Discipline and Learn
Bodies, Pedagogy and Writing
Megan Watkins
University of Western Sydney, Australia

Discipline and Learn: Bodies, Pedagogy and Writing explores how discipline is typically construed as a form of subjection in contemporary educational thought and in critical and cultural theory more broadly. It provides a critique of this emphasis on the repressive aspects of discipline highlighting its enabling potential and role in the development of dispositions to learning. The book engages with the work of a range of theorists: Foucault, Bourdieu, Merleau-Ponty, Mauss and Spinoza and considers their usefulness in theorizing embodiment and learning in the teaching of writing in the early years of school. Emphasis, however, is placed on the work of Bourdieu and his notion of habitus melding theory and practice in an ethnography of contemporary classrooms. This text is invaluable reading for students and academics across the social sciences and humanities interested in questions of embodiment, affect and their relation to learning.

This is the most thought-provoking book to be published on pedagogy in a long, long time. Conceptually elegant and empirically rich, it undercuts conventional wisdom and potentially rearranges how we think about teaching, learning and writing. It argues that students’ bodies not just their minds matter in learning, explaining how, in practice, the desire to learn is a mindful bodily disposition. And it shows how, through an enabling form of discipline, teachers can produce a scholarly habitus in all students, including the educationally disadvantaged and defiant.

Jane Kenway, Professor of Education, Monash University

Discipline and Learn: Bodies, Pedagogy and Writing is an excellent book which makes an important contribution to our understanding of both pedagogy and the body and which is sure to spark debate in both fields. It is careful and judicious in its approach but still manages to be provocative and original.

Nick Crossley, Professor of Sociology, University of Manchester

Cover image: The Blackfriars School: The old style with Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW
Discipline and Learn

*Bodies, Pedagogy and Writing*
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Bodies, Pedagogy and Writing

Megan Watkins
DEDICATION

To Gwen, who was the first to discipline me and from whom I first learned.

To Greg, who would probably like to discipline me and from whom I’m always learning.

And

To Declan, who I hope I have disciplined well and who seems to love learning.
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INTRODUCTION

DISCIPLINE AND LEARN

discipline, v. [a.F. discipliner (12th c. in Hatz.–Darm.) or med.L. disciplinare, f. L. disciplina DISCIPLINE sb.]

a. trans. To subject to discipline; in earlier use, to instruct, educate, train; in later use, more especially to train to habits of order and subordination; to bring under control.

Oxford English Dictionary (1989, p. 735)

A vivid memory I have from my years as a high school history teacher in the outer western suburbs of Sydney, Australia, is looking at students and thinking that some just didn’t know how to learn. I remember standing in front of the class, watching their bodies fidget, having great difficulty assuming the stillness and degree of focus necessary to complete what they were doing. This was not the case with all students. There were those who settled into work quickly, demonstrating an ability to apply themselves. Restlessness and difficulty concentrating seemed more of a problem for the less able students, but I still wondered why there was such a marked contrast in the application to work that these students displayed. Part of the problem was a difference in ability. Study of history at a secondary level requires students to read and write with reasonable proficiency; skills that are assumed competencies by this stage of education. While students continue to develop their literacy skills in high school, it was quite clear that many of the students who were experiencing difficulty had not yet acquired a good grasp of the mechanics of writing, such as spelling, punctuation and basic syntax, despite being in their eighth year of school. This made the construction of the various types of texts they were required to write an almost impossible task for some. It became clear that to address this problem I would have to place a much stronger emphasis on teaching writing rather than simply the content of my subject.

It was at this point in my teaching career that I embraced what was then the fledgling genre-based approach to writing, a technique that focuses on teaching the structural and grammatical features of the key text types of schooling (Cope and Kalantzis, 1993). Despite finding the approach useful, I remained frustrated with the way many students continued to experience difficulty with writing, despite my best efforts to teach them. After a number of years teaching and developing expertise in the field of literacy education, I was appointed to a literacy consultancy position in the Department of School Education working in primary and secondary schools in the western suburbs of Sydney. I visited numerous classrooms and observed many lessons and continued to see those same restless bodies I had seen in my own classroom years before. It began to occur to me that in the years I’d spent trying to improve students’ writing I’d ignored the role of the...
body in learning. My focus and that of the approach I had been working with had been curriculum content; the structure and grammar of the texts students were expected to write. While this is fundamentally important, especially given its neglect within education for some twenty years, the way the curriculum was to be implemented was given far less attention. Pedagogy seemed to be collapsed into curriculum with the focus on what was taught rather than the practicalities of how. Rather than an outright neglect of pedagogy, however, it was more a matter of its reshaping. There was a move away from the craft of teaching – or what Durkheim (2002, p. 2) refers to as the ‘savoir faire of the educator’ – towards a greater emphasis on student-directed learning, resulting in a reduced role for the teacher. This shift has considerable implications for the ways in which the body is configured pedagogically. I realised the reasons why a number of my own students had trouble settling down and concentrating was that they lacked the discipline to do so. While I was quite strict in terms of classroom management and provided a considerable degree of teacher direction, I only saw my junior secondary students, aged 12–14 years, for three, 40-minute lessons a week and so my impact was minimal. Also, by this stage of their education, students seemed to have already acquired a particular set of work habits. The ways in which they conducted themselves in class and their overall approach to learning appeared quite engrained, dispositions formed largely during the seven years of their primary education. This seems a formative period in terms of students’ academic demeanour, a time during which certain dispositions to learning are acquired that are as much corporeal as they are cognitive.

Yet this bodily aspect of learning and its impact on cognition receives little attention within educational theory and practice. While students’ bodies may figure as a classroom management issue, learning is generally conceived in cognitive terms; the corporeality of the process is largely ignored. This is particularly the case within the current educational paradigm in which the tenets of progressivist education favouring student-directed learning and limited teacher direction prevail (Cope and Kalantzis, 1993; Reese, 2001). While the high point of progressivism may have passed and there is now a perceived need for a more explicit approach to teaching than was the case during the 1970s and 1980s (Board of Studies, New South Wales, 1994; Board of Studies, New South Wales, 1998; National Curriculum Board, 2009), there seems little understanding as to how this is achieved. The practices many teachers employ still bear the stamp of progressivism, with student-directed learning now very much a part of the commonsense of teaching. The more strict disciplinary codes characteristic of instructional pedagogies are largely viewed as anachronistic (Burbules, 2003 p. 194). This is particularly the case in the early years of school where the existence of a romantic notion of childhood seems to prohibit a more interventionist style of teaching. Instead, emphasis is placed on establishing a learning environment with minimal regulation to allow students the “freedom to learn” (Brady, 2006; Nolan, 2006; Silberman, 2006). The teacher’s role is to facilitate, rather than to direct, learning (Watkins, 2008). In practice this is realised through a predominance of group-based and independent learning activities over
whole-class instruction, which the increased use of IT in classrooms has seemed to exacerbate. These less teacher-directed methodologies result in a far more relaxed disciplinary code framing classroom practice and a greater tolerance of talk and movement than is the case with teacher-directed approaches.

Crucial to this book is the argument that while there are different types of learning, successful academic engagement requires that students develop a form of bodily discipline conducive to applied intellectual effort. Different pedagogic modes are informed by different conceptions as to how this is achieved and exert differing degrees of disciplinary force upon students’ bodies. This book has a different take on discipline than is captured by the usual talk of classroom management. It includes the formation of self-discipline internalised by students but shaped by the discipline inherent in a teacher’s pedagogy. Discipline, however, is typically construed as a form of subjection in contemporary educational thought and practice and this negative meaning is often used as a rationale for de-emphasising the teacher’s role and promoting student-directed learning. Yet the etymological roots of discipline are not found in subordination. Originally, to discipline meant to instruct, educate or train, with the implication that learning was dependent upon a teacher directing a student’s acquisition of knowledge and skills. This earlier meaning has an enabling quality that is generally lost within current usage. Where this meaning is retained is in learning a sport, with training and discipline understood as necessary aspects of sporting achievement. In learning a sport, however, the role of the body is foregrounded. Within the academic realm the body is deemed relatively insignificant. The focus is on the mind with training viewed more as an impediment to creative and spontaneous thought, as if there is no requisite training for scholarly endeavour. The ways in which discipline can capacitate students’ bodies and minds with the potential to be both transformative and emancipatory is rarely considered within current educational inquiry (for exceptions to this see: Slee, 1995; Millei, 2010; Parkes, 2010). A truly transformative and emancipatory education, however, needs to embrace the kinds of discipline that underpin educational success.

DISCIPLINE AS ENABLING

Discipline is generally only conceived as possessing reproductive tendencies. Little thought is given to how the processes of reproduction may also prove enabling. Reproduction theorists view schooling as one of the key mechanisms through which social inequality is maintained, although there is considerable variation as to how this is approached. In the 1970s Bowles and Gintis espoused the quite crude principle of correspondence, focusing on schools as essentially instruments of economic reproduction. Other perspectives are more concerned with the complexities of how reproduction is realised through socio-cultural means (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Willis, 1977; Apple, 1979). None of these approaches, however, seem to give any attention to the enabling potential of pedagogy and the role discipline may play in this. Rather, what tends to preoccupy reproduction theorists is broad socio-structural outcomes. There is very little
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examination of the practices involved in attaining these and the resources they may provide students. These analyses characteristically focus on the relative achievements of students in relation to their parents’ income, occupation and other variables (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Bourdieu, 1998a; Teese, 2007). While such forms of inquiry are valuable in foregrounding the inequalities embedded in educational systems, they tend to obscure the enabling processes of schooling. By not focusing on practice, they fail to capture the ways in which economically advantaged children actually get the competencies that are inequitably distributed and the ways in which teachers can work against inequality at a classroom level. This is not some simple romanticising about the power of teachers to change lives that has become a staple of Hollywood movies, but a realistic assessment of the possibilities of engaged pedagogy.

There are, of course, exceptions to this neglect of pedagogic practice both within and outside the broad spectrum of scholarship dealing with educational reproduction. Bernstein’s work on the linguistic codes governing schooling examines reproductive processes in more detail and why they are inequitably distributed (Bernstein, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1990). Through an investigation of classroom practice and the language of schooling, Bernstein was able to identify the different patternings of language underpinning working class and middle class discourse; what he termed restricted and elaborated codes. To Bernstein, there are distinct parallels between the elaborated code used by middle class students and the discursive structures of academic writing. As a result he felt working class students were disadvantaged because the restricted code framing their patterns of speech impeded their ability to read and write. There has been considerable criticism of this argument. There are those who claim Bernstein’s work denigrates the language and culture of the working class (Labov, 1972); those who challenge the linguistic efficacy of his notion of code (Tannen, 1982); and those, such as Bourdieu (1994), who critique Bernstein’s work on the basis that it fetishises the discourse of the middle class (Harker and May, 1993). I wouldn’t argue that education unfairly valorises middle class culture, but I do assert that it is through educational institutions that the middle class maintains its monopolisation of important socio-linguistic competencies. Despite these criticisms, Bernstein’s work has proved influential within the sociology of education (Singh, 2002; Fritz, 2007; Au, 2008; Maton, 2009) and literacy pedagogy (Cope and Kalantzis, 1993; Hasan, 1999, 2002; Nash, 2006). His central concern in investigating classroom practice, however, is language. His notion of pedagogy is framed almost entirely by the linguistic. The corporeality of learning – the various disciplinary techniques that teachers use and the ways in which they impact upon students’ bodies – is not his focus. This is not so much a criticism of Bernstein’s work, given it falls outside the parameters of his inquiry, but it serves to highlight how the body is often ignored in studies of pedagogy.

Emerging from the same politically progressive tradition as reproduction theory, critical pedagogy does make allowance for the enabling potential of education; yet it does so by conceiving discipline in negative terms. Theorists such as Giroux (1988, 2004) and McLaren (1989, 2003), who found reproduction theory yielded little scope for articulating any transformative role for schooling, proffered an
alternative theory of education. They assigned teachers a radicalised role to “empower students both as individuals and as potential agents of social change by establishing a critical pedagogy that students can use in the classroom and in the streets” (McLaren, 1989, p. 221). Yet, despite the visionary rhetoric underpinning critical pedagogy, there seems little substantive account of how these ideals are realised at a classroom level (Heilman, 2003). This is particularly the case with Giroux and McLaren’s work. As Gore (1993, p. 34) comments, “… their approach is centred on articulating a ‘pedagogical product’ rather than pedagogical practice, that is, a social vision for teachers’ work rather than guidelines for instructional practice”. The same cannot be said about all those working within the field of critical pedagogy. Freire (1972, 1985) and Shor (1992), for example, are concerned with explicating the ways in which critical pedagogy is actualised within classroom practice. What characterises the pedagogy they advocate, and which is implicit in the more abstract accounts of Giroux, McLaren and other theorists working in this field, is an underlying progressivism premised on the recognition and liberation of student voice rather than the formation of specific new capacities. Although acknowledging the need for teachers to maintain a certain degree of authority in their role of empowering students, the methodology underpinning critical pedagogy is essentially student-directed, framed by a limited degree of disciplinary force. Freire (1972, pp. 46–47) draws on these pedagogic principles in his critique of traditional, teacher-directed learning, or what he terms “banking education”:

1. the teacher teaches and the students are taught;
2. the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing;
3. the teacher thinks and the students are thought about;
4. the teacher talks and the students listen – meekly;
5. the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined;
6. the teacher chooses and enforces his (sic) choice, and the students comply;
7. the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher;
8. the teacher chooses the program content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it;
9. the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of students;
10. the teacher is the subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects.

Here, Freire casts students in a passive role with the heightened degree of disciplinary force generated by teacher-directed pedagogy conceived solely in negative terms. While acknowledging that traditional teaching methods are potentially repressive, such a possibility is not unique to teacher-directed learning. Although not undertaken in such an overt manner, progressivist pedagogy can exhibit similar tendencies (Sharp and Green, 1975; Walkerdine, 1984; Kalantzis, Cope, Noble and Poynting, 1990; Sripakraik, 2009). Moreover, it ‘throws the baby out with the bathwater’; it ignores the significant social powers conferred upon those, such as academics, through the attainment of traditional literacies.
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DISCIPLINE AND LEARN: THEORETICAL INFLUENCES

While also acknowledging its ability to repress, discipline can enable; enskilling bodies to perform in various ways. While a range of theorists and conceptual resources are drawn upon to examine this perspective in the context of schooling, emphasis in this book is placed on Foucault’s notion of discipline, Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the habitus and Spinoza’s monism and approach to affect and desire. Each of these contributes to a rethinking of the body and its role in learning, highlighting the impact of pedagogy and its ability to capacitate. As with the generally negative stance on discipline within educational theory, Foucault’s work has a similar emphasis. He is often lauded for his take on the enabling potential of power, especially in his later work on technologies of the self (Foucault, 1990). However, this ‘positive’ conception of discipline is largely rhetorical and subordinated to a concentration on discipline as primarily negative. This is clearly evident in his juxtaposition of the terms ‘discipline’ and ‘punish’ in his seminal text of the same name. Here in this book, however, the productive possibilities of discipline are highlighted, as the title Discipline and Learn conveys. While making an obvious reference to Foucault, this book does not simply provide a Foucauldian analysis of the body and learning. The conceptual tools that are drawn upon owe much to his genealogical method and analysis of temporal and spatial schemas. However, in focusing on the enabling aspects of discipline, a mechanism is required for articulating the ways in which disciplinary force not only circulates and is embodied but accumulates as a form of agency in relation to individual practice. In the context of schooling and with the focus here on literacy, it needs to demonstrate how teachers’ practice impacts upon students’ bodies and the extent to which different forms of embodiment assist in the difficult process of learning to write. Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is helpful in this regard because it provides a means for negotiating the social/individual nexus, the relationship between pedagogic practice and student outcomes. Despite its benefits, there are aspects of Bourdieu’s concept that prove problematic in analysing the role of the body in learning, such as his emphasis on the unconscious and largely corporeal nature of the habitus. In making little allowance for the intervention of consciousness, Bourdieu’s habitus provides a far too deterministic interpretation of practice. This is evident in his application of the concept to education. In Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture and State Nobility, Bourdieu only seems to account for the reproductive, as opposed to transformative, processes of schooling. As with Foucault and discipline, this book takes the kernel of Bourdieu’s generative conception of habitus and gives it centre stage in an analysis of pedagogy.

In examining the role of the body in learning and especially learning to write, it is also important to give consideration to the role of the mind. Rather than viewing the two as separate, following Spinoza, it is useful to think of them as a single substance operating in parallel in the determination of practice. It is not so much that the habitus needs to make allowance for the intervention of consciousness but rather to view consciousness as itself embodied, with practice understood as a dialectic of bodily habituation and mindful reflection. This is the position taken in
this book, that the body is not simply a corporeal entity; it is also invested with reason using embodied understanding as the basis of scholarly endeavour. Infused with a Spinozan monism, the habitus not only informs and guides, but responds to the workings of consciousness in the process of negotiating being in the world. While Bourdieu does take account of consciousness in his logic of practice, it functions more as an epiphenomenon rather than an integral, and integrated, aspect of action. To Spinoza the mind and the body act in concert, but it is only through the body and its capacity to be affected that we come to know the world. Affect functions as both force and capacity with pedagogy and the discipline it generates carrying varying intensities of affective force. A Spinozan interpretation of habitus, therefore, not only allows the dispositions resulting from the accumulation of bodily affect to shape practice, it also allows the embodied consciousness that is produced from this corporeal engagement with the world.

