observability of the effects was less in question, but their significance was another matter, because whatever conclusions one drew would involve ascriptions of relative social and moral standing. It was largely on the basis of the criminal threats perceived around the abuse of mesmerism that the proposed reduction of its practice to medical doctors with a diploma was forwarded.
Moreover, the expertise of the early psychologists became authorized in part through such requirements and debates. G. Stanley Hall and William James are usually treated as oppositional characters in the history of psychology, for instance, having palpable digs at each other that are particularly evident in their exchange of letters and in James’ *Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals*. They were united, however, in their upholding of the importance of “facts,” an importance brought to notice by the multiple claims to multiple forms of awareness that studies of somnambulism seemed to generate. Both drew on hypnosis experiments to authorize their commitments, examining, for instance, reaction time and attention in the hypnotic state. James practiced hypnosis on occasion, was supportive of mental healing movements, as well as open to using other research results, especially Binet’s, to theorize “exceptional mental states” which for him included dreams, hysteria, telepathy, mediumship, telekinesis, genius and more. For James, suggestibility was the main condition of hypnosis and was most probably achieved by a narrowing of the field of consciousness, which in turn heightened other possibilities within the stream of thought that was continuously acting in us all. For Hall, the unconscious was historically set, the site of culture-epochs’ unfolding, the repository vault that gave recapitulation theory its home, and was thus not amenable to any kind of suggestion that could undo a priori racio-genetic limits for development. Despite their philosophical differences, then, with Hall much more enamored of the experimentalism of Wundt than James, both functioned, ironically in regard to the Protestant worldviews that scaffolded their specific pathways and wrestling, as interlocutors for hypnotic research, publishing for and lecturing specifically to teachers on their respective versions of the sciences of mind and how to influence a child which was directly tied to such experiments (Hall, 1881; 1883; James, 1896/1983; 1899/1915).

Thus, while oppositional models and research strategies might have been predictable responses to the reportage of “new” phenomena, the parameters of education and psychology’s symbiotic relationship were drawn in part through an absorption of animal magnetic literature and vocabulary into professionals’ concerns over governance and obedience. How to get other people to do what they preferred was, significantly, taken as a grappling with a spirit/matter problematic in the midst of having to assert scientific facts about how to engineer the ideal citizen.

**FOCUS ON WILL IN INTELLIGENCE TESTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT THEORIES**

While many of the early American psychologists had gone to Germany for their Ph.D.’s the mental measurement movement emanated more directly from experiences of confinement made possible in France. Euro-American narrative axes were already drawn following early nineteenth century immigration patterns, and as such it was more a matter of to which idealized “European” source American scholars turned, not whether. In discussing psychopathology and mental evaluation specifically in the United States, Eugene Taylor (1996) points, for instance, to a Swiss-French-English-American alliance, rather than a German-American one. The studies conducted in clinical settings in France particularly were motivated, in part,
by the notion that one person’s mind, or the mental character of a group, supplied a key to the collective mental features buried within an apparently fragmented society. While desire for this unlocking was tied to the vagaries of administration in French colonies it was also linked with governance at home. Key to this unlocking was a conception of Will. For Stone, in the 1830s the young woman magnetized for his observation was not of diseased Will and had character of high repute, thus rendering the confusion about the impact of the mind of one person upon another – how was this possible if her Will was not diseased? By the late 1800s the conception of Will had gone through many reformulations, including redefinitions in German idealism and French psychiatry, from “rationalist” inscriptions related to consciousness and volition to “irrationalist” locations deep in a collective unconscious. Simply invoking the term Will did not necessarily clarify anything, except that perhaps the historical frame of reference was Judaic and Christian theology.

In 1902 Marey supported Binet’s application for a professorship at the Sorbonne, arguing that Binet persuaded himself that “the study of hypnotism as interesting as it was did not provide by itself a basis sufficiently large on which to build a scientific psychology, and he thought it was necessary to replace it in priority with the study of the normal person” (cited in Gould, 1981). In “Purpose of Testing,” Binet argued that his study of the normal person led him to seeing the need for better identifying the stupid ones. Stupidity, however, was not permanent. Binet argued against the motto “stupidity is for a long time,” chastising teachers who:

