Armed conflict is an inescapable reality in the world today. Military institutions and their activities both in peacetime and in wartime are a fact of life in western democracies and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Preparation of the men and women who are sent by their governments to fight or keep the peace is a life and death matter for those charged with the education and training of the Armed Forces. The development of military pedagogies is an attempt to address and reconcile the principles of education and military necessity. The enduring requirement is for an operationally effective yet ethically acceptable military organisation that is accountable to the society that it serves and to global ethical standards. This book provides new perspectives on the role of education in the Armed Forces of a democratic state. The wide ranging perspectives offered reflect the contributors who are from diverse professional backgrounds including serving military officers, academics and educators employed in military academies as well as social scientists. This book is aimed at those interested in policy and practice although it also provides more theoretical analyses that will interest academics and the general public.
Military Pedagogies and Why They Matter
EDUCATIONAL FUTURES
RETHINKING THEORY AND PRACTICE
Volume 25

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Military Pedagogies and Why They Matter

Tone Kvernbekk
University of Oslo, Norway

Harold Simpson
Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, UK

Michael A. Peters
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
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ALL PEDAGOGY IS MILITARY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the total dependence of industrialized states on the social practice termed education. The author posits that “industrial” education, the form of education that accompanies agricultural and mechanical industrialization, notably as practiced in the world’s great research universities, is the greatest war weapon ever invented. He posits that education is the primary driver in all major theatres of contemporary human endeavour, that education is the well-spring of contemporary military, economic and political power and that contemporary education can be a form of “non-violent” warfare strategically designed to strike directly at statist and corporate prestige and power.

Former Russian President Putin seemingly recognized this. In his February 2007 address to the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy he stated the United States (US) “has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations.” Not often does a national leader lump culture and education in with economics and politics, at least in so public a forum. Doing so is justified entirely.

It is the realizations of these spheres of human activity that provide the form and substance of human existence and possibility. In effect we—each of us—embody our educations and cultures, our politics and economics. We humans, as citizens of nation states and as inhabitants of the earth, each of us, are functions of these spheres of activity—concretely manifest in humanly devised institutions as Burger King, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of Eight (G8) and the Roman Catholic Church.

That these Western institutions and their impositions do not necessarily promote the interests of humans in general is quite evident. Burger King follows closely upon US military, diplomatic, financial and political incursions, bringing fast-food culture where it has not necessarily been welcome. The IMF imposes credit restrictions upon highly indebted countries, leading to deprivation so severe that citizens die as a result. The G8 (the G7 and Russia) develops global policy to protect the current status of the world’s wealthiest countries, even if that means deprivation and unwonted death in other places. The Roman Catholic Church adds to this statist and corporate repression by forbidding the use of contraceptive birth control by its adherents.

Cultural (including religion), economical and political instruments, employed violently, can have consequences at least as severe as the use of outright armed force, in this instance by destroying indigenous food production and delivery systems through predatory pricing and crop substitution, increasing demand for
food by religious encouragement of population growth, limiting unrestricted access to food to those with the money to buy it, while, at the same time, restricting financial liquidity (money) in those self-same countries where it is most needed.

However, the considerable power accruing to the political, economic and cultural spheres notwithstanding, at this particular juncture in human affairs, education, to a greater degree than the other spheres, forms and controls human activity and possibility. Without vast and coordinated systems of education, the operations in the other spheres could not proceed in the way they do at present. Each sphere is education dependent. This education dependency is a function of the dual power of education. The various institutions that comprise the system, the universities, colleges, schools and departments of education for example, educate and train in a conventional sense, produce plumbers, mathematicians, hairdressers and psychologists for instance, but, at the same time, these educational systems and institutions produce subjective (human) affect and attributes that are more general.

To educate is to enculturate—there is no other way to do it. Education does not shape or socialize the human so much as form the human outright. Education is a zero sum game; it is formative of the human exposed to it, a primary source of the mind, not an influence upon an a priori conceptual structure and functional process. Thinking is a learned activity, and it is learned along with the structures (conceptual architecture) that encapsulate and vitiate it. Humans are born with brains; but in contemporary industrialized societies it is education in its fecund multiplicity that allows humans to make their minds in specific ways, to create “difference” for example, to objectify and thereby name human surrounds and attempt to control them. Education doesn’t “win hearts and minds.” Education makes them.

This perspective conveys the full strategic power of education—and affirms its placement by the former Russian president on the same plane as culture, economics and politics. While these four spheres usually are conceptualized as discrete elements of social power and development, at the same time they are co-constitutive in the social production of contemporary “reality.” This social production of reality, whether by starvation or TV shows, is the realist policy goal of disparate nation states and some non-statist organizations as well.

This is not to suggest that all forms of education are morally, technically, or ethically equal, that critical pedagogy for example is equivalent to warfare training, though critical pedagogy ideally, and military pedagogy ideally, are directed toward the production of an “ideal type.” At minimum, the soldier in training, like a student enlightened by exposure to critical pedagogy, is “empowered” in as much as each learns a code encapsulated by an almost automatic acceptance of the rules of a particular language, of a symbolic universe as received—as a given. The student and soldier are similarly empowered in that each is provided with specific conceptual technologies and affect, skills and rules for their construction of reality—or, at the least, access to “reality” even if the one pedagogy is based in supposed reflectivity while the other isn’t.

Because education imparts much of what becomes a student’s reality, education lies at the core of the social production of reality (perception), whether fantastic or
ALL PEDAGOGY IS MILITARY

actual, though that social production is, of course, always contested. Education also lies at the core of contemporary martial labour, overt or covert, psychological or physical. That is “why we fight” in the twentieth-first century—with education, armed force, culture, economics and politics—to define and control target populations, at home and abroad. Making reality on a global scale is a sophisticated and expensive business. The fight to define reality is constant; hegemony by its nature is always contested, and the construction of subjectivity is a highly imperfect process. The granting or denial of education, the forms and content to be imposed, these are tactical decisions—strategy concerns the reality to be imparted.

While reality may be hermetically sealed in Nineteen Eight Four and in The Matrix, in practice “systems leakage” is ongoing. For example, the Internet today is not contained in spite of significant military/commercial effort; globally, human consciousness of human possibility may be expanding. In the irony that is history, the weapon produced by the US Department of Defense (DoD) to harden strategic communications systems in the early 1970s, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPNET), thus far has led to the opposite.5

While the ideal of a “closed system” no doubt still drives US DoD communications and surveillance technology development, the strategic advantages of a more open system are evident in the US engineered and electronically-aided “postmodern coups” in Serbia and Georgia for instance. Perhaps “total awareness” is in the end inefficient, that systems friction, fantastic or actual, is a necessary component of any given reality if it is to be convincing.6 The concept of “full spectrum dominance” may be more symbolically than practically efficacious, like the gargoyles on Medieval European cathedrals used to scare away demons so as to leave believers to their business.

Regardless, the twofold power of education is evident—while it can be employed as a weapon in its own right to form subjectivity in general, for example citizens who believe a militant democracy or militant theocracy is the natural order of things, education at the same time can be employed to produce the specific subjectivities required for the weaponization of the four spheres of activity named by Putin. The use of the economics weapon in Chile in the 1970s and 1980s provides an instructive instance.