Central to the accumulation of affect and the formation of a scholarly habitus is the role of the teacher. Although students begin school with different dispositions to learning, the disciplinary force generated by their teachers’ pedagogy can have a considerable impact. It may prove enabling, investing their bodies with the capacity to learn. As Elias (1982, p. 328) writes, “No society can survive without a challenging of individual drives and affects, without a very specific control of individual behaviour”. The form of “control” Elias intends is not disempowering but rather, by training the body for scholarly endeavour, a student can be empowered to learn. Indeed, it is only through conceiving “control” as empowerment that the unequal distribution of certain capacities and their links to relations of power can be understood. A complementary effect of the formation of a scholarly habitus seems to be an increase in the desire to learn. This tallies with Spinoza’s notion of desire. As he explains, “It is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it and desire it” (Spinoza, Ethics, 111, P9, S). If students possess the necessary bodily disposition it is more likely they will apply themselves to their work framed by a desire for academic achievement. It is this I feel that was missing from those restless bodies I’d witnessed in my classroom years ago.

ORGANISATION OF THE BOOK

While this book raises questions about the nature and cultivation of the desire to learn, in particular the extent to which it is derived from the accumulation of bodily affect, its central concern is the relationship between discipline and the formation of a scholarly habitus in the process of learning to write. To do this, the body is explored from three different perspectives; as bodies in theory, bodies in text and bodies in practice, organised as three different sections within the book. The first of these sections comprises two chapters. Chapter 1, Conceiving the Body, surveys different conceptualisations of the body: the phenomenological perspectives of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the early sociological account of Mauss, and its more recent treatment following Foucault’s rediscovery of the body as an object of
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socio-cultural concern. These various theorisations are assessed in terms of their usefulness in understanding the role of the body in learning with consideration given to the need within education for an approach that embraces both the body and the mind. These concerns are also addressed in Chapter 2, Pedagogy and the Mindful Body, but focusing more specifically on the work of Bourdieu and Spinoza. In light of this analysis, a reconceptualisation of Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is proposed, drawing upon Spinoza’s psychophysical parallelism which frames the empirically based chapters in Section 3.

In Section 2 the focus shifts to bodies in text, the ways in which bodies have been configured textually and the implications of this for pedagogic practice. Emphasis is given to the temporality of bodies, how they are shaped historically, a perspective often neglected within socio-cultural analysis (Shilling, 2005, p. 14). As with schools in most Western English-speaking nations, those in Australia have experienced considerable change since the beginnings of public education in the nineteenth century. The move from traditional to progressivist teaching techniques, and factors such as the rise of educational psychology, have left their mark on approaches to pedagogy and the body of the learner. These shifts are explored through an analysis of English Syllabus documents within the New South Wales education system, which drew on trends from both the United States of America and the United Kingdom to inform its earliest syllabus in 1905 through to those of more recent years.

In Section 3 emphasis is placed on bodies in practice. It provides an ethnography of two very different primary schools conducted over the course of a year examining the pedagogic practice of a kindergarten, Year 3 and Year 5 teacher in each. The specific focus is the disciplinary techniques employed by these teachers: their organisation of the pedagogic space, involving classroom design, ambience and the use of this space; classroom regimen, where noise level, movement and student composure are considered; and their implementation of the writing curriculum, focusing on lesson content, duration and each teacher’s overall approach. This analysis not only highlights the impact of the teachers’ practice on their students’ ability to write, but also students’ overall disposition for academic work and the extent to which they have acquired a habitus for learning. In the concluding chapter, Disparate Bodies, there is a return to the issues raised in Chapters 1 and 2. The corporeality of learning is reconsidered in light of the examination of bodies in practice with a call for a reassessment of the role of discipline in the process of learning to write and in the formation of dispositions to learning in general.

AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF CORPOREALITY AND LEARNING:
THE BACKGROUND TO BODIES IN PRACTICE

Despite growing scholarship within the field of education on the role of the body in learning, much of this remains at the level of theory or textual analysis without close examination of bodies in practice. Yet to fully grasp what bodies do and how they come to be, close observation is required. This is not so much to obtain a true
and accurate account, as ethnographies need to be understood as always culturally, spatially and historically situated (Kenway, Kraak and Hickey-Moody, 2006). Yet ethnographic methods and especially those of observation can reveal the minutiae of practice that may otherwise remain obscured. In investigating bodies and learning within a classroom context, these techniques proved insightful in capturing the impact of particular spatialities and regimens and revealing the different ways in which pedagogy disciplines bodies and promotes different dispositions to learning. Six audio-taped observation sessions were conducted in each of the six teacher’s classrooms. Extensive observation notes were compiled and teaching stimulus material and student work samples were also collected over the course of the study. The observation lessons were generally undertaken twice a term during the first three of the four school terms. This was not always possible given demands on the teachers’ time, but on average each observation lesson was 1½–2 hours in length and so a total of 10–12 hours of each teacher’s classroom practice was observed with some of a longer duration. At the conclusion of the classroom observation period towards the end of the school year each teacher was interviewed about their teaching background and aspects of their pedagogic practice. Both school principals were also interviewed at this time to gather additional background information on each school.

The two primary schools investigated, here called Westville Public School (PS) and Northside PS, are very different schools having comparatively diverse student populations in terms of socio-economic background, ethnic mix and geographical location. Westville PS is located in an outer western suburb of Sydney. The socio-economic status (SES) of the children attending the school is very low, which is reflected in its classification as a disadvantaged school receiving additional government funding. While there is a spread of household types, a number of students live in public housing with either one or both parents unemployed. Students are drawn from a diverse range of ethnic and language groupings, with 38 percent of the population from a language background other than English (LBOTE). The highest non-Anglo ethnic group is Filipino followed closely by other Pacific Islander students of mainly Samoan and Tongan backgrounds. Students from a variety of other nationalities and ethnic groups are represented at the school: Korean, Vietnamese, Sri Lankan, Indian, Pakistani, Turkish, Croatian and Serbian. In addition, the school has a high Aboriginal population of 7 percent, compared to the national average of 2 percent.

Unlike many schools in the area, it has a pleasant environment with much time and money devoted to landscaping and overall ‘beautification’ of the school grounds. At the time of the study the student population was 577 with a staff of 21 classroom teachers and nine support staff in the areas of learning difficulties, English as a Second Language (ESL), Library, Aboriginal Education and Community Liaison. With a few exceptions, particularly at an executive level, the staff was young and relatively inexperienced. In the year of the study there had been a complete turnover in the senior executive at the school with the appointment of a new Principal and Deputy. The new Principal was quite candid in her assessment of the school. At the time of her appointment, she had been informed
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that Westville was “a cutting edge school” especially in its approach to literacy but
she felt this was not the case; a view backed up by the school’s continued poor
performance in external standardised literacy tests. Although the Principal
displayed a genuine admiration for her staff’s commitment to their students, she
felt welfare needs were given precedence over academic concerns, an ethos
seemingly generated by the disadvantage of its student population.

The second school involved in the study was Northside PS, located in a northern
and higher SES suburb of Sydney. Established in 1928, the school has three
imposing two-storey brick buildings and a number of demountables on a well-
maintained site. Northside is considered one of the top primary schools in NSW
based on its results in external standardised literacy tests, with a number of its
students regularly awarded scholarships to prestigious high schools within the
private system and places at selective state high schools. This impressive
performance is assisted by the school having Opportunity Classes (OC) in Years 5
and 6, drawn from gifted and talented students from schools within the district.
This contributes to what the Principal referred to as the school’s “very good
reputation both in perception and reality” and the “very positive and very strong
ethos” of its staff. In contrast to Westville, the staff at Northside were much older
and far more experienced. Nothside was also much larger than Westville. At the
time of the study its student population was 870 with 42 teaching positions. There
were also ESL and Library support staff. The recent growth in the student
population was largely due to an increase in high and medium density housing in
the area, placing considerable pressure on Northside to accommodate rising student
numbers. The school had also witnessed a dramatic increase in its LBOTE
population, which at the time of the study was 75 percent from mainly Chinese
backgrounds and countries elsewhere in East Asia. There were also many students
from Korean, Indian and Sri Lankan backgrounds. While the rapid rise in the
LBOTE population resulted in the need to employ ESL staff, the initial language
difficulties that the ESL students experienced did not significantly affect the
school’s external test results, which the Principal described as “considerably well
above the state average”.

Initially this was not intended as a comparative study of the two schools. I
assumed that major differences in teaching methodology would occur within each
school and relate to age, experience and the level of class taught. While there were
variations, there were also distinct similarities in relation to the pedagogic practice
and overall educational philosophy of the teachers within each school. It also
became clear that, despite individual differences, students from the three classes in
each school displayed marked similarities in relation to their dispositions to
learning. In contrast, there emerged quite distinct differences between the schools
and the collective pedagogical philosophy and practice of the teachers in each site.
The reasons behind this and the part played by a process of pedagogic embodiment
are explored in detail in Section 3. Prior to this, different ways of conceiving the
body and the theoretical framework used to analyse the teachers’ practice is
discussed in Section 1.
SECTION 1

BODIES IN THEORY
CHAPTER 1

CONCEIVING THE BODY

Many people have to be persuaded that studying too is a job, and a very tiring one, with its own particular apprenticeship – involving muscles and nerves as well as intellect. It is a process of adaptation, a habit acquired with effort, tedium and even suffering.

A. Gramsci (1973, p. 42)

Our understanding itself is embodied. That is, our bodily know-how and the way we act and move can encode components of our understanding of self and world.

C. Taylor (1999, p. 34)

Education is not merely a cognitive process: it also has a bodily dimension. This point is captured by Gramsci who highlights the extent to which bodily discipline is necessary for academic success. The bodily nature of education is perhaps most obvious when children commence school. Much of the first few months of kindergarten are devoted to a form of corporeal induction whereby children’s bodies are attuned to the temporal rhythms, spatiality and comportment of schooling. As time progresses there is an ongoing refinement of these disciplinary procedures as students’ bodies also assume the regularities of literate practice: the spatiality of the page, desk and chair and the grip and movement of the pen – some more successfully than others. Yet, despite the undeniable corporeality of schooling, it seems to be taken for granted within mainstream education. Even in the primary years, the formative period of pedagogic embodiment, there seems little acknowledgement of the need for the apprenticeship to which Gramsci refers. Rather, the body is relegated to the realm of classroom management and considered secondary to the role of the mind in learning.

Despite widespread interest in the body across various disciplines, mainstream educational practice and scholarship tend to give it little attention (Evans, Rich, Davies and Allwood, 2005; Evans, Davies and Rich, 2009). In contrast, from the early 1980s, the body and processes of embodiment have figured significantly within social and cultural theory (see for example: Turner, 1984; Frank, 1991; Shilling, 1994 2005, 2008; Williams & Bendelow, 1998; Crossley, 2001, 2006; Blaikie, 2004; Howson, 2004; Fraser and Greco, 2004 Blackman, 2008). While this focus on the body has been influenced by many disciplinary areas and theoretical perspectives, in particular feminist thought and phenomenology, it is to Foucault that a great deal of the credit can be given for this recent interest. Much of the application of Foucault’s work in the area of body studies, however, draws on the Foucault of Discipline and Punish rather than his later work around...
CHAPTER 1

technologies of the self. As a consequence, it tends towards an examination of disciplinary coercion, which, while valuable in highlighting the body’s social malleability, falls short of assigning it any agentic capacity. Yet, the body is much more than the product of institutionalised structures or even broader social experience. As Taylor (1999, p. 34) points out, “Our understanding is itself embodied”. For a productive theorisation of bodies and schooling, conceptualisations of the body need to provide much more than these very partial accounts of embodiment. Consideration needs to be given to how embodied data acquired through engagement in the world is fashioned as a type of modus operandi for action.

This chapter examines various conceptualisations of the body which are useful for understanding its role in learning. They tend to coalesce, however, around these distinct orientations that emphasise either structural constraint or agentic capacity, though with the latter receiving far less attention. Despite their differences, these perspectives on the body share a similar resistance to engaging with notions of mind and consciousness. To some extent this is understandable given their focus is the corporeal basis of being. Yet an implicit rationale underpins this work; namely the rejection of Cartesian dualism and its privileging of mind over body. A focus on the body at the expense of the mind, however, doesn’t correct this theoretical imbalance; it merely inverts it. In theorising the role of the body in schooling a more viable ontology is required. It isn’t sufficient to simply divert attention to the corporeal, as seems the preoccupation within social and cultural theory. Gramsci quite rightly points out that education has both a bodily and an intellectual dimension. Both, therefore, require consideration. Indeed, as this and the next chapter will argue, it is the interplay of mind and body that is fundamental to understanding pedagogy not only in the context of schooling but as a broader cultural process influencing subjectivity and everyday practice.

CHALLENGING DESCARTES: THE PHENOMENOLOGIES OF HUSSERL AND MERLEAU-PONTY

Despite the wealth of scholarship dealing with various aspects of the body, its intellectual treatment has a long yet generally unsatisfying history. Western philosophy has coupled the body with the mind as a binary opposition and, as Grosz (1994) points out, such dichotomous thinking generally results in a hierarchising of terms. Traditionally, the body is subordinate to the mind and this somatophobia has dominated its intellectual treatment (Spelman, 1982; Meynell, 2009). Such a perspective has its roots in classical philosophy, but it is the work of Decartes that has more firmly left its mark on the modern era. Utilising Aristotle’s a priori category of substance, meaning not simply prior to but existing separately, Descartes devised a metaphysics that conceived of mind and matter as distinct. While, he did allow for mind/body interaction, referring to them as “substantially united”, he was never able to thoroughly explain this relationship despite assigning both mind and body the status of substance (Curley, 1998). The form of interaction Descartes intends, however, is unidirectional, a movement from mind to body.
To Descartes the mind is the seat of reason overriding bodily affects and quelling desire. The very act of thinking, encapsulated in his dictum cogito ergo sum or “I think therefore I am”, defines the self for Descartes and so he sees the mind as possessing the will to determine action. To Lloyd (1994, p. 39), however, “The price to be paid for Cartesian purity of consciousness is the separation of self from world”. Despite this, Descartes’ metaphysics have tended to dominate Western thought, developing into a commonsense logic whereby action is simply viewed as a function of will or mind over matter.

Contemporary social and cultural theory has reacted sharply against this understanding of action, questioning the very notion of self as simply pertaining to mind. While Foucault provided much of the inspiration for the intense scrutiny of the body from the 1980s, exemplified in the work of Turner (1984) and Featherstone, Hepworth and Turner (1991), it is with the diverse theoretical perspectives of phenomenology and sociology at the beginning of the last century that the body becomes a focus of study quite distinct from the mind. Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, first made the distinction between korper, the physical body, and leib, the lived body (Welton, 1999, p. 4). This distinction allowed the body to be viewed as much more than a physical or natural phenomenon: it became both a cultural entity and a product of history. The preoccupation of Husserl’s phenomenology, however, is far from a study of corporeality. He felt the task of phenomenology was to study things as they appear in consciousness. In doing this, phenomenology had to deal with notions of consciousness, mind and the self. It had to confront Descartes’ cogito, which to Husserl was erroneously conceived.

To arrive at the point where Descartes concludes, “I am only a thinking thing, that is to say, a mind, an understanding, or reason”, he explains he had to, “efface from my thinking all images of corporeal things, or since that can hardly be done, I shall at least view them as empty and false” (Descartes, Meditations III). In his pursuit of philosophical truths, it was thought or rather doubt, which provided the only certainty. To Descartes, the sensate body was variable and uncertain, an unreliable basis for ontological proof. Indubitability was only achieved by separation from the physical world. Such a position was anathema to Husserl who could not conceive of being without world. His project was to insert the cogito back into the world through a reformulation that questioned Descartes’ notion of a pure act of consciousness. Husserl concluded that thinking had to be about something. Each cogito required a cogitatum (Husserl, 1977, p. 33) and it is this intentionality of thought that implicates the world. To arrive at a point of pure consciousness, which Husserl still deemed possible despite his critique of Descartes’ method, one had to bracket off experience, a process referred to as the phenomenological epoché (Smith and Woodruff Smith, 1995, p. 11). From this position the world could be held at bay and pure consciousness attained. Yet while Husserl could not venture a philosophy which divorced being from world, the phenomenological epoché essentially had this effect. In actuality Husserl was an idealist. His notion of
self maintained the Cartesian separation of mind and body privileging the
former in a phenomenology of intentional consciousness.

It was Merleau-Ponty who breached this divide with a radical interpretation of
Husserl’s philosophy. He claimed that “the whole Husserlian analysis is blocked
by the framework of acts which imposes upon it the philosophy of consciousness.
It is necessary to take up again and develop the fungierende or latent intentionality
which is the intentionality within being” (Merleau-Ponty, 1975, p. 244). To
Merleau-Ponty, being and acting in the world couldn’t simply be explained by a
process of conscious acts. He viewed the self as much more than a mind, seeing
subjectivity as embodied. He sought to excise the distinctions between mind and
body, self and world or redefine them “as relational, intertwined and reversible
aspects of a single fabric” (Crossley, 1995a, p. 47). Merleau-Ponty saw the body as
both acting and being acted upon in a seamless, generative process. Unlike Husserl,
where the subject is present in the world but somehow disembodied, with Merleau-
Ponty the subject becomes a body-subject and is not merely present in the world
but is of the world. There is a symphysis of flesh, the flesh of the body and the
flesh of the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1975, p. 138).

As a form of bodily consciousness, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body-subject
is also an attempt to override the mind/body dualism that pervades Husserl’s
phenomenology. As a result, he diverges considerably from Husserl claiming he
was “pushing Husserl further than he wished to go” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, p. 72).
With Merleau-Ponty, emphasis is finally given to the role of the body in the
constitution of subjectivity. His conception of self has both a psychical and bodily
dimension with consciousness no longer maintaining exclusivity over
understanding. Subjectivity becomes not simply a function of consciousness but of
bodily practice. Understanding, therefore, is both cognitive and corporeal with the
mind and body possessing learning potential, the latter in the form of what
Merleau-Ponty terms motor significance. Understanding is also not autonomously
derived. In Merleau-Ponty’s use of the term, consciousness is intersubjective,
forever reliant on “the living relationship and tension among individuals”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p. 90), an important point in relation to education.