> are not interested in students who lack intelligence. They have neither sympathy nor respect for them, and their intemperate language leads them to say such things in their presence as ‘This is a child who will never amount to anything. . . he is poorly endowed. . . he is not intelligent at all.’ How often have I heard these imprudent words! (Binet, 1909/1984, p. 100)

Binet did not propose a biological determinism for feeblemindedness predicated upon a diseased Will:

> How can we help a child if we label him as unable to achieve by biological proclamation? If we do nothing, if we don’t intervene actively and usefully, he will continue to lose time . . . and will finally become discouraged. The situation is very serious for him, and since his is not an exceptional case (since children with defective comprehension are legion), we might say that it is a serious question for all of us and for all of society. The child who loses the taste for work in class strongly risks being unable to acquire it after he leaves school. (Binet, 1909/1984, p. 100)

He thus protested against the brutal pessimism of studies that argued, on the basis of hypnotic therapy, that intelligence was a fixed quantity defined by the power of the Will: “Some recent thinkers seem to have given their moral support to these deplorable verdicts by affirming that an individual’s intelligence is a fixed quantity, a quantity that cannot be increased. We must protest and react against this brutal
pessimism; we must try to demonstrate that it is founded upon nothing” (Binet, 1909/1984, p. 101).

While in France, Binet and Simon were most renowned for inscribing a notion of Will-as-conscious-volition into child development tests, in the US, Goddard on the east coast and Terman on the west exemplify how Will-as-unconscious-hereditary-endowment informed the definition of intelligence and the demarcation between developmental stages and mental types. What Will was and the role Will played differed, then, changing the specific relation that could be forged between concepts of individual and nation. The risk, the danger, the pollutant or contagion metaphors thus would become differently located in each case, suggesting different kinds of and targets within educational and welfare policy.

For example, by the mid-1920s Terman’s Stanford-Binet had become popular in city-based common schooling in particular, feeding off a conception of defective Wills in children labeled backward and feebleminded. The image of a statistically small but disproportionately menacing number of feebleminded children complemented alarm over inefficiency. If the capacity to engage in moral conduct is given by heritability of intelligence and exposed by one’s hypnotic suggestibility, then the problem of “inefficiency” is a matter of finding those who are ineducable. If you submitted readily to hypnosis your Will was considered weak, you were too much in the vicinity of lunacy, and your educability was in question. An important conceptual transformation is effected in this new process of attribution. What was once a problem of organizational inefficiency was now redefined as a problem of intellectual capacity, a harbinger of negative morality (Richardson, 1999, p. 56). A shift in mind theory accompanies it; feeblemindedness and genius are dependent upon the operation of the Will, which now inhabits the unconscious. Will organizes and bursts through consciousness in ways that feebleminded children, dangerously, cannot control and that child geniuses allow automatically into beautiful, if not mystical, performances. Thus while animal magnetic studies had led to theorization of the role of Will in child development and intelligence testing Binet’s purposes of testing and rationale seemed quite contrary to that of Terman’s:

Intelligence tests of the feeble-minded. Thus far intelligence tests have found their chief application in the identification and grading of the feeble-minded… Wherever intelligence tests have been made in any considerable number in the schools, they have shown that not far from 2 per cent of the children enrolled have a grade of intelligence which, however long they live, will never develop beyond the level which is normal to the average child of 11 or 12 years. The large majority of these belong to the moron grade; that is, their mental development will stop somewhere between the 7-year and 12-year level of intelligence, more often between 9 and 12. (Terman, 1916)

For Terman, “the nation” was at stake as for Binet, but the “solutions” were different for Terman. Educability goes through the Will and the Will must therefore not be too weak or too strong. “High grade defectives” often overlooked in classrooms and elsewhere posed a particularly difficult problem for Will-management.
It is safe to predict that in the near future intelligence tests will bring tens of thousands of these high-grade defectives under the surveillance and protection of society. This will ultimately result in curtailing the reproduction of feeble-mindedness and in the elimination of an enormous amount of crime, pauperism, and industrial inefficiency. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the high-grade cases, of the type now so frequently overlooked, are precisely the ones whose guardianship it is most important for the State to assume. (Terman, 1916)

Stanford-Binet tests were not to identify who needed which kind of help in the formation of moral character but who could not be “helped” altogether. The post-Civil War and WWI US of Terman was a vastly different timespace from post-Revolutionary and post-Napoleonic France of Binet: in the latter the larger social purpose was to uplift and dissipate the presumed impact of feeblemindedness via integration and assimilation. For Terman, it was via strategies of plain exclusion. Either way, the strategies proposed are indebted to the interventions of mesmeric experiments that had helped reinscribe the feebleminded as educable in France, at least for Binet, and ineducable in the US, at least within a particular strand of efficiency discourse.