An agreement between the School of Economy at the Catholic University of Chile (Santiago) and the Economics faculty at the University of Chicago led to almost twenty years of intense co-operation between the two, transforming not only the discipline of economics in Chile, but also the Chilean economy after the US sponsored dictator Pinochet seized power in 1973 (Pinochet was arrested for crimes against humanity in the United Kingdom [UK] in 1998). Intense economical education led to the production of homegrown “Chicago Boys,” evidencing the transformative power that attaches to the spheres of culture, education, economics and politics—especially when military force provides a catalyst.

Chile moved from a socialist economy to a neo-liberal economy in a manner that provided a model for similar economic adjustments in many other countries. The “Chilean model” has been re-imposed many times since, for instance in the nation states of the former Yugoslavia, post-invasion Iraq, Poland—arguably in the
UK, US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia—and most dramatically in the republics formerly federated within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Modified somewhat and enabled through electronic communications, the neoliberal economic revolution is a global success, though one that perhaps is threatened by the dysfunctions that historically accompany large scale capital deregulation.

This realization—this weaponization—of the academic discipline of economics is not an unusual instance. A weapon is something used to injure, defeat, or destroy, and weaponization is evident in most any arena of contemporary academic endeavour—the scientization and military application of sensory deprivation provides an immediate example. Less prosaically, George Orwell, the author of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the great explication of statist propaganda, along with T. S. Eliot and other English literary and dramaturgical luminaries, was himself a purveyor of statist propaganda for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) during World War II (WWII). Most any knowledge or skill can be turned into a weapon; even the seemingly abstruse knowledge of an anarchist English novelist is no exception.

Principal actors know the importance of deliberate subjective formation. Putin knows the importance of education, and understands how skills and knowledge can be turned into weapons. So do the leaders of India and China, Korea, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, as do the leaders of Singapore, Hong Kong and most every other statist and religious jurisdiction. Rupert Murdoch, Warren Buffet and Bill Gates know this, but perhaps the great 19th century US robber barons knew the power of systemic education better than anyone. Ford, Carnegie, Rockefeller, Kellogg, Sloan—these name but a few of the financiers and industrialists that influenced, indeed to a degree determined, the development of the US education system. More than a hundred years after a comprehensive system of educational thought (pedagogy) and institutions was more or less in place in the US, its influence, as Putin articulates, is now one of global imposition.

These 19th century US philanthropists understood the importance of controlling the production of subjectivity. Like their steel plants and oil refineries, humans too could be made in accord with the broad needs of a burgeoning industrial economy and an increasingly powerful nation state. Though exact specifications for this mass production have been difficult to define and implement (like taxes, they are always contested), the school systems put in place during the Industrial Revolution still produce more or less uniform subjectivity *en masse* in the US and in most every other country with an industrialized education system. It is the nature of the beast, liberal protestations to the contrary.

The subjective qualities, the “ideal types” the system will strive to produce is firstly a political issue and only secondly technical (pedagogical); this is the case as well in theocracies where the issue may seem solely religious. Interestingly, in the 1990s when the USSR lost its political authority, its economic system, much of its culture and military power, it maintained its education power, allowing Putin’s regime to reorganize and remilitarize the Russian nation state only ten years later. The depth of the Russian education system was responsible. Education power and
the price of natural resources are to Russia’s current comparative advantage. Education power, latent and actual, is strategically under appreciated however. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) publication *The World Factbook* does not have a category for the quantification of education, though that agency well may have comprehensive education registers that are not included.

Though tradition (culture) is powerful, education theoretically isolated from this broader setting, is not an ideal state independent of the agentic factors (the human beings, machines that carry systemic logic, etc.) that vitiate it. Education is a social process with no existence independent of its manifestation in quotidian practice. Education, like other social practices, must be reinvested regularly or it will not thrive or even survive. Strategically important knowledge and skills will be less available or lost altogether if the system is not protected, this ultimately weakening any given jurisdiction in all four spheres of activity, and putting its military power at risk. Not all countries have an educational heritage as deep as Russia.

**MAKING WAR-FIGHTERS**

The strategic importance of education was recognized long before the robber barons of the US Industrial Revolution however; strategic understanding of the power of compulsory mass (universal) education in Europe coincides with the Christian Reformation. Protestantism, statist militarism and secular education have been closely linked since their inception. Martin Luther in a letter dated 1524, To the Councilmen of all Cities in Germany that they Establish and Maintain Christian Schools (LW 45:341–378):

> I maintain that the civil authorities are under obligation to compel the people to send their children to school. . . .If the government can compel such citizens as are fit for military service to bear the spear and rifle, to mount ramparts, and perform other material duties in time of war, how much more has it a right to compel the people to send their children to school, because in this case we are warring with the devil, whose object it is secretly to exhaust our cities and principalities of their strong men.

The Catholic Church answered in spirit if not in kind with the Society of Jesus (Jesuits, 1540). In one way or another education from the West has been at global war since. In the years following the Reformation, religious organizations, Protestant and Catholic, and private (mercantile) companies as the West India Company selectively disseminated (Western) education as an adjunct to their economic and religious activity. Educational expansionism accompanied European global expansionism, in what the French historian Fernand Braudel called “the system of five hundred years.” Education was a multi-purpose tool employed alongside military, economic, political and cultural tools to develop and maintain European (and US) dominance on land and sea, and in air and “space,” from the 16th century until 2008 perhaps, when education power allowed the Chinese military to send up a submarine in the midst of a US naval battle group (2007) and to bring down a satellite in global orbit with a missile (2008).
The originary poets of Western culture, the archetypical Western cultural workers, the forbears of modern historians and poets and scientists, first functioned to chronicle and assist with warfare. Their great stories, retold and revisioned, still hold Western warrior cultures together. Heroic Homeric martial myths (8th century BCE) still ground the Western cultural imaginary. Herodotus (c.484–425 BCE.) was not only the first “travel writer,” but the “father of history” (Cicero) because of his narratives of the wars between the Greeks and barbarians (Persia—present day Iran). These generative Hellenic narratives, like the generative narratives emanating from Rome and Germanic Europe later, are weapons bred in the bone of Western culture.

Herodotus’ successor Thucydides (460–395 BCE.) is not only considered the Western world’s first realist historian and historian of record for the Peloponnesian Wars (431–404 BCE), but also the first great theorist of war and a practicing military leader. Interested not only in chronicling what he observed, Thucydides was concerned as well with the causes of the Wars between the Hellenes domiciled on the Attic peninsula. For generations Thucydides’ history was considered the foundation of an education proper. His chronicles and speculations formed a primary model for the study of the past in the Western academy that is still on offer in “history” and most any other academic discipline framed by the conventions of mechanical (meaningful, linear) historical movement. These originary myths are inherently martial, carrying with them values that generate and legitimate contemporary warrior culture.

After classical antiquity there may have been a pan-European education system based in the canons of the Church of Rome, or the court of Charlemagne or in Bourbon French hegemony. However it wasn’t until the nineteenth century that education could provide definitive strategic advantage, and then only because of vastly increased agricultural and mechanical production. The development of full-spectrum strategic statist education is coextensive with the development of coal fired steam engines and four crop rotation in Northwest Europe and North America (the Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions). By the late nineteenth century, mindscapes were transformed by systems of mass compulsory education just as landscapes were transformed by systems of industrialized material production in newly formed fields and factories.

The Anglophone academy has been loath to conceptualize education in cultural/material terms whereby education is a strategic industry dedicated to the production of subjectivity. However, notwithstanding this squeamishness, the strategic value of compelled mass elementary and select advanced education, and of continuous knowledge production and continuous operational improvement has been evident politically, economically, culturally and militarily since the mid-nineteenth century. German “grade” schools, polytechnics, and research universities are exemplars, as is the Kindergarten, a nineteenth century Prussian invention (Friedrich Fröbel). These institutions predate the German industrial revolution considerably however.

