

# Inclusion, Diversity, and Intercultural Dialogue in Young People's Philosophical Inquiry

Ching-Ching Lin and  
Lavina Sequeira (Eds.)



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DAVID KENNEDY

## FOREWORD

### *In Search of the Third Space*

In an age of acceleration, this volume of chapters could be said to represent another generation, following fast on the heels of the last, of Philosophy for Children (P4C) and its distinctive pedagogical praxis, Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CPI). One senses that these chapters are cries from the heart as much as communiqués from the intellect, goaded forward by the dramatic inequities of wealth and power, by the injustices and violations of human dignity and fundamental human rights that threaten us at this epochal moment; by the corresponding rise, worldwide, of political cultures of cruelty, indifference, authoritarianism, kleptocracy, open genocide, permanent war and naked corruption; and by the sense of hope that not only persists in spite of, but even *because* of our global situation.

No doubt the species has been here before—perhaps more often than not—but this particular moment is exacerbated by the specter of, if not species extinction, then draconian adaptation to catastrophic degradation of the biosphere in the relatively near future. It might even be suggested that it is this particular concern that drives the sense of urgency we find in these chapters—that it operates on the implicit assumption that, in the Anthropocene, all that will save the natural world is the reconstruction of the human world, and that reconstruction is not just a legislative but a constitutional one, by which I mean effected at the level of “human nature,” or deep-seated habituation, to the extent that we understand the latter as in great part a product of education, understood in the broad sense of that term.

Indeed, what also shines like a bright flame through all of these essays, in spite of their fierce and insistent criticism of monological and hegemonic discourses, of ideological, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, economic and political fundamentalisms, is the more fundamental optimism that CPI, and especially CPI with children—that is, P4C—embodies, and the reasoned belief that dialogical inquiry, and in particular communal dialogical inquiry, most often mediated by a skilled facilitator, nourishes the possibility, not just of noetic transformation, but of the emergence of those habits of heart and mind that make cultural, social and political transformation possible. In fact many of these essays present CPI as a sort of de-programming from the cult of culture-as-usual and unexamined belief—which, it could be argued, has been philosophy’s role at least since Socrates sat down in the agora.

Philosophy for Children's optimism is, as I understand it, most deeply grounded in the persistent and ineradicable presence of childhood in the human evolutionary landscape, which triggers and evokes for adults the signs of natality—the presence of the singular, of that unmitigated sense of the new, the unexpected, and the possibility of the realization of freedom and *shalom*—a form of peace that results from the sublimation as opposed to the eradication of conflict. The extraordinarily long childhood of humans invokes that “revolutionary futurity” that announces again and again our species' possibility. We are after all, according to evolutionary biologists, *paedomorphs*; the whole human life cycle is under the sign of childhood, not just physiologically but psychologically. It is not just our flat, hairless faces, our upright posture, relatively large brain weight, our thin skull bones, our small teeth and so on, that give evidence of our neotenic traits; it is our curiosity, our capacity for playful behavior, exploration, enthusiasm, honesty and trust, sense of wonder, imagination, creativity, open-mindedness, our educability and above all our capacity for love. Human childhood not only lasts significantly longer than in other species, but remains, pointing both forward and backward. At the height of the French Revolution Schiller said of children, “They are what we were; they are what we should once again become. We were nature just as they, and our culture, by means of reason and freedom, should lead us back to nature. They are, therefore, not only the representation of our lost childhood, ... they are also representations of our highest fulfillment in the ideal, ...” (p. 85).<sup>1</sup>

It is this liminality—or should I say intersectionality?—between adulthood and childhood that creates and nourishes the philosophical impulse—the impulse to interrogate, to de- and re-construct, not just our conceptual but our existential understanding of our shared experience of the world. And philosophy as reconstructed by P4C/CPI as a *communal* practice sharpens the interrogatory edge, leading to a different image of philosophy, which has traditionally been either an individualistic or a cultish practice. In order to trace its genealogy, we need to go back to the early Socratic dialogues, to before the moment that Plato, the Spartan sympathizer, took his deceased master hostage to his own grand narrative—before, that is, he began working for the state tyrants of Syracuse. As Walter Kohan has suggested,<sup>2</sup> in rendering philosophical inquiry communal and dialogical, P4C/CPI rescues the child Socrates from the adult Plato—Socrates the gadfly, the *bricolateur*, the Fool, the one who listens to his *daemon*, the one who knows he knows nothing, the one who does not attempt to overcome contradiction through big theory, the master of the *aporia*, hence the “corrupter of youth [childhood],” worthy of death at the hands of the Authorities.

As a pedagogy, community of inquiry discourse does even more to deliver Socrates from the authoritarian clutches of his interpreter-scribe Plato. It deconstructs Socrates as chief interrogator as well, and disrupts the monological authoritative center of the speech community. In CPI Socrates the grand inquisitor, the law school professor, the logical strangler whose interlocutors, stunned into submission, can only answer “Yes Socrates, surely Socrates, but of course Socrates, how could it

be otherwise?” abdicates his epistemological throne in favor of his own doctrine, written over the door of the entrance to this form of communal discourse—“Follow the argument where it leads.” In CPI, Socrates takes his own advice, and his or her interventions become, to quote a P4C slogan, “procedurally strong and philosophically self-effacing.” This is a political as well as an argumentative move. It represents an implicit trust in and loyalty to the spontaneous, emergent *reasonableness*—inventor/discoverer of P4C Matthew Lipman’s term of choice—of the collective that we associate with democratic—or, more precisely, anarchist-theory and sensibility. From a genealogical point of view, CPI corrects Socrates with C.S. Peirce, who coined the term community of inquiry and who famously said, “Truth is what the community of inquirers will decide is the case in the long run,”<sup>3</sup> (Raposa 1989, p. 154), through a communal process that Kant, that reluctant revolutionary, characterized as the exercise of three “maxims” of “logical common sense”: (1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; and (3) to think always consistently. The first is the maxim of an unprejudiced, the second of a broadened, the third of a consistent way of thinking.<sup>4</sup>

What is remarkable about P4C as a project, and makes of it a major pedagogical innovation, is just that: it is for *children*. The trust that children are capable of “following the argument where it leads” is already a statement about the nature of human reason and about how it develops through childhood. We can find precursors in Romanticism—in Schiller, Wordsworth and Coleridge in particular—and in New England Transcendentalism—Emerson and in particular and A. Bronson Alcott especially,<sup>5</sup> but these expressions are still linked to a spiritualist discourse—of the child as prophet and seer, the Daoist image of the infant as unconscious master, or Thomas Traherne’s Adamic “innocent eye.” As stirring as these iconic images are, they don’t leave a dent in the secularist tradition, first articulated for modernity in Rousseau, for whom “Of all man’s faculties, reason, which is, so to speak, compounded of all the rest, is the last and choicest growth ... if children understood reason they would not need education,”<sup>6</sup> and further developed in his spiritual disciple Piaget, for whom the logical development of the child is sectioned off and quarantined in a stage theory. In fact it was only with the introduction of the socialist Vygotsky’s collectivist, interactional theory—which constitutes a major element of CPI learning theory—that a pathway is opened for recognizing the operation of “logical common sense” in children’s communal discourse.