Here, then, the perpetual logic of differentiation-integration played out in unique ways, evincing alternative (but not) cultural models of modernity. In Binet, the construction project regarding the child-nation relation went first through a collective notion, the “all of us” and “for all of society” moving then into differentiation of “the stupid” for purposes of “restrengthening” the “us,” while in Terman, the initial differentiation and exclusion of “the feebleminded” is what subsequently gave solidity and content to the delimited “us” of the nation. The seepage in “the subject” that feeblemindedness and hypnosis came to represent as a peculiar kind of weakness and of Will as the focal point for better securing territoriality, for shoring up the leak or making coherent a singular self cannot be disarticulated, then, from the competitive nationalisms that differentially structured similar anxieties about the development of children and the forging of love and belonging.

REDEFINITION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

Last, animal magnetic performances changed the meaning of the sites in which they were practiced, including institutions, persons, and who or what “the public” was. Such changes came about because such performances questioned what was proper or possible to do in particular locales. Stone’s incredulity was able to arise in the 1830s in part because he had access to being able to detect if anything fraudulent had been set up in the home he visited in advance. In the mid-century period, sickrooms were converted into public halls, dining rooms into laboratories, hospital wards into theaters (Winter, 1998). By the turn of the twentieth century and under the pressure of an international eugenic philosophy, classrooms, asylums, and reform schools risked being converted to funeral houses:
Dr. Johnson: I remember a year ago when the Nebraska State Medical Society met in Beatrice and I invited a number of the physicians out to our institutions, that, after looking through some of the worst classes we had, one of the physicians—a physician I have known a great many years and who had practiced medicine for forty years—remarked, “Doctor, do you want me to suggest a sure cure for those cases?” I said, “yes.” He replied: “Two grains of morphine hypodermically.” [understood as lethal] I asked him if he cared to administer the dose. “No,” he said, he did not care to. But in all seriousness most of the physicians that have visited our institution have said in substance that it is certainly too bad these children have to live, and we ought to put them out of the way, either by morphine or by the chloroform route or some other route.

Dr. Morgridge: They do not like to be the executioners, however.

Dr. Johnson: No. (Johnson, 1906, p. 230)

While this conversation was not directly referring to animal magnetic trials, its availability – both what is exposed and what is critiqued by the doctors’ discussion – signals how the social project of modernity/nationalism had regionalized Being, presence, and appearance in ways that included and exceeded racial particularity, ethnic exceptionality, and territorial rootedness, especially where “disability” was the topic. In revising the geography of public and private spaces and offering new conventions for proper conduct, animal magnetism broadened sites considered part of public knowledge, particularly amid the invention of the unconscious as a repository site now open to governance. The child who was never permitted entry to a public school, and the child who did not overtly “respond” to hypnotic or other therapeutic interventions in ways that their overseers recognized, thus played an important role in what it was that public schools seemed to be about.