Prussia, the state that formed the basis for the German nation and empire, is more responsible than any other for developing contemporary strategic education.
Much of the US system, and the systems in many other countries, is based upon the education system the Prussians developed. Even the concept of lifelong learning dates to nineteenth-century Prussia. The constant subjective upgrading and continuous quality improvement that currently is considered novel and progressive was incorporated into the Prussian educational system from the mid-nineteenth century, mostly through vocational upgrading.

Prussia then already conceived of education stretching from cradle to grave, as a continuous flow process; the German industrial revolution, which proceeded quite differently from the more organic revolution in Great Britain, intensified and enlarged the process. Prussia had turned to education as a means to redevelop the state, the military, the economy and the culture a half century before the German industrial revolution. Defeat by Napoleon in 1806 provided the catalyst. The von Humboldt brothers founded the University of Berlin, the world’s first research university, in 1810. The invention and introduction of academic disciplines in the new German research universities allowed for the reorganization of existing knowledge and provided capacious disciplinary structure for the new knowledge that comprised the new disciplines.

This new form of educational institution produced a “fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society,” (*Bildung*) that was itself a weapons system (i.e. the producer of objective knowledge that was itself a form of global warfare). The Kindergarten, compelled mass elementary schooling, the revised curriculum in the academic “high” schools (*Gymnasium*), new vocational schools (the Berlin Polytechnic was founded in 1820), centralized educational governance and the introduction of “lifelong learning” regularized the formation of subjectivity. This amounted to an Education Revolution on a scale with the Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions that receive academic recognition and study.

The transformative educational goal set for Germany by Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt was nothing less than the “spiritual and moral training of the nation.” “War is the one of the healthiest phenomena for the cultivation of the human race,” Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote, though he did qualify that statement, “It is the admittedly fearful extreme.” *Bildung* was the term von Humboldt used to describe the dispositional set ostensibly imparted by this “training.” This elevated concept for the formation of an ideal (bourgeois) type was based in teaching a subject to search out “truth” and relate it to “equality,” the end product being a subject who complements the concept of State as developed by Hegel. Massumi writes (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, xii):

The end product would be “a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society”—each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State, Prussian mind meld. More insidious than the well-known practical co-operation between university and government (the burgeoning military funding of research) is its philosophical role in the propagation of the form of *representational thinking* itself that “properly spiritual absolute State” endlessly reproduced and disseminated at every level of the social fabric.
Hegel developed much of his statist war theory while in the employ of the University of Berlin; Marx and Engels attended. Alumni include 29 Nobel prize winners. Von Braun attended, as did von Neumann, the “father” of contemporary electronically enabled computing. Einstein and Planck attended, as did the German nationalist poets and theorists Heine and Fichte. Von Bismarck, the person most responsible for the unification of Germany, attended, as did the philosophers Schopenhauer and Schelling. The University of Chicago (25 Nobel Laureates in economics alone), founded in 1890 by the American Baptist Education Society and US oilman J.D. Rockefeller, perhaps is the only university extant that emulates the sheer academic power of the University of Berlin before it was dismembered by the USSR after WWII.

Germany provides the paradigmatic example of the use of education strategically, in the nation itself and imperially. The term *Kulturkampf* (culture war) dates to 1873; it was in large a battle between Bismarck’s Protestant modernists and Catholic conservatives. Bismarck’s Minister of Culture (Education) Adalbert von Falk carried *Kulturkampf* into East Prussia (much of current Poland) in an effort to force state schooling and secularism on the indigenous Catholic population.

Though this “culture war” was not a complete success, Roman Catholic control of education was much reduced and religiously oriented curriculum was replaced by a secular, nationalist curriculum that emphasized the study of “new subjects” such as German literature and history. Most importantly, the culture war resulted in state control of education (the Jesuit order in Germany was dissolved during the battle and civil marriages instituted). This Protestant statist educational reform was replayed in other industrializing countries as well, including Canada where the dissolution of the country almost resulted (the Manitoba Schools Question of 1892).

The Western monopoly on nationalized industrialized education power was short lived however; the Meji Restoration in Japan imported the French and more notably the German educational model in the early 1870s. Mass compulsory schooling, military conscription and the development of some of the world’s finest research universities, the national University of Tokyo and University of Kyoto notably, were among the radical reforms instituted. A national Ministry of Education was established in 1871, three years after the fall of the shogunate; a law mandating compulsory education followed shortly. Its doubtful if another country could have done so much so quickly; social respect for learning and privilege and national cohesiveness was all important (culture).

Present day Egypt and Turkey tried to break the Western education monopoly decades earlier than Japan. Their developmental efforts were disabused, in spite of progressive administrations devoting considerable resources to educational upgrading. Japan was an anomaly—the only non-European nation to develop formidable industrial, educational and military power during the nineteenth century. It is only very recently, since the 1950s, that education power has become more widely disseminated. As usual however, after the generative developments in pre-industrial Germany, education power develops in concert with industrial power, lately in Korea, Singapore, India and China for example.
STRATEGIC POST-COMBAT WARFARE

War is the deliberate use of armed force by one social entity against another. War requires specialized labour—affective, cognitive and physical attributes—normatively labelled attributes as loyalty and endurance for example—labour that is in kind and degree foreign to other human endeavours. The British military historian John Keegan (1993) states “…view with extreme suspicion all theories and representations of war that that equate it with any other activity in human affairs” (xvi). This caution must be respected, for producing propaganda or dictating economic policy is not inherently life threatening. While this may seem obvious, a purposive physically hazardous occupation as soldiering differs in kind from that of writers, politicians, economists or educationists. Death is not a usual occupational hazard in non-military professions. Using the concept of warfare to describe other forms of organized violence is a fraught undertaking.

The last generation of French social philosophers have seemed quite willing to tread this ground however. Each lived through the German occupation of France during WWII, and perhaps common experience led to common theoretical occupation with war. Deleuze, Guatarri, Foucault, Virilio, Derrida (born in Algeria), Baudrillard, to name but the most prominent, theoretically foregrounded warfare in ways that separated it from actual armed combat, extended it into the spheres of activity Putin identified—education, culture, economics and politics. Interestingly, the Israelis applied Deleuze and Guatarri’s concept of smooth and striated space to actual warfare, using it to theorize tunnelling through buildings—homes, offices, factories—to build safer routes through hostile human geographies rather than travelling on exposed pre-existing routes (Weizman, 2007).

These French theorists—and others such as Manuel de Landa (1991)—have moved from unilinear developmental models of war to models of multiplicity capable of containing contemporary war, where the lack of front lines, common theatres of perception or even perceptible combat theatres prove the rule rather than the exception. In addition, contemporary surface combat, the combat of armed fighting forces per se, has been accompanied by constant, intense, or perhaps even “total subterranean combat” in the spheres of politics, economics, culture and education. This constant non-violent combat, such as the Western media swarming whereby China is attacked via Tibet, is typical of twenty-first century warfare, as is the US legal and diplomatic attack on the Iranian financial system.