Merleau-Ponty, however, neglects to provide an account of the nature of the
relationship between body and mind, and their interaction with the world. While
these dimensions of existence are evident in his work, they seem to dissolve into
an amorphous mass or “single fabric” (Crossley, 1995a, p. 47). For the purposes
of phenomenology, which Merleau-Ponty (1999, p. vii) views as “a philosophy
which puts essences back into existence”, the fluidity of being seems a useful
concept. As the basis for explaining individual practice, however, it is only a
starting point, a way in which to begin theorising the relationship between body
and world. Merleau-Ponty provides considerable insight into the corporeal
dimensions of existence, but he is still faced with the ongoing quandary of how
best to deal with the binaries of being. While recognising a distinction between
mind and body, individual and world, his work essentially blurs and, at times,
collapses these categories, particularly in his use of the term flesh. This dilemma
is evident in his repeated use of the chiasmus, a rhetorical device inverting word
order to create the effect of counterbalance and interconnectedness, as in “We choose the world and the world chooses us” (Merleau-Ponty, 1999, p. 454). This may be interesting wordplay but it doesn’t explain much about the nature of the relationship between individual and world. Merleau-Ponty may have abandoned Descartes’ ontology but he seems to have only moved partway towards providing a satisfactory substitute.

MAUSS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE BODY

An emphasis on the body can also be found in the early sociology of Mauss, in particular his seminal text *Techniques of the Body* published in 1935. Mauss was interested in the socially acquired nature of bodily comportment. He made use of the much older term *habitus* to refer to the habitual nature of practice but wanted to instil it with a sociological quality. While individuals may possess a particular gait which appears unique, Mauss recognised a commonality across individual practice; an embodiment of the social as a form of *practical reason*. Bourdieu later adopted this notion of habitus but whereas Mauss generally applies it as a descriptive category for individual action, Bourdieu reformulates it as an explanatory concept providing an overall rationale for practice. There is also some variance in Mauss and Bourdieu’s understanding of the social. Mauss uses it as a term to denote broad, undefined social experience; to Bourdieu it implies the institutionalised structuring of social experience encapsulated in his category of *field*. While Mauss and Bourdieu may differ in their conceptualisation of the social and its effect on the body, they share a common cause of theorising the body as a sociological phenomenon. This contrasts markedly with the largely philosophical perspective of Merleau-Ponty who, as Turner (1996, p. 78) claims, provides “an individualistic account of embodiment...largely devoid of historical and sociological content”. Turner’s criticism, however, requires some qualification because there is an underlying sociology to Merleau-Ponty’s work. This is evident in his emphasis on intersubjectivity and his ongoing difficulty with Husserl’s notion of intentional consciousness which, to Merleau-Ponty, privileged individuality over world. Clearly the world is present in Merleau-Ponty’s account, but its sociological content is never thoroughly explicated.

Mauss, on the other hand, takes note of the socially reproductive nature of the habitus. While dealt with in a fleeting manner, he classifies the reproduction of bodily techniques in terms of gender and age exemplifying how practice is rarely natural. To Mauss, bodily practice is learned through on-going social interaction. He states that “In all [these] elements of the art of using the human body, the facts of education were dominant. The notion of education could be superimposed on that of imitation” (Mauss, 1979, p. 101). Learning here is understood as mimesis. Through close observation of a particular activity individuals ‘borrow’ what they consider successful and make it their own. But there are various types of imitative behaviour, which are indicative of different pedagogies. To many, what Mauss intends here is a form of imitation that is pre-reflective; it lacks conscious intent with individuals simply mimicking what they see without conscious
acknowledgement. Through repeated performance the activity is embodied as habitus which is similar in some respects to Merleau-Ponty’s fungierende, the intentionality of being. While differing in their sociological force, both these notions are forms of bodily know-how displacing conscious intent.

Although generally interpreted in this way, Mauss’s work can actually be read quite differently with techniques of the body implying an initial conscious response, at least in some forms of imitative action. This is evident in his frequent reference to training in which he discusses a number of instances where bodily techniques have been modified in this way. He recounts, for example, how the teaching of swimming had changed from when he first learnt the sport. Mauss was apparently taught to open his eyes under water only after he had learnt to swim, a practice which proved difficult especially when diving. As an adult Mauss observed how the technique had changed, with children being taught to control their instinctive reflex of closing their eyes in the water and to feel at ease opening them prior to learning to swim. The result of this was an improved diving technique. In another example Mauss discusses how Maori mothers instruct their daughters in the acquisition of onioni, a particular way of walking. He quotes from a study by Elsdon Best who describes how mothers drilled their daughters in this accomplishment: “and I have heard a mother say to her girl: ‘Ha! Kaore koe e onioni’ (you’re not doing the onioni) when the young one was neglecting to practice the gait” (Mauss, 1979, p. 102).

These examples suggest that while Mauss was largely focusing on the role of mimesis in the social reproduction of bodily techniques, consciousness had an important part to play. Although this isn’t made explicit, his references to training are very often accompanied by some mention of the use of language. This is generally on the part of the trainer but it can be assumed that a series of questions and answers would be used to clarify aspects of technique. Much of what is discussed as part of the instructional process may retreat to the unconscious but, “By being expressed in language thought processes can become perceptual contents available for consciousness” (Grosz, 1994, p. 30). The techniques of the body to which Mauss refers are socially acquired but not simply as a result of subliminal habituation. Bodily techniques do become habituated and certain aspects of individual corporeality are obviously acquired without conscious reflection through immersion within a particular milieu. But Mauss’s work provides important pedagogic insights, not only into the socially acquired nature of bodily techniques – the body’s receptivity, malleability and capacity to learn – but also into the body’s ability to be taught, which denotes a quite different pedagogic intent. As Mauss (1979, p. 116) points out in one anecdote, “I can tell you that I’m very bad at climbing trees, though reasonable on mountains and rocks. A difference of education and hence of method”. Mauss’s tree climbing ability suggests it was a childhood-learnt behaviour whereas mountaineering was a skill he was explicitly taught; the difference in pedagogy resulting in a difference in the level of skill he attained.

The taught rather than learned nature of bodily techniques allows for a re-evaluation of the often neglected role of consciousness in recent sociological
analysis. What is generally missing from discussion of Mauss’s work is the process whereby actions develop into habituated technique; an examination of the pedagogy involved rather than simply the end product. His reference to “drill”, “practise” and “training” in relation to some techniques suggests not merely an unconscious adoption of bodily facility but conscious attention by both trainer and trainee to the acquisition of technique. According to Strathern (1996, p. 12), however, “Mauss did not link habitus with personne. Habitus calls to mind the unconscious, and personne the conscious aspects of ourselves”. The focus in *Techniques of the Body* may be socially acquired bodily know-how, but this does not necessarily negate conscious intent. As Mauss (1979, p. 122) stresses at the end of the essay: “It is thanks to society that there is an intervention of consciousness. It is not thanks to unconsciousness that there is an intervention of society”. While bodily techniques may be socially acquired they are open to conscious manipulation otherwise education and training would have little effect.

What Mauss seems to grapple with in *Techniques of the Body* is an appropriate term for the kind of corporeal intuition of which he writes. While he decides upon the term *habitus*, he wants it to be understood as involving “the techniques and work of collective and individual practical reason rather than, in the ordinary, merely the soul and its repetitive faculties” (Mauss, 1979, p. 101). For Mauss, habitus is not simply socially acquired habit; it possesses a kind of rationality which is corporeal rather than simply cognitive. Habitus, therefore, need not be considered unconscious simply because it involves the social reproduction of the body. Rather, Mauss seems to be suggesting there is a conscious element in the development of what later becomes habitual. Strathern (1996, p. 12) recognises this in his own discussion of the Maori *onioni* when he explains that “teaching and learning are at first fully conscious. It is only afterward that the learned pattern becomes an unconscious part of bodily routines”. It is not that Mauss fails to give emphasis to consciousness in *Techniques of the Body* because he is dismissing it, or fails to recognise its role; it simply isn’t his prime concern. In many respects, particularly if Mauss is read as early twentieth century sociology, the conscious aspect of practice is probably understood. Mauss wants to examine what was largely ignored at the time, namely the importance of the body in understanding practice. Perhaps this is why Mauss uses the word *techniques*, which tends to denote purpose and skill rather than habit and routine. As he points out, what he ultimately wants is a term that signifies “skill, presence of mind and habit combined” (Mauss, 1979, p. 108). He may have assumed consciousness would be taken for granted, not anticipating its neglect within more recent theorisation of the body. The problem with Mauss is that he doesn’t clearly articulate the role of consciousness in the acquisition of techniques of the body. This is a shortcoming not only in theories of practice more generally but also in conceiving the role of the body in learning.

**FOUCAULT – REDISCOVERING THE BODY**

While both Mauss and Merleau-Ponty have had considerable influence on theorisation of the body, it is Foucault’s work that led to a rediscovery of the body
in the 1980s provoking a plethora of studies from different disciplinary areas on various aspects of corporeality. Foucault’s notion of the body can be understood in different ways and has generated quite diverse theoretical perspectives, evident for example in the contrast between the work of Bryan Turner (1984, 1996, 2008) and Judith Butler (1990, 1993). While to some extent the body as discursive construct is a constant within Foucault’s work, nevertheless there is a broadening of what he understands by discourse. In his earlier work, the term simply denotes the linguistic but is reformulated in The Archaeology of Knowledge to include the extralinguistic or material conditions of discourse which he defines as “institutions, political events, economic practices and processes” (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). Discourse, therefore, comes to encompass much more than language and, through the associated concept of discursive formation, is intertwined with the socio-historical relations within which language operates. From a Foucauldian perspective discourse evolves into a metaconcept, but in becoming such a bloated category it tends to create theoretical confusion blurring the relationship between language and material practice with the latter often only configured textually, relinquishing its substantive quality. From such a perspective the body is viewed as primarily discursive or, as Gibbs (2002, p. 336) points out, “a body of words”, losing sight of the embodied nature of being.

It is this notion of the body as discursive construct which underpins Butler’s work, with subjectivity conceived in terms of a process of iterative performativity. Butler (1993, p. 13) defines a performative as “that discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names”. In this quite liberal application of speech act theory, Butler’s aim is to demonstrate the materiality of language; but materiality is not simply in the saying, it is a process of doing, a point of particular poignancy in relation to pedagogic practice. Her recourse to speech act theory simply conflates the two and, as Turner (1996, p. 28) points out, “The lived body drops from view, as the text becomes the all-pervasive topic of research”. This is disappointing because the notion of iterative performativity has considerable application in theorising the pedagogic body. As an essentially linguistic concept, however, it provides little insight into the ways in which pedagogic practice can result in different forms of embodiment. Of course language has a role to play, but so too does the myriad of disciplinary techniques that teachers employ that are not specifically linguistic but which are fundamental to the production of particular student bodies.

Hunter (1991, p. 47) also critiques the notion of discourse as a metaconcept, arguing that:

language or discourse plays no fundamental or general role in these groups of relations. It is the techniques of living themselves – the open-ended ensembles of behaviours, forms of calculation, social relations, norms, architectures, trainings – that give rise to the forms of human agency and capacity characteristic of different departments of existence. And it is the role of linguistic (mathematical, etc) notations to function as instruments deployed according to the highly various ‘logics’ of these instituted ensembles.
Hunter is of the view that Foucault actually leaves behind his focus on discourse in his work on technologies of power and the self and instead concentrates on dispositifs or apparatuses, the ‘ensembles’ to which Hunter refers. This perspective largely underpins the application of Foucauldian theory in various sociologies of the body as in the early work of Turner (1984) and Shilling (1994). Yet while there is a definite shift in Foucault’s work which tends to downplay the role of discourse in relation to subject formation, Hunter’s relegation of language to simply a product of the logics of practice may be taking it a bit far. Hunter’s intention may be to mark out a space with which to theorise material practice, but he seems to suggest that it somehow lies outside the discursive. While subjectivity is largely a product of everyday experience, analyses of practice also need to recognise the materiality and performativity of language. At the same time, this must not be conflated with the materiality and performativity of the body; an individual’s physical presence in the world or what Shilling (2005) refers to as “corporeal realism”. It is this perspective on the body that is Foucault’s focus in Discipline and Punish, a text which has tended to dominate analysis of the body within education.

FOUCAULT, BODIES AND SCHOOLING

In Discipline and Punish Foucault examines the disciplinary techniques of power within institutionalised settings with a particular emphasis on the development of prisons. This text is significant in its analysis of how spatiality and particular regimens shape the body to maximise its functionality for purposes of social control. As Foucault (1977, p. 138) explains discipline “…dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a capacity which seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection”. In Discipline and Punish Foucault is centrally concerned with the body’s propensity to acquire routinised traits through the imposition of spatial and temporal schemas, a notion of embodiment overlaid by a rigid social determinism. Any enabling potential of disciplinary power is directed towards social utility rather than individual agency. This passive conceptualisation of embodiment has tended to dominate sociology of the body (Shilling, 2005, p. 1) and is similarly evident within education. Jones’s (2000) study on the dynamics at play in learning to write is one such example. Jones’s focus is the contradictory nature of disciplinary power. She discusses the joy and sense of satisfaction a child feels in mastering the mechanics of handwriting but interprets this newfound bodily facility as a form of submission to “the meticulous controls of pedagogy”. Jones seems to downplay the inherent pleasure of literate practice and the potential a child acquires in gaining control over a pen and composing text, in deference to what she terms “the strict subjection” of the pedagogic relation. While the power imbalance in favour of the teacher and the socially reproductive nature of pedagogy are not in dispute, it is these negative aspects of pedagogic practice that are often emphasised within educational theory. They are very much the mainstay of sociologies of education.
(Gillborn and Youdell, 2000; Apple, 1995; Goldstein, 2005; Saltman and Gabbard, 2011), critical pedagogy (Giroux, 1983, 1988, 2004; McLaren, 1989, 2003; Kellner, 2003; McLaren, Martin, Farahmandpur and Jaramillo, 2004; Giroux and Giroux, 2006; Monchinski, 2008) and Foucauldian analyses of education (Goodson and Dowbiggin, 1990; Gore, 1998; Besley & Peters, 2007; Dussel, 2010). While the latter may give these issues a different gloss, with a focus on subjection of the body as opposed to the mind, the recurrent theme of pedagogy as social control is similarly foregrounded, rarely engaging with its enabling potential. Students are generally cast as supplicant bodies rather than agents with the potential to act competently in the world.

Jones’s work is also interesting for its treatment of the socially regulative nature of pedagogic desire and the ways in which it operates within the teaching/learning relation. In recounting her own experience of learning to write she explains that “Via perfect writing, I desired to deliver the perfect mind to my teacher. The predictable and painstakingly even shape of my words signalled my willingness to conform, to be controlled which pleased my teachers” (Jones, 2000, p. 53). Jones’s willingness to please may be an act of conformity but not, as she seems to suggest, mindless obedience. The desire which drives Jones to write well and please her teachers results in a disciplining of her body endowing it with a capacity for literate practice (Watkins, 2008). Yet, Jones seems to view this manipulation of her desires in a negative light. While possessing the potential to be abusive – as in any unequal power relationship – this desire to please is what motivates Jones to succeed. Conforming to her teachers’ desires does not lessen Jones’s pre-existing sense of self; rather it leads to the acquisition of particular dispositions constitutive of her own subjectivity. Subject formation does not occur autonomously, it is an intersubjective process. Cultivating Jones’s desire to write well may be an act of coercion, but it also shows her teachers exercising their pedagogic role of assisting their students attain the skills and knowledge they require for academic success. Minimising the teacher’s role does not reduce the socially reproductive forces at play in a classroom; rather, a lack of effective teacher intervention can leave them unchecked. Jones’s disciplined body, evident in her mastery of the pen and scholarly comportment, is a necessary precursor for academic endeavour. Illegible handwriting and an unruly body may suggest a form of resistance against the conformities of schooling but they also impede learning. A lack of self-discipline and a failure to acquire socially valued skills leaves one susceptible to more insidious forms of institutionalised control, what Willis (1977, p. 3) terms self damnation. What Jones learns becomes part of her bodily make-up, a fluid set of dispositions equipping her with the capacity to succeed.

The disciplinary techniques of institutionalised schooling are generally viewed in a negative sense, with contemporary perspectives on learning advocating a greater degree of personal freedom and fewer restrictions upon the student body (Brady, 2006; Nolan, 2006; Silberman, 2006; Nash, 2009; Levine and Munsch, 2011). Yet, in frequenting almost any social space bodies need to conform to particular rules of motility; schemas which, while somewhat flexible, dictate speed, comportment and spacing between animate and inanimate bodies. These schemas,
or carnal genres, may appear restrictive but they actually equip bodies with a type of intuition with which to negotiate the world. Movement in public space is structured around rules such as keeping to the left or right, queuing for service, turn-taking to enter and leave buildings and maintaining a certain personal space. These develop as carnal genres because they are functional, ensuring the efficient and safe movement of bodies in social space. A similar perspective is presented by Goffman who analyses the bodily routines used to maintain public order (Goffman, 1972). In a school context these ‘rules’ are more rigidly enforced, but this is necessitated by the concentration and particular use of bodies. In class, students are constantly told to ‘sit still’, ‘put up your hand’, ‘don’t call out’, and in the playground, ‘don’t run’, ‘line up properly’ and ‘don’t litter’. The myriad of instructions given to children are designed to elicit a particular behaviour which when habituated constitutes a discipline that invests their bodies with the capacity to act in a manner both effective and efficient for schooling. As Foucault (1977, p. 211) explains, “The disciplines function increasingly as techniques for making useful individuals”, yet in Discipline and Punish where the focus is on disciplinary power as social control, he neglects to adequately address the agentic aspects of this utility.