In regard to persons, the role of the unconscious was drawn upon in different ways in different curriculum traditions circulating in the United States and these roles drew their “empirical” and “imaginative” purchase from animal magnetic trials and associated discourse. In those traditions indebted in looser or tighter forms to Herbart and Bildung narratives, the unconscious as a newly public site of governance contracts. It is not the Geist, the expansiveness of spirit and origin of the universe, in which thought is not an exclusively human quality, and which imbues all manifested forms in the likes of a Hegel or Hartmann. Rather, the unconscious becomes a domain beneath a threshold, rationalized and in service to a personalized accumulation. Stimuli rising above the threshold are noticed and need to be stored systematically in “consciousness” via grid-like operations that the teacher presents as instruction, enlargening the apperceptive mass by overtly linking the old to the new. The unconscious, which houses unruly individuality in some theories (Herbart) or racialized cultural epochs in others (American Herbartianism and Child-study), is thereby deployed around its negative potential for undoing or interrupting. The unconscious is to be in service to the positive production of memory, learning, and/or evolution, which will eventually keep its apparent negativity and deterritorialization qualities in check.
Third, who or what the public is was also redefined in relation to compulsory school attendance and what it meant to be a special or delinquent child, the parameters of which cannot be divorced from mind and unconsciousness studies and investigation into “trance states.” Through the linking of tutelary complexes the parameters for “the public” are reestablished in the early decades of the twentieth century more in consonance with “the fully conscious human” and less in opposition to “the private.” A stricter conscious/unconscious binary now inflects what/who is acceptable in terms of a public school’s population and what/who not, reshaping previous exclusions predicated on racialization and sexualization of capacity. By the turn of the twentieth century one has to be a fully conscious and suggestible “human” within particular limits in order to attend a public school – limits that were pregnant with past meaning systems regarding race and sex and that were being “weighed upon” further by complaints about “unsuitable” Catholic, Jewish, and Orthodox immigrants crashing “like waves upon the shore.” Significantly, inclusion in the broader species category of the human did not imply let alone guarantee inclusion in publicly funded education. Inclusion in public education was not unilaterally desired, nor was such full inclusion vaunted as the purpose of schools at the point of their founding. This institutional history and structure and the ideals and systems of reasoning it embodied is why late-nineteenth century scholars could refer to “public” schools, not “see” exclusivity as an issue, and feel comfortable with what Peter Wagner (1994) calls the play of liberty and discipline within the first crisis of modernity. Mesmeric practices/debates thus helped reorient public/private domains in relation to new conventions for judgment and proper conduct, in regard to new sites of governance, new institutional dynamics, and did this amid the refiguration of old humanist lines of inclusion/exclusion that appeared not just reworded but remobilized as part of the recalcitrance of modernity/nationalism.

CONCLUSION: CULTURAL MODELS OF MODERNITY AND UNCERTAINTIES THAT PERSISTENTLY RETURN

Animal magnetism’s relative obscurity at the turn of the twenty-first century “has encouraged the idea that it has always been a ‘fringe’ or ‘pseudo-’ science, eking out a precarious existence on the margins of ‘real science.’ The relegation is anachronistic and question-begging.” Animal magnetism became the occasion for rethinking authority in science, medicine, education, and Life/Death at large, and “revealed the location and character of such authority to have been more insecure than historians have appreciated” (Winter, 1998, p. 4). William Stone’s open confusion and willingness to modify his beliefs not only indexes the troubling of extant grounds of truth but indicates that a search for new ones had already begun. Animal magnetic discourse was not the passive recipient of established modes of explanation but rather a contributor to the development of new modes of interpretation. This included modes of interpretation that sustained the relationship between negativity and the politics of a West/rest separation and that were apparently oppositional – on the one hand, such debates contributed to the seeming positivity of a World-Historical System in which a phenotype-mind compound,
sequenced in evolutionary theory and embodying a differentiation-integration dynamic, flattens other possibilities and considerations into its normative frame, constricting “the cosmos” to “social relations,” traveling to establish not just who/what a human is and what the most crucial “parts” are, but also contributing to developmentized gradations of nations and colonies. On the other hand, such trials and experiments unplugged the tight enclosures being attempted through nationalization movements – subject, object, past/future, and territory could seemingly be penetrated without regard for the location of the trial, considered all the more disturbing when “the subject” was sitting in a chair with the eyes closed. Such possibilities were two sides, however, of the same coin that elevated mind studies as the problem and solution to assent, consent, progress, and governance of populations, particularly in the United States, giving American public institutions that stereotypically psychologized, individualized, and Protestant air. In other words, animal magnetic discourse facilitated the working out of different cultural models of modernity in which a series of beliefs became central, only to return over and over, whether as proclamation or as criticism: “self” particularly as self-determination, “knowledge” as free-floating, ejected from body, simultaneously objective and fallibilistic, and “power” as discursively defined and diffused (Delanty & O’Mahoney, 2002).

Finally, how such animal magnetic discourse actually infused onto-theo-philosophical regionalization, which was never just in books or in the head, nor put in play without simultaneous rejection of such finite totalities, is worth drawing out in conclusion. The manner in which animal magnetic discourse contributed implicitly and explicitly to the naming, essentialization, and undermining of “the West” as a “self”-elevated unity provides an important new frame and shift in scale for curriculum historical research, as well as a broader understanding of how repetitive trans-Atlantic narrative axes formed in the field.