Twenty-first century actual total war is kept out of common sightlines, while actual limited armed combat and constant statist rearmament are profiled highly. Real contemporary war takes place in factories, fields, research laboratories, conferences, meeting rooms, classrooms, homes, offices, on TV, over the Internet, in the movies and most importantly perhaps, in the minds of the mass of humans. Warfare today can be conceived of as a grand “psy-op” (psychological operation) fought on a seamless global electronically-enabled battlefield—a strategic shift of significance—concerning nothing less than control of the planet. A profound inversion may be evident, something akin to Baudrillard’s (1995) statement concerning the First Gulf War—that it did not happen (that is, the war as a media event much outweighed actual warfare in significance).
While actual armed combat in the twenty-first century may be more limited in scope as compared to the century preceding, the scope and intensity of warfare, as this paper argues, in the spheres identified by Putin has increased greatly. This increased velocity and concentration is a function of new communications and surveillance technologies, whose initial development was funded almost exclusively by the US DoD. Might there be a correlation between a decline in the lethality of armed combat amongst combatants, if not non-combatants (civilians residing in actual war zones), and the increase in the intensity of the virtual (viral) war conducted in the other spheres of activity?

French “poststructural” theorists extended the art of war much beyond Clausewitz’s concept of armed force massed at the opposite’s weakest point in structured statist warfare, to warfare everywhere, all the time. Following on their thought, contemporary warfare can be perceived as totally blended—evident in the transformation of the more limited military/industrial/educational complexes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into the contemporary global military/educational/industrial/political/financial/entertainment/communications/surveillance complex.

The current complex developed and administered largely by the US, and now facing other such nascent complexes in India and Brazil for example, the current Western total war machine, is under constant attack in the new form of total warfare that it itself generated; complex ramparts may be breached at any time by highly skilled computer scientists and operators in China, Russia, India, Serbia, Egypt or Saudi Arabia, the sovereign wealth funds of the Middle East and Asia, the state owned oil companies of Russia and China, and the higher education of newly industrialized nations more generally, to name but a few of the threats to Western (US) hegemony. The French theorists, and again others as Friedrich Kittler (1999), have provided the conceptual tools whereby this form of total war is apprehensible.

However, it is not as if the current electronically-based, multi-linear and multi-modal warfare with deliberate destabilization as the common denominator suddenly arrived “full blown” in war theatres. The industrial nations of the nineteenth century, and indeed military leaders back at least to Alexander understood the strategic value of knowledge and education. Much more recently however, the post-WWII era saw quantitative change so vast in so many arenas of human endeavour that the change proved qualitative (Hegel), not least because of the development of the enabling technologies for “always-on” warfare.

Peter Drucker, a “business” theorist and one of the many thousands of émigré scholars driven from Europe in the 1930s, was the first theorist to identify the phenomena that came to be characterized as “post-industrialism” or the “information age” and its education dependence. In *Landmarks of Tomorrow* (1957, 123–124), Drucker articulated what he termed The Educated Society and The Educational Revolution:

The higher education of a country controls its military, its technological and it economic potential. In an age of superpowers and absolute weapons, higher education may indeed be the only area in which a country can still be ahead, can still gain decisive advantage….The greatest impact of the educational revolution is therefore on international power and politics. It has made the
supply of highly educated people a decisive factor in the competition between powers—for leadership and perhaps even for survival. The conclusion from this is as simple as it is new: Educational development becomes a priority of national policy (Italics in original).

Drucker played out Weber’s (1968, 225) assertion regarding Gesellschaft societies, “this means fundamentally domination through knowledge.” Yet, the strategic value of constant knowledge production was known since the nineteenth century. Knowledge production and knowledge delivery were weaponized at the same time as they were nationalized and industrialized. The results were evident in the War of 1870 (and the U.S. Civil War). The increased military power obtained then by the nascent industrial nations (including Russia and Japan) has however been augmented, extended and transformed, no longer as dependent on human beings, on massed force and conscription for example, but more singularly dependent on information and computing systems (ICT).

Contemporary war as imposed by the US is a complex system, spectacularly activated for heuristic purposes in select theatres, all the peoples of the globe the target audience. The distinction between the civil and martial spheres, the basis of modern professional armies, is less prominent, with actual armed combat valued for its communicative abilities, as basic didactic instruction in economics, politics, culture and education. The object lesson of contemporary global warfare, actual or virtual, is the inalterability of current relations and structures of power, the acceptance of existing political and economic relations and structures as quotidian reality. Could it be the wars of politics, education, culture and economics when wrapped together constitute total strategic war, while wars involving Western armed forces, such as the current armed conflict in Afghanistan, are mostly tactical, one mode of war amongst many that functions partially as a diversion to protect other forms of war from common apprehension?

Society Must Be Defended

Lectures by Michel Foucault at the Collège de France proffered in 1975/76 were published in English in 2003 under the title Society Must Be Defended. In these lectures Foucault extended the concept of warfare beyond the use of armed force, beyond limited or total war, or specific theatres or battlefields. His conceptualization occluded neither asymmetric war nor war by means other than the use of armed force; Foucault moved war out from under conventional definitions whereby warfare is inter or intra-statist armed conflict. He provided a more nuanced and abstract (and abstruse) concept of war, one that approaches the “war machine” developed by his contemporaries Deleuze and Guattari.

Foucault’s broadening of the war concept (15–16):

Power is war, the continuation of war by other means. At this point, we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. This would imply three things. First, that power relations, as they function in a society like ours, are essentially anchored in a certain
relationship of force that was established in and through war at a given historical moment that can be historically specified. And while it is true that political power puts an end to war and established or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed by the last battle of the war. According to this hypothesis, the role of political power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that relationship of force, and to reinscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals.

The second implication for Foucault is that political manoeuvring, the geopolitics of oil for example, must be interpreted as a continuation of war. The third implication resulting from Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s aphorism is that a “final decision” can come only from the use of armed force. This Apocalyptic scenario sees only actual war as capable of suspending the exercise of power as continuous multi-dimensional, multi-modal warfare. Such a war could do so only by obliterating the societies fighting the “silent war,” the wars in the spheres of activity Putin identified. Would the former Russian president take theoretical issue with Foucault’s concept of war, especially after a US missile defence system with ground facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic is hemming Russia in more tightly than ever?

Foucault addresses education itself in this same lecture series (45–46):

To put it in more concrete terms, we can obviously describe a given society’s school apparatus or its set of educational apparatuses, but I think we can analyze them effectively only if we do not try to derive from them something like the Statist unity of sovereignty. We can analyze them only if we try to see how they interact, how they support one another, and how this apparatus defines a certain number of global strategies on the basis of multiple subjugations (of child to adult, progeny to parents, ignorance to knowledge, apprentice to master, family to administration, and so on). All these mechanisms and operators of domination are the actual plinth of the global apparatus that is the school apparatus. So, if you like, we have to see the structures of power as global strategies that traverse and use local tactics of domination.

Nietzsche said knowledge is always a strategic relationship in which we are placed, and Foucault that knowledge is the effect of battle. Education is a primary knowledge battleground, the definition and determination of knowledge (and reality) the ultimate spoil of war. The West has controlled the definition and determination of knowledge for centuries, placed others (the rest of the world) in a strategic relationship to education and knowledge that has greatly benefited North America and Europe. The Western strategic grip on education and knowledge is lessening however; and as education power is a primary source of subjectivity—and subjectivity (applied human intelligence) the ultimate source of power—Western (US) ability to define and control future global development is lessening.
The term military pedagogy encompasses teaching in a military setting or with a military purpose. A military purpose is an object or end to be attained that relates to warfare, defence, military use and armed forces—as opposed to a civil purpose which is an object or end to be attained that relates to the community-at-large, the body politic, or most commonly perhaps, a national state. While most knowledge and education is not directly concerned with military purposes, is not transmitted through the world’s great war colleges for instance, and is valued for its practical application in contemporary civil settings, nonetheless, as this paper has argued, most any knowledge and education can be weaponized if there is the political will to do so. Therefore all pedagogy is military pedagogy to the extent knowledge and education are used as weapons.