Another Foucauldian account of bodies and schooling pertinent to the perspective taken here is the earlier influential study by Kamler, Maclean, Reid and Simpson (1994) who examine the relationship between discipline and the formation of a corporate classroom body. While their focus is the degree to which gender differentiation becomes evident in the first month of school, they devote considerable time to examining how learning to be part of a class group is integral to becoming a school student. In their study of a class of 27 kindergarten students in an Australian regional government school, they document how the students’ teacher painstakingly “tames” her class into the rituals of school. While Kamler et al. draw extensively on Foucault, they also make use of Bourdieu to capture how this disciplining of the young students’ bodies develops into certain dispositions of behaviour or a “school habitus”. Beyond the actual acknowledgement of its embryonic formation in the first weeks of school, there is little or no consideration given to how these dispositions within the habitus might enable students to perform academically. Despite a useful connection between Foucault’s concept of discipline and Bourdieu’s habitus, Kamler et al. typically concentrate on the socially deterministic, as opposed to agentic, aspects of disciplinary power. One of the ritual practices of schooling they investigate is the learning of songs. They compare the use of song in pre-school kindergarten classrooms, where they see the purpose as simply pleasure, to its function in the more formalised structure of school proper, where it is used on a regular basis throughout the day as a classroom management technique. On various occasions the teacher in this study has her class sing in unison and perform accompanying actions. Kamler et al. (1994, p. 107) see singing prior to school as a vehicle for pleasure but on entering kindergarten feel it is “transformed into a technique of power, whereby the teacher can get the group to look at her and be subject to her disciplinary gaze”. Undeniably this is the teacher’s intent yet it is not simply a technique to foster “a collective student body”
important in terms of the development of a school habitus. It is equally important on an individual basis as this discipline predisposes students to the regimen of academic work, listening and watching attentively and completing tasks in line with the teacher’s instructions. Rather than pleasure being lost from these activities, as if the students were somehow leaving behind an idealised stage of childhood, it simply functions differently, or with an added dimension. Pleasure isn’t only derived from the song itself; it is also linked to a sense of identification, “one of the most powerful and ubiquitous modes of social responsiveness” (Tomkins, 1962, p. 444). In following their teacher and other classmates in these activities, the students’ pleasure is not diminished. Rather, through a desire for recognition and sense of belonging, they are learning a new social ethic as they move in time to the songs.

Kamler et al.’s central concern in examining the development of a school habitus in the first month of school is gender. Although not a focus here, their findings on gender differentiation provide useful insights into the formation of a scholarly habitus more generally. While Kamler et al. see gender as highly significant they point out that it only becomes a relevant category in certain aspects of classroom practice as it is often “sublimated” within what they refer to as the “androgynous corporate body” (Kamler et al., 1994, p. 75). Gender is most obvious when it comes to issues of behaviour and discipline. Here Kamler et al. observe an imbalance because girls tend to be acknowledged in class for quietness and obedience whereas boys are singled out for poor behaviour, such as being rowdy. As a result, boys are highly visible whereas girls assume a certain invisibility within the class. Kamler et al. view this differential treatment of girls and boys as a matter of concern, yet in their analysis they tend to focus on the girls and interpret their internalisation of the teacher’s gaze as problematic. The disciplinary techniques the girls embody are seen as a form of regulation promoting docility and disempowerment, but there is something of a contradiction in this analysis. The girls may be positioned to be quiet and still but, in the process, are acquiring a habitus for learning that is empowering rather than the contrary. The docility they exhibit and receive recognition for actually functions as a precursor to literate practice: sitting quietly, following instructions and completing work independently. On the other hand, through their visibility the boys tend to have poor behaviour reinforced and the teacher’s “taming” is less successful. Boys tend to develop the appropriate dispositions for schooling much later than girls (Connolly, 2004; Keddie and Mills, 2007; Logue, 2007; Ponitz, Rimm-Kaufman and Brock, 2009) and this could partly explain the problems many experience at a later date in relation to literacy (Doctoroff, Greer and Arnold, 2006; Moss, 2007; Sullivan, 2009).

Within education considerable attention is given to boys’ weaker literacy performance in comparison to girls, yet this is often attributed to a supposed ‘feminised curriculum’ and boys having been positioned as more interested in ‘technical’ subjects (Alloway, Davies, Gilbert, Gilbert and King, 1996; Rowan, Knobel, Bigum and Lankshear, 2002). Little consideration is given to the corporeality of literate practice and how girls and boys may embody different
CONCEIVING THE BODY

dispositions to learning both prior to and in the first years of school. Often, as in Kamler et al.’s study, the enabling aspects of the ways in which girls are positioned are obscured by a focus on the discursive rather than material aspects of bodily practice. Yet as Foucault explains, docility can be productive, it need not be understood as disabling. In lectures published after his death as The Hermeneutics of the Subject he discusses the importance of docility to the Stoics who viewed it as a crucial quality in the cultivation of the self (Foucault, 2005, p. 338). This does not mean that the girls in Kamler et al.’s study were not disadvantaged in other ways by their teacher’s actions. The girls may have been empowered by a discipline which predisposed them to literate practice, but the emphasis their teacher gave to rewarding quietness may have also encouraged them to be less assertive than the boys. Either way the discipline that students embody is of a far more complex nature than what Kamler et al. portray and their use of the term “androgynous corporate body” tends to mask a more subtle gendering of embodied dispositions that occurred within the class.

The aspect of disciplinary power that Foucault (1977, p. 176) finds particularly insidious and which is of particular relevance to a discussion of bodies and schooling, is its panoptic quality. In describing the spatial (and temporal) dimensions of panopticism, Foucault shows how the architecture of modern institutions distributes individuals in space in such a way as to enable a “new physics of power”. Institutions such as schools can do this because their “analytical arrangement of space” produces an “axial visibility” which allows for the hierarchical observation that orders and corrects human movement and engenders the internalisation of reformed behaviours as second nature. This “architecture and geometry” involves “channels of power” which run along what might be called vectors operating in this field of visibility (see Section 3 – Bodies in Practice for an empirical account of vectors within classrooms). Foucault analyses this disciplinary “cage” in terms of sequestration, constraint and subjection but it could be argued that these vectors and the regimens associated with them, are potentially enabling. In classrooms such vectors are not simply the trajectories allowing observation from a position of authority; they are also lines of intersubjective engagement. These vectors are fundamental to the production of carnal genres, the particular ways of behaving motivated by specific institutions (Foucault, 1977, pp. 200–208). In a sense, panopticism contributes to the durability of embodied discipline giving it the potential to function as a technology of the self rather than simply a technology of power. Disciplinary power can be pedagogically productive, not only because it aids classroom management but its panoptic quality gives it the potential to function as a form of embodied social conscience or corrective mediating behaviour. In habituating the carnal genres of schooling, students also acquire a set of ethical dispositions that guide their behaviour as a member of a larger social group. Their bodies become infused with an understanding that effective social participation generally depends on a disciplining of their own bodies in terms of how they affect others. This discipline, therefore, has a broader social good beyond a delimiting form of governance.

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While important pedagogically for the development of a social ethics of the body, these effects of disciplinary power are enabling in other ways more specifically related to academic performance. As is evident in Gramsci’s comment that opened this chapter, studying has its own particular apprenticeship. This process of induction into scholarly labour begins very early in a child’s life, prior to schooling. The ability to sit at a desk for even short periods of time and concentrate on a task can be quite difficult for many children. Simply sitting at a table is a learned behaviour. Anyone having closely observed the stage when children move from a highchair to sit at a table to eat will understand this. Much of what is taken for granted in everyday practice requires learning. Once learnt, however, it tends to become naturalised to the point where the initial learning process is forgotten. Elias (1978) has explored this phenomenon in relation to the development of social etiquette, what he terms the civilising process, whereby individuals and societies over time implement particular “rules” governing social behaviour which are learned and then assume a taken-for-grantedness within everyday life. Elias’s focus is the mundane: using a fork, sneezing into a handkerchief and not farting in public. This notion of a civilising process also has applicability for the learned nature of scholarly comportment. While much time is devoted in kindergarten to enculturating children into the practices of school life, this need not only be understood from a classroom management perspective. Such practices are also important in developing a scholarly habitus, a naturalness about sitting at a desk to read and write and work independently. It is this learned behaviour, this civilising process, which constitutes an important part of the apprenticeship of academic learning. As Elias (cited in Shilling, 1994, p. 164) explains, “…in the development of civilised bodies, the boundaries between consciousness and drives strengthen. The civilised body possesses self-controls manifest in ‘morals’ or ‘rational thought’ which interpose themselves between ‘spontaneous and emotional impulses, on the one hand and the skeletal muscles, on the other’, and which allow for the deferral of satisfaction. This prevents impulses from expressing themselves in action without the permission of these control mechanisms”.

Practice is essentially governed by desire, but it is the nature and formation of this desire that is important in a study of pedagogy (Watkins, 2008). In assisting children acquire a desire for academic endeavour and literate practice; they firstly require a certain scholarly habitus, a bodily disposition which engenders that desire. The bodily dimension of writing involving sitting and labouring to construct a text, which is essentially habituated technique in proficient writers, is generally taken for granted. To write and write well, however, is not simply a matter of will. Bodies need to be attuned to the dynamics of writing which requires a certain bodily discipline that curbs other desires, “the impulses” to which Elias refers. This discipline eventually attains the status of a disposition generating an ongoing desire to write.

Many children enter school already predisposed to write. To teachers they are either seen as ‘natural’ learners or their early success is related to a combination of
social class and parental involvement. While the latter explanation is no doubt true, a blanket concept such as ‘class’ does not provide much insight into what it is that constitutes the readiness for academic learning. What these children possess may appear as natural due to its habituation, but what they have acquired prior to entering school is a particular habitus for learning. They are comfortable sitting at a desk and have considerable bodily control when completing work. The ease and early success experienced by many children who have attended childcare for a number of years prior to commencing school can be partly attributed to this bodily preparedness for the classroom (Raban and Ure, 2000; Dockett and Perry, 2001; Barnett and Hustedt, 2003; Fantuzzo, Rouse, McDermott, Sekino, Childs and Weiss, 2005; Magnuson, Ruhm and Waldfogel, 2007). In childcare centres, days are generally highly structured with time devoted to indoor and outdoor activities; much of the former either sitting at work tables completing puzzles, craft or sitting on mats listening to stories and singing songs. These regularities of practice are over time embodied by children and so they develop a somatic familiarity for the desk and chair; the basic hardware of scholarly labour. This formative period for the embodiment of scholarly posture does not signal the beginnings of a passive approach to learning. It is the necessary precursor to the self-discipline required for independent learning and academic work. In children whose bodies are accustomed to sit at a desk and concentrate for sustained periods, their body in a sense disappears as they begin to habituate a scholarly posture. It doesn’t receive their conscious attention and they are no longer aware of its role in what they do. We use our bodies in virtually everything we do but over time we attain a level of ‘disengagement’ from each and every task, without which it would be impossible to function or to increase the complexity of our actions (Leder, 1990). What is familiar and habitual is assigned to the unconscious, generally only resurrected by consciousness if modification is required. This disappearance of the body reduces cognitive load, resulting in a greater capacity for conscious thought (Leder, 1990).

To write effectively children need to habituate the biodynamics of literate practice. This entails not only mastering the appropriate writing technology, initially an implement such as a crayon, pencil, pen or even a keyboard, but also the ability to sit at a desk for sustained periods of time and concentrate on producing text. Children need to feel ‘at one’ with what they are doing, a sense of flow or naturalness about the actions they perform. Their use of the pen and their posture when writing must become a part of their being (Watkins and Noble, 2011). As Merleau-Ponty (1999, p. 91) explains, “those actions in which I habitually engage incorporate their instruments into themselves and make them play a part in the original structure of my own body”. This process is also referred to by Foucault (1977, p. 152) who discusses it in terms of body-object articulation whereby “Discipline defines each of the relations that the body must have with the object that it manipulates”. To Foucault the point at which the body and object work as one is attained as a result of a disciplined body. It is only through the incorporation of this bodily know-how, and disengagement from the very physicality of writing, that children possess the necessary cognitive capacity to focus more directly on the content of their work; the form and function of what
they write. For learning in general this process of disengagement is ongoing, whereby what is learned retreats to the unconscious only to be accessed at point of need. Through the habituation of this scholarly technique children acquire a practical ability to write as well as a bodily disposition for learning. It is this generative capacity of disciplinary power and its agentic function that Foucault and much application of his work tends to downplay.

THE PROBLEMS WITH FOUCAULT’S BODY

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977, p. 215) explains that, “Discipline” may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a “physics”, or an “anatomy” of power, a technology.

Foucault, however, rarely gives individual bodies agentic discretion over this technology, rather it is institutionally engendered. It may not be directly identifiable with any particular institution, but it is manifest in the particular procedures and routines which they employ and from which they ultimately seem to benefit. According to Foucault (1977, p. 167), institutions harness certain aspects of disciplinary power which he categorises as: cellular, the manipulation of spatial distribution; organic, the coding of activities; genetic, the organisation of time and; combinatory, involving the grouping of individuals. Despite the usefulness of these categories in analysing the different forms and functions of disciplinary power, Foucault tends to invest the procedures themselves with the capacity to discipline. Crossley (1996, p. 107) similarly notes this problem, although specifically in relation to discipline imposed spatially stating, “Space is not an (external) object-like force which imposes itself on the body from without. It is a lived and shared dwelling whose ‘effects’ cannot be understood or accounted for independently of the human action which animates them”. Crossley highlights the ways in which Foucault downplays the agency of individual bodies’ utilisation of space, which is indicative of his response to the array of disciplinary techniques he documents.

In critiquing Foucault’s treatment of the disciplinary tendencies of spatial organisation, Crossley draws largely upon Merleau-Ponty referring to the ways in which he sees the body in an “active relation to its environment” (Crossley, 1996, p. 106). Yet while Foucault is far too determinist, limiting agency in terms of the disciplinary procedures he describes; Merleau-Ponty seems excessively subjectivist, endowing the body with the capacity to exact what it deems useful from its surroundings. Crossley points out that Merleau-Ponty clarifies this in that the body is empowered to do this as a result of “acquired schemas and habits”, but doesn’t explain how these are acquired and in what way they provide impetus for action. There is no account of the process or pedagogy whereby bodies develop the ingenuity to manipulate their environment. Crossley attempts to address this in his own work through his notions of carnal sociology (Crossley, 1995a) and reflexive
embodiment (Crossley, 2004, 2006) in which the body is both active and acted upon. He is justifiably critical of the tendency within sociology of the body to concentrate on the latter at the expense of the former (Crossley, 2007). While not specifically addressing the issue of pedagogy, in highlighting both these perspectives Crossley at least intends to erase the theoretical gap of conceptualising how it is that forces enacted upon the body are encoded and function to affect individual action, a process Foucault neglects.

Foucault acknowledged his lack of engagement with the agentic aspects of discipline in one of his last interviews commenting that “Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and more interested in the interaction: between oneself and others in the technologies of individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon him/herself in the technology of the self” (Martin, Gutman and Hutton, 1988, p. 19). Foucault’s later concept of *technologies of the self* seems to provide something of a balance to his perspective on discipline. His understanding of technologies of the self, however, does not appear to act in concert with his notion of disciplinary power. In fact, his technologies of power and the self seem conceptually quite distinct. The former operates as an external force investing the body with a certain social utility whereas he defines the latter as allowing, “individuals to effect...a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality” (Foucault, 1990, p. 18). This seems to suggest an internal force of will, the conscious mind determining action. Foucault can conceive of the body as socially constituted, a product of the play of disciplinary forces, but he seems unable to view these as individually agentic and so gives the mind, rather than the body, the capacity to effect change in fashioning the self. Given its usual omission, this apparent insertion of the mind within a technology of the self is pleasing, but without addressing the nature of the mind/body relation in determining action an unhelpful dualism remains. Foucault simply suggests subjectivity is a process of interaction between techniques of power and the self; a position left under-theorised and which only provides a partial account.

Despite these unresolved gaps in Foucault’s theorisation of the body, his work proved instrumental in spawning a wealth of interest in the topic as a distinct area of intellectual concern. Within sociology, his work influenced the development of a sub-discipline related specifically to the body as the locus of inquiry. Despite Mauss’s insights during the 1930s and 40s, the body was largely neglected within sociology, considered either a topic of primarily biological concern or an area where theorisation tended towards a form of individualism lacking a sociological focus (Turner, 1984). This latter criticism was often directed towards ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, as in the work of Garfinkel (1967) and Goffman (1959, 1972). Their notion of the social as an instantiation of individualised ritual practice was generally viewed as sociologically naive. The social, of course, can be understood in different ways from the product of institutionalised structures to an aggregation of individualised action. Yet in
theorising bodies and practice there are pitfalls in emphasising one over the other resulting in a pendulum swing favouring either structure or agency. This is clearly the case in comparing the conceptualisation of the social within the work of Turner (1984, 1992) and Frank (1991). In Turner, whose *The Body and Society* provides one of the first examples of a specific sociology of the body, there is a clear bias towards structure. Following Foucault, Turner’s frame of reference is quite clearly the body as a product of social control. To Frank, however, who critiques Turner’s take on the body, the focus is agency. Frank makes some attempt to incorporate social structure in his account but it seems to function as mere setting. Its central role in the development of bodily capacity and subject formation is never developed. The social, however, is not simply structure or agency; it is both. In the main, social structures, or rather structuring, allows for individual agency. This is not simply theoretical pragmatism but rather an acknowledgement that the social and the individual cannot be understood as distinct entities. It is the nexus that needs to be theoretically expounded, not simply the poles.