If one were generating key words for the papers collected here they would have to include “disruption,” “interruption,” “doubt,” “revolt,” and multiple others with the prefixes “dis,” “de,” “hetero,” “dia,” “pre,” “trans,” “inter,” “intra,” “multi,” “co,” “poly.” I would wager that there is not one author here who doesn’t agree with Oliverio’s (Chapter 1) statement, “there is no separation between education, politics, and morality, ... all inquiry is both political and moral.” These chapters are, as I suggested earlier, responding to a sense of global urgency that reinvents philosophy—and CPI in particular—not just as a pedagogy but as a social force promising reconstruction of existing paradigms, and in fact of cultural and political

sensibilities and deeply embedded habits of being themselves. The times are calling upon us to change or perish.

As such, one major challenge the papers take on is how to save the practice of communal philosophical dialogue from the neutralization and domestication that follow from being embedded in the pervasive sub-cultural context of traditional schooling, which, however unconsciously, perpetuates an understanding of children as in need of protection from too-early knowledge of the harshness of “reality” — whether it be the atrocities committed by Christopher Columbus and his crew or the hidden injuries of race, class or economy with which we live on a daily basis—lest they be demoralized or brainwashed. And further, how can a professedly egalitarian safe space, a classroom community whose ethos is intrinsically assimilative, avoid an aversion to disruption, a tendency to ignore the analysis of inequalities, to mute and background differences of class, race, ethnicity, to overlook, however unconsciously the potential voices of the members of silenced, marginalized, and excluded groups?

All of these perfectly understandable bargains with group life tend to mute the intrinsic provocation that philosophy represents—to turn it into a spectator sport, a form, however subtle, of sophistry. In our very pursuit of another form of peace—not *shalom* but *eirene*, an interlude in the everlasting state or condition of war—we quietly gag oppositional or counter-narratives, and as Kizel (Chapter 6) puts it, “censure the self in conformity to a meta-narrative.” This process of subtle, indirect, usually well-intentioned and gentle silencing, of shutting down difference, of—as Chetty (Chapter 4), in his analysis of how many P4C teachers approach issues associated with racism and other forms of marginalization—creates what he calls the “philosophically gated community.” The latter is a “cognitive shelter” that leaves cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gendered boundaries outside the gate and unexplored; the fundamental social and ethical challenges of our time are neatly avoided in discussions about friendship, thinking, and even justice. Epistemic violence and injustice are overlooked in the dream/sleep of reason that is the dominant Enlightenment rationality paradigm.

The authors in this volume might argue that we are being rudely awakened—that globalization has placed us in a new planetary space of unprecedented intervisibility and interdependence, whether it be racial, cultural, sexual, religious, economic or political, and it is an intervisibility from which we cannot turn away, for there is no place to turn. The effect of monological hegemonic knowledge paradigms and implicit hyper-individualistic narratives of subjectivity, of cultural, religious and political fundamentalisms and social phobias, when gone unquestioned, is to freeze and maintain those injuries which lie just under the surface of late-capitalist social and economic life. Cultural and linguistic diversity are not normative ideals, they *are us*—our basic existential situation. The authors of these essays, as explicitly stated by Thornton and Burgh (Chapter 5) may be said to have embraced the conflict produced by this rude awakening, and adopted it as the vehicle of an evolutionary impulse. Conflict is the energy that makes reconstruction possible, whereas for harmony theorists, it is the energy that destroys: “We do not, they write, “consider peace in

the negative, as the absence of conflict, but in the positive as the capacity to respond skilfully to conflict as a way of life. Therefore, we concentrate on peace education that prepares students to turn conflict into inquiry.” The theme, then, is decentering, deconstruction, disruption, interruption, interrogation, problematization, othering – whether of the Cartesian unitary self, the false appearance of cultural unity and homogeneity, monological discourses of all kinds, mono-lingualism, hegemonic forms of culture and ideology, patriarchy, domination and exploitation, and, on the positive side of the dialectic, encounter, intersection, dialogue, hybridity, negotiation, reconstruction, coordination, transition, mediation. In fact what runs through the essays, either explicitly or implicitly, is an epistemology of *revolt* that extends, not just to the social world but to the intrasubjective world of self and identity and, further, to our relationship with other species, and ultimately to our lived relationship with nature itself understood as interlocutor—an interlocutor, we are now realizing, that we ignore, de-animate, enslave, abuse and exterminate at our peril. It is a revolt against the dystopian results of a dominant western knowledge system and the technology it creates now gone global, a grand narrative that, the more powerful it becomes, the more alienating, emptied as it is of communal values, and hence the more likely to produce monsters. “The educational task,” Thornton and Burgh argue, “is to create opportunities for children to problematize the very environment they inhabit.” It is also possible that children, who are born into this situation, are more likely to transform it in the direction of revolutionary futurity than the majority of their elders.

The elements of this revolt against the rationalization of domination and hierarchy are stated clearly in the invocation of what Oliverio terms “cultural disobedience,” and Thornton and Burgh “traitorous identity,” which is, on their account, created by focusing attention on “experiences that do not fit the dominant story” (Chapter 5). Both refer to a form of inter- and intrasubjective decentering, an “interculturally qualified intersubjectivity” that makes a space in CPI for the interaction between diverse narratives, for boundary crossings and “bridgings,” and which adopts a fallibilist perspective towards all narratives—an embrace of radical doubt. All these papers seek to prepare the ground for a pedagogy that makes place for the contestation of hegemonic regimes of knowledge by opening a space in which conflict is not avoided but “turned into inquiry.” Cultural disobedience is the first of two overarching themes that traverse these essays—the call for “disruption” of existing cultural ideological and political paradigms through communal inquiry. The second is the invocation of a “third space” that is opened up through this disruption.

This “third space” emerges in virtually every paper, in multiple descriptive forms and different vocabularies, depending on the theoretical discourse in play: in Lin (Chapter 7), who is writing about language and literacies, it is an intersectional space that is “cracked open” through communal philosophical dialogue, in which we are “allowed to “reconstruct reality collaboratively”—where difference, diversity, our multiple identities are open for negotiation, and in which the hybridity and

border-crossing, the transgressive urge that is at the heart of our “cultural disobedience” and “traitorous identity” is allowed its critical and creative play. For Oliverio it is the “cosmopolitan” space of “cultural innovation” in which the boundary work between cultures, identities, and ideologies can take place, and foster an “interculturally qualified intersubjectivity”—a zone of hybridity. In Pires (Chapter 2), this boundary-work takes place at the pre-subjective level: the third space is cracked open even before language, in the domain of the intercorporeal, where at the aesthetic level body and mind, thought and affect are one, where there is a “constant wandering,” as Paul Schilder put it, of our body images into each other—an intercorporeal dialogue,<sup>7</sup> or as infant-mother interaction researchers have described it, a “dance.”<sup>8</sup> In the disruptive experience of encountering, not just cultural and linguistic but ontological difference, it is the body, affect, felt flows and intensities that opens the third space. Like all the characterizations of this space invoked and described here, it is the aesthetics of community of inquiry—the universal intervisibility of the circle, the location of meaning in questions arising spontaneously from within the group, the productive confusion between the individual subject and the subjectivity of the group as a whole, felt at the somatic level—that renders this discourse disruptive of hegemonic control.