NOTES


2 Education in this work is conceptualized as a “cultural material” system for subjective production. Accordingly, education is the production, representation, regulation, and distribution of codified (explicit, formal) knowledge and the social practice based in that codified knowledge, directed toward the production of ideal types of subjectivity—the human “subject” that is itself a contingent and performative site (sight) that cannot but physically, affectively, intellectually, and cognitively embody what it has learned.

The teachings of Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault inform this definition of education, as does Gur-Ze’ev’s (1998, n.p.) concept of “normalizing education”:

Control of the legitimization, production, representation and distribution of knowledge enables the reduction of the human subject into a “subject” who will function as an object or an agent of “her” system. In this sense the control of knowledge enables much more than the possibilities of policing social behavior: it provides the means for establishing an unchallenged legitimization for a certain hegemonic version of the production of the “subject,” the normalized subject, her possibilities and limitations. Such a control is usually called “education.”

3 The Russian educational psychologist and philosopher Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934) theoretically (and scientifically) formulated the full generative power of education for the first time, though the US educational philosopher John Dewey developed theory that recognized its formative function as well. Vygotsky taught that the sociocultural environment, the actual social relations in which the child is engaged, and the tools a particular society uses, language for instance, are the source of the human mind, including its volitional and affective components. See Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in Society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

4 Weber’s (1968, 21) “ideal type” is an abstraction. He explains:

The more sharply and precisely the ideal type has been constructed, thus the more abstract and unrealistic in this it is, the better able it is to perform its functions in formulating terminology, classifications and hypotheses.

This Weberian concept underlies the author’s use of “ideal type” in relation to subjectivity.

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7 Alfred McCoy, *A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (2006) investigates use of “sensory deprivation” and “self-inflicted pain” as interrogation techniques. He documents the development of these techniques in the most prestigious of universities, in the US, Canada and the UK. Psychology, like mathematics, physics or biology, was weaponized in these universities and many others.

8 For a more lengthy exploration of the themes developed in this chapter, see Falk, C. (2003) *Education is war: the constitution of postindustrial learning*.


10 Kittler’s work pulls out the way in which industrial/postindustrial communications technologies are products of warfare. His periods are the Gutenberg, Edison and Turing worlds. Each encompasses one of the three recent mediatory social states. The Gutenberg universe is grounded in the typewriter, which, interestingly was developed in the U.S. by the Remington Firearms Co. of New York, then the mass broadcast radio that came directly out the use of wireless communications during World War I, and, of course, computers based in the Second World War work of Turing. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Kittler, 1999) is a complex work of philosophy and theory, and though education is not his central concern, he does address it, especially as concerns the limitations inherent in the concept of Bildung.

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Clifford Falk
University of British Columbia
TONE KVERNBEKK AND HAROLD SIMPSON

THE USE AND ABUSE OF MEMORY AND HISTORY IN MILITARY PEDAGOGY

“He who controls the present, controls the past. He who controls the past, controls the future”. - George Orwell

“It is only through knowledge of its history that a society can have knowledge of itself”. - Arthur Marwick

INTRODUCTION

Most Western European and North American military academies make extensive use of history in their educational curricula; certainly within the British military pedagogy political and military history is a major medium of teaching and learning. For the most part the place and role of history is largely unquestioned within most western military pedagogies.

The ultimate context for the role of history in military pedagogy is the role of history in human life. The conceptual landscape circumscribing our discussion is philosophical and historiographical in nature. It is made up by such concepts as memory, collective memory, the duty of memory, and forgetting. This landscape affords fruitful tensions and it allows us a broad perspective that perhaps will yield new and unexpected insights and viewpoints. It is our intention to problematize the centrality of history as an unquestioned “given” in military pedagogy and suggest a different, more complex understanding of it and thereby a different role for it from what usually seems to be the case.

While both history and memory are vital ingredients in our lives, they may not be unconditional goods. We shall argue that the potential for abuse is great, and that those teaching history in military academies have to be acutely aware of that fact. The relationships between history and memory are manifold. Basically history is vaster than memory; it has the whole apparatus of science at its disposal, it is explicit and aims at true representations of the past. Memory, on the other hand, may be implicit, biased, and its aim of being faithful to the past makes it highly susceptible to various forms of abuse. But neither is history a neutral form of inquiry, and historians may have an agenda of their own. Richard Evans (2004) argues that the historical writings about the Third Reich are not becoming more academic and scientific, but less. Many historians, he says, speaking about this particular field of research, exhibit an increasing tendency to downplay analysis, argumentation and rigorous treatment of evidence in favour of passing moral judgments. Whether he is correct or not, we may draw the twin lessons that historians like other academicians must be conscious of their own role and how
they represent history, and that consumers of history also need to be aware both that historical descriptions may be distorted and that historians may have an agenda. The French philosopher Voltaire is reported to have said about history that it teaches only those events that meet the conditions of memory. For Voltaire, this meant that history as an academic discipline was barred from principled thinking and comparative analyses. For us in this context, should Voltaire be right, it would mean that history would lose its capacity to expand or refute memory.

We shall proceed by first laying out our conceptual landscape. Second, we shall examine more closely the uses and abuses of history in military pedagogy; and finally we shall look at history in post civil conflict countries, where we shall argue that forgetting emerges as an imperative. And here we find the paradox that provides the all-pervasive tension both of history and of our article: memories of historical events are vital ingredients in peoples’ and nations’ identity, and all nations have voices reminding us of that which “we must not forget”. Yet in some circumstances such memories stand in the way of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.

MEMORY AND HISTORY

Ancient philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle and St. Augustine, have all been endlessly fascinated by the enigma of memory. How can we have a present representation of something that is past, gone, and therefore absent? And how can we judge memory’s faithfulness and distinguish it from imagination? While they had thorough discussions of mnemonic phenomena, they did not raise the question of who remembers. While everybody immediately concedes that we all have individual memories of, say, our own childhood, we are going to take the notion of collective memory as our basic unit of analysis here. We take our understanding of it from Paul Ricoeur (2004) and use it to denote a fundamental consciousness of belonging to a group (a nation, a society) that is capable of designating itself in the first person plural – as a we. Groups or nations will naturally have many memories in their stock; memories that give the group its identity; its sense of who we are and how we came to be who we are. There is a quality of “ourness” attached to memories, not just an individual “mineness”. As already St. Augustine noted (1961), memory ensures the temporal continuity. It ties together past, present and future in fluid, intricate ways. The present takes center stage. Sometimes the past is adjusted to suit the needs of the present, and also expectations for the future may be adjusted accordingly.