In the introduction to the second edition of *The Body and Society* Turner accepts and responds to criticisms of his 1984 edition referring to the “lopsided development of the sociology of the body” (1996, p. 32) that emphasised structure over agency. For Urry (2000), however, the sociological debates around structure and agency are simply unhelpful and he feels different logics need to be embraced. He wants to see “the ordering of social life as contingent, unpredictable, patterned and irreducible to human subjects” (Urry, 2000, p. 16). Like Latour (2005), similarly keen to reassemble the social, Urry wants to acknowledge the impact of objects on human agency: desks, chairs, computers, etc, and to incorporate both the animate and inanimate, human and material, in what might be conceived as ‘social’. Importantly, Urry views agency as embodied, but in his account of the ways in which objects contribute to this he tends to overstate their role, claiming that “Agency is to be seen as an accomplishment and this is brought about through various objects …” (Urry, 2000, p. 78). Yet, it is not so much the objects that achieve this but an individual’s ability to use them, which is generally dependent on the acquisition of skill often requiring the guidance of others. Urry does not adequately account for the pedagogic relations involved in the use of things, which cannot simply be explained in terms of “the forming and reforming of chains or networks of humans and non-humans” (Urry, 2000, p. 78). Such an explanation tends to erase the often difficult task of object use and mastery, as in a child’s use of a pen. The pedagogic process requires further elaboration in Urry’s account and, so too, Latour’s (1992) as it is far more complex than a matter of human/object engagement. Agency is embodied but embodiment is a function of a particular pedagogy; a process that inevitably raises the issue of power and so structure and agency. Within sociology of the body, however, not only is the issue of pedagogy generally neglected, so too is agency. For Turner, research on the body has concentrated on a limited number of areas and has failed to treat adequately issues relating to embodiment and bodily practices, a view Shilling (2005, 2007) shares. Despite these criticisms, problems with Foucault’s notion of the body derived from his emphasis on technologies of power within *Discipline and Punish* remain. There
is still limited treatment of the more agentic aspects of embodiment within recent scholarship and in particular their empirical explication.

PHYSICAL CAPITAL, HABITUS AND PEDAGOGIC EMBODIMENT

Sociology of the body likewise tends to give little consideration to schooling and embodiment. An exception to this can be found in the work of Shilling who, while writing more generally on the relationship between the body and society (1994, 2005, 2007, 2008) also explores the role of the body in schooling (1991, 1992, 2004, 2010). Shilling’s work draws on a range of theorists but of particular interest here is his discussion of Bourdieu. Shilling refers to the selective application of Bourdieu’s work within the sociology of education, namely the widespread use of his early work on social reproduction, which, while utilising the notion of cultural capital, tends to neglect its embodied state as habitus, the set of socially acquired dispositions that generate individual practice (Shilling, 1992). Since making this comment, however, there is now far more engagement with the notion of habitus within educational research to the extent that Reay (2004) bemoans its habitual use especially as she feels its explanatory power is often taken as given. Rather than a concept at the service of the data, Reay is of the view the opposite is the case. Given this, close examination of the embodied dimensions of habitus and the impact of schooling upon its formation tends to receive minimal attention. Although not focusing specifically on habitus, Shilling aimed to redress this oversight by examining how embodied capital is an important aspect of schooling, which, through conversion into economic or symbolic capital, possesses a similar capacity for the reproduction of social inequality.

In his earlier work Shilling favours the term physical as opposed to embodied capital and tends to focus on how individuals make use of their bodies in relation to sport and leisure activities. In the school context his work is primarily concerned with social class and gender differentiation in the teaching of physical education (PE). This is an important field of inquiry, especially in relation to how it impacts upon the academic sphere and employment post school, but neither Shilling nor other theorists in the area of body studies in education (Wright, 2004; Evans, 2004; Evans, Rich, Davies and Allwood, 2005; O’Loughlin, 2006; Skattebol, 2006; Hills, 2007; Burrows, 2010; Lee and Macdonald, 2010, Vander Schee and Boyles, 2010) consider physical capital from an academic perspective; the school’s role in the embodiment of dispositions to learning. Literate practice and the capacity for academic endeavour are not obviously seen as forms of physical capital, yet they are embodied. Notions of embodied and physical capital, however, seem to have different orientations. Embodied capital is a term which gives emphasis to process whereas physical capital seems to stress product or the end result of a process of embodiment. Although making reference to “production” in the titles of his early work on physical capital and schooling (1991, 1992), it seems product rather than production is Shilling’s focus. The actual production of physical capital is given minimal treatment, examined predominantly in terms of the development of
particular sporting skills, preference for physical activities and also as bodily representation, such as through dress.

Although drawing on Bourdieu, Shilling makes little use of his notion of habitus. While he mentions the term and acknowledges its embodied nature, he seems to attach minimal significance to its role in the production of physical capital. This may be due to Shilling’s critique of the concept which he details elsewhere (1994, 1997). Shilling is not alone in his criticism of Bourdieu’s construct (see for example: Giroux, 1982; Gartman, 1991; Aboulafia, 1999; Bohman, 1999; Margolis, 1999; King, 2000; Crossley, 2001; Lahire, 2003; Adams, 2006; Bennett, 2007; Reed-Danahay, 2007). To many, the habitus is overly socially determined ruling out any possibility for individual transformative action. As Shilling (1997, p. 747) explains, “As operationalised in Bourdieu’s work the habitus makes it impossible to separate out action from structure, as the two are inextricably entwined, or to account for social change as the two are mutually regenerating”. While there are problems with Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, which are taken up in more detail in Chapter 2, it does possess a certain functionality for theorising a socially informed yet individually agentic understanding of practice. Bourdieu does conflate structure and agency within the habitus, but this is intentional on his part. The habitus is intended as a mediating device wherein structure is individuated, bridging the structure/agency divide. His success in achieving this, however, is debatable. Shilling also draws on Giddens’s structuration theory and Archer’s morphogenetic approach to resolve issues of structure and agency. Interestingly, however, he is critical of these theorists for failing to engage with the corporeality of practice and their “undersocialised” view of agency that places too great an emphasis on the role of consciousness in the determination of action, pointing out that,

For structuration theory and the morphogenetic approach to incorporate a greater somatic component would require a view of the embodied dimensions of agency that is shaped by the social system but is no mere reflection of it, that possesses a creativity able to affect the reproduction or transformation of social structures; and that is subject to change over time.

(Shilling, 1997, p. 748)

What Shilling sees as a weakness in Giddens and Archer is actually one of the strengths of Bourdieu’s work. The habitus allows for what Giddens and Archer do not; the capacity for a socially embodied form of action. Shilling’s critique of the adequacy of the habitus to affect change may be valid but the value of its socially embodied nature should not be dismissed. In more recent work Shilling (2010) appears to acknowledge this. As is the position presented here and elsewhere (Watkins, 2005a), Shilling similarly places emphasis on the role of pedagogic embodiment. Unlike a notion of physical capital that highlights externalisation, with embodiment, and the pedagogy that guides this process, internalisation and embodied dispositions or habitus are foregrounded. Bourdieu, however, actually rejects the idea that the habitus is immutable and considers this a misinterpretation of his work (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, pp. 132–137). To Bourdieu the habitus
does possess the capacity for change; the problem is that the impetus for this is located in social structures not within the individual. As Bourdieu (1998b, p. 122) explains, “… rupture cannot result from a simple awakening of consciousness; the transformation of dispositions cannot occur without a prior or concomitant transformation of the objective structures of which they are the product and which they can survive”. As such, Bourdieu leaves himself open to the criticism that the habitus is overly deterministic and lacks any transformative potential. A way out of this would be to give greater emphasis to individual reflexivity as a socially acquired capacity, but this would entail a re-examination of how the habitus deals with notions of consciousness and a reassessment of the mind/body relation, the possibility of which is taken up in the next chapter.

NEGLECTING THE MIND: SOCIOLOGY AND ANTI/ANTE THEORY

In general, the theorisation of practice within sociology seems overly preoccupied with issues of structure and agency at the expense of an adequate conceptualisation of the mind/body relation. If mentioned, it is often in terms of an anti-Cartesian stance which, as little more than critique, is hardly a viable alternative. As a result, tacit reference is given to the mind, as it seems anathema to conceive of consciousness as integral to the shaping of action. Shilling (1997), for example, is critical of what he terms “the theoretical weight” given to consciousness by Giddens and Archer but is equally critical of Bourdieu for failing to infuse the habitus with a greater potential for initiating change which, it could be argued, is due largely to its lack of a conscious component. In analysing theories of practice Shilling has termed perspectives either “under” or “over” socialised which, while a useful description, does not in itself provide a way out of the theoretical pendulum swing between structure and agency. A useful intervention seems to be some engagement with the nature of the mind/body relation, but this is generally left to philosophers to explore. Consequently, issues of structure and agency overshadow debate around the role of the mind and body in determining action. Within sociology a focus on the body is seen to remedy this situation but what this seems to produce is a mindless ontology which, in pursuing an anti-Cartesian line, has simply inverted Descartes’s dualism. Shilling’s (1997, p. 748) request for “a view of the embodied dimensions of agency that is shaped by the social system but is no mere reflection of it” may be more effectively met with a reassessment of the mind/body relation which views consciousness as functioning dialectically with embodied aspects of subjectivity. While socially constituted, individual action is not simply a result of bodily determination. To a considerable extent, everyday practice functions below the level of consciousness, and much can be theorised from a purely bodily perspective, but individuals also possess a reflexive capacity that allows them to modify and refine what they do. So, although arguing against a Cartesian dualism, there needs to be some recognition of the heuristic distinction between mind and body if a balance is to be found between the “over” and “under” socialised notions of agency to which Shilling refers and which Bourdieu attempts to address in his notion of habitus. This interface between structure and agency,
mind and body, is where theorisation about the nature of pedagogic practice should be centred. Given its usual cognitive bias, educational theory has much to learn from sociologies of the body, but it will be of minimal use without an accompanying reconceptualisation of the mind/body relation.

This counter-Cartesianism within social and cultural theory which neglects the mind seems to function as a kind of anti-theory, but in being anti-Cartesian it has also assumed a position of being anti the mind and conscious intent. This anti-theory, however, could also be interpreted as a kind of ante-theory operating as a prior, or preliminary stage of reconceptualising the mind/body relation in the wake of Cartesianism’s rejection. It seems an almost necessary intellectual exercise, given the body’s neglect within the Western philosophical tradition, to focus attention on its role in the processes of being. Yet, there seems to be an implicit rationale that doing this provides a kind of epistemological correction to its previous neglect, as if focusing on the body and embodiment will somehow excise the mind/body binary. While analysis of subjectivity as an embodied concept is an important field of inquiry, failure to engage with notions of consciousness means it only provides a partial account of human practice with the theoretical gap around consciousness remaining. As discussed, attempts to bridge this gap within sociology tend to be narrowly conceived in terms of structure and agency with the epistemological links between this opposition and the mind/body relation rarely considered. In attempting to resolve the structure/agency divide, the nature of the mind/body relation is also an issue yet; it isn’t factored into the equation except in terms of the rejection of Cartesianism. Debate around human embodiment, therefore, tends to concentrate on notions of structural constraint and bodily inscription on the one hand and phenomenological engagement and social interactionism on the other. Attempts to link what is done to the body and what the body does are generally undertaken without reference to the mind and conscious understanding. There is also minimal theorisation of the intersection of these perspectives; a space of particular pedagogic concern which necessitates engagement with issues of conscious intent, not as the sole determinant of action but as an integral aspect, along with corporeal competence, in explaining human practice.

ATTEMPTS TO BRIDGE THE DIVIDE

Crossley’s attempt at bridging this theoretical divide was referred to in relation to his critique of Foucault, but he draws on a number of theorists to examine how embodied aspects of existence guide practice. Together with Foucault, Crossley makes particular use of Merleau-Ponty meshing structuralism and phenomenology to provide a more balanced account of the corporeal bases of being. He tends, however, to give greater emphasis to Merleau-Ponty and his concept of the body-subject, a notion intended to counter Descartes’s dualism. As Crossley (1995b, p. 135) states, Merleau-Ponty “shows how the field of perception and the field of action are articulated, how they function together in a mutually transformative fashion and thus how action is always oriented to a present situation which it will accommodate and transform”. This account of action, however, also seems to
discount the role of consciousness. The body’s interaction with its surroundings is never presented as problematic. No account of reflexivity, the thinking through of the possibility of a bodily mismatch with circumstances and the need to consciously adjust behaviour is required. Instead there is an assumed ongoing complementarity. Crossley, however, still finds Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualisation of the body-subject valuable because it equips the body with not only a social past of acquired traits but also a social present; namely, how these traits function as a set of competencies for effective action, something he finds lacking in Mauss (Crossley, 1995b, 2004). While to some extent this is a valid criticism in that Mauss doesn’t engage with the immediacy of intercorporeality and spatiality, he does refer to training and drill and so at least there is an implication of the pedagogic; the process whereby agents are taught to utilise their bodies more effectively and for specific purposes. Despite Merleau-Ponty’s insights into the productive interrelationship of body and space, he also neglects to provide a detailed account of the processes whereby agents develop and, in some cases, explicitly learn bodily capacities for social competence. In other words, Merleau-Ponty also takes the pedagogic for granted. The acquisition of particular competencies is understood as primarily a process of immersion, a view Crossley (2004, p. 52) largely shares, whereby agents simply assume bodily know-how as a result of being in the world. While Merleau-Ponty also explains acquisition in terms of habit, there is similarly little emphasis on its formation or the central role of pedagogy in this process (Merleau-Ponty, 1999, p. 144).

Pedagogy is much more than a process of unconscious osmosis or repetition. It requires recourse to consciousness, often as a result of the intervention of other more capable bodies and minds. The process of learning, even at a bodily level, involves degrees of reflexivity or conscious reassessment of the effectiveness and suitability of particular actions (Noble and Watkins, 2003). Crossley does point out the weaknesses in Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of bodily interaction and sees Goffman as providing a more thorough account of how agents modify their behaviour to maintain face and the requirements of appropriate social performance. He adds, however, that Goffman “is clear that such observance belongs to embodied action itself and not to any separate act of intellection: that is action follows rules without the mediation of conscious or otherwise ‘mental’ processes” (Crossley, 1995b, p. 138). Crossley’s own position on the role of consciousness is unclear. He seems to want to deny its role in the determination of action in his interpretation of Goffman but endorses Merleau-Ponty’s comment that “mindedness and embodiment of human life are inseparable” (Crossley, 1995b, p. 142). While I’d agree in part with Merleau-Ponty, what he means by mindedness requires clarification, particularly given its implications for pedagogy and learning. Mindedness here does not relate to consciousness or specifically cognition but to a bodily mindedness or intuition. Crossley’s notion of reflexive embodiment has a similar meaning because the reflexive doesn’t involve recourse to consciousness but rather operates as a pre-reflective bodily corrective or, as Crossley (2004, p. 51) explains, “a way of knowing both body and world for the practical purposes of using both to modify the former”. In his account of the reflexive body techniques
of circuit trainers, however, Crossley (2004, p. 49) refers to their acquisition of particular routines as “more or less a constant process of adjustment and self-monitoring”. Yet to Crossley this doesn’t entail conscious intervention, rather he sees immersion in practice as guiding this process. Surely, however, for newcomers learning routines and the fact that an instructor is on hand to offer advice to all those participating in the circuit classes, conscious awareness has a role to play. The pedagogy here does not simply entail a dialectic of body and world but of body and mind as they mediate the world, with the mind retreating when proficiency is attained. The automaticity of the circuit trainer’s routine is achieved through a process of bodily incorporation. Conscious awareness necessarily fades as bodily intuition takes over but it remains “on call” if required; a process examined in Chapter 2. While consciousness seems an uncertain category for Crossley, his use of both phenomenology and social interactionism ensure he provides a more agentic perspective on human embodiment and action than is evident in much sociology of the body. His attempts to reconcile the structure/agency divide in his notion of reflexive embodiment, however, shows an ambivalence towards the issue of conscious intent.

Another theorist keen to bridge the structure/agency divide is Giddens. Whereas Crossley attempts to do so in relation to human embodiment and action, Giddens tends to ignore corporeality, viewing action more in terms of the function of a thinking and purposeful agent. Giddens’s contribution to the debate is the concept of structuration, which focuses on the duality of structure. To Giddens (1979, p. 5), structure is “both the medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices”. He rejects the notion of structure as constraint, viewing it instead as a set of rules and resources; the inherent properties of social systems that are in turn constitutive of practice. In terms of this fundamental interrelationship between structure and agency, Giddens has much in common with Bourdieu but, whereas Bourdieu uses the habitus to mediate structure and agency, Giddens has no such mechanism. Instead, he explains that “structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices and ‘exists’ in the generating moments of this constitution” (Giddens, 1979, p. 5).

Giddens’s use of the term constitution, however, is misleading. Given his lack of engagement with notions of embodiment it is difficult to ascertain the ways in which structure enters the agent and functions as an enabling capacity to generate practice, except in terms of a conscious monitoring of activity. In Giddens’s account structure does not sediment into corporeal dispositions as with Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Instead Giddens (1979, p. 40) refers to “stocks of knowledge” that appear to be the accumulation of agents’ social experience, of which they may not be conscious but can draw on to guide behaviour.