And the list goes on. Each author approaches this interrogative, interlocutive, relational space with a different disciplinary lens, and the ensuing heteroglossia gives us a fractal of the larger argument for border-crossing that is the book’s main theme. For Kizel (Chapter 6) it is the recognition and exploration of “narrative multiplicity,” including the generation of counter-narratives and the toleration of conflicting narratives in dialogical relation, that does not guarantee but offers what he calls “the fluid narrative space” or “unstable present,” a space that offers eventual, ongoing resolution of ideological divides through, first legitimating multiple narratives, then through CPI dialogue “going beyond existing constructions and boundaries” through encountering these multiple narratives in the atmosphere of intellectual safety of the CPI. Sequeira (Chapter 3) moves the analysis from language, narrativity and corporeality to subjectivity, and develops Oliverio’s broad analysis of the dynamics of the intersubjective and the intercultural in the context of dialogic self theory—thus invoking multiplicity, difference and intersectionality in the heart of the subject herself. Here the third space is represented as “intersectional identity space,” a continually shifting hybrid juxtaposition of multiple self and other positions. Again, CPI is offered as a discursive setting in which the dynamics of intersectionality can be explored. And finally, Makaiau and Chirouter offer us accounts of actual programmatic and institutional and research-based educational projects and initiatives that seek to operationalize the school itself as a third space—in which the principles, dynamics and practices of CPI—“critical thinking, reflection, listening, empathy and democratic debate” (Chirouter & Vannier, Chapter 9); “deep thinking, empowerment, empathy for alternative points of view, experience in community-based decision-making and problem-solving, and tools for reflection” (Makaiau, Chapter 8)—escape the isolated confines of the “philosophy class” and

act to shape the culture and identity of the school itself as a cultural and social zone of “revolutionary futurity.”

But just what is this third space? Is it a new zone—the emergent actualization of a virtual interlocutive space that now arises in response to the historical exigencies of complexification, of migration and border crossing both literal and metaphorical, of the increasing intersectionality of all our lives, the increasing intervisibility? Perhaps it is that cosmopolitan space on the borders where, as Oliverio puts it, the paradox of difference is at its most poignant: where a border is also a potential bridge. “As borders are places where it is not possible to stay but should be crossed, inhabiting this intermediate space, staying in-between, means being committed to a relationship by recognizing the substantial importance of otherness in order for subjectivity to come into existence” (Oliverio, Chapter 1).

Indeed, the “between” has a long history in continental philosophy, at least since Martin Buber. As a transitional space it is, as Hugh Silverman pointed out, a “space of difference which is neither that of the subject or that of the object.”<sup>9</sup> As a hermeneutical space, it is a “place of relation,” where interlocutors are in a relation of both mutual and self-interrogation. As a subjective space it is, per Sequeira, where “the between is interiorized into the within and reversibly, the within is exteriorized into the between” (Sequiera, Chapter 3). As such, one wonders, can it always be a “safe” space? We have several educationalists’ accounts of the “safety question” in this volume—one in Chetty, who critiques “the central notion of the community of enquiry as an egalitarian safe space” as creating an uneasy paradox in the domestication of interruption, subtly gagging the potential voices of the members of silenced, marginalized, and excluded groups, and gingerly ignoring oppositional or counter-narratives, assimilating all subjects to a hegemonic model of rationality. Similarly, Thornton and Burgh argue that “it is misplaced to assume that the community of inquiry is a safe intellectual environment . . . . Unless care is taken in all aspects of inquiry, choice of materials, facilitation of dialogue, classroom structure, the inquiry is likely to create well-reasoned children only within the dominant rationality.” Makaiau, on the other hand, uses the word “safe” or “safety” thirty-eight times, and “intellectually safe” eight, all in affirmation of the absolute centrality of “safety” in a community of philosophical inquiry dedicated to a “culturally responsive pedagogy” and “social justice education.” I leave it to the reader to decide whether this apparent disagreement is in fact anything more than a semantical misunderstanding. In fact, one reason for the optimism of the P4C community may lie in the phenomenology of CPI itself and its roots in the more ancient notion of philosophy as care of the self, an intentionally therapeutic space, and as such a discursive space that can remain both “safe” *and* contested.

Perhaps, in fact, we need, first, as Lin does, to talk about this interrogatory, creative space that CPI promises in the plural—as the emergence and negotiation of third *spaces*, each with its qualitative difference; and second, as event—an embodied time-space situation, a duration composed of flows and intensities, liable to communicative “noise,” to chaos or stagnation, to unexpected transformation and

constant reconstruction. In terms of its manifestation in communal philosophical dialogue, we see it characterized linguistically as heteroglossia, heterogeneity and hybridity; as the transitional space of the intersection of inter- and intrasubjective, ethnic, gendered, racial, linguistic, class and cultural identities in conversation; as the dance that emerges from, expresses and negotiates affectively saturated intercorporeality; as cultural boundary work and innovation; as making a space for the dialogical co-presence of multiple narratives; as the acceptance of a pedagogy of negotiation of conflict in the interest of epistemological reconstruction; and finally, moving across the borders of philosophy into the regions that are its deeper sources of energy and material—the arts. This is a border crossing that Lipman embraced in his identification of “five relatively discrete stages” of CPI practice, the last of which is exploration of the third transitional space of creative aesthetic experience in poetry, music, dance, theatre, and the plastic arts.<sup>10</sup>

One thing we can be sure of is that the third space that is CPI will never—or only in moments of *kairos*—present itself as “pure” inter-relationality: boundaries do not disappear, they are only reconstructed; the encounter with otherness, both inter- and intrasubjectively, is not always warm and fuzzy. In the space of difference, dialogue and mutual interrogation the authority of the ego is put in question, and this is not always easy. What does remain, and what makes of this volume a call to arms, is the pervasive sense that we humans are living in a global moment of dramatic transition, in a world characterized by startling social, economic and political injustices, and that we cannot but feel our involuntary complicity with the structural inequalities that maintain the systemic crises—material, political, and moral—that now stalk the planet. We are driven to think against the grain of normalization and domestication. We feel poignantly, as Thornton and Burgh put it, that our “intellectual freedom is compromised by the domination of instrumental rationality that sees all as a means to the furtherance of our currently-accepted economic and political structures,” and that as pedagogues we no longer have the luxury of separating education, politics, and morality. Our sense of urgency—as well as our sense of hope and dialectical optimism—is fueled by the generic disruption caused by our ever-increasing exposure to differing linguistic backgrounds and cultural contexts. As Pires points out, this is an affective disruption, at the level of the body, and as such both triggers and grounds the disruption “of one’s assumptions, pre-conceived notions, and semiosphere” caused by the inquiry process itself, thereby making visible “the potential of “a creative plane of ethical and political invention . . . which presents infinite possibility for social and political transformation.” It is this shock of otherness and the existential experience of difference and diversity that is the first trigger of inquiry, border-crossing, doubt, and political activation.