It is perhaps not surprising that many of a given group’s memories are military memories. One only needs to take a look at elementary and/or secondary school curricula all over the world to see how our collective, national identities are shaped by stories of important battles. History, Ricoeur says, has a fundamental relation to violence. There is no historical community that has not arisen out of war. Such decisive battles Ricoeur calls founding events: they are acts of violence that were justified after the fact by their very age. For example, Norway was united in one kingdom after the battle of Hafrsfjord in 885, and became a Christian nation after
the battle of Stiklestad in 1030 – events which are stored in the archives of collective memory, the latter still exerting an influence on the Norwegian self-making story. But let us look at a more recent example, the battle of Gallipoli in 1915, during WW1 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gallipoli). This battle, which resulted in a decisive Ottoman victory against the British Empire, resonates profoundly among most, if not all, involved nations. Today the ANZAC Day is still commemorated in Australia and New Zealand, as the battle is generally considered to mark the awakening of a national consciousness of each nation, finally to replace their former identities as parts of the British Empire. In Turkey, the same battle is viewed as a defining moment in history. Roughly, this battle paved the way for the Turkish war of independence against Greece and for the foundation of the Turkish republic in 1923, after the victory in the battle of Dumlupinar. In commemoration of this victory, August 30 is celebrated as Victory Day in Turkey.

However, battles or wars need not be founding events to enter into a people’s collective memory and help shape their identity. For example, the charge of the Light Brigade is stored in British archives of collective memories (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charge_of_the_Light_Brigade). This charge took place during the battle of Balaclava in the Crimean war in 1854. The charge was disastrous; of 673 cavalrymen 118 were killed and 127 wounded. So how did this battle become part of British collective memory, not just the memory of historians or military educationalists? One reason may be that it is immortalized in Tennyson’s famous poem *The Charge of the Light Brigade*; the poem has made the charge a symbol of warfare at its most courageous and at its most tragic. The last verse goes like this:

> When can their glory fade?  
> O the wild charge they made!  
> All the world wonder’d.  
> Honour the charge they made!  
> Honour the Light Brigade,  
> Noble six hundred!

While Tennyson’s words may convey the false impression that the entire brigade was destroyed, we suggest that the poem functions as a commemoration of the event and the reckless bravery of the cavalrymen, which may explain the continued existence in collective memory of the charge of the Light Brigade (http://www.nationalcenter.org/ChargeoftheLightBrigade.html). When can their glory ever fade, if we keep remembering them? We shall discuss commemoration, the use and abuse of memory and history, in greater detail in the next section.

There is only a small leap from the strong presence in our collective memory of military memories, whether of founding events or not, to the idea that we have an obligation to remember. Intertwined with the duty of memory is the notion of indebtedness: we are indebted to those who have gone before us (Ricoeur 2004). But battles won also means battles lost, and what is glory for some is humiliation...
for others. Even symbolic wounds are stored in the archives of collective memory. We shall come back to this in a subsequent section.

The relation of collective memory to history is not entirely clear, but the two are not the same. While memory’s aim is faithfulness, Ricoeur says, the aim of history is truth. History is much vaster than memory. There are, of course, numerous historical events that were never anyone’s memories. So what happens when academic history meets living collective memory? History clearly cannot abolish memory, but it can expand, complete, correct or refute it. And this job history does by an active recollection and gathering of data that far outstrip the resources of memory, whether personal or collective. History is active recollection of the past, a reconstruction of past events with a claim to truth. The job of the historian, as we know, is faced with serious epistemological and methodological problems, since history too must represent that which is absent and long gone. At the heart of the historiographical operation we find the process of writing, which among other things has the side effect of creating a distance from that which is represented and thus opening up the possibilities for criticism.

In less philosophical terms, for most historians in a western liberal democracy history is an academic discipline that sheds light upon and analyses the past in order to better understand our present. E. H. Carr famously defines history as “a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past” (1990, p. 30). Most historians would add that this process of linking the past to the present also facilitates the opportunity to learn valuable lessons for the benefit of the future. Pragmatic historians would assert that history is not simply an academic study of the past for its own sake; it can serve as a practical intellectual tool for analysing the present in order to inform the future decisions that will be made by politicians, diplomats, military leaders and others. This is in essence the same argument that underpins the use of history in western military pedagogy. We hope to show that a consideration of collective memory not only broadens the perspective but also may open up for a new understanding of the role of history in military pedagogy.

MEMORY, HISTORY AND MILITARY PEDAGOGY

We said above that it is memory’s ambition to be faithful to the past. But the exercise of memory may affect this ambition – use always includes the possibility of abuse.

Ricoeur (2004) distinguishes remembering and memorization. Remembering, he says, is a return to consciousness of an event that is recognized as having happened before. Memorization, on the other hand, is a form of learning where “things” are fixed and available for activation; it saves us from learning all over again. In earlier times memorization was part and parcel of all education: the learning by heart and a concomitant fear or perhaps denial of forgetting.

As we all know, memorization is still a favoured strategy for teaching and learning. As our own examples suggest, even history is first learned by memorizing dates, facts, names, striking events, holidays and victory days to celebrate. More
often than not this is taught within the framework of a nation. And, we may surmise, more often than not history is perceived as external, dead and boring. Nobody alive today witnessed the battle of Stiklestad or the Crimean war, so how do they become part of a living collective memory, shaping our identity, if we perceive it as dead and irrelevant? It would seem that the gap between dead history taught in school and the experience of memory gradually disappears, as we familiarize ourselves with the unfamiliar historical past and get to share in the collective memory of our group or nation. Even in military academies, we suggest, history is taught in this fashion. In a sense, of course, this is imposed memory – the official history, publicly learned and duly celebrated.

**History in Military Pedagogies**

So how is history treated in military pedagogies? Within British and other western military academies officers undertake extensive studies of past battles, sieges and campaigns, even to the extent of visiting the actual battlefields. The idea seems to be that studying the plans and decisions of past commanders and the results that ensued will make today’s officers better informed about their profession and better able to make the right decision when they themselves meet real tactical and operational challenges. For instance, the charge of the Light Brigade continues to be studied by modern military historians as an example of what can go wrong when there is no accurate military intelligence and orders are less than clear.

But how can such historical knowledge be used? Niall Ferguson, the British historian, writing in the London based Daily Telegraph in January 2007 cited the British experience of occupying and pacifying Iraq in 1922 as an object lesson that today’s political and military leaders should take note of when trying to formulate a coherent British strategy in Iraq more than 80 years later (Ferguson 2007). There is an underlying assumption here that unless you learn the lesson of the past, you condemn yourself to repeating its mistakes: neglecting history could, in the worst case, lose you a battle, a campaign or even a war. Or, one might add, it could even lose you the peace.

The view espoused by Ferguson seems to afford history a very narrow, limited, and even uncritical role. Nevertheless, there are many examples of those who did look to history as a guide, thought they had learned the right lessons and then went on to fail both militarily and politically. For example, the French military and strategic planners put great effort into the construction of the Maginot Line between the two World Wars on the assumption that the next conflict with Germany would be essentially of the same nature as the last, namely positional warfare from heavily fortified positions. From their history of huge losses in WW1 the French drew the lesson that what was needed was a more strongly fortified system defending their own frontiers. Whilst the Maginot Line might have made an excellent counter to the German infantry attacks of 1914, it proved completely inadequate to counter the Combined Arms nature of German Blitzkrieg in 1940. Germany, by contrast, had taken a far more radical and forward looking doctrinal approach to warfare, without being bound by the past.
What kind of use of history do we see here? An uncritical use without factoring in contemporary realities surely amounts to putting too much faith in history, as well as entertaining the assumption that history repeats itself almost perfectly. Putting too much faith in history may well be dubbed an abuse of it. Furthermore, a very limited conception of history seems to be at play, if the only lesson to be learned concerns military strategy and tactics. A wider understanding of history and memory and their role in people’s lives opens up for different uses of history, but also for different abuses.