Giddens (1984, p. 49), therefore, makes a distinction between what he terms discursive and practical consciousness. The former involves verbal expression, the latter simply tacit awareness, which an agent knows but cannot verbally recount. Giddens’s understanding of practical consciousness though avoids the body and its own learned behaviour which, as habituated practice, is generally and necessarily below the level of consciousness. Giddens wants to retain some ongoing form of
consciousness but in doing so provides a particularly unpractical account of practice. Consciousness at various levels or “states of intensity” is crucial for understanding what agents do, but so are inscribed patterns of behaviour of which we may not even be tacitly aware (Searle, 1997, p. 5). The apparent “naturalness” of the corporeal is easy to discount. It is this “hidden” nature of embodied facility that is all but ignored in theorising the pedagogic; a process understood as almost exclusively cognitive. Giddens’s neglect of the body and any acknowledgement of the role of unconscious bodily intuition could be a result of his intention to counter structuralist theorisations of practice given he feels, “the pressing task facing social theory today is not to further the conceptual elimination of the subject, but, on the contrary, to promote a recovery of the subject without lapsing into subjectivism” (Giddens, 1979, p. 41). From Giddens’s perspective, any lapse in the workings of consciousness by allowing a corporeal unconscious to assert a role in determining behaviour seems to work against what he understands by agency, thereby contributing to “the conceptual elimination of the subject”. But with the disembodied agent of structuration theory acting essentially on the basis of conscious intent, Giddens gives his own theory of practice a subjectivist slant; the very position he is keen to avoid. In Modernity and Self-Identity Giddens (1991) does attempt to engage far more with the bodily dimensions of subjectivity, yet he still gives little emphasis to the processes of embodiment. Instead, his central concern is ontological security which involves a kind of psychological monitoring of individual practice drawing heavily upon the work of Goffman and Laing.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A focus on structure or agency – or alternatively, attempts to bridge this divide which invariably reveal a structural or agentic bias – tend to dominate theorisation of the body. A fundamental shortcoming is the inadequate treatment of its ontological underpinnings. Cartesianism is summarily dismissed, but the gap resulting from its demise is all but ignored, seemingly filled by the concentration given to explicating the corporeal. Yet debates around emphasising either structure or agency may in fact result from this failure to engage with notions of consciousness and the nature of the mind/body relation; an issue of particular poignancy for understanding the role of the body in learning. In the next chapter an attempt is made to correct this imbalance by proposing an alternate ontological framework that incorporates notions of body and mind with the intention of providing a firmer foundation on which to theorise the pedagogic.
We learn bodily. The social order inscribes itself in bodies through this permanent confrontation which may be more or less dramatic but is always largely marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by affective transactions with the environment.

P. Bourdieu (2000, p. 141)

Reason is not seen as a transcendent or disembodied quality of the soul or mind; rather, reason, desire and knowledge are embodied and dependent, at least in the first instance, on the quality and complexity of the corporeal affects.

M. Gatens (1996, p. 110)

The focus in Chapter 1 was to survey various past and present theorisations of the body, especially phenomenological and sociological understandings. Emphasis was also given to work within education largely involving applications of Foucauldian theory. Despite the benefits of this scholarship in demonstrating the ontological significance of the corporeal, there is little interest in articulating a role for the mind in determining practice. While there needs to be a much greater appreciation of the bodily aspects of learning, this should not be undertaken without also acknowledging the role of the mind. Although Bourdieu may feel that “We learn bodily”, this is not exclusively so; cognition figures substantially in the process. The problem is that the mind and body are presented as separate entities, with the former seemingly devoid of any corporeal instantiation. Yet this need not be the case. Drawing on the work of Spinoza, Gatens (1996, p. 110) points out that “reason, desire and knowledge are embodied”. Rather than distinct from the body, consciousness can be conceived as reliant upon “the quality and complexity of corporeal affects”. This chapter returns to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus to explore this relation. While the habitus is a productive conceptualisation of the relation between social structure and bodily action, it nevertheless achieves this by displacing the question of human consciousness. This chapter proposes a reformulation of Bourdieu’s habitus drawing upon the insights of Spinoza’s monism. In doing this, it provides a foundation for a theory of pedagogic embodiment that considers the role of the body and the mind in determining action.

BOURDIEU – LOSING CONSCIOUSNESS

Despite Schinkel’s view that sociology’s overuse of Bourdieu’s term habitus renders it now in a state of “having been innovative” (Schinkel, 2007, p. 707), it
arguably provides the most effective means of bridging the structure/agency divide. Bourdieu (1990, p. 53) defines the habitus as:

systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.

His intention in devising the habitus was to counter both the subjectivist and objectivist tendencies within social and cultural theory, dissolving the binarism that underlies both sociological and philosophical inquiry (Bottero, 2010, p. 4). Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 19) refers to Bourdieu’s theorisation of the social as “monist” as “it refuses to establish sharp demarcations between the external and the internal, the conscious and the unconscious, the bodily and the discursive”. Bourdieu may be monist to the extent that he captures the simultaneity of structure and agency in the operation of the habitus, but this still rests on a dualism of mind and body. Bourdieu’s “partial” monism is made possible through his focus on embodied practice; a view grounded in a “practical non-thetic intentionality” which he explains,

“has nothing in common with a cogitatio (or a noesis), [it] is rooted in a posture, a way of bearing the body (a hesis), a durable way of being of the durable modified body which is engendered and perpetuated, while constantly changing (within limits), in a twofold relationship structured and structuring to the environment” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 144).

This bodily intentionality is lodged within the dispositions of the habitus acquired through the repeated experience of everyday life. These dispositions operate in a virtual sense whereby schemas of action inscribed within the body take command and guide practice when prompted to act. The possibility of any recourse to consciousness, either prior to or during activity, is generally not a matter for the habitus. Given the concept’s fundamental role in determining practice the only conclusion to be drawn is that neither conscious intent nor reflection is integral to action. To obviate the need for conscious intervention, as in the case of a situational disjuncture, Bourdieu (1990, p. 61) points out that “the habitus tends to protect itself from crises and critical challenges by providing itself with a milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as possible”.

Apart from the problem of fetishising the habitus – seemingly providing it with its own in-built reflexivity – Bourdieu only ever deals with the concept as if it was already formed. The actual development of dispositions within the habitus, as in the case of young children beginning school, is not considered. The pedagogic dimension of the habitus receives minimal discussion in Bourdieu’s work. In his early analysis of education, pedagogy is viewed specifically from the perspective of “social reproduction” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). While an important aspect of pedagogy, it is only one dimension of its overall impact. In focusing on this, Bourdieu fails to capture the enabling potential of the process. As his critics point
out, if the dispositions within the habitus merely replicate given social structures, the concept is simply a cog in the process of social reproduction and Bourdieu’s sociology is overwhelmingly structuralist in orientation (Giroux, 1982; de Certeau, 1984; Gartman, 1991; Crossley, 2001; Sweetman, 2003; Adkins, 2004; Adams, 2006; Bottero, 2010). Bourdieu, however, is adamant this is not the case, stressing that the “Habitus is not the fate that some people read into it” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 133). Rather, Bourdieu sees it as “an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 133). Yet this doesn’t tally with the propensity of the habitus to avoid incompatible contexts, and its overall resistance to change. Even if some compromise is found between these two positions, with the habitus understood as a more flexible concept, the impetus for change is located outside the individual with agency dependent not only on the external but also on forces which have a sustained impact upon the habitus. It is only through iteration that a dispositional inclination is attained. This process, as detailed by Bourdieu, goes partway towards explaining the logic of practice and is critical in understanding the importance of habituation within the pedagogic process, but the problem remains as to how to conceive of a socialised subjectivity which has some in-built mechanism for individual autonomy, without a resultant slippage into subjectivism.

As it stands, to Bourdieu, the habitus already provides the requisite degree of autonomy; though he does concede that at times there is a need for conscious intervention or, what he terms, strategic calculation. This mode of action, however, is not really accounted for in his overall logic of practice because it is only at “times of crises” that “rational choice” may intervene and, even so, this is only an option for “those agents who are in a position to be rational” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 131). As far as Bourdieu is concerned, consciousness is an aberration. It only intercedes at “times of crises” and is neither a part of everyday practice nor an aspect of embodied subjectivity. Instead, consciousness is conceived as quite separate from the somatic in its sporadic intervention in practice.

Wacquant may perceive a monist intent in Bourdieu’s work, but his theorisation of habitus is still hampered by an underlying dualism. Bourdieu may not draw sharp demarcations between the various modalities of human existence but, at the same time, he is not even-handed in his treatment of their role in the formation of subjectivity and the determination of practice. One of the key strengths of Bourdieu’s habitus is the conceptualisation of subjectivity as embodied. His understanding of embodiment, however, is still very much framed in terms of the anti-Cartesian stance of much sociology of the body. That is, Bourdieu’s notion of embodiment is almost exclusively corporeal. Rather than incorporating the conscious mind within his conceptualisation of practice as also embodied; it is marginalised in deference to the intentionality inherent in bodily schemas. Instead of providing a monist ontology, Bourdieu inverts Descartes’s dualism virtually effacing conscious intent from the processes of being and doing.

This exclusion of consciousness in the theorisation of the habitus is significant. The concept has generated much debate, yet commentary seems focused on its success or otherwise in bridging the structure/agency divide. Despite
acknowledgement that the habitus may function as a useful heuristic for explicating the individual/social nexus, there is considerable criticism of its failure to adequately account for agency. Turner (1992, p. 90), for example, comments that the habitus is not dissimilar to Durkheim’s account of social facts and that Bourdieu’s work in general is a form of “disguised structuralism”. This criticism is interesting in its failure to elaborate reasons that could account for the deterministic tendencies of the habitus that relate specifically to issues of the mind/body relation and Bourdieu’s neglect of consciousness. There are some exceptions to this such as Margolis (1999, p. 76) who “cannot see how to ensure the theoretical contribution of the habitus without a reasonably detailed account of the cognizing process of social life”. Aboulafia (1999), Bohman (1999) and Jenkins (1992) share similar views. In general, though, Bourdieu and his critics display ambivalence towards consciousness. Bourdieu attributes minimal significance to its role in everyday life, and his critics seem to contain their critique within the confines of attempting to resolve issues of structure and agency, generally by altering the structural component of the equation or reframing notions of the social.

The agentic function of consciousness is generally downplayed as a result of an anti-Cartesian backlash (see Chapter 1 for discussion of this point). In contrast, it is a central concern of neuroscience and, through interdisciplinary dialogue, (Damasio, 1994, 1999; Brook and Mandik, 2004; Steinberg, 2006; Immordino-Yang and Damasio, 2007) there is renewed interest in some areas of philosophy (Searle, 1997; Bennett, Dennett, Hacker and Searle, 2007). The humanities, however, still seem to view consciousness as something of a theoretical pariah with little attention given to its ontological significance. It is generally conceived as a purely cognitive phenomenon, the preserve of a unified, thinking, yet disembodied, subject prompted to act as a result of rational and calculated thought. Affect, emotion, desire and the body are all categories typically considered antithetical to reason and consciousness. Bourdieu may have rejected this epistemological stance in focusing his attention on the role of the corporeal in his logic of practice, but he has tended to limit the impact of corporeality and the effect of the sensate to the realm of the body and habituated action. Their role in the working of consciousness is not considered. While broadening a sociology of action to incorporate socially acquired bodily schemas of practice, a Cartesian separation of body and mind is still evident in Bourdieu’s work.

CONSCIOUSNESS – A VIRTUAL CONSTANT

It could be argued, however, that consciousness is a virtual constant of everyday life, not simply as Bourdieu sees it, as strategic calculation, but, as a set of capacities, which allow for various levels of reflection to impact upon practice. This may be as banal as what to wear on a particular occasion or reassessing the family budget. Such matters may not require the degree of intellection envisaged by Bourdieu but they do involve consciousness and a form of reflexivity with the potential to engender more sophisticated degrees of reflexive thought. Conceptualisations of consciousness, as Greenfield (2000, p. 168) points out, are
often premised on an unnecessary and false assumption that it is “either on or off, there or not there”. She suggests it is better to view consciousness as a continuum – “not as a sudden blinding light but as a dimmer switch” (Greenfield, 2000, p. 168). Consciousness can be considered a polymorphous state, having various forms or, to be more precise, levels moving from basic wakefulness through to awareness, attentiveness and on to degrees of reflection which involve complex thought. As a result, it is variable, changing in intensity from one moment to the next.

In terms of understanding pedagogic practice, the role of consciousness must be considered, particularly as it pertains to complex thought. In learning to write, its role is clearly evident. Before the mechanics of handwriting are routinised to the point of habituation, children first exhibit a mindful focus on the formation of letters and spacing between letters and words. If this conscious attention is not initiated by children themselves, their teacher is generally quick to intervene. What results is a play of consciousnesses between teacher and student, and also among students themselves, which is an integral aspect of the teaching/learning dynamic. Once a degree of competency is attained, there is little need for much conscious monitoring of handwriting. Accordingly, greater cognitive processing, and degrees of reflexivity, can be devoted towards choice of words and the sense and flow of sentences, much of which must also be habituated for children to produce more sophisticated textual forms.

What is evident within school-based pedagogy, and which can be effectively extrapolated to the pedagogy of the everyday, is how consciousness operates in a dialectical and complementary relation to the habitus. Consciousness is not anomalous in terms of what we do; rather, it is an immanent aspect of practice. A distinction needs to be made, however, between the pedagogy of the everyday and institutionalised pedagogy, as in the case of schooling. While there is a dialectic in relation to the habitus and consciousness within all forms of pedagogy, the ratio of habituation and consciousness may vary between the everyday and schooling. In the latter, learning is concentrated. Specific skills and knowledge must be acquired within a shorter timeframe, and with additional restrictions. Schooling does not have the luxury of the time and organisation of the everyday and so habituation must be orchestrated and conscious awareness heightened. This can be achieved through a teaching methodology that emphasises the repeated and detailed treatment of certain skills and knowledge, together with a combination of explicit teaching and focused and sustained learning. Schooling condenses the everyday. This is a process many progressivist educators deride as artificial, and so work against, without fully realising the need for, and appropriateness of, this process.

Pedagogy has both a cognitive and corporeal dimension, as does practice per se. Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus, however, focuses on the latter and does not acknowledge the importance of consciousness as a factor in determining action. Despite allowing for consciousness in terms of strategic calculation, this lies outside the habitus and the realm of the corporeal. The concept itself is devoid of any conscious intent and so consciousness is disembodied within Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Consciousness, however, need not be understood as separate to the body. As Searle (1997, p. 184) explains, “we ought to think of the experience
of our body as the central reference point of all forms of consciousness”. Consciousness, therefore, can be understood as embodied and reliant upon the corporeal affects resulting from day-to-day experience. Much of this ongoing flow of sensation may not be registered overtly by consciousness but, depending on its intensity and recurrence, may still have the capacity to function as a somatic marker alerting the mind to act. Damasio (1994, p. 174) refers to somatic markers as “a special instance of feelings generated from secondary emotions”. He explains that “these emotions and feelings have been connected, by learning, to predict future outcomes of certain scenarios”. An accumulation of affect, therefore, has the capacity to function as a somatic marker, which has implications for habituation and learning.

While a considerable proportion of practice is routinised, and individuals function, as Bourdieu explains, with a socially embodied “feel for the game”, this is not the totality of what constitutes the logic of practice (Bourdieu, 1998b, pp. 80–81). There is rarely one logical choice or move in a game. A feel for the game involves considering the array of options and instantaneously deciding on the best one, such as looking for the best kicker or fastest runner. In terms of writing, this could involve how best to construct a sentence, the choice between active or passive voice, for example. Although giving it a more sociological slant, Bourdieu seems to draw on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body-subject here, which emphasises the complementary relationship between body and space. Yet, as with Bourdieu, Merleau-Ponty’s concept neglects the potential tensions within practice which require conscious evaluation and not simply a reliance on bodily intuition. While the two are interdependent, they are not one and the same. As Damasio (1994, p. 133) points out, even though we possess “the means to respond adaptively at an automated level…consciousness buys an enlarged protection policy”.

CONSCIOUSNESS, AFFECT AND EMOTION

Damasio’s understanding of consciousness is not distinct from the body. It is reliant on bodily affects and their emotional states. He explains that “feeling your emotional states, which is to say being conscious of emotions, offers you flexibility of response based on the particular history of your interactions with the environment” (Damasio, 1994, p. 133).

When Damasio refers to emotions, or feelings, however, he is not referring exclusively to states of mind. While emotions are essentially cognitive they are derived from bodily affects. Emotions, at least initially, result from the conscious registering of these affects. This important distinction is also made by Massumi (1996, p. 221) who points out that emotion and affect “Follow different logics and pertain to different orders”. In her discussion of Massumi’s work, Boler (1996) explains how he sees affects as “intensities” and emotions as “qualified intensities” adding that “In some sense, affect is similar to a preliminal / prediscursive and uncapturable dimension of experience, while emotion is an identified intensity, or recognised affect”.

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Boler (1996), however, is not happy with this distinction. She sees emotions as “inscribed habits of inattention” that need to be understood as “frequently imperceptible, less fixed and qualified”. What Massumi appears to be capturing in the distinction he makes, particularly with his reference to “different orders” and “different logics”, is how affects and emotions relate to different modalities of being. This should not be understood as a form of dualism. Rather, Massumi is referring to what pertains to the mind, namely emotions, and the body, that is affect, as having an ontological correspondence, similar in a sense to Spinozan parallelism. Affect and emotion are at the same time different and similar: different in the sense that they belong to distinct modes of existence, but similar in that emotion is substantially a product of affect or, as Damasio (1994, p. 159) puts it, “Feelings [by which he means emotions] offer us a glimpse of what goes on in our flesh”.

Boler does not seem to want to make this distinction. Her conceptualisation of emotions as “inscribed habits of inattention” seems to locate them, along with affects, in the realm of the corporeal, with an implied resistance to any conscious expression. The distinction she draws between affect and emotion seems to focus on the longevity of their bodily effect; that is, affect is more fleeting whereas emotion is generally sustained. Affect, however, also has the propensity to be inscribed in the body, lodged in flesh as traces of experience. Although in this sense, it is as an accumulation of affects, or, as Spinoza would term it, “affection” resulting from the repeated impact of similar encounters with, and in, the world (Deleuze, 1988, p. 48). In explaining Spinoza’s notion of affect, Deleuze (1988, p. 49) makes reference to its two aspects: force or “affectus” which refers to the passage from one state to another; and affection or “affectio” the state of the affected body. Spinoza, therefore, understood affect as both process and product. Affective force or affectus can reside in the body as affectio, over time forming the dispositions which Bourdieu views as the habitus.

It is in relation to this that Massumi, no doubt, views affect as autonomous. While affect can receive conscious attention as emotion, it may not. Even without instantiation through consciousness, affect could still possess the capacity to direct behaviour, or at least, provoke a response. In these instances, it could be viewed as autonomous. Such an example is provided by Massumi in his discussion of Hertha Sturm’s experiment of children’s reactions to viewing different versions of a film with the aim of generating different affective responses (Sturm, 1987 cited in Massumi 1996). As an initial bodily sensation, however, affect in itself is generally far too ephemeral to be viewed as much more than a combinatory element in inducing individuals to act in particular ways. By and large action is conditioned by, or rather learned through, the repetition of similar affects. This is also the view of Tomkins (1962, p. 181) who, while acknowledging that humans possess innate affective responses, stresses the impact of learning on affect. To exemplify this, Tomkins refers to the affective response of crying in infants and how, over time, this response is considerably weakened through social conditioning to the point where few adult males cry in public. Tomkins is not simply referring to the outward display of the affective response, that is the act of crying, he explains that “We also learn to change some of the internal components of the innate affective responses” (Tomkins,
1962, p. 182). Humans, therefore, may possess affective predispositions, but how affect operates in relation to subject formation and its role in shaping action is a function of pedagogy in its broadest sense. In ascribing affect autonomy, Massumi neglects the role of the pedagogic in human response. What appears as a singular affect may in actuality be an assemblage of previously experienced sensations, perhaps even having received conscious mediation in the past.

Boler also has difficulty with Massumi’s notion of “the autonomy of affect”, yet her criticism is quite different. Boler suggests that viewing an affect as autonomous is not dissimilar from psychoanalytic notions of the “preliminal or prediscursive” (Boler, 1996, p. 12). This view, however, seems to narrow the domain of the unconscious to the psychical and fails to acknowledge that it is equally corporeal. Given Boler’s description of emotions as “inscribed habits of inattention”, it doesn’t seem her intention to make such a distinction because the term itself suggests that emotions function within the realm of the bodily unconscious. Boler, however, does not adequately distinguish between affect and emotion; instead there is a blurring of categories. While emotion may possess corporeality, what is not clear are the ways in which this is distinct from that of affect. As it is understood here, affect denotes the sensate, the initial bodily reaction to ongoing encounters with the external. In contrast, emotion involves conscious awareness of bodily affects. A similar distinction is made by Nathanson (1992, p. 49) who uses affect to describe “the strictly biological portion of emotion”. Once receiving conscious attention, emotions may lay dormant ready to be reactivated again and again given inducement by affect. From Boler’s perspective, the location of dormant emotions produced through this iterative process seems to be the body. This may be why she refers to emotions as “inscribed habits of inattention”, but this definition obscures the necessary conscious recognition involved with emotion. As Lupton (1998, p. 33) points out, “There is a world of difference between a physical feeling and an emotion, even where the embodied sensation may be the same”. To explain this further Lupton cites Miller’s work on the emotion of disgust where he points out that “Disgust is a feeling about something and in response to something not just raw unattached feeling. That’s what the stomach flu is. Part of disgust is the very awareness of being disgusted, the consciousness of itself” (Lupton, 1998, p. 33, original emphasis).

Boler does not intend to deny consciousness – indeed a focus of her work is consciousness raising – rather, it seems she wants to merge affect and emotion. Making an analytic distinction between the two, however, is important because what pertains to emotion and affect, like mind and body, consciousness and unconsciousness, have different pedagogic implications. As mentioned previously in relation to Massumi, this recognition of the different modalities of existence is not about maintaining a dualist ontology but rather accounting for the different aspects of being. Also, simply conflating affect and emotion provides little insight into the workings of consciousness. As Nathanson (1992, p. 114) explains, “Consciousness itself is a function of affect”. It is the actual recognition of an affect – as an emotion – which is the most basic form of consciousness (Greenfield, 2000, p. 161). Boler perhaps feels no real need to make a distinction between affect
and emotion given her work is about considering the important role of emotion within education (Boler, 1999). In particular, she is concerned with how feminine emotion has been devalued in preference to masculine reason, and how emotions can function as a powerful pedagogic resource. I would agree with Boler on this point. Emotion is not only a significant aspect of thought, it actually provides the foundation for reason and rational judgement. Such a view of the interrelationship of emotion, affect and reason relates very much to the Spinozan framework of knowledge discussed later in this chapter and resonates with Tomkins’s point that “Out of the marriage of reason with affect there issues clarity with passion. Reason without affect would be impotent, affect without reason would be blind” (Tomkins, 1962, p. 112). Here, however, the emphasis is not the pedagogic significance of emotions but pedagogic embodiment and the formation of academic dispositions for learning. As a result, there is a need to acknowledge the difference between affect and emotion and articulate how the former functions in relation to the corporeal and the psychical, the unconscious and consciousness, and to consider their respective pedagogic effects.

THE EMBODIED MIND

The blurring which occurs with the categories of affect and emotion is also evident in dealing with notions of consciousness and unconsciousness. What the terms consciousness and unconsciousness actually denote varies considerably. Not only is there fractured understanding resulting from the disciplinary disjunction between the sciences and humanities, but their almost exclusive association with the mind is now challenged with some acknowledgement that each has a corporeal dimension. Within the sciences, consciousness has been predominantly studied as an embrained, as opposed to embodied, phenomenon with notions of mind equated substantially with the brain. Dennett (1998), for example, uses the terms mind and brain interchangeably, as though they were synonymous. Within philosophy, consciousness has tended to be a very loaded term evoking the ghost of Descartes and humanist notions of an all-knowing, unitary self. Consciousness is conceived as self-consciousness involving reasoned reflection and a notion of mind as transcendent, divorced from bodily experience. Although this perspective and its related ontology have lost considerable theoretical traction, this hasn’t seemed to provoke a reassessment of the nature of consciousness itself. Instead, it has been left to languish as a philosophical concept with a kind of theoretical ambivalence towards it in many areas of the humanities.

Despite this, in both the sciences (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1993; Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003; Oyama, 1995; Feldman Barrett and Lindquist, 2008) and philosophy (Searle, 1997) some inroads have been made into rethinking consciousness as an embodied aspect of human existence with the mind viewed as “embodied, in the full sense of the term, not just embrained” (Damasio, 1994, p. 118). Attention is now drawn to how the mind is shaped through experience. Given the emphasis assigned to genes and natural predisposition, resulting from the current fashion for genetic determinism, the contribution of the experiential on the
formation of mind is often downplayed. While genes may be important in
determining certain aspects of bodily make-up and an individual’s propensity for
particular diseases, many neuroscientists such as Greenfield (2000) want to stress
how the uniqueness of mind is directly attributable to individual experience not a
pre-programmed capacity. Greenfield and Damasio share the view that experience
does not necessarily have a direct effect on the brain; rather its impact is felt via the
body through the skin, musculoskeletal system and in Greenfield’s case, the
hormonal system.

It is interesting, therefore, to ponder how such embodied notions of mind, and, in
particular, the conscious mind, might be articulated with Bourdieu’s understanding of
the logic of practice and the autonomy he assigns to the role of the habitus in
accounting for agency. If consciousness is a product of bodily experience it seems
worthwhile to incorporate its function within a theory of practice rather than treat it,
as Bourdieu does, as an epiphenomenon to the processes of being and doing. This
acknowledgement of the importance of consciousness in understanding practice does
not run the risk of resurrecting Cartesianism; rather, with consciousness as an
embodied concept it possesses an oppositional logic to dualism in that mind and
consciousness are a product of experience, rather than distinct from it. Practice may
be a product of habituated response but it also involves degrees of conscious
reflection. These embodied processes of habituation and consciousness operate as a
dialectic. Not only do some activities which were initially conscious become
habituated over time, but this habituated practice may also be reflected upon and
perhaps modified, as in the case of children correcting poor writing. This example
may seem trivial but the processes involved – the movement between the habitual
and consciousness – are evident in practice in general. Even practice that has become
embodied without recourse to consciousness is open to conscious reflection.
Bourdieu may allow for this in terms of strategic calculation, which intercedes when
there is a misfit between habitus and field, but conscious intervention is a possibility
in the course of any activity. It may not result from a self-directed act of intellection;
rather, it could be predicated on outside intervention. This is evident in such cases as
a teacher drawing attention to a child’s poor writing or their inability to sit still. Such
a comment by a teacher may trigger the child to make a conscious decision to change
what they’re doing at that time and, if the intervention is consistent and effective,
may instil a type of **habitual consciousness** in the child to self-correct; a habit for
reflexivity (Sweetman, 2003).

The understanding of practice proposed here does not involve such a tight fit
between Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and field nor a singular causal relation.
Instead, while individuals tend to perform almost automatically within specific
milieus with which they are familiar and in which the processes of bodily
enculturation have occurred, there is still the ongoing possibility of degrees of
conscious reflection to modify behaviour, even within the context of the familiar.
Also, rather than a “crisis situation” always resulting from the disjuncture between
habitus and field, practice, with an ongoing recourse to consciousness, can be
understood as far more seamless than that which Bourdieu proposes. As such, there
is the possibility of a reasonably fluid movement across fields; even those with
which we may have little or no experience, depending of course on the particular make-up of an individual’s habitus. Such a view of practice can provide some explanation as to why some working class children confronted with what is largely the middle class culture of schooling still manage to succeed. It also frees pedagogy from the treadmill of social reproduction allowing it to be understood as a potentially enabling process. This enabling potential, however, is very much dependent upon the ability to habituate certain practices – one of these being the propensity or disposition for conscious reflection. This seems a contradiction in terms as the very process of habituation seems to rule out the intervention of consciousness. Yet, with consciousness understood as embodied, there is no longer a contradiction. Thought can be triggered by a dispositional tendency, functioning in a similar way to Damasio’s notion of a somatic marker.

While this process of habituation is markedly different from what Bourdieu proposes, it doesn’t require discarding the notion of habitus. Rather, it involves breaking down Bourdieu’s implicit dualisms of body and mind, consciousness and unconsciousness, and refashioning the habitus so it becomes a truly embodied concept with consciousness, and the potential for reflexivity, corporealisated. Bourdieu does view the mind/body relation in a non-dualistic sense in terms of the unconscious, but when it comes to consciousness he seems to retain the binary relationship pointing out that “The very structures of the world are present in the structures (or to put it better the cognitive schemes) that agents implement in order to understand it” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 152). He explains, however, that these cognitive schemes “are not forms of consciousness but dispositions of the body [or] practical schemas” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 176). The mindful state of unconscious understanding, or what Giddens views as “practical consciousness”, is corporealised by Bourdieu. The unconscious, however, needs to be understood as an amalgam of the psychical and the somatic.

The unconscious, as it is used here, is quite distinct from psychoanalytic understandings of the unconscious (Sullivan, 2006, p. 7). The Freudian unconscious is conceived as a purely psychical phenomenon and a realm not simply below the level of consciousness, but, particularly in relation to Lacan, unable to be accessed by consciousness and quite distinct from the body. The terms consciousness and unconsciousness can be understood in various ways. Bourdieu has been able to transcend a solely mentalist notion of the unconscious through his incorporation of bodily habituation. Despite this broadening of the term to include the corporeal, Bourdieu views unconsciousness as quite distinct from consciousness. He retains the latter exclusively within the psychical domain. The possibility of conscious reflection attaining a dispositional status is ruled out. This theoretical impasse is unfortunate, given Bourdieu is able to conceptualise the unconscious in such a productive sense as both “mindful” and bodily. With the embodied notion of consciousness proposed here, however, no such clear distinction is made. Unconsciousness is not radically differentiated from consciousness; rather, it is placed in a chain of intensities similar to the grades of light in Greenfield’s “dimmer switch” analogy. For this reason, and to mark its differentiation from psychoanalytic understandings, it is perhaps better understood as non-consciousness, which denotes inattention or action that is not
reflexive. Given this, the movement between non-consciousness and consciousness is not difficult to conceive. What is required, given the corporealisation of these states, or intensities, is an ontological framework which, while recognising the role of bodily experience, does not simply collapse the category of mind into body but retains an analytic distinction between the two. In many respects this can be found in the work of Spinoza.

**SPINOZA AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM**

Despite Wacquant’s reference to Bourdieu’s work as monist, it is evident from the sharp distinctions Bourdieu makes between consciousness and unconsciousness and his separation of the former from any bodily instantiation, that an underlying dualism is apparent in his work. With Spinoza, however, the dualistic tendencies of the mind/body relation are erased with a monism that identifies thought and extension as attributes of a single substance. Despite the inherent dualism in language whereby the very act of naming seems to maintain the binary distinction between mind and body, Spinoza (Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, P7) proposes a parallelism whereby, “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things”. Thought and extension, and the finite modes of these attributes, namely individual minds and bodies, “are not separate entities but distinct expressions of the same reality” (Allison, 1987, p. 85). To Spinoza, the mind and the body act in concert or, as he states, “the order of actions and passions of our body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the mind” (Spinoza, *Ethics*, III, P2D).

This contrasts markedly with Descartes’s dualistic account that sees the mind and body as separate substances. Despite this substantive distinction, which would seem to rule out any causative relationship between mind and body given a substance is by definition existentially autonomous, Descartes, unlike Spinoza, allows for mind/body interaction. What is significant about the notion of interaction informing Descartes’s account, however, is the hierarchising of mind over body and the latter’s exclusion in terms of understanding self and world. To Descartes (*The Principles of Philosophy*, Part 1, 8) “thought is known prior to and more certainly than anything physical”. The impact of the world upon the body is best resisted as it only serves to cloud the mind’s capacity for rational thought.

Descartes identified two modes of thinking: the intellect through which reason is attained, and the will, which is a free unbound capacity for choice. While to Descartes the will is infinite, the intellect is not. Herein, he contends, lays the basis of human error; namely, acting simply in response to will which is not informed by the perception of the intellect. With the mind and body substantively distinct, it is quite feasible, or in fact requisite within Descartes’s metaphysics, that the mind can be all-knowing. Yet, as Lloyd (1994, p. 39) explains, the dilemma of the Cartesian self “resides in its status as self-contained substance. This is the source of its supposed autonomy as knower; but, at the same time, it is the source of its separation from the world it purports to know”. In contrast, Spinoza (*Ethics*, II, P23) explains that the mind only comes to know itself through the body never
viewing the order of understanding proceeding from mind to body. Instead, it is the human body “which provides the focal point from, and through which alone the human mind can perceive its world” (Allison 1987, p. 107). It is the body’s interaction with the world, its capacity to be affected by other bodies, which provides the basis of human understanding. This focus on the external world has led Spinoza to be viewed as a materialist (Curley, 1988). Yet, while there is a material grounding to his philosophy, Spinoza should not be read as simply inverting Descartes’s idealism rather, the parallelism governing the attributes of Spinoza’s single substance ensures equal weight is given to mind and body. Dualisms, as such, are avoided within his metaphysics. To Grosz (1994, p. 13), however, Spinoza’s *psychophysical parallelism* is problematic. While she rejects Cartesian dualism, she insists Spinoza fails to explain “the causal or other interactions of mind and body”. Indeed Spinoza (*Ethics*, III, P2) writes that “The body cannot determine the mind to thought; neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else”.

In response to the ontological positions of Descartes and Spinoza, Grosz (1994, p. xii) proposes an alternative similar to the Mobius strip, which she suggests is able to capture “the fluid interface between mind and body, the internal and external”. Yet, this notion of interaction between mind and body maintains the dualism which she is keen to avoid. It seems only through the kind of parallelism proposed by Spinoza, where there is no question of interaction, that any form of dualism and its concomitant ontological problems are evaded. Parallelism renders the idea of *interaction* unnecessary. The relationship between mind and body is not one of interaction or reciprocity between separate entities. Rather, it is one of coexistence, with the mind and body being isomorphic in nature, or in Spinoza’s words (*Ethics*, III, P2D), “the mind and body are one and the same thing which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension”.

In some respects Spinoza’s psychophysical parallelism is not very far removed from some contemporary theorising within neuroscience. Greenfield, who holds the view that the mind is the personalisation of the brain resulting from individual bodily experience, points out that the brain and the body work in concert (Greenfield, 2000, p. 176). Yet, by this she does not intend a simplistic notion of mind/body interaction but that “the brain and the body must have a form of communication that is more related to feelings and not dependent upon the fast zaps of simple electrical signals buzzing up and down the spinal cord” (Greenfield, 2000, p. 176). Her answer is hormones, but from a Spinozan perspective, these bodily chemicals that are related to sensation provide further affirmation of the ontological parallelism of body and mind.

While there is a bodily basis to Spinoza’s conceptualisation of self and human understanding, his parallelistic approach to the mind/body relation acknowledges the equally important role of the mind. Despite the distinct corporeality of his philosophy, Spinoza was undeniably a rationalist. Knowledge of the world may be attained through the impact of bodily affects, yet to Spinoza this form of understanding is “mutilated, confused and without order for the intellect” (Spinoza,
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_Ethics, II, P40S_. This kind of understanding, termed _opinion_ or _imagination_ by Spinoza, is merely the lowest level within a hierarchy of knowledge. Imagination, or the bodily basis of understanding, requires the order of reason for considered or, in Spinoza’s terms, _adequate_ thought. Spinoza, like Descartes, placed reason at a premium. Where they differ is that Descartes viewed reason as a product of an all-knowing mind, separate from world and bodily influence. To Spinoza the foundation of knowledge is premised on what Descartes rejects, namely the world and its impact on the body.

A SPINOZAN HABITUS

Spinoza’s parallelistic treatment of the mind/body relation and his embodied notion of reason have much to offer contemporary social and cultural theory which, in its rejection of Cartesianism, has embraced the body but generally excised the mind. In particular, it is useful in reassessing Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. As it stands Spinoza resonates throughout Bourdieu’s work. Bourdieu makes use of Spinoza’s term _conatus_ or _striving to be_ in relation to how social structures “perpetuate their social being” (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 19). Bourdieu’s main debt to Spinoza, however, can be seen in the emphasis he places on the body and the processes of social embodiment in understanding practice. The habitus as the key construct within this theory of practice is essentially an accumulation of bodily affects, which over time have sedimented into dispositions. These dispositions function like a set of virtual genres of practice which, given the nuances of a particular situation, are triggered into action. The habitus’s capacity to retain bodily affects, in essence the process of embodiment, is also referred to by Spinoza, who writes that “The human body can undergo many changes, and nevertheless retain impressions, or traces, of the objects and consequently the same images of things” (_Ethics_, III, Post. 2). The difference here is that, unlike Bourdieu, Spinoza is not simply considering embodiment as a corporeal process. Given his parallelistic ontology, it is simultaneously a cognitive process, hence his reference to bodily traces as also being “images of things”.

As already discussed, Bourdieu does not totally exclude the mind. He acknowledges the impact of embodiment on cognitive structures, but to Bourdieu this does not mean consciousness. Rather, he is referring to the unconscious mind, fusing it with the bodily unconscious, the realm in which the habitus functions. As such, Bourdieu generally excludes consciousness from his logic of practice and in doing so only provides a partial account of what guides human activity. His focus is the automatic which is an essential and, at times, all pervading aspect of practice. As Pascal writes and Bourdieu (2000, p. 2) cites, “we are as much automatic as intellectual”. Pascal also points out that “Custom is the source of our strongest and most believed proofs. It inclines the automaton about the matter”. The mind, though, does not remain in automatic mode. It is also inclined to reflect upon activity, which may lead to a modification of behaviour. The kind of customary knowledge Pascal refers to is similar to what Spinoza terms imagination but, as with Spinoza, he identifies other kinds, or levels, of thought, namely those involving reason and the intellect. Reason need not be understood as a separate or
compartmentalised notion of thought as Bourdieu seems to suggest; only activated at times of crisis. Rather, thought operates as a more fluid phenomenon. While for much of the time the mind and the body function in a habitual way, there is also the ongoing potential for reflection. This is particularly the case during the process of teaching and learning where there is a constant slippage between habitual and reflexive modes of thought; generally, the greater the aptitude for a particular activity the less the reliance on the reflexive. It remains, however, as a virtual corrective, often interceding even if not required, if individuals have developed a dispositional proclivity for the reflexive mode. Reflection, as it is used here, does not necessarily typify higher levels of reason but it surely falls within the parameters of the rational. Reason is neither transcendent nor disconnected from the everyday; it is simply a point along a continuum of different modes of thought. It is an essential aspect of human activity yet one which Bourdieu has difficulty incorporating within his theory of practice.

Bourdieu’s habitus, therefore, requires reassessment. It is a far too useful theoretical concept to discard. It requires a more comprehensive treatment of the processes of embodiment whereby consciousness and unconsciousness are understood as being derived from a corporeal base. This is where a Spinozan reading of Bourdieu’s habitus is useful. Infusing the habitus with Spinoza’s parallelistic monism ensures the construct has the theoretical flexibility to not simply explain the habitual aspects of practice but to embrace a dialectic with consciousness which allows for degrees of reflexivity to be taken into account in terms of understanding the nature of practice. With the habitus conceived in this way, it has a far greater application to theorising the pedagogic which needs to be understood as encompassing both the cognitive and the corporeal dimensions of being.

VYGOTSKY, SPINOZA AND PEDAGOGIC AFFECT

Central to theorising the pedagogic within a school context is trying to ascertain those practices that are most effective in equipping students with the skills they require for academic success. The focus here is learning to write and one of the key theorists in this field is Lev Vygotsky who investigated the relationship between thought and language development in the Soviet Union in the early twentieth century. Vygotsky detailed the importance of teacher direction upon student learning. He theorised the notion of a Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD), which refers to the gap between a child's actual development determined by independent problem solving and their potential development achieved when assisted (Vygotsky, 1996, p. 187). The form of assistance Vygotsky intended was not simply that which results from peer collaboration. This is very much the interpretation of Vygotsky’s ZPD within ‘whole language’ and progressivist applications of his work (Berk and Winsler, 2002). Although peer support can be beneficial to learning, in outlining his theory of the ZPD, Vygotsky was detailing a particular pedagogic approach that is considerably divergent from the student-directed learning that underpins contemporary progressivist-inspired approaches. Vygotsky was a fierce critic of the progressivist free education movement.
prevalent in the Soviet Union during the 1920s (van der Veer and Valsiner, 1991, p. 53). He claimed that “Instruction is one of the principal sources of the schoolchild’s concepts and is also a powerful force in directing their evolution; it determines the fate of [their] total mental development (Vygotsky, 1996, p. 157).

Vygotsky did not base his understanding of the ZDP upon a theory of affect yet, before his death, as Werstch (1985, p. 189) explains, he clearly demonstrated an interest in its role as an “integrating and motivational force for consciousness”. The effectiveness of the teacher-directed pedagogy underpinning Vygotsky’s ZPD is understood here as pertaining to a heightening of pedagogic affect and, as such, a heightening of consciousness, an effect which is not as potent with less teacher-directed pedagogies. Being a psychologist, Vygotsky’s focus was mental development. His theoretical perspective, however, was in sharp contrast to the biological determinism that governs Piaget’s theory of child development (Vygotsky, 1996, p. 45). While acknowledging an innate component, Vygotsky viewed development as primarily a social process; namely that a child’s intrapsychological processing is a function of prior and similar processing on an interpsychological plane (Wertsch, 1985, p. 60). It was children’s mental development and, in particular, the relationship between thought and language which was Vygotsky’s central concern. In relation to this, he began to demonstrate some interest in the impact of affect on consciousness (Wertsch, 1985, p. 189) and was keen to counter the dualism that he believed underpinned psychology, commenting that “the tragedy of all modern psychology … consists in the fact that it cannot find a way to understand the real sensible tie between our thoughts and feelings on the one hand and the activity of the body on the other hand” (cited in van der Veer and Valsiner 1991, p. 355).

Affect seemed to provide a solution to this problem and Vygotsky found Spinoza’s monism a much sounder ontological basis from which to theorise the impact of affect on consciousness and children’s overall mental development. Due to Vygotsky’s premature death his theorisation of the role of affect was never elaborated and, to many, there is evidence that he finally felt that Spinoza did not provide the answer. Followers, such as Leontev and Ilyenkov, pursued these ideas in what is now termed Activity Theory; an approach aimed at studying the relationship between human activity and consciousness (Cole, 1997). Given the significance that Vygotsky attached to instruction, it is interesting to contemplate how he would have theorised the relationship between pedagogic practice and affect and, in turn, how this impacts upon consciousness as an embodied phenomenon. Although much of his own work seems to confirm the cognitive bias within education, Vygotsky’s interest in Spinoza’s monist ontology indicates a certain unease with this position. As Wertsch (1985, p. 200) points out, “Following Spinoza, Vygotsky argued that investigations are often misled in their attempts to understand the relationship between mental and neurophysical phenomena because their analyses are based on the false assumption that they are dealing with two substances rather than with two attributes of the one substance”.

Education’s preoccupation with the mind at the expense of the body has major pedagogic repercussions. With consciousness understood as an embodied
phenomenon, in line with the logic of Spinoza’s monism, the body as well as the mind can be seen as an object of pedagogic concern with a view towards a parallelistic conception of the mind/body relation. Although not utilising a Vygotskian approach, there are similar concerns here, namely to theorise the affective impact of a teacher’s practice in terms of a Spinozan notion of habitus, or how classroom activity affects students’ bodies and minds. In many ways, this is a function of the disciplinary force generated by a teacher’s manipulation of the classroom environment and their particular approach to curriculum implementation, all of which possess considerable pedagogic affect.

RETHINKING PEDAGOGY AND THE ROLE OF THE BODY

With mainstream educational theory locked within a Cartesian paradigm giving emphasis to the mind and viewing learning as a purely cognitive process, theorisation of pedagogy tends to suffer from an impoverished ontological framework. Little attention is given to the function of academic dispositions that predispose learners to the regimen of schooling and academic work (Watkins and Noble, 2008). If considered, these dispositions are understood in cognitive terms as concentration, persistence and interest generally linked to a Cartesian notion of free will, with a view that a child will succeed if he or she ‘puts their mind to it’. Yet a propensity for learning, particularly that associated with institutionalised education, has probably more to do with how a child’s body has been regulated prior to school and the extent to which they have embodied abilities such as sitting still, working for sustained periods of time and following instructions (Watkins and Noble, 2010). Bourdieu does not specifically refer to this form of pedagogic embodiment, but it relates very much to his understanding of the structuring of dispositions within the habitus and clearly shows the need for a more detailed understanding of the role of bodily habituation in learning. Habituation does not simply relate to the unconscious as a bodily phenomenon, it also has a psychical dimension. In fact, without the ability to make knowledge and skills automatic, cognitive processing would become overloaded and learning an impossibility. While this is not a call to resurrect traditional pedagogic practices, such as those where students’ learning experiences were dominated by the numbing overuse of drill and practice, it suggests there needs to be a better understanding of how certain skills and knowledge are best learned and the implications of this for the programming and delivery of curriculum.

In a sense, there are similarities between the role of habit in learning and Spinoza’s account of the impact of affects on the body. He considered, “the more an affect arises from a number of causes concurring together the greater it is. A number of causes together can do more than if they were fewer. And so, the more an affect is aroused by a number of causes, the stronger it is” (Spinoza, Ethics, V, P8 & D). The logic here is simple yet the implications profound, especially in relation to pedagogy. While Spinoza is not directly referring to the impact of the habitual on learning, the crux of his proposition is specifically related to this application, namely that repetition intensifies affect. Pedagogically, this is significant as it indicates that
iteration leads to acquisition, a point Butler (1993) argues though more in a discursive as opposed to material sense of the body. From a teaching perspective this would suggest a need for a systematic and consistent pedagogy and, in relation to learning, the importance of practice and sustained effort.

While habituation has an important yet generally neglected role in the processes of teaching and learning, it does not account for the entirety of how individuals function in the world. Also, it tends to minimise the degree of agency involved in human practice, a criticism levelled against Bourdieu’s habitus. Similar criticisms are voiced by progressivist educators and proponents of critical pedagogy with the process of habituating skills and knowledge through drill and practice considered ineffective pedagogy that only encourages low-level skill development and a lack of critical thought. If drill and practice was all there was to education this would be a valid criticism, but the ability to habituate certain skills and knowledge is essential for learning and academic success. What is troubling, and ultimately inequitable, is that the habituation of academic dispositions and relevant skills and knowledge is not evenly distributed. Generally children from low socio-economic backgrounds have habituated dispositions that are unsuited to schooling and academic work (Nash, 2005). Of course other children may have failed to acquire these necessary traits as well. While there is a significant class basis to this failure to acquire what can be given the umbrella term academic dispositions, there are other groups of children whose poor academic success may also relate to this factor, such as boys experiencing difficulty with literacy. This suggests that the teacher’s role is central. They need to understand the dispositions of each student’s habitus and scaffold learning appropriately. For learning to be ongoing and productive it needs a dispositional foundation achieved through the habituation of certain knowledge and bodily capacity.

While habituation is crucial, learning would be a particularly passive activity if it were simply a process of inculcating the abilities to function automatically. Learning also involves conscious reflection. While there are certain skills and knowledge which may be acquired relatively unconsciously, learning also involves reflection. What is important about conscious processing, be it learning something new or in applying previously acquired knowledge and skills, is its effectiveness in modifying behaviour. Spinoza (Ethics, V, P9D) points out that “because the mind’s essence, that is, power, consists only in thought, the mind is less acted on by an affect which determines it to consider many things together than by an equally great affect considering one or few objects”. In effect, the mind needs to focus on a limited number of things at any one time to be effective and, it is concentrated and sustained thought that heightens the degree and effect of reflection. This is significant in a number of ways, many of which relate to the pedagogic centrality of the teacher and their methodological approach.

Firstly, it suggests teachers need to provide activities that encourage the development of sustained thought in learners. While it is important to provide variety, it is essential that this is not undertaken at the expense of allocating ample time and depth of application to learning. Activities need to be structured around key skills and learning outcomes. Variety can be offered within these parameters
providing there is concentrated application of key knowledge and skills. Yet, to cater for what is often considered the short concentration spans of children, they are inundated with a variety of brief learning activities. While these may function as an effective short-term behaviour management technique, the brevity of these activities fails to allow them to develop a detailed understanding of curriculum content. As a result, it tends to compound the problems that students experience, which may not even be cognitive. Instead, they may relate to a failure in having habituated the appropriate bodily dispositions for schooling. Constant change and limited application only serve to reinforce this lack of bodily discipline.

Secondly, to intensify the effectiveness of cognitive processing as much understanding as possible needs to be processed automatically. This means that as much knowledge as possible needs to reside in the realm of the unconscious in a virtual state ready to be retrieved when required. Tomkins (1962, p. 115) also stresses the necessity of habituating knowledge, stating: “This capacity to make automatic or nearly automatic what was once voluntary, conscious and learned frees consciousness for new learning”. This dormant bank of knowledge and skills has a complementary relationship with consciousness, with the two states functioning dialectically. The repercussions of this for teaching methodology are significant. To ensure students can master more sophisticated tasks it is necessary that they have achieved a certain level of automaticity with regard to prerequisite understanding. This is recognised in areas such as learning to read, where certain phonological, syntactic and semantic knowledge needs to be processed automatically if adequate comprehension and reading beyond the literal is to be achieved. This suggests the need for iteration to assist the habituation of required and at times foundational skills and knowledge. In the area of writing the need for certain kinds of knowledge, such as lexicogrammar, to become habituated is not well recognised. While proficient writers play with text through the manipulation of lexicogrammatical forms, little is understood, pedagogically, about how best to attain these skills, particularly in the early years of school. Since the mid 1990s there has been a greater acceptance of the need for children to develop a more explicit understanding of grammar and textual form, yet the theorisation of the pedagogy to support this is limited (Board of Studies, New South Wales, 1994; Board of Studies, New South Wales, 1998; National Curriculum Board, 2009). It seems that as with reading, the more knowledge that can be processed automatically from basic syntactical understanding and sentence construction through to literary and rhetorical forms, the more a writer can concentrate on composition. The effectiveness of conscious intervention depends on its dialectical relationship with the bodily and psychical unconscious; the location of previously habituated skills and knowledge. Consciousness is not only a part of the initial phase of a considerable amount of learning – that is, when attention is first drawn to a new concept or skill – it also intervenes in the habitual, and, through ongoing, heightened degrees of reflexivity, modification of both understanding and practice can occur.

Learning, however, and practice in general, is not simply premised on the workings of the mind/body relation, it is also dependent on interaction with the
environment; that is, the potency of affects generated by other minds and bodies which is discussed in more detail in the empirical treatment of these issues in Section 3 – Bodies in Practice. Consciousness shouldn’t only be understood as an embodied phenomenon, it should also be seen as intersubjective, its power to act not simply a result of accumulated bodily affects but a function of the intervention of other consciousnesses. In relation to learning in the early years of school, this suggests the importance of key others: parents, classmates and, in particular, the teacher. The teacher has a central role, not simply in structuring the classroom environment and designing activities for learning which are appropriately scaffolded, but for actively intervening in the learning process. This entails ensuring students are aware of what they are doing, that is, reflecting upon and evaluating their efforts to the point where they habituate not only knowledge and skills but also the capacity for reflexive thought. This process is not undertaken autonomously by the child. It is constantly reinforced by the teacher and the classroom activities they devise, which of course also involve the contribution of all students in a class.

In much contemporary theorising of pedagogy, this form of intervention is seen as interference in a child’s learning, yet such a view fails to acknowledge the intersubjective nature of learning, and also that the teaching/learning relationship is not an equal one. This does not mean that the relationship is unidirectional with the teacher simply directing the child’s learning, but it does acknowledge a power differential, which is not simply a function of the teacher’s institutional position but, rather, a result of their greater understanding. The teacher, therefore, through their own accumulated knowledge and skills, has a responsibility to guide and support a child’s learning. In practice, the teaching/learning process is dialectical. The teacher may direct their students’ learning, but, so too, the students’ learning will, and should, direct the teacher’s teaching. Being is intersubjectively determined and quite obviously so in the context of schooling. While reference is made here to the intersubjective play of consciousnesses, primarily in relation to the teacher and student, intersubjectivity is also fundamentally an unconscious phenomenon, in both a psychical and somatic sense. While these notions of intersubjectivity are discussed further in later chapters, it is an area of inquiry that requires more detailed analysis, particularly as it pertains to the cultivation of pedagogic desire, both a teacher’s desire to teach and a student’s to learn.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A prime concern in theorising the pedagogic is to reconsider certain ontological presuppositions of teaching practice. The critique of Cartesianism which pervades contemporary social and cultural theory has had little impact on educational theory and practice. The tendency to simply invert Descartes’ dualism and concentrate on the body as the locus of understanding may shatter the paradigmatic dominance of Cartesianism, but its virtual erasure of consciousness means it provides a less than viable alternate ontology. Bourdieu’s belief that we “learn bodily” is only partially correct. The conscious mind is also integral to determining what we do. Spinoza’s
mind/body parallelism is a useful way to think through not only the mind/body relation, but consciousness and unconsciousness, reflection and habituation and the intersubjective torsion between one embodied consciousness and others. Spinoza’s parallelistic monism effaces dualistic understandings yet allows for an analytic distinction between mind and body, essential in terms of theorising the pedagogic. While the mind and its capacity for conscious reflection are prominent within Spinoza’s ontology, the corporeal basis of understanding is always foregrounded. Spinoza, therefore, allows for what Bourdieu only positions marginally; that is, an embodied notion of consciousness and a view of reflection which is not separate to everyday practice but simply a particular level of understanding linked to our ongoing engagement in the world. Infused with a psychophysical parallelism, the habitus provides a more comprehensive notion of practice wherein there is an ongoing dialectic between consciousness/non-consciousness and reflection/habituation, determining what individuals do and how they do it. In relation to pedagogy, this dialectic provides the means for understanding how knowledge and skills are acquired and are then, in a sense, naturalised, embodied, yet available for conscious evaluation and modification. The pedagogic body, therefore, needs to be understood as not simply shaped by the external, nor capacitated by its ability to retain affects, but rather, as mindful; that is, where these affects form the basis of conscious understanding and where embodied reasoning is integral to how we learn.