As noted in the introduction, assistance for such an audit trail might be found in Foucault’s work, among others, where the problem of “the West” and of circularity is overtly addressed and critiqued in different ways. In Histoire de la Folie, for example, the what and where of “the West” is directly related to the coming-into-being of a mad/reason nexus staged apophatically in the Preface. In The Order of Things “the West” is overtly problematized as to “its” availability from the first page in opposition to China. In the opening of Hermeneutics of the Subject lectures, however, “the West” just appears as Western, with Christianity, and the Gnostic exception, as a key focus. Hellenic, Roman, Christian, and post-Christian thought are the nodal points named throughout the subsequent lectures. If one dare generalize, for Foucault, the West becomes West across his work, then, through appeal to two major tributaries – a wandering, swamping, and shifting Christianity (which in turn somehow automatically animates discussion of Hellenic and Roman thought) and the dynamics that came to be attributed especially to the head and face of a human self – a mad/reason nexus, rationalism, science, biopower, statism, etc. For Sells, however, the West becomes West through a cross-fertilization of Abrahamic traditions within which mystical languages of unsaying have repeatedly operated. The West is
the legacy of the encounter of Semitic prophetic traditions with the Graeco-Roman cultural world. These traditions shared both a highly developed Ptolemaic symbolic cosmology and a central assertion of one, transcendent principle of reality. Rather than focusing upon the textual borrowings of one tradition from another, it seems more profitable to see these traditions as competing within a partially shared intellectual and symbolic world, defining themselves in conversation with one another and against one another. (Sells, 1994, pp. 4–5)

For Sells the performative apophasis (saying/unsaying) characteristic in different ways of the mystical traditions of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, as well as contemporary social theory is a formative feature of the West: “Classical apophasis has been viewed as religious and as anti-religious; as theistic, pantheistic, and atheistic; as pious and libertine; as orthodox and heretical. At its most intense, apophatic language has as a subject matter neither divine nor human, neither self nor other. It can be read as a relentless critique of religious traditions or as a realization of the deeper wisdoms within such traditions. It can be read as grounded in the intimate specificities of particular traditions or as opening onto intercultural and inter-religious conversation. These possibilities may not be mutually exclusive” (Sells, 1994, pp. 12–13). For Nancy (2007), however, world-forming and the shaping of “the West” takes place not through a penetration or interpenetration of theological heritages but through a withdrawal – the withdrawal of a dominant Christian God whose overt presence as origin and as heaven previously provided an “out” or other-regionality always in reserve and in interplay with the this-worldly. The withdrawal of God from consideration in analytical schema facilitated the subsequent closure, flattening, and self-referential finitude of post-Christian approaches to the social, laying the groundwork for globalization (mondialisation) theories today, whose obsession with travel, flows, and compactness are effects, rather than analyses of, such withdrawals.

Where the West is won and lost, though, is more than a significant political choice of a writer or their preferred cosmo-theological focus. The implications are enormous, yet not authorizable through simplistic appeals to realism or inclusion/exclusion. The trajectory, domains, axes, or constellations that are drawn upon to analyze, delimit, and produce West and “its” Others that in turn enables West to appear in a mode of purification and self-selectivity is something that Said (1979) long ago drew out. For Foucault in The Order of Things the drawing out strategy is somewhat different, offering an historicization of this very debate over the nameability, limits, formation – in short, the political production – of World, its parameters in shifting epistemes, and the move into World as having a Western part – the re-entering, colonizing, or encircling effects that reference to the West continuously seems to incite, for it is from position of the West, within an “our” that Foucault simultaneously names and troubles, that his historicization of shifting productions of World is undertaken.

Yet the unconscious of knowledge and of history, which is not consciousness’ opposite, is still required – it’s mysterious own rules must be figured out.
Beneath what science knows about itself is something that it doesn’t know; and its history, its becoming, its periods and accidents obey a certain number of laws and determinations. These laws and determinations are what I have tried to bring to light. I have tried to unearth an autonomous domain that would be the unconscious of knowledge, which would have its own rules, just as the individual human unconscious has its own rules and determinations. (Foucault, 1989, p. 54)

As Jonathon Culler notes in his discussion of history of science “It is not so much that the unconscious replaces the historical series; rather, it becomes the space where any antecedents that have an explanatory function are located. Structural explanation relates actions to a system of norms – the rules of language, the collective representation of a society, the mechanisms of a psychic economy – and the concept of the unconscious is a way of exploring how these systems have explanatory force. It is a way of explaining how they can be simultaneously unknown yet effectively present. If a description of a linguistic system counts as the analysis of language, it is because the system is something not immediately given to consciousness yet deemed to be always present, always at work in the behavior it structures and makes possible” (Culler, 1988, p. 91).

Here, the challenge is to see beyond the self-centricities, if it’s possible – a challenge Foucault sets for himself and historicizes. “The West” becomes nameable, knowable, only once there is such a thing as knowledge and hence knowledge of “the West” and “its” mode of being can be delineated, not simply a phenomenon of any old ordering and rules, but linked intrinsically to a rationalism opposed to superstition and magic that has become part of “its” self-representation. It is precisely here, in that messy broth of spiritualisms, mediums, clairvoyants, prophets, and so forth in which animal magnetic discourse appeared, that its role in territorialization of “knowing,” in establishing a rationalism that seemed opposed to magic, superstition, mysticism, and the occult became pivotal: “in particular, the empirical domain which sixteenth-century man saw as a complex of kinships, resemblances, and affinities, and in which language and things were endlessly interwoven – this whole vast field was to take on a new configuration. This new configuration may, I suppose, be called ‘rationalism’; one might say, if one’s mind is filled with ready-made concepts, that the seventeenth century marks the disappearance of the old superstitious or magical beliefs and the entry of nature, at long last, into the scientific order. But what we must grasp and attempt to reconstitute are the modifications that affected knowledge itself, at that archaic level which makes possible both knowledge itself and the mode of being of what is to be known” (Foucault, 1973, p. 54).

It is not a coincidence, then, that Foucault as for animal magnetic enthusiasts, mesmerists, and devotees to hypnosis, albeit in different ways, moved through the theorization of a conscious/unconscious border in regard to what constitutes the West and in proximity to discussion of a Life/Death border. When life becomes Life for Foucault, upon this entry of nature into the scientific order, Life and Death appear as two, irrepeateable events within a modern episteme especially, where Death threatens to inhabit Life from the beginning such as in degeneration theories.
– or to return as a ghost, such as in “trance states” of subjects, mediums, or patients in animal magnetic trials. In such an episteme and its search for origin, Life/Death dualism becomes common-sensical and characteristic of “the West” and it’s rationalizable, this-worldly, finite causations. The implicit link between science, governmentality, and biopower becomes clearer – for the way in which discourse produces its objects as amenable to scientific analysis is tied to the pressure on Life as an objectifiable continuum that must be governed and managed for the overall health of “the social organism.” The role of the unconscious can, then, be fairly well limited by the boundaries set within such a cosmological structure and the seepage and leakage pointed to in animal magnetic experiments tidied up to procure the claim to rationalism and the apparently omniscient and knowing-better center of “the West”:

In Western psychology…I think that there may be a tendency to overemphasize the role of the unconscious in looking for the source of one’s problems. I think that this stems from some basic assumptions that Western psychology starts with: for instance, it does not accept the idea of imprints being carried over from a past life. And at the same time there is an assumption that everything must be accounted for within this lifetime. So, when you can’t explain what is causing certain behaviors or problems, the tendency is to always attribute it to the unconscious. It’s a bit like you’ve lost something and you decide that the object is in this room. And once you have decided this, then you’ve already fixed your parameters, you’ve precluded the possibility of its being outside the room or in another room. So you keep on searching, but you are not finding it, yet you continue to assume that it is still hidden somewhere in the room. (HH Dalai Lama & Cutler, 1998, p. 7)

For Foucault, the very regionalism attributed to naming “the West” is both required and challenged from the opening lines of *The Order of Things*: “my thought – our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography – breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other” (p. xv). Whatever the “our” is imagined as here, it is articuable only as part of an ordering impulse that makes it possible, as Foucault notes, to name this and that, a strategy of thought (thought and the outside of thought being the point of appeal in much of Foucault’s work), an ordering practice, which tautologically is not singular – there are different ordering practices which can be further ordered, for “a thing can be absolute according to one relation yet relative according to others; order can be at once necessary and natural (in relation to thought) and arbitrary (in relation to things), since, according to the way in which we consider it, the same thing may be placed at differing points in our order” (1973, p. 54). “The West” is both a function of a desire to order in a particular way, a Utopic search in *The Order of Things* for a common locus that is chimerical, and that which sits in contrast to a China that the West projects knowledge of, while knowing it cannot know China – the other side of another attempt at ordering. This dual-edged and
circular motion, one that Foucault’s analyses embody and historicize, reverberates through the disciplining of fascination with animal magnetic practices across the nineteenth century, bespeaking, then, not only dangers, risks, and potentials that contemporaries imagined in the wake of “altered states,” but also a new orientation to the perfectibility discourse at the heart of multiple modernist imaginaries. The strategies of negativity that such trials and experiments alluded to drew upon and in some cases reversed the doxa of medieval Abrahamic traditions and their (differential) circling around metaphors of lightness/darkness, interiority, height/depth and techniques of the unsayable. Negativity especially in the sense of invisibility and the unnameability of what contemporaries felt they were trying to describe sat in tension with the requirements of a metaphysics of presence in emergent scientific discourses and in “masculinist” appeals to action and agency as indicative of the coherent subject’s focused Will and command of volitional capacities. Perpetual self-creation, dynamism, “life-long learning,” renewal through political action, institutional inventions, such as new curriculum reforms, behavior management strategies, kinds of tracking, and so forth, cannot be disarticulated from approaches to such yearling sciences of assent and dissent, of Being, appearance, presence, and (non)closure, and to domain-formation in educational fields both differentiated and integrated around the requirement to appear, against an ever-threatening and over-flowing pluralized background, as a nation with bordered territoriality.

In the end, the conceptualization of individual and nation, under the burden of seepage that such trials and experiments seemed to expose, had to be both shored up and brought into relation in unique ways, which is precisely why this historical retrieval can appear as such – the falling-away of animal magnetic discourse from the radar of “making up” people and of field- and nation-formation studies alludes to the topographical structures that must have initially buried such vibrant literature and apparently threatening deterritorialization. Stone’s fascination for the magnetized subject he observed who accurately according to him described scenes in New York city to which she had never been indicates both the threatening potential for penetration and the limits of sensationalist epistemology, the inability of current explanations to account for the phenomenon that he felt was before him, the leakage around conceptions of territory, knowledge, subject, object and processes of education. The abnormalization of hypnosis, the depiction of its subjects as weak (able to be used), the “pseudo” status attributed to psychical science rather than psychology, and the delimitation of unconsciousness studies to psychoanalytics and psychopathology enabled the strategy of unification attempted around “mind” to proceed as a discourse of progress, telos, and even eschatology – to become the realm in which Manifest Destiny and secularized Protestantisms would play out as “global” discourses of human development, nationalized independence, and self-generated productivity. Different versions of mind could thus be bequeathed to emergent social sciences and populational reasoning could proceed as though it was not only “normal” but the only way to “be” within Occidentalist obsessions with Being, as though such reasoning was the only possible form of organizing experience and interpreting events. The apparently twin contemporary possibilities, of critical theoretical and “post” deployments of negativity differed and danced around the ways in which objectification of discrete entities especially was to be
approached or contested given such Occidentalist obsessions – the former challenging some versions of non-neutrality and vested interests in the formation of objects while upholding “materialism” and the validity and mastery of the subject and the latter trying to reclaim the other-regionality lost in the flattening of World by refusing to name “it” as an it, to hold out the promise of the abyss, the edge, aporia, or the non-knowable alterity irreducible to familiar and finite borders between ontology and epistemology.

Animal magnetic discourse incited and was absorbed into such logics, into endless theorization of subject-object interplay, as well as of the child-nation relation, giving curriculum history its previously delimited home and mesmerized focus on nationalized public schools and “the figure of the normate” (Thomson, 1999) – a figure whose boundaries were both internally and externally comport through domestic and foreign policies that relied upon processes of imperialism, substitution, institutionalization, and rationalization. As one of the many sites in which a social project of subject- and subjectivity-formation played out, animal magnetism, mesmerism, and hypnosis contributed to the differentiation and integration of unique cultural models of modernity, in which it became possible to see how even anti-establishment, anti-ethnocentric, and counter-colonial thinking could not always remain vigilant towards a collusion with the institutional structures and conceptual systems being confronted. Hence, quite simply, this study of animal magnetism and its role in the attempted shaping of a planar World-Historical System, of modern classificatory systems, such as macro and micro, West/rest and public/private, of pedagogical ideas-practices, and of the ontological status attributed to major concepts such as mind, thus raises to the “threshold” of noticeability how the availability of a curriculum studies field and the production of historical accounts such as this one are both the effect and vehicle of the very conditions being analyzed.

NOTES

1 William L. Stone (1837), p. 5. I thank Michael Shapiro and Hannah Tavares for generous, insightful and encouraging feedback on earlier versions of this chapter. This chapter modifies quite significantly earlier historical arguments I have published in Curriculum Inquiry in 2007 as ‘Animal magnetism and curriculum history,’ Sumner, pp.

2 Entification is different from essentialization. In a Kantian sense, entification refers to the coming-into-being of a thing as opposed to its essence, quality or nature. The problem with this delimitation, however, is that a close reading of different philosophical tracts in German- and French-based debates over animal magnetism and the nature of the universe will rapidly indicate significant differences in how “things” come into being and the question of form, whether the term “things” includes objects, thoughts, feelings, instincts, awareness, etc, whether there is such a “thing” as being, one life, or endurance of the earth, and so forth (see Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes published 1807 and translated as The Phenomenology of Spirit and sometimes as The Phenomenology of Mind as a key case in point. Hegel does not reference animal magnetism in this text but it is contemporaneous with animal magnetism’s first period of controversy and his reference to a “nightlike abyss” resembling a universal unconscious in his theory of world origin resembles some of the interpretations of animal magnetic enthusiasts).
I am not arguing here that animal magnetism, mesmerism and hypnosis are exactly the same phenomena or strategies. Rather, together they contributed to a motif that in retrospect has been labeled by Henri Ellenberger (1970) as “the discovery of the unconscious.”

Subject-object distantiatio n is only one version of this belief and disciplining, hence it is not the sole focus here.

I use cosmology, belief-system and worldview synonymously although none of them satisfy. Cognizant of Heidegger’s claim that any delineation of an ancient or medieval worldview is anachronistic, I suggest that appeals to rationality in general and scientific rationality in particular emerged in part out of recognition of incommensurable cosmologies that imperialism and trade made available. Methodistic rationalism, from Descartes at least onwards, may be considered here beyond the usual critical readings of science where reason is often portrayed as a purely negative device to suppress or to “block” recognition of difference. Appeals to reason and to rationality, which are not always collapsible terms especially in William James, were also an attempt to “referee” the recognition of difference. I refer to this assumption about who can and cannot occupy the site of referee, or theory-builder as Spivak (2000) puts it, as an entitlement complex.

See Bynum (1999) for an extended discussion of personalism within philosophies that formed on the African continent and spread to the East, (China, India, and Japan for Bynum) and to the West. See DuBois (2008) and Bergson (1906/1950) for further examples of the obsolescence of subject-object distantiatiation.

After a flurry of literature at the turn of the nineteenth century a relative lull appeared, so that by the 1830s in the United States, animal magnetism enthusiasts claimed no one on the continent had heard of the practice. See especially Poyen (1837) on this point.

Sommambulism technically referred to a state of sleepwalking but was often used to refer to a hypnotic state before the term hypnosis was coined or to broader altered or trance states in which the subject claimed no memory upon return.

I thank Michael Shapiro for raising this point.

Francis Galton, for instance, debates Césare Lombroso’s interpretation that genius is another form of mental morbidity and tries to separate the two, elevating genius, although he later concedes that there are families who spawn children with both madness and genius.

An Anti-imperialism League was formed in the United States in 1898 in protest especially of the invasion of the Philippine Isles. The early pamphlets from the League’s meetings do not focus on treatment of already-othered Others at home, of African Americans, Native Americans, Latinas, or Asians living in the United States, but rather theorize the consequences of domination for peoples abroad.

John Marini (2005) argues that what distinguishes the formalization of social sciences in American universities was the popularity of the theories of August Comte, which created a different way to navigate the theological debates that inspired different Protestant denominations to found their own universities.

Scientist – William Whewell, 1834; Hypnosis – James Braid, 1842; and norm, with the root based on a tool, the old carpenter’s square. Davis (1997) notes that norm and associated terms including normal, normalcy, normality, abnormal, and average enter English dictionaries such as Johnson’s between 1840–1860.

Reports of such events during demonstrations and stage shows appear, for instance, in the Appendices to Poyen’s translation of the French report.


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