Commemoration

Often memory and history are enlisted in the service of something; where the nature of this “something” decides whether we deem it use or abuse of memory. Memorization, as briefly described above, may be used in the service of remembrance of events that are judged to be founding, or otherwise remarkable or important for the common identity. There is, Ricoeur claims, a formidable pact that is forged between remembrance, memorization and commemoration (Ricoeur 2004). Naturally we commemorate that which we must not forget. For example, many Norwegian cities had various arrangements to commemorate the “Crystal Night” happenings in 1938. More precisely, the arrangements were made to ensure that the event of the Crystal Night stays in our collective memory – it is one of those things that we must not forget, to prevent them from happening again. We have a duty to remember, and we often resort to rites, ceremonies or even myths to help us remember. This is clearly a different use of history from the one we outlined above as being common in western military academies.

But the duty of memory, to which we all subscribe, is a double-edged sword. It may lead to good use of memory as well as to abuse. And nowhere is the duty of memory more blatantly expressed than in the demand to commemorate an event, now and forever. For example, in the collective memory of the Northern Irish Protestants a huge emphasis is placed on past events where the protestant population in Ireland was besieged and nearly wiped out by the Irish Catholics. There are of course several things to be said about this example. Let us begin by stating the simple fact that the battle of the Boyne, on the 12th of July 1690, is commemorated and celebrated by Northern Irish Protestants to this day. This was the high watermark of Protestant ascendancy when Prince William of Orange decisively defeated the catholic King James II. The so-called Orange Order commemorates the battle by arranging a series of Orange Walks every year, building up to the 12th of July celebrations. But not only do these walks keep the memory of the battle of the Boyne and its outcome alive, they also help keep alive old enmities and old hatred. A battle won is also a battle lost, glory to some means humiliation and wounded memories to others.

French philosopher of history Pierre Nora (1996) aptly observes that we may become obsessed with commemoration. The memorial model has triumphed over the historical model and brought in a new use of the past. This use, Nora says, is both unpredictable and capricious. In our terminology here, we would call it abuse.
Nora distinguishes between memorial and historical models. The historical model refers to the history as an academic subject, with its claim to truth and its demands for evidence, objectivity and argumentation. The memorial model refers to what we might call popular history, collective memories passed on in successive generations; whether such memories are happy or wounded they are often imbued with (strong) emotions and link up to national or ethnic or group identity. In some sense, in some cases, history and memory can be identical – history as verified memory. But for the most part history, with its large normative and methodological apparatus, can be used to correct, confirm, complete or refute both personal and collective memory. This is a role for history that military academies should pay more attention to; perhaps with a special eye to how the duty of memory may take the form of an abuse of memory.

Ideaology

We all know the pathology of memory from our everyday vocabularies: trauma, repression, return of repressed memories, obsession, and false, implanted memories. Generally, we speak of these mainly as abuses of personal memory, but we shall extend such abuses to cover also collective memory – what we have already alluded to above as wounded collective memories.

The connections between ideology and the abuse of memory and history are many and may occur at different levels. It cannot be our aim here to treat all of these, but to examine some of the ways in which memory can be manipulated for political (or other) purposes.

In some sense this manipulation begins with the forced memorization in school briefly discussed in a previous section. Such manipulation, by which we learn the authorized, official history of our nation, happens in all countries. In Norway, for example, the national curriculum has always been perceived as a nation-building device. Some events are selected to become founding events, other events are thereby ignored. The collective memory of, for example, ethnic groups within a nation-state may differ from the official story, sometimes to a great extent. All memory is necessarily selective and even history as a scientific discipline is selective – historians invariably face the problem that they cannot recount all details. As we have seen, our allegiance to the official story is reinforced by commemorations of remarkable events. It may not be a big step for a political power to impose commemorations and thus abuse and manipulate memory. George Orwell’s observation is profoundly true: “He who controls the present, controls the past. He who controls the past, controls the future” (1949, p.199).

Ideological processes are highly complex; more often than not they remain hidden and unacknowledged. Among the common effects of ideological processes are distortions of reality and justification of the system of power or domination. Let us now re-introduce the notion of a wounded memory and develop it into an argument concerning the abuse of memory and history. Wounded memories, we have suggested, may be stored in the archives of collective memory of those who lost the battles. As far back as in 1389 the Serbs were defeated by the Ottomans in
the battle of Kosovo Polje, surely creating a wounded memory at the time. Now, we do not know how prominently such a memory has figured in Serbian collective memory throughout the centuries. What we do know is that it was successfully revived by Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian nationalists and put to ideological work: to justify war and ethnic cleansing. And for the best part of a decade Milosevic enjoyed solid popular support from the Serbian population as a whole. What kind of mechanisms can be involved in such abuse of memory?

One possible mechanism is the manipulation of the sense of indebtedness; that we are indebted to those who have gone before us (Ricoeur 2004). The duty of memory may serve to keep up a feeling of being obligated to these others. We may begin to see ourselves as their heirs, so that when we speak about them, speak about the battle of Kosovo Polje, we no longer speak as plain observers. We speak as their heirs: there is a heritage at stake. Admittedly we hypothesize here, having no data about this particular case to employ. But even if our hypotheses should be mistaken concerning the Serbian case, we still think they are reasonable as a general view of how this kind of abuse of memory may occur. We find subtle workings of ideology here, not necessarily as manipulations of power, but as an insidious, unspoken appeal to people’s consciousness to remember and to speak for the victims and their demand for justice and revenge. Our ancestors were defeated, they were wronged, it is up to us to avenge them and set the record straight. A duty of memory that is first imposed from the outside by a clever orator may become internalized and experienced as a moral obligation.

Other possible mechanisms are more easily detected. At the political level ideology operates to justify power and domination. The stories of founding events, of glory or humiliation, feed into the public discourses of national pride, faithfulness to heritage, justice for past victims, fears and grudges against the old enemy who becomes the enemy once again. It does indeed seem that Milosevic was extremely adept at manipulating both memories and fears. Much of the same ideological abuse of memory can be seen in Northern Ireland still today and certainly in the near past. The theme of protestant victory and crushing of catholic aspirations has been exploited by some Northern Irish protestant politicians to justify their hard line stance where any concession to the other side is portrayed as surrender. A selective collective memory is used, perhaps manipulated, to maintain ideas of the catholic population as the past, present and probably future enemy.

What can the historian contribute when faced with such abuses of collective memory? History neither can nor should be a substitution for memory. All groups and nations have a collective memory and an identity fashioned at least partly by the collective consciousness. Some of these memories will be of glory and some will be wounded; both lend themselves to use and abuse. We would like to suggest that the distantiated view of the historian is of vital importance, not only in such cases as Serbia or Northern Ireland, but generally. History may expand the collective memory beyond any actual memory by bringing forth new data, new perspectives, and different vantage points. It may also correct and criticize the memory of a community when a community so to speak folds back upon itself and creates a circle of past and present: the present shapes the past and the past shapes
THE USE AND ABUSE OF MEMORY AND HISTORY

the present. The ways in which the past perseveres in the present is vital to both the memorial model and the historical model. If the past is completely ineffaceable, there is in a sense too much memory and the past will haunt the present. This is something that all militaries on peace-keeping missions should be acutely aware of.

HISTORY IN POST CIVIL CONFLICT COUNTRIES

Countries that have only recently emerged from authoritarian rule or countries where there has been intra-state conflicts are often in a precarious state. In countries such as Sierra Leone and Rwanda that have been traumatized by civil conflict, post conflict peace is likely to be fragile and the consensus upon which that peace is built highly vulnerable. Such countries have many wounded collective (and individual) memories. How should these be dealt with to avoid endless cycles of retaliation and felt needs to speak for wronged ancestors, demand justice for the victims and avenge them? In the case of Sierra Leone, the post conflict Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) were composed of both former government soldiers and members of the various rebel factions. Each side had its own wounded memories, its own historical collective identity and its own view of the history of the recent conflict. This is where forgetting enters the picture.