Meanwhile, a perennial question remains, posed by every thinking parent and teacher, answered by some and avoided by others. Should children in school be shielded from the very high stakes form of inquiry and problematization that these essays goad us toward? That is, are children in school generally capable of assuming levels of doubt and interrogation of the status quo without drifting into anomie,

cynicism or fanaticism, whether of the left or the right? This question has been around since Socrates was handed the death penalty by the “moral majority” in 399 BCE. I would argue that the way we answer it turns on a view of childhood and the child, and that the authors in this volume seem clearly to view the latter as every bit as capable as the adult—in many cases more so—of internalizing those habits of thought—“complex problem solving, critical thinking, good judgment, reasoning, inter-personal and cross-cultural communication, empathy, multiple perspective taking, personal reflection” (Makaiau, Chapter 8)—that allow for the boundary-work to which the present volume summons us. In fact we might claim, echoing the old Romantic discourses of childhood, that they are harbingers of the third space, its unconscious prophets, and therefore our teachers as much as our students.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Friedrich von Schiller, *Naive and Sentimental Poetry & On the Sublime: Two essays*. New York: Norton, 1966/1795, p. 85.
- <sup>2</sup> Walter Omar Kohan, “Childhood, Philosophy, and the Polis: Exclusion and Resistance,” in D. Kennedy and B. Bahler (eds.), *Philosophy of Childhood Today: Exploring the Boundaries*. Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2017.
- <sup>3</sup> Michael L. Raposa, *Peirce’s Philosophy of Religion*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989, p. 154.
- <sup>4</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 160–161. And see David Kennedy, “Thinking for Oneself and with Others,” *Analytic Teaching* 20:1 November 1999.
- <sup>5</sup> A. Bronson Alcott, *How Like an Angel Came I Down: Conversations with Children on the Gospels*. Lindisfarne Press, 1991.
- <sup>6</sup> J.J. Rousseau, *Emile, or On Education*. Trans. Allan Bloom, (Book 2). New York: Basic Books, 1979.
- <sup>7</sup> Paul Schilder, *The Image and Appearance of the Human Body: Studies in the Constructive Energies of the Psyche*. New York: International Universities Press, 1950.
- <sup>8</sup> See Daniel Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*. New York: Basic Books, 1985.
- <sup>9</sup> Hugh J. Silverman, “Hermeneutics and Interrogation.” *Research in Phenomenology* 16, 1986, pp. 87-94.
- <sup>10</sup> Matthew Lipman *Thinking in Education*, Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 100–103.



## INTRODUCTION

The mobility of people across geographical borders in a new era of globalization lend new urgency for engaging in an intersectional thematic study of diversity, philosophy, and education. The ever-shifting cultural and linguistic landscapes in contemporary societies necessitate the incorporation of a new vision for education. As educators, how do we transform the vision of diversity and inclusion into a wealth of resources for learning? How do we actively engage students' cultural and linguistic diversities in philosophical inquiry? How can we locate the "classroom community of philosophical inquiry" as an emerging paradigm of cross cultural communication and collaboration?

Matthew Lipman founded Philosophy for Children (P4C) in the 1970s prompted by what he saw as a lack of critical thinking in college campuses. He championed the perspective that the incorporation of philosophy at an early age promotes critical thinking skills. Following Socratic and Deweyan traditions, P4C incorporates and emphasizes Socratic inquiry as a pedagogical approach, wherein students engage and dialogue with each other about questions of philosophical significance. Considering the current sociopolitical milieu where technocratic vision, right-wing politics, and political extremism threatens the very existence of human freedom and democratic values, the somber vision of Lipman is more relevant than ever.

This volume is dedicated to explore theoretical and practical issues and challenges of pursuing philosophical inquiry in culturally and linguistically diverse contexts. It encompasses a plethora of perspectives with insights from diverse philosophical positions, theoretical frameworks, and empirical studies. Despite the wide range of perspectives contained in this volume, all chapters included address the vital question: How do we translate our vision of cultural and linguistic diversity into pedagogical practices that foster critical thinking and democratic education? Each author probes this question in a specific domain and explores implications for engaging culturally and linguistically diverse students in philosophical inquiry. These evaluations provide venues and intersectional spaces that serve as reflections for future inquiry.

### THE DIALECTICS BETWEEN CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY, INTERCORPOREALITY AND INTERSECTIONALITY

Stefano Oliverio, Marta Pires, and Lavina Sequeira in their chapters reflect upon the fundamental relationship of culture and philosophy and its implications for a global cosmopolitan society. Philosophy in its traditional, elitist setting may negate the

effects of pluralism and multiculturalism and unwittingly defend a universalistic vision of the world that endangers diversity and democratic principles. In contrast, philosophy that allows free and open borders can play an active role in preserving the richness and diversity of cultures. Their papers together form a coordinated attempt to expand the more recent literature on diversity, *fluidity*, and *dynamics* of cultural boundaries, moving progressively from a broad analysis of intersubjectivity and interculturality, to the contexts of phenomenology of body and dialogic self theories – thus pointing to transference, intercorporeality, and intersectionality as an essential dimension of communal experience enacted through intercultural dialogue.

In “Intercultural Philosophy and the Community of Philosophical Inquiry as the Embryonic Cosmopolitan Society,” Oliverio asserts that P4C owes its critical stance to the mutual conditioning between culture and philosophy, particularly its ability to reflect on the intimate relationship between the two. He conceptualizes P4C as a privileged space in which diversity is leveraged to inform action and create sustained change. Oliverio calls for cultural disobedience against any hasty act of binary exclusion. While we need to be able to be sensitized about different kinds of otherness, we need to remain alert to the deconstructive judgments of us-versus-them and be ready to be called upon to disclose the other in us and us in the other.

Pires in “The Transcultural Discourse of Affect in Philosophical Inquiry: An Introduction,” problematizes this further by conceptualizing P4C as a tool to challenge latent cultural and language borders in contemporary school communities. Drawing from Spinoza, Deleuze, and others, Pires argues that P4C provides an “affective” approach in which cultural and linguistic diversity is utilized to trigger disruptive moments in normalizing education, and in so doing enables the suspension of ideological judgment and beliefs. While the disruption may introduce doubts, it also gives rise to a transcultural experience that is essential to the furthering of inquiry. This disruption contains enormous significance when acting as a pre-condition for philosophical inquiry and learning.

Extending Pires’s argument to classroom settings, Sequeira’s “Negotiating Intersectional Identities in a Classroom Community of Inquiry: A Dialogical Self Perspective,” marks an attempt to push toward more complex theorizing about diversity by including the intersectionality of student identities and the implications of such negotiations on the individual self. She suggests that the binary opposition and exclusion so prevalent in popular discourse tends to subconsciously exclude students of immigrant and minority backgrounds from participating in the communal discourse, thereby failing to leverage the complexity of individual identity for political agency. Sequeira suggests that the dialogical self tends to respond to the intersections of identities contextually and spatially, and therefore may be marginalized or empowered based on the socio-cultural context. The Community of Inquiry, she suggests, provides a fertile ground to negotiate the fluidity of minority students’ situated and lived experiences.

TEACHERS AS THE GATED COMMUNITY AND THE SOURCE  
OF EPISTEMIC VIOLENCE

Darren Chetty and Simone Thornton and Gilbert Burgh draw our attention to the normalizing potential of the community of inquiry, as a potential threat to the vision of diversity and inclusion. The attitudes and practices of teachers can control students' access to educational opportunities and limit their participation in the school community of inquiry and in doing so unwittingly contributes to the perpetuation of social inequality.

In "The Elephant in the Room: Picturebooks, Philosophy for Children and Racism", Chetty contextualizes diversity by drawing attention to the nuances of race and its intersection with other modes of oppressions such as language policy, pedagogy, and other structural forces operating in the classroom communities. Using Critical Race Theory as a framework, he asserts that power manifests itself in the form of overt control, especially in the form of regulating and controlling student consciousness in choosing teaching materials that reflect the value of the dominant group. By complicating the ideas of racial thinking within the community of inquiry, his piece helps bring in different layers of consideration when engaging diverse learners in philosophical inquiry. His argument helps introduce a new concern with minority students within the discourse of the Community of Inquiry and helps address the imbalance of power relationships within the classroom.

Simone Thornton & Gilbert Burgh's "Making Peace Education Everyone's Business" issues an echo to Chetty's argument by stating that the traditional practice of p4c – the use of purpose written stories-as-text – is more likely to foster paper doubting, by allowing for the possibility of "hidden curriculum" in the name of sheltering children, and in doing so risk reinforcing the normalizing potential of the teacher. In contrast, they advocate the importance of challenging the normativity of stimulus materials, by calling for a return to a more direct realm of student experience as a way to break the eternal recurrence of habits and memory.

NARRATIVE INQUIRY AS A METHODOLOGY TO EXPLORE  
LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, AND POWER

Arie Kizel's "Philosophy with Children as Enabling Community of Multi-Narratives", and Ching-Ching Lin's "Diversity and Inclusion: Realizing the Heteroglossic Potential in Young People's Philosophical Inquiry" resonate with each other and both demonstrate the ways that P4C realizes the vision of inclusion and diversity through practicing multi-narratives in the community of inquiry.

Kizel argues that narratives highlight multiplicity and variety that is fundamental to human experience. By introducing narrative theory into the framework of Community of Inquiry, he envisions a model of P4C that utilizes the wealth of student identities in the classroom. The Community of Inquiry creates a space for the potential agreement and conflict endorsed by various divergent voices in the

classroom. This fluid space of negotiation could lead students to reflect on relevant perspectives and thereby transforming their experiences and knowledge through dialogue and philosophical inquiry.

Lin theorizes P4C as an intersectional site encapsulating language, socio-cultural, structural, and ideological forces. By integrating narratives and other genres into philosophical inquiry, she argues that P4C forges a new social language that allows us to navigate through contradictions between content and form, personal and public voices, and different social and ideological forces. She asserts that P4C has the potential to provide a rich and authentic context for learning, enabling diverse learners to draw upon their lived and situated experiences, thereby promoting thinking that is critical and empowering.

Both Kizel and Lin theorize that by privileging new points of view and voices, the fusion of dialogue and narrative can be used to explore the interplay between individual experiences within the larger socio-cultural discourses. It is in the overlapping space between discourse as a public event and meaning making as private reflection that the possibility of student voice that is so valuable to democracy can emerge.

#### APPLICATION TO CLASSROOM CONTEXTS

The rationale for more empirical studies is necessary in order to include perspectives that meet the needs of a culturally diverse classroom. Amber Strong Makaiau and Edwige Chirouter & Marie-Paule Vannier offer two unique perspectives to help address this gap in the existing literature.

Amber Strong Makaiau's "Philosophy for Children Hawai'i: A Culturally Responsive Pedagogy for Social Justice Education" is "a culturally responsive offshoot of Lipman and Sharp's original P4C program". Set in a multicultural community context, her study provides an analysis of the alignment between P4C and culturally responsive pedagogy (CRP). In doing so, her study provides a needed dialogue between two thus far parallel educational reforms and proves there is a possibility for their alliance. In other words, her study provides a persuasive argument that there is room within the principle and structure of the school system for social justice and student driven learning, and P4C is an effective tool to implement this vision.

Last but not least, Edwige Chirouter and Marie-Paule Vannier's current undertaking under UNESCO titled, "The UNESCO Chair Practice of Philosophy with Children: A Basis for Intercultural Dialogue and Social Transformation," symbolizes the international community's recognition of P4C as a viable tool to combat the worldwide literacy issue by equipping students with critical and empathetic faculties. Their chapter documents the use of P4C as "a cultural, sensitive, and reflexive approach to knowledge" to engage students with special needs in an inner-city enclave of Nantes, France. By testing "at the margin", their study serves to illustrate the potential of P4C on diverse student populations especially those students who struggle with multiple

learning challenges. It provides valuable empirical evidence of the application of Philosophy for Children (P4C) when the practice is integrated with children books that are “anthropologically strong” and philosophically interesting to develop culturally competent and responsive instruction.

CONCLUSION

This volume grows out of the desire to uphold and defend a cultural heritage that grounds its value and belief in the benefits of a diverse and inclusive democracy and dedicates itself to exploring its pedagogical implications in school and academic environments. We believe that the construct of diversity and inclusion should be part of a broader cultural discourse and a general theory of democratic education where P4C plays a unique role. Towards this goal, we hope that this volume will offer opportunities for dialogue and conversation, for the purpose of creating empowering spaces for learners who are culturally and linguistically diverse.



**PART 1**

**THE DIALECTICS BETWEEN CULTURE  
AND PHILOSOPHY**



STEFANO OLIVERIO

# 1. INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE COMMUNITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY AS THE EMBRYONIC COSMOPOLITAN COMMUNITY<sup>1</sup>

## THE HERMENEUTICS OF THE STRANGER AND THE “INTERCULTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF PHILOSOPHY”

In this chapter I want to explore in what sense the community of philosophical inquiry (henceforth CPI) is (and/or should be reconstructed as) a cosmopolitan community. To begin with, I would like to situate my educational and pedagogical reflections within the framework of the current intercultural scenarios as far as they cannot leave unaffected the philosophical undertaking itself.

In this perspective, strategic are the positions advocated by the contemporary Cuban, Germany-based, philosopher Raúl Fornet-Betancourt. The starting point of his argumentation, as I reconstruct it, is the highlighting of the fact that the stranger is the one who *breaks in* and *interferes* with the order which is ‘our own’ and makes her/himself present in it:

The stranger exists because there is the plurality. The plurality shows itself in phenomena which represent originals that cannot be reduced to variations of one identity, broadly as the latter can be defined. For this reason, when we speak of the stranger we should speak of her/him in the plural ... the strangers. (Fornet-Betancourt, 2012, p. 43)<sup>2</sup>

The strangers are those who

are in ‘our’ world, that is in our world of provenance, but are not natives of it, so that we cannot understand them starting from the horizon of our world... Strangers are *for us* those human beings for whom our history, our language etc. do not represent any reference point or protection but rather a maze. (Ibid., pp. 43–44)

This situation appeals to a “hermeneutics of the strangers,” that is:

the work of Hermes, [undertaken by each of us] not as the only subject who degrades strangers to objects of interpretation but rather as a subject who perceives strangers as subjects who appeal to [us] by being the interpreters of [our] world and the self-interpreters of [our] own condition and who, therefore, do not deem to be available for the interpreter as a mute object of her/his

soliloquy but rather understand themselves as interlocutors who have the same rights as those who interpret them. (Ibid., p. 46)

The hermeneutics of the strangers and the intimately connected work of translation invoke what Fernet-Betancourt (2012, p. 47) defines an “interculturally qualified intersubjectivity [which] presupposes that one works *intersubjectively* at the level of one’s own way of thinking and *intraculturally* at the level of one’s own culture.”

In the next section I will revisit this idea in terms of the CPI as a specific educational device to promote this interculturally/cosmopolitanly qualified intersubjectivity. Beforehand, I want to illustrate some tenets that substantiate Fernet-Betancourt’s position. In particular, it is important to highlight his notion of an *intercultural transformation of philosophy* (Fernet-Betancourt, 1998a, p. 8 ff), in which we should be able to hear the double value (subjective and objective) of the genitive. In the context of the “hurricane of globalization” (Hinkelammert, 1997) philosophy should engage with the plurality of cultures and with the conditions of their dialogue, in two respects: on the one hand,

philosophy cannot get involved in the dialogue of cultures without being transformed by it [= objective genitive]. On the other, philosophy, which transforms itself interculturally, turns into a ferment that changes the cultures in dialogue [= subjective genitive]. Indeed, this philosophy fosters the critical potential in every culture insofar as it strengthens the basis which makes the phenomenon of the ‘cultural disobedience’ possible in the limit situations. (Fernet-Betancourt, 1998a, p. 15. Square brackets added)

The notion of ‘cultural disobedience’ is pivotal because, while recognizing the originality of cultures, it allows us not to connect their originality with the ideas of their “solipsistic locking up and intransitive autochthony” (*Ibidem*) but rather to spot the conflict of innovation and tradition which inhabits each culture and is fuelled by the encounter/dialogue with other cultures (Fernet-Betancourt, 2001). In this perspective subjects are not doomed to their cultures but have them as one of their (obviously privileged) existential options, which can (and should) be critically tested and judged.

In this work of criticism philosophy and a philosophical mindset are crucial and philosophy is, therefore, the chief driving force to promote “cultural disobedience” and “to [transform] cultures through processes of interaction, that is, to [turn] the cultural borders into bridges” (Fernet-Betancourt, 1998a, p. 18).

At the same time, by valorising the opening of cultures and their critical appropriation on the part of subjects who are, however, never de-contextualized subjects but always immersed in historical-cultural worlds, the notion of ‘cultural disobedience’ allows us to recognize cultures as “reserves for mankind” (Fernet-Betancourt, 1998b, p. 158) that enable us to contrast “the levelling integration of otherness into a monoculturally inflected ‘world-culture’” (*Ibidem*) and to promote

what Fernet-Betancourt (2001, p. 26) engagingly calls the “culturalization of globalization.”

Cultures could not represent any ‘reserve’ if they were monolithic and self-enclosed universes. If, however, “in every regional cultural world [there are] peculiar forms of intellection, understanding and explaining, which make these worlds internally ‘communicable’” (Fernet-Betancourt, 1998b, p. 165), then cultures can contribute to combating the neutralization of differences imposed by globalization without renouncing the search for common ground. This requires that intercultural education does not consist merely in information in the sense of the getting to know other cultures but in an *in-formation* understood as receiving a form, as being shaped through the encounter with other cultures (Fernet-Betancourt, 1998b, pp. 158–159).

I would suggest that this work of in-formation is co-extensive with what Fernet-Betancourt (1998a, p. 18) defines turning “cultural borders into bridges.” Indeed, as the Italian educationalist Daniela Manno (2014) has highlighted, developing the thought of Mikhail Bakhtin, there is an intimate relationship between the ideas of form and ‘borders.’ No form is possible without borders, which are a space that both creates a form, by separating it from what is ‘outside,’ and represents a place of encounter for the differences to which borders give rise:

Speaking of the ‘form’ in terms of ‘borders’ signals that [Bakhtin] grasped, much earlier than more recent studies, the potentiality of borders to activate encounters and to sustain transformative dynamics.... As borders are places where it is not possible to stay but should be crossed, inhabiting this intermediate space, staying in-between, means being committed to a relationship by recognizing the substantial importance of otherness in order for subjectivity to come into existence. (Manno, 2014, pp. 121, 123)

#### CULTURE AS “SPIRITUAL HYPHENATION” AND THE COSMOPOLITAN COMMUNITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

Against the backdrop of what I have been arguing, it is possible to state that in contemporary scenarios a major educational challenge is to find out how philosophy can be mobilized to trigger “the critical reflection in the members of each single culture” (Fernet-Betancourt, 1998b, p. 158) and, accordingly, to equip subjects with the cognitive and affective tools and resources to work “*intersubjectively* at the level of one’s own way of thinking and *intraculturally* at the level of one’s own culture” (Fernet-Betancourt, 2012, p. 47) and to cultivate, therefore, an *interculturally qualified intersubjectivity*, in which borders are experienced both as form-giving factors and as places of encounter that enable people to discover the constitutive relation of subjectivity to the otherness.

Lipman’s (2003) and Sharp’s (1987, 1991) community of philosophical inquiry (see also Splitter & Sharp, 1995; Kennedy, 1990, 1997, 2004, 2011, 2012) can

represent a device that allows us to educationally operationalize the tenets of Fernet-Betancourt and to promote intersubjective work at the individual level and intracultural work at the cultural level, insofar as it is an intersubjective space of co-philosophizing in which subjects, engaging in a philosophical dialogue, de- and re-construct their meaning perspectives and come to a “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer, 2004).

I would suggest that we should understand this fusion in terms of a ‘hyphenated culture’ always in the making. By this expression I want to appropriate Horace Kallen’s (1970[1915], p. 124) notion of *hyphenation* as “a multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind.” Kallen elaborated this idea by creatively reversing the disparaging use of the hyphenation made by the Americans of English origin to belittle the immigrants who, as Irish-American, Afro-American, Italo-American and so on, did not belong to the English stock:

[I]t is absurd to lose sight of the truth that the hyphen unites very much more than it separates, and that in point of fact, *the greater the hyphenation, the greater the unanimity ... culture is nothing more than spiritual hyphenation—it is humanism in the best sense of the term.* (Kallen, 1970[1916], pp. 63–64. Italics added)

Kallen’s perspective allows us to engage with the question of the dialogue of cultures and of the cultural disobedience from a reverse angle in comparison with that explored in the wake of Fernet-Betancourt. Detecting the (possible) hyphenation that inhabits *every* culture means contributing to the identification of those ‘communicable’ traits and those areas of interaction which save cultures from their ‘intransitive autochthony,’ make them a reserve for mankind and ensure the possibility of the freedom of subjects from being trapped within their own culture. And what Kallen calls the “orchestration of mankind” could be, moreover, profitably put in relation with the need for a “culturalization of globalization” in Fernet-Betancourt’s sense.

Moreover, Kallen helps us to realize that the trap of cultural self-encapsulation can snap shut not only as a consequence of a lack of a cosmopolitan openness but also due to an abstract cosmopolitanism that does not factor in “nationality” understood as the “inwardness of nativity” (Kallen, 1970[1915], p. 95). If the culturalization of globalization should be furthered in and through an orchestration of mankind, the latter in its turn requires that cultures remain ‘reserves for mankind’ and, therefore, there is the need for a constant shuttling between the dimension of global openness (provided by philosophy as a ferment and a trigger of ‘cultural disobedience’) and the dimension of local inwardness.

This ‘shuttling’ should not proceed without a reflective stance and should be interpreted, accordingly, in the terms of David Hansen’s (2011) educational cosmopolitanism and, therefore, as the movement between the *reflective loyalty to the known* (to one’s own traditions) and the *reflective openness to the new* (to other traditions and to the unexpected results of the encounters with them). And it is this dynamics of reflective passing from the known to the new and *vice versa* that the

CPI should promote, insofar as it is a pedagogical device which can live up to the challenges of the intercultural transformation of philosophy and to the need for a hyphenated, that is, cosmopolitan culture.

I want to briefly pinpoint two reasons—at the theoretical as well as the pedagogical level—why this cosmopolitan inflection of the CPI is possible and legitimate. First, it is to highlight Hansen’s (2010, p. 6) stress on Socrates’s

strong interest in talking with people from near and far. Socrates time and again considers with others what it might mean to lead one’s life according to other people’s values. In so doing, he points to why cosmopolitanism implies more than tolerance of difference. Rather, it suggests a willingness to learn from or with other traditions and human inheritances. This orientation does not mean accepting or supporting other mores and customs, but it does mean regarding them as indices rather than as departures from the human. Socrates was often relentless in trying to come to grips with his own and other people’s most underlying commitments. He never hesitated to take inquiry to the most universalizable plane. At the same time, he remained profoundly rooted in his local culture, so much so that even when threatened with execution, he refused to go into safe exile.

In this perspective Socrates becomes the first champion and the very paradigm of the double movement of reflective loyalty to the known and reflective openness to the new. In other words, Hansen teaches us to view philosophical inquiry (and its first hero) as deeply and even primordially involved in this shuttling between the local allegiances and the openness to a discussion of one’s own customs and to a more universal plane. By elaborating his reading of Socrates heritage, Hansen draws our attention to the fact that the setting of *The Republic* is Piraeus, which was a main port and, therefore, a crossroads of intercultural exchanges. I would like to add one more element in reference to *The Republic*: it is to remember that Socrates

had accompanied Glaucon to the Piraeus both to pray and to see; he was motivated by piety and by theory—in the primitive and most revealing sense of that term, idle curiosity. The Athenians were introducing a new goddess in their cult.... Adeimantus finally persuades Socrates to stay in the Piraeus by the promise of another innovation: a torch race on horse-back. The conversation [=the dialogue staged in *The Republic*], also an innovation and its self innovating, takes the place of that torch race and is parallel to it. Socrates has a taste for newness .... (Bloom, 1991, p. 311. Square brackets added)

In the light of the argumentation here developed, this textual clue could be read as the intimation that philosophical inquiry installs itself in the space of cultural innovation opened up within traditions in contexts offering a variety of intercultural encounters (as Piraeus was).

Bearing in mind that “the towering, solitary figure of Socrates” is “the paradigm of doing philosophy” (Lipman, 1988, p. 12), this reading of the Socrates legacy can

allow us to discover new levels of philosophical inquiry as it is realized within our (multicultural) classrooms. Many times, interested in investigating general concepts (justice, identity, beauty etc.) within CPIs, we can forget this ‘Piraeus’ origin of philosophy from the questioning (but also the re-cognition) of one’s own customs and from the reflection resulting from the encounter and dialogue with people with different customs, values/beliefs.

Secondly, it is interesting to note how the dynamics represent a possible inflection of CPI pedagogy. Indeed, the latter is modelled in accordance with the Vygotskian idea that the development of thinking happens through a process of internalization, that is, the process through which what is originally experienced at an interpsychical level passes to the intrapsychical level (Lipman, 1996). In the cosmopolitan perspective I have been endeavouring to elaborate this Vygotskian process is substantiated in the movement through which students participating in cosmopolitanly inflected CPIs pass from an intersubjective dialogue, in which different (cultural) horizons are discussed and/or shared, to the ability to identify the (intracultural) dialogicity of their own culture of origin (this passage being the very source of the creation of cosmopolitanly qualified intersubjectivity in the sense of Fernet-Betancourt). In this sense, in the CPI a constant *hyphenation* can be experienced, in which the monologism of cultures—what Fernet-Betancourt calls their “intransitive autochthony”—is interrupted and new horizons emerge within and thanks to philosophical dialogue.

The CPI, understood in this way, is the community in which a *hermeneutically cosmopolitan intelligence* is cultivated. As David Kennedy (1990) has insightfully remarked, by providing a Gadamerian reading of the pedagogy of the CPI,

[t]he understanding which emerges through dialogue is an ever-emerging and never finished rationality.... Through the fusion of horizons of the members of the community of inquiry, the multiplicity of unfinished and partial interpretations are carried toward the unity of full understanding, an immanent, horizontal unity which is necessary to any concept of dialogue at all, and which is expressed existentially as an “inexorable” “exigence of reason for unity.”<sup>3</sup>

Transferring these remarks into the horizon I have been exploring, this means that the work of thinking within a CPI can allow its participants to pursue a kind of universalization which thrives on the diversity of cultures and engages them in that ‘orchestration’ and ‘multiplicity in unity’ that is the sign of a cosmopolitan tension which does not yield either to a *Bildung* ending in a final self-transparency (like in ‘Hegelian’ versions of the unifying orchestration of multiplicity) or to a kind of multicultural education in which the set free differences resist any movement towards universalization (like in some ‘postmodern’ forms of valorization of multiplicity), but rather operates in the direction of *Bildung* as in-formation through a hermeneutics of the stranger, also and primarily that stranger who everyone discovers that s/he is.

INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE COMMUNITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL  
BRIDGING THE GAP, 'LOCAL MINDING,' AND  
"A CERTAIN HUMAN BLINDNESS"

The theoretical proposal advanced in this chapter originates from hermeneutical themes (drawn from Forner-Betancourt) revisited through the pragmatist lens provided by the synthesis of Lipman's, Kallen's and Hansen's views. The possibility of dovetailing pragmatism with hermeneutics is anything but new in the philosophical and educational conversation (Bernstein, 2010a, 2010b; Fairfield, 2000, 2009) but in the present context it has some significant bearings on the way in which CPI is interpreted that cannot be passed over in silence. Indeed, throughout the whole discussion a similar note has been played, albeit harping on slightly different chords. A common thread runs through the present reflection on CPI as an embryonic cosmopolitan community, first when *translation* has been stressed as the chief strategy to promote an interculturally qualified inter- subjectivity; secondly, when *hyphenation* has been emphasized by understanding it as the emergence of a plural and multifaceted identity disclosed through getting into contact with the inner dialogicity of one's own culture as it is discovered by entering into a dialogue with other cultures; and, finally, when the need for *universalization* has been invoked to avoid the traps of the "intransitive autochthony" that cultures risk cultivating. In all cases CPI should be construed as the "space of encounter" (Callari Galli, 1996; Cambi, 2006) where borders turn into bridges and a new, more broadened 'we' can emerge, without erasing the cultural differences but drawing upon them to build new intercultural horizons. In this perspective, the cosmopolitan CPI seems to embrace the idea of a tendential 'commensurability' of cultures and, therefore, to espouse what, in a seminal paper on the epistemology of CPI, Maughn Rollins (1995) has called the position of first-order non-realism. For the first-order non-realists

[i]n all areas of inquiry, that perspective is superior which subsumes the most points of view. And the drive toward comprehensiveness is the principal characteristic of being reasonable. [...] [A]ll or most conceptual frameworks are commensurable—compatible; [...] they reveal the same reality, like windows in the same room; [...] they don't require one to choose between them; [...] they can all be true at the same time. [...] First-order non-realists don't worry that there may be no way of arbitrating between divergent viewpoints, because they assume that with enough subtlety and effort, all viewpoints of equal status can be reconciled. (Rollins, 1995, pp. 33–34)

Rollins sagaciously highlights the peril that "[o]ne rather paradoxical repercussion of this drive toward reconciliation or synthesis of viewpoints is that first-order non-realists are actually intolerant of pluralism" (Ibid., p. 36).

To situate this remark within the current reflection, we could even venture to ask whether, by privileging the perspective of reconciliation, what has been presented as the endeavour to 'culturalize globalization' through hyphenation, in order to

counter its homogenizing drifts, could risk turning over—with a paradoxical heterogenesis of ends—into a confirmation of the differences-erasing tendency at work in our world. If this were the case, the project of the culturalization of globalization would find a better underpinning in a kind of CPI inflected according to what Rollins calls “second-order non-realism” that does not recoil from (and even encourages) radical relativism, by insisting on the possibility of the incommensurability of cultures and, instead of cultivating the idea of a synthesis, aims rather at making us aware “of the danger that one viewpoint will be coerced in place of others that are not commensurable with it [as an] always present [danger] between individuals and society, and between cultures of unequal power” (Ibid., p. 38). In this latter perspective, rather than turning borders into bridges (a typically hermeneutical strategy) we should cultivate the ability to stay at the borders understood not as separating barriers but as those lines that allow people to get into a shape, their own specific shape.

We could call the first-order non-realist view of CPI the “bridging the gap strategy,” while the second-order non-realist one the “minding the gap strategy,” understanding “minding” as paying attention to and, indeed, taking care of and, to re-adapt Dewey’s (1987, p. 268) phrase “deal[ing] consciously and expressly with the situations” of radical incommensurability that we encounter and that we should not claim to (re)solve into a more universal horizon. In Italian there is the expression “fare mente locale,” which means “to collect one’s thoughts,” “to get concentrated,” but literally should be translated “to make one’s own mind local.” The second-order non-realist view of CPI could be, accordingly, spelled out in terms of a ‘local minding’ that promotes a concentration of thoughts not as the task of reconciliation but, reversely, as the detecting of those areas of the cultures of the participants in CPI in which “local incommensurability” obtains, to use Thomas Kuhn’s (1983) expression.

While I am willing to admit the force of the reasons of the second-order non-realists and I am ready to suggest that facilitators of cosmopolitan CPIs should develop also a knack for spotting the points where commensurability is more difficult and incommensurability could be unsurpassable, I think that in the current scenarios we need to insist on the hyphenation and the aspiration to build more universal horizons and these appeal us based on a belief in at least tendential commensurability. In its turn, the latter requires the work of translation understood as “the process of connecting, or bridging, that which is not understood with that which is. It is an activity in which meaning is not only preserved (as when we translate from one language into another), but constructed and enlarged” (Splitter & Sharp, quoted in Rollins, 1995, p. 35). To put it in a nutshell: I would suggest that, in the cosmopolitan educational view here endorsed, any second-order non-realist attitude should be situated within a prevailing first-order non-realist stance.

This responds also to a further concern: espousing the ‘minding the gap strategy,’ that is, the ‘local minding’ as the recognition of an unsurpassable border and of a gulf that no dialogue could bridge, could perpetuate an ‘over-culturalist’ view of

subjectivity, that is, the idea that subjects are thoroughly shaped by their culture (see Zoletto, 2012). If this perspective is embraced, it is moot whether a genuine inquiry—and the construction of shared conceptual platforms—could take place. There would be, indeed, the risk that any dialogue in a cosmopolitan CPI turns out to be only the juxtaposition of several monologues in which the participants confine themselves to re-weaving their own beliefs without endeavouring to build new common horizons. To put it differently: while we cannot think of any cosmopolitanly philosophical undertaking as operating at the stratospheric level of a disembodied and culturally uprooted condition and we have to work for the development of an authentic intercultural view of philosophy, we should not abandon the ‘Socratic’ stance according to which philosophy is *an innovation not only within cultures but of cultures*—obviously carried out not by assuming disembodied perspectives but rather through the recognition of what Dewey (1981, 1985) would call the generic traits of experience, which a communal philosophical inquiry could help to discover and elaborate on.

Throughout this chapter, by appropriating some tenets of Fornet-Betancourt (not without some idiosyncratic hermeneutical bending), I have been moving on a razor’s edge: on the one hand, I have emphasized the need for a culturalization of globalization drawing upon cultures as reserves of mankind; on the other, I have appealed also to ‘cultural disobedience’ as a resource to avoid any ‘intransitive autochthony.’ The project of a cosmopolitan CPI should inhabit this dialectics—which matches the transactive dynamics between reflective loyalty to the known and reflective openness to the new—and the second-order non-realist attitude could reveal itself as insufficient to attain this goal. For this reason I have advocated a cosmopolitan CPI construed tendentially in first-order non-realist terms, although it should be tempered with a second-order non-realist prudence in order to avoid the possibility that the project of an interculturally qualified intersubjectivity turns into the pursuit of an undifferentiated universalism.

In conclusion, I would like to note that in this discussion the stress has been upon a cognitive and epistemic dimension (as suggested by the insistence on the notions of ‘beliefs’ and ‘conceptual platforms’). This does not imply at all the discounting of the relevance of other dimensions. I am thinking first of all of that dimension highlighted in a memorable passage of William James (2000, p. 267):

Our judgments concerning the worth of things, big or little, depend on the *feelings* the things arouse in us. Where we judge a thing to be precious in consequence of the *idea* we frame of it, this is only because the idea is itself associated already with a feeling. If we were radically feelingless, and if ideas were the only things our mind could entertain, we should lose all our likes and dislikes at a stroke, and be unable to point to any one situation or experience in life more valuable or significant than any other. Now the blindness in human beings, of which this discourse will treat, is the blindness with which we all are afflicted in regard to the feelings of creatures and people different from

ourselves. [...] Hence the stupidity and injustice of our opinions, so far as they deal with the significance of alien lives. Hence the falsity of our judgments, so far as they presume to decide in an absolute way on the value of other persons' conditions or ideals.

I cannot comment here on James's tenets (also on what could be their shortcomings) but I do want to use them to raise a final question. The cosmopolitan CPI, as it has been presented, can certainly help us to recover from our cultural blindness, understood both as the blindness concerning some levels of our cultural heritage, which we unearth only in and through the dialogue with other cultures, and as the blindness about the possible limitations of our culture, against which we should assume an attitude of 'disobedience.' But does the cosmopolitan CPI represent an adequate educational setting in order to cope with the type of blindness that James addresses, namely that rooted in feelings? How can the project of an interculturally qualified intersubjectivity through the cosmopolitan CPI promote also a new view of the potentialities of caring thinking (Lipman, 2003)? Would the appeal to caring thinking be sufficient to meet the challenge of the understanding of "alien lives" as James frames it?

In actual CPIs it is not uncommon that the sessions of philosophical inquiry end with open questions. This seems to be all the more a suitable outcome when we deal with the idea of a cosmopolitan education for a hyphenated condition that is still, as Dewey (1988) used to say about creative democracy, a "task before us."

## NOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> All translations in this paper are the author's unless otherwise specified.
- <sup>3</sup> The words "inexorable" and "exigence of reason for unity" are quoted from Gadamer's *The Reason in an Age of Science*.

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