Forgetting stands in stark contrast to the duty of memory and everything we know about the role of history in people’s identities. It also puts Arthur Marwick’s claim that societies only have knowledge of themselves in so far as they have knowledge of their history into sharp relief (Marwick 1970). Sometimes societies have to make a virtue of forgetting their history.

By and large forgetting is experienced as an attack on the reliability of memory. Memory deals in faithfulness to the past and often defines itself precisely as a struggle against forgetting. Still, as Ricoeur points out, the idea of a memory that never forgets anything is more terrifying than appealing.

So what does it mean to forget something? Already St. Augustine (1961) struggled with the paradox that we may forget something but still remember that we have forgotten this something. In what sense can, for example, the armed forces of Sierra Leone forget past events in a way that would allow former enemies to join forces in a new national army? Is there a duty of forgetting, parallel to the duty of memory?

Perhaps it is wise to distinguish here, as in the case of memory, between individual and collective forgetting. St. Augustine speaks of individual forgetting; his memories were exclusively his and only he could forget them. Ricoeur suggests that one form of forgetting is an erasing of all traces, both material (written) and psychical. But memories, such as childhood memories, may not have been definitively erased; rather they have been rendered inaccessible or unavailable. This view is of course epitomized by Freud: memories are still there, only relegated to the unconscious and kept there by repression. St. Augustine seems to have been genuinely afraid of forgetting, while Ricoeur (2004) seems to think that we forget less than we fear, and that the idea of a total memory is terrifying anyway.
But how can we understand collective forgetting, of the kind attempted when the former enemies in Sierra Leone decided to bury the past? It certainly cannot mean an erasing of all traces; in all likelihood people will still carry their wounded memories with them. In the case of Sierra Leone, the various groups of former enemies could work together in the new national army only by a deliberate act of collective amnesia: they agreed to bury the past. This is a kind of institutionalized forgetting, a commanded amnesia. Such a form of forgetting may border on abuse, similar to abuse of memory. But collective, commanded amnesia has other important political dimensions. Paul Ricoeur (2004) makes much of the fact that the concepts of amnesia and amnesty share a common root. Both indicate a denial of memory, and amnesty in addition is historically considered a sort of pardon.

So what do we have here? A collective amnesia, a decision to not remember the history and past battles. Without such amnesia, civil peace – a reconciliation of enemy citizens – may be hard if not impossible to obtain. The forgetting in question is a tacit agreement not to recall. Present strife becomes a past not to be recalled.

It seems to us that this is a fair description of what has taken place in Sierra Leone, and perhaps in other countries as well. Studying the past would entail trading accusations for starting the civil war, apportioning blame for the numerous atrocities committed over a 10 year period, and rekindling an urge or a need to seek vengeance and justice for the victims. To keep the past alive would most likely be highly counterproductive and potentially undermine a fragile peace. Reconciliation rests on collective amnesia, a kind of commanded forgetting. Forgetting holds the power to heal wounded collective memories.

Can we speak here of a duty to forget? Ricoeur himself is highly sceptical. There can, he says, not be a duty of forgetting parallel to the duty of memory. A commanded forgetting can only be temporary; a collective amnesia that should last “for ever” would amount to an abuse of forgetting. The reason for this is that a commanded absolute amnesia would prevent both individual and collective memory to work on the past, reshape their identity and finally take possession of their past again. No peoples are without a past, one only has to learn to deal with it differently and draw different lessons from it. As Ricoeur puts it, “If a form of forgetting could then be legitimately invoked, it would not be as a duty to silence evil but to state it in a pacified mode, without anger” (2004, p. 456). Nobody knows how much time is required for such processes. And as we have seen in the case of Serbia, skilful orators may bring past battles back to living memory and use them for their own purposes. In some sense both past and present may be damaged by such abuses of memory, if too much attention is given to one portion of history while other portions may be erased and forgotten. While there may be no duty to forget, there certainly may be a right to forget.

CONCLUSION

We have in this article discussed various dimensions of memory and history and their possible uses and abuses in military pedagogies. To the extent that history in
western military academies is studied to provide “prescriptions” for present (and possible future) battles, we argue that this is not only a very narrow conception of history, it is indeed an abuse of history. If this is all history amounts to, we lose sight of the possibilities. In addition, as we have seen, history understood in this way does not really work. It does not serve the purpose it is intended to do. The lessons to be drawn from history might be quite different ones from those that are usually drawn, as we hope to have shown.

So what could history amount to in military academies? We think that students can be taught a quite different sense of history, its nature, scope, and relation to memory. At a minimum, the teachers of history in military academies should be aware of the dimensions that we have touched upon. And of course there might be other dimensions; we do not assume that our analysis is exhaustive.

The concept of the duty of memory may be a good place to start for military personnel participating in, for example, peace-keeping international operations. All people have a collective memory and it would be a mistake to neglect it. After all, peace-keeping forces need to understand their surroundings, and a vital part of that is made up by the history of the region or country and of people’s collective memories, whether wounded or not. But this requires that history be taught in a different way in military academies. While an academy may not be able to teach soldiers precisely what a given group’s collective memories are, it can teach the soldiers the significance of such memories and the emotional power of commemorations.

History and memory are not the same, although they overlap in significant ways. The academic subject of history is much vaster than collective or individual memory, and commands an array of scientific principles and normative considerations. History aims at truth, memory aims at faithfulness to the past. It is important to historians that Voltaire, referred to in the introduction, should not be right in his views about history. History, he said, teaches that which meets the conditions of memory. We have argued that it is vital for history (and for all actors on the international military scene) that history remains independent of and vaster than memory. History is needed as a corrective to and an expansion of memory and as a means of knowing what can be safely forgotten. On the other hand, teachers of history at military academies should pay some heed to Richard Evans’ (2004) views, whether they agree or not. Teachers of history may not be chroniclers of history, but they certainly are presenters. Are they, or should they also be, moral judges of history?

We know that collective memories make up an important part of a group’s identity; they give people a sense of who they are, what heritage their ancestors left them, and perhaps a feeling of speaking for ancestors who were somehow wronged. Hence the duty of memory and the variety of commemorations we see around the world. But sometimes, we have argued, forgetting is just as important. This is a highly complex problem because it goes against what we do know about the importance of history for identity, and also against the duty of memory and the faithfulness to the past. However, sometimes a collective amnesia is necessary if wounded memories are to heal. This does not mean that people should erase all
traces of their past and so completely forget it (should that be possible), but it does imply a kind of common agreement not to recall. It could also involve a possibility to revive other portions of the past; portions that have become inaccessible because the focus has been elsewhere. Quite possibly (academic) historians could have a contribution to make in such cases. We suggest that memory and forgetting and their apparently paradoxical relations are important subjects for history in military academies. And history as an academic discipline may make yet a contribution: it may indicate the moment of deserved forgetting. And of course, as we have said before, history may expand, complete, refute or correct both individual and collective memory.

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Tone Kvernbekk
Institute of Educational Research,
University of Oslo
and
Norwegian Defense Command and Staff College

Lt Col Harold Simpson MBE
British Army Education and Training Services Branch,
Joint Services Command and Staff College,
UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham