Policy, Geophilosophy and Education

P. Taylor Webb
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

and

Kalervo N. Gulson
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

Education policy is premised on its instrumentalist approach. This instrumentalism is based on narrow assumptions concerning people (the subject), decision-making (power), problem-solving (science and methodology), and knowledge (epistemology). Policy, Geophilosophy, Education reconceptualises the object, and hence, the objectives, of education policy. Specifically, the book illustrates how education policy positions and constitutes objects and subjects through emergent policy arrangements that simultaneously influence how policy is sensed, embodied, and enacted. The book examines the disciplinary and multi-disciplinary approaches to education policy analysis over the last sixty years, and reveals how policy analysis constitutes the ontologies and epistemologies of policy. In order to reconceptualise policy, Policy, Geophilosophy, Education uses ideas of spatiality, affect and problematization from the disciplines of geography and philosophy. The book problematizes case-vignettes to illustrate the complex and often paradoxical relations between neo-liberal education policy equity, and educational inequalities produced in the representational registers of race and ethnicity.
Policy, Geophilosophy and Education
Policy, Geophilosophy and Education

P. Taylor Webb
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

and

Kalervo N. Gulson
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ix

Introduction: Notes on the Writing Experiment xi

## Part 1: Emergence

Chapter 1: Policy Scientificity 3.0: Theory and Policy Analysis in-and-for This World and Other-Worlds 3
  - Policy Scientificities in Education 5
  - Policy Scientificity 1.0 6
  - Policy Scientificity 2.0 7
  - Policy Scientificity 3.0 11
  - Policy Mutations 16

  - Critical Parochialisms, or “Where Did My Ontology Go?” 22
  - The Spatialities of Education Policy (Analyses) 25
  - Unpredictable ‘Agency’: Emergence and Affect 26
  - What It Does (and Doesn’t Do)… 31

Chapter 3: Policy Problematization 33
  - No Solution; No Problem: Policy Logics in Education 35
  - Policy 37
  - Problematization 38
  - Problematization: Contradictions, Recursions, and Events 39
  - Policy Problematizers 44
  - The Insufficiencies of Knowledge in Educational Research 47

## Part 2: Intermezzo

Chapter 4: Policy Prolepsis: Phantasmic Encounters in Becoming-Policy 51
  - The Incompleteness of Policy 52
  - Policy Prolepsis 55
  - The Politics of Affective Space: Phantasmic Positionings 59
TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Politics of Absences and Presences: Policy Prolepsis in Time 60
Policy Prolepsis and Enacting Subjects 64

Chapter 5: Policy Intensions and the Folds of the Self 67
Critiquing and (Re)conceptualizing Policy Implementation 69
History of ‘Policy Implementation’ 70
Immanent Space and Emergent Geographies 72
The Immanent Space of Education Policy 74
Policy Intensions and the Geographies of the Self 75
Policy Cartographies and the Geographies of the Self 77

Neo-liberalism and Governmentality 85
Human Capital as Voluntary Formations of the Self 88
The Aporias of Neo-Liberal Equality in Education 92

Part 3: Connections

Chapter 7: Ambient fear, Islamic Schools and the Affective Geographies of Race and Religion: “We Had to Hide That We’re Muslim All the Time” 101
The Relational Geographies of Religion and Race 103
The Management of Religious, Educational (Suburban) Space 107
Islamic Schools and the Geographies of Ambient Fear 110
Histories of Fear and City Sedimentations 113
Marketizing Space and Commodifying Educational Difference 116

Chapter 8: Policy E(A)ffects: Spatial and Racial Encounters in the City 117
Oh, the Spaces You Will Go: Marketized Education and Culturally Focused Schools 118
Policy Effects: Representational and Material Manifestations of Education Policy 120
Space, Place and Encounters: A Conceptual Terrain for Rethinking Policy Effects 122
Education Policy and the Constituting of Geo-memories 126
The Racializations of Subjects/Objects: Material Encounters in the City 130
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 9: 3.0: Lines: The Vectors of a Policy Geophilosophy</th>
<th>133</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Line One: The Spatial and Affective</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Two: Problematization for Emergent Ontologies</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Three: Problematic Attachments and New Concepts</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving with a Geophilosophy</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This book greatly benefited from the assistance and input from many people. We are grateful to Peter de Liefde for his patience through the preparation process. We would like to thank several people for their time, encouragement, and keen editorial eyes, including: Stephen Ball, Eva Bendix Petersen, Matthew Clarke, Trevor Gale, Stephen Heimans, Bob Lingard, Amy Scott Metcalfe, Elizabeth St. Pierre, Greg Thompson, and Deborah Youdell. Thank you to Sam Sellar who provided detailed feedback on Chapters One and Two. We would also like to acknowledge the participants of the workshop on Education Policy Analysis for a Complex World: Exploring the Possibilities of Post-structural Policy Analysis. Chapter Six was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We take full responsibility for the result.

Finally, and most importantly, we would like to thank our families and especially our partners: Amy Rudzinski and Owen; Kim Shaddick, Finn, Kobi and Aila.

We acknowledge with much gratitude the following publishing sources for the material used throughout the book. We appreciate their permission to modify and reprint those excerpts into this book.


INTRODUCTION

Notes on the Writing Experiment

We wrote this book as an experiment. This book wanders through disciplinary and multi-disciplinary approaches to policy analysis, including: political science, policy sociology, policy archeology, and other critical and poststructural approaches. We should note that one of us begrudgingly entertains the term ‘poststructural’ for pragmatic reasons and one of us does not much care for the term – even though the latter has recently come to learn about the importance of the term in relation to it functioning as a shelter from physical and epistemological violence produced from ‘science’ – a violence that Lyotard (in Van Reijen & Veerman, 1988: 279) noted when he declared that “there is no reason, only reasons”.

This difference however, is not indication of some fatal flaw. Difference is what brought this book together: a collective difference from the instrumentalism of technorational policy analysis; respective differences between geography and philosophy (and a shared sense of what they might do together); and, perpetual differences over what words to use, whether a hyphen should be used in the neologism ‘neo-liberal’, whether to have a glass of wine or a pint of beer, etc. All of this is just rambling on about the author-function, and noting how some words, concepts, and wines are selected for us already. It is fun to live vicariously every now and then, and much easier than trying to create other languages. We hope you will pardon us, however, if we do both in this book, often at the same time.

In thinking about how some of these chapters came together, the book started as a paper that we wrote when trying to think about how to research a policy change in Toronto, Canada. We had a suspicion that what we had been working with was not adequate for the job ahead. We used to work together at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver until Gulson left in 2010. Our research grant kept us connected, but we used to read separate literatures that converged during our frequent, but long-distance conversations. Webb had sabbatical in 2011–2012 and read the works of Gilles Deleuze and the newly released lectures of Michel Foucault at the Collège de France. Gulson continued reading and thinking about spatial theories, especially that of non-representational theory (e.g., Anderson & Harrison, 2010). We have been writing ‘empirical’ case reports and conceptual papers separately, and together, for four years.

This book encapsulates some of our work but it is also a part of us opening up what we hope will be our next explorations into policy analysis. Writing has been provoking: we have reconsidered the ontological, representational and epistemological aspects of policy and the many different ways it is used and analysed. We also worked with the ideas of becoming and (philosophical/spatial)
concept creation in relation to education policy. We were interested in continuing the idea of “policy theorists” (Simons, Olssen, & Peters, 2009a: 27) who, provide … answers to the epistemological challenges of post-structuralism and the current pluralist social world, and who also take up the difficult work of intellectually-based social criticism.

In this book we attempt a type of conceptual contribution – what we are calling policy geophilosophy – for a new way of undertaking policy studies that may possibly reinvigorate the field. We see this work as congruent with St. Pierre’s (2011: 613) challenge and call for “a renewed commitment to a reimagination of social science inquiry” that is enabled by ‘post’ approaches, including poststructuralism. We argue that we need to develop new concepts for policy studies in order to contribute to the reimagining of inquiry and to hedge against undue ossification and co-option of critical policy studies.

Our project follows the strict mantra that it is much easier to develop new ideas once you let go of others’ desires.1 Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 8) contend, although concepts are dates, signed and baptized, they have their own way of not dying while remaining subject to constraints of renewal, replacement, and mutation that give philosophy a history as well as a turbulent geography, each moment and place of which is preserved (but in time) and that passes (but outside time).

We are attempting to create a vocabulary and several concepts to generate different ways to understand education policy, on the premise that there is an impetus and momentum in contemporary policy studies to which we attempt to speak to, and, and times, with. This book includes published papers that emerged during our respective and collective journeys – what we have come to posit as a policy geophilosophy.

What will be clear from some of the chapters is that there are ‘data’ included in the sense that we speak of data as words external to theory, or words as interview transcripts. We are cognisant, following St. Pierre and Jackson (2014: 716) that this is a reading of, conventional humanist qualitative research, words in interview transcripts and in field notes are considered primary data, collected as they are in ‘face to face’ encounters in the presence of participants in their natural settings. Again, words spoken by participants are privileged regardless of their adequacy to respond to the study’s substantive and theoretical demands.

As St. Pierre and Jackson (2014: 716) contend, this view privileges these words over those that might equally be adequate “to respond to the study’s substantive and theoretical demands”.

We do not presume what counts as data, and while people’s words are included, we do not assume that these are the only ‘data’, nor other materials in the world, nor of course, other worlds in materials. If you do lean towards needing this type
INTRODUCTION

of validity and legitimacy we have done this type of work as part of other papers that have been published parallel to this book and the papers reworked within (see notably, Gulson & Webb, 2012; 2013a; 2013b). Our approach in this book has an affinity with what Brinkmann (2014: 722) posits as an abductive approach to analysis in which the “abductive tool-user, the bricoleur, the craftsperson, [is] the ideal qualitative researcher.”

We wanted to know what happened when using abduction or an open-ended approach to approaching diverse signs and materials as ‘data’. For example, some of our data includes snippets from literature (i.e., Tom Robbins, Olive Senior, Jack Kerouac, Dr. Seuss). We work from the premise that some of what we write are impressions, born from bewilderment (even when we should know better). While we might not quite want to be characterized as ‘post-coding’ researchers, we do think that what we are attempting to do is to undertake analysis that “occurs ‘in the middle of things’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 293), without a beginning or end, without origin or destination. In this way, analysis occurs everywhere and all the time” (St. Pierre & Jackson, 2014: 717). We see the material as part of our lives as researchers and scholars and people, not something separate from our different roles. Continual analysis enables us, as scholars, “to be able to act in a specific situation” (Brinkmann, 2014: 722). For Brinkmann (2014: 722),

[un]like induction and deduction – both of which address the relationship between data and theory – abduction is a form of reasoning that is concerned with the relationship between a situation and inquiry. It is neither data-driven nor theory driven, but break-down driven (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011). It occurs in situations of breakdown, surprise, bewilderment, or wonder.

Some of the examples will seem to be singular, and in a sense, they are – e.g. a focus on one school. Like Berlant (2011: 12) we are interested in the idea of generalisability – that is, “how the singular becomes delaminated from its location in someone’s story or some locale’s irreducibly local history and circulated as evidence of something shared”. As such, we are interested in how policy analysis is done and comes to be made stable – its scientificities – such that it is applied to all and sundry, regardless of temporal and geographical specificities. We are fascinated that we can “track the becoming general of singular things” (Berlant, 2011: 12). We welcome you to (re)read some of these previously published papers as chapters in this book – for we think they now sit as part of this conceptual program rather than as the initial exploratory forays designed as journal articles, with all of the limitations of that format.

EMERGENCE, INTERMEZZO, CONNECTIONS

The first section of the book – emergence – is comprised of three chapters. These chapters provide an introduction to the concept of policy geophilosophy in education.
Chapter One discusses disciplinary and multi-disciplinary approaches to policy analysis as they have been developed or adopted in educational policy studies. The chapter lays out our understanding of the terrain we traverse, and explains why – and in what ways – a policy geophilosophy can assist us and others working within education policy (who isn’t nowadays?) and, perhaps, working our ways out of it. The first chapter provides an overview of the various approaches or analytics to understanding such an object and its historical role(s) in education. We aim to map out the conceptual, methodological and ethical dimensions of policy analysis in education with a focus on the conditions of how policy analysis is done, and the ontological status of policy – what we have come to know as ‘policy scientificities’.

Chapter Two, at the risk of appearing like a mystery novel, identifies the culprit of our text – policy geophilosophy – up front. Our policy geophilosophy examines how education policy positions and constitutes objects and subjects through emergent and adaptive policy arrangements that simultaneously influence how policy is sensed, embodied, and enacted. Here, we are interested in three things. The first is how policy as concept and action both endures (stabilizes) and mutates in and through space-times; second, the ways policy analysis refrains and constitutes the ontologies and epistemologies of policy and its objects; and third, how policy shapes and constitutes subjects.

With the culprit taken care of, Chapter Three discusses our approach to performing such analyses. Here, we articulate a policy problematization and discuss, for better or worse, the methods we use when approaching the object better known as education policy. The third chapter wrests directly within the supposed logics of education policy that portends ‘solutions’ to educational ‘problems’ and maps the disciplinary vagaries produced from such logics and objects. Our goal with problematizing policy is to think through the ontology of such an object rather than to only treat its remit as an epistemological enterprise beget with ‘solutions’.

The second section of the book – intermezzo – contains three chapters (Chapters Four to Six). These chapters work in different ways, and for various purposes. Nevertheless, we believe that these chapters are talking to each other and to our concept of policy geophilosophy. The chapters introduce a few conceptual tools that have assisted us in rethinking education policy in the ways that we discussed in Section 1. We hope they may assist you too.

Chapter Four discusses what we have come to term a policy prolepsis. The import of such an idea is a return to material encounters with policy, an ‘ontology’, that works within and between different registers of representation, and in relation to ontologies that themselves are becoming. We argue in this chapter that policy material cannot be considered independent of the forces that produce it, and we stress the point that certain affective registers are used in the eventual political contests that attempt to settle ontological difference – including uncertainty. Here, then, our policy prolepsis identifies the many space-times in the enactments of policy becomings.
Chapter Five discusses another concept that we use in our problematizations of education policy, namely policy intensions. Borrowing `intension' from philosophy, a policy intension is a broad and ambiguous idea that attempts to capture the ways in which education policy is sensed, embodied, and eventually enacted. This chapter provides readers with our understanding of people, but we talk about this in relation to subjects/objects and the many different ways they move – and are moved – within education policy. We note how intensions are part of the processes of subjectification and use Gilles Deleuze’s (1988) idea of the fold to think through the affective and shifting spaces of subjectivity produced in policy prolepses and enacted within policy intensions.

Chapter Six connects our discussion regarding subjects/objects and situates them explicitly within conceptions of neo-liberalism. Our goal in this chapter is not to rehash this edu-economic history, but to connect subjects/objects with the many different spaces of care that are practiced and enacted in relation to school choice. We conduct a problematization that attempts to recognize how neo-liberal education policy is being used to escape the inequities and educational inequalities produced in the (liberal) registers of race and ethnicity. This argument unearths historical and spatial conceptions of the subject, education, and economy and notes how these objects are changing – indeed becoming – in ways that are not immediately recognizable, in fact, in ways that are unsettled and uncertain.

The third and final section of the book – connections – contains three chapters (Chapters Seven to Nine).

Chapter Seven provides an ‘empirical’ or material example to the previous two chapters. We think through the development of government-funded private Islamic schools, and the local politics which emerged in relation to school choice policies. We use the idea of ‘ambient fear’ to illustrate our concepts of policy prolepsis and policy intension, and note how the affective registers of policy making are used, but in disproportionate ways depending on different representations of race and religion. We link the idea of ‘ambient fear’ to the idea of the city which, for us, remains an under-theorized space in educational policy studies.

Chapter Eight situates the city as a prominent object within the spaces of school choice and race. The chapter identifies the emergent relations of cities, and the emergent raciologies that are used to traverse neo-liberal education policy. This problematization relies on rethinking representational conceptions of space and noting what new set of relations are produced when non-representational conceptions of space are levied in relation to non-representational notions of race and ethnicity.

Chapter Nine is the final chapter of the book. These kinds of chapters are typically entitled ‘conclusions’. We, however, have decided not to use this trope; instead, we have alternatively labelled the chapter ‘lines’. The chapter discusses what we believe are some of the possibilities and opportunities that a policy geophilosophy provide. We also discuss what a policy geophilosophy does not, or cannot, do. Our hope is that
INTRODUCTION

this chapter provides others a way to engage in the difficult work of intellectually-based social criticism aimed at the routinised and domineering practices of education policy development and its analysis.

Off we go.

NOTE

1 In other words, “Beware of the dreams of others, because if you are caught in their dream, you are done for.” (Deleuze, 2007: 323)
PART 1

EMERGENCE

POLICY GEOPHILOSOPHY

How education policy positions and constitutes objects and subjects through emergent and adaptive arrangements that simultaneously influence how policy is sensed, embodied, and enacted.

This section examines and discusses:

• The disciplinary and multi-disciplinary approaches to policy analysis as they have been developed, adopted, and practiced in educational policy studies.
• How policy – as concept and action – both stabilizes and mutates in and through space-times.
• How policy analysis refrains and constitutes the ontologies and epistemologies of policy.
• Policy problematization, in contrast to other methods and epistemologies of policy analysis.
CHAPTER 1

POLICY SCIENTIFICITY 3.0

Theory and Policy Analysis in-and-for This World and Other-Worlds

What we are suffering from is not a void but inadequate means for thinking about everything that is happening. There is an overabundance of things to be known: fundamental, terrible, wonderful, insignificant, and crucial at the same time.

—Foucault, 1997: 325

In this chapter we provide a kind of topography of the disciplinary and multi-disciplinary approaches to policy analysis as they have been developed, adopted, and practiced in education. We aim to map out the conceptual, methodological, and ethical dimensions of policy analysis in education. While there is a sense of periodisation in these mappings, we are most interested in the contours of how policy analysis is done, and the conditions or ontological status of policy.

To do this we posit a typology and heuristic of three education ‘policy scientificities’ that correspond to, but should not be taken as being reduced to:

1. policy scientificity 1.0 (i.e., the ‘policy sciences’),
2. policy scientificity 2.0 (critical policy studies, policy sociology); and
3. policy scientificity 3.0 (‘post’ studies; e.g., post-human, post-structural).

If at any point during the mapping you step out for a coffee, we completely understand.

The following borrows heavily and is considerably reduced from Simons, Olssen, and Peters (2009a, 2009b: 1–95), Olssen, Codd, and O’Neil (2004), Rizvi and Lingard (2010), and Ball (1995). We cannot stress enough that you should read these first if you have come this far. These reviews or maps carefully articulate shifts in the ways policy analysis has been undertaken in education, and the conceptual, methodological and ethical dimensions produced through these shifts. We believe selective ‘tune-outs’ of some recent policy scholarship to be problematic in education, and we are convinced this ‘selective muting’ is why we perpetuate some of the same old problems in education, largely because we keep thinking with the same old solutions. This, ‘muting’ we contend, is applicable to social sciences more broadly. We elaborate on these ideas in Chapters Two and Three.

We use the term ‘policy scientificities’ in juxtaposition to the original ‘policy sciences’ articulated by Lerner and Lasswell (Lerner & Laswell, 1951). We flag the term ‘scientificity’ in relation to developments in the physical and natural
CHAPTER 1

sciences that investigate multiplicity, chaos, non-linear dynamics, and (non) representation with inter- and multi- disciplinary frameworks. The distinction that we wish to highlight between a policy ‘scientificity’ and a policy ‘science’ pivots on the conditions that policy analysis uses to produce and legitimate its intended objectives – this is, scientificity as the “constitution of science as science” (Lather, 2006a: 786) – particularly as changes are occurring in the natural and physical sciences. Foucault (1970: 400), however, gets right to our distinction when thinking about education policy when he stated,

it is useless … to say that the ‘human sciences’ are false sciences; they are not sciences at all; the configuration that defines their positivity and gives them their roots in the modern episteme at the same time makes it impossible for them to be sciences …

Following Foucault (1974), policy scientificity is, therefore, how policy analysis “structures certain of its objects, systemizes parts of it, formalizes, underwrites strategies” (Lather, 2006a: 786), through its different outcomes and practices. But that is not all. Policy scientificity is also what is excluded when engaged with systematizing, formalizing, and underwriting objects for policy analysis. We discuss the idea of policy absences more fully in Chapter Two as part of our discussion on ‘ontological politics’. Here, policy scientificity reanimates the notion of ‘policy science’ and points to the uncertainty of onto-epistemes in the natural and physical sciences, given the early evidence of adaptive, self-organizing, and emergent ontologies. This is not a condemnation of our colleagues who work in the ‘natural’ and ‘physical’ sciences, but an invitation to mutually celebrating not-knowing!

In what Nietzsche (1974: 301 cited by Lather, 2004a) discussed as the “unnatural sciences”, policy scientificity locates, places, situates, or ‘spatialises’ researchers in analyses as “creative thinkers” (Olssen, 2008) and “policy problematizers” (see Chapter Three). These roles are in stark contrast to the preferred roles of researchers as ‘problem solvers’, ‘solution providers’, the eponymous ‘knowledge transferrers’ or people who ‘mobilize knowledge’ evident in so many disciplinary approaches to education policy. While we are not entirely sure what the last category even means, we have a sneaking suspicion that it is a thinly veiled characterization of the ‘traveling knowledge salesmen’ who is deeply connected to, and performed by, the un-reflexive and globalizing networks of policy mobility (McCann & Ward, 2013). We would add, too, that we are entirely aware of the privileges bestowed to such a figure by its gendered characteristics. Admittedly, then, our use of ‘policy scientificity’ is probably a poor strategy because of the dominance of so-called ‘rational,’ ‘disciplinary,’ ‘instrumental,’ and ‘masculine’ convictions circulating within global policy studies. Nevertheless, we hope that people still trained in techno-rational, positivistic, and disciplinary approaches to education policy will actually open and read this book, unlike the folks of Troy.

The metamorphosis of a ‘policy science’ into a ‘policy scientificity’ allows us, in a similar manner to seeing ‘science’ as an “arena of struggle in broadening the
definition of science” (Lather, 2006a: 787), to focus on the representational and material aspects of policy analysis. We can, therefore, examine language, meaning, subjectivity, and the variety of ways that representation legitimates scientific and disciplinary criteria (and delegitimate or exclude competing criteria). The so-called human sciences, then, are a “‘meta-epistemological’ position [that addresses] finitude, relativity, and perspective” (Foucault, 1970: 355).

‘Scientificity’ allows us to shift focus “to the proper characterization of the object, not control of the subjectivity of the knower” (Lather, 2006a: 787). The object we wish to characterise, properly or not, is education policy and the concomitant objects brought forth within its purview. We believe the ontological question what is education policy? to be a very interesting one – even when colleagues have looked at us incredulously when we have raised it as such – particularly amidst the “blurred, intermediary and composite disciplines [that] multiply endlessly” (Foucault, 1970: 358). Our policy scientificities conceive of an invigoration of policy ontologies where “ontologies are brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day, sociomaterial practices” (Mol, 2002: 6).

And, finally, our apparent sequencing of policy studies (i.e., 1.0, 2.0, 3.0) is an attempt to capture some of the cumulative expectations piled onto policy analysis and education over the past sixty years. While our numbering of policy scientificities implies a kind of evolution or progression within policy studies, we certainly do not mean to suggest such a thing. Educational ‘progress’ is something best left to free market believers, development psychologists, and other transcendentalists. Rather, we are much more comfortable suggesting policy analysis has mutated in three discernible ways and now haunts education like a Cerberus.

And, yes, our numbering system is a nod to Lather (2009), who we think was onto something when she told us to “get lost” as a way to repudiate the instrumentalism embedded in contemporary policy science. Finally, our numbering also borrows from web development in the sense that now the internet is apparently adaptive with an impending “singularity” about to occur any moment now (i.e., Web 3.0, see Kurzweil, 2005). We are not sure if ‘singularity’ is the most exciting or frightening thing we have heard in awhile, but we do think ‘singularity’ is a cognate way to describe the current state of education policy, particularly its global convergence and isomorphism (Sahlberg, 2011). And we are convinced that this is a truly scary idea for educators and scholars who work on the margins of multiplicity instead.
“Policy sciences” figured prominently within the social sciences as a multi-disciplinary approach that included politics, law, sociology, economics, and psychology. The term *policy sciences* was coined by Lerner and Lasswell in 1951 (Lerner & Laswell, 1951), and referred to the role public policy might play in providing solutions to the problems of the social welfare state, including the post war reconstruction and the spread of Western democratic values (i.e., employment, security, equality). The entire point of policy sciences, according to Parsons (1995), was to “manage the ‘public’ and its problems” which, conveniently, required specialist knowledge. Fay (1975: 14 cited in Ball, 1995: 258) described policy science as a,

set of procedures which enables one to determine the technically best course of action to adopt in order to implement a decision or achieve a goal. Here the policy scientist doesn’t merely clarify the possible outcomes of a certain course of action, he [sic] actually chooses the most efficient course of action in terms of available scientific information.

Rizvi and Lingard (2010: 1) summed up the policy sciences as ways to assist the state to “develop priorities and programs, and determine ways to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness.”

Interestingly, and perhaps curiously, policy sciences assumed if analyses were based on a series of well-established and replicable methods, that policy analysis would provide ways of making and evaluating policy. The resulting knowledge for managing the public would, thus, somehow transcend the political apparatuses and machinations that govern the public in capitalist states. Lasswell (1970) amended his initial ideas to include a “policy process” to account for political machinations but insisted that ‘policy scientists’ remain ‘problem-oriented’, even within the vagaries of governance. Lasswell would eventually amend his model with what he called the “decision process” to account for the politics of science – which maintains the rationalized intentions of population control and remains a staple of policy analysis today.

For instance, we note that techno-rational ideas persistently surface in debates about ‘policy cycles’ and ‘policy processes’, and are supported and disseminated by numerous organisations like the American Educational Research Association and its affiliated journal *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, a journal for “those engaged in educational policy analysis, evaluation, and decision making”. We use the term ‘techno-rational’ to refer to the kinds of positivistic assumptions guiding *policy scientificity 1.0* and the instrumentalist perspective of government in which ‘solutions’ can be ‘implemented’. These positivistic and instrumental assumptions of how analysis should proceed and be applied also guide educational governance and decision making, including the kinds of ‘predictive’ claims such assumptions portend (see deLeon, 2005 for a critique of such claims). *Policy scientificity 1.0*
continues into the 21st century in many ways, such as repeated calls for “scientifically based” studies in education (Eisenhart & Towne, 2003).

Yet, the ‘science’ of policy science was not, and is not, so clear-cut. The notions of contestation and incrementalism were part of 1.0, such as Easton’s (1953) notion that policy is the “authoritative allocation of values” and Lindblom’s (1959) ideas of policy analysis as a “science of muddling through”. Policy scientificity 1.0, nonetheless, remained and remains a settlement around instrumentalism and related rationalities of decision-making. Simons, et al. (2009a) pointed to the implications of such an instrumentalist orientation. They stated that the policy sciences, aim at the re-organisation of society through policy measures taken on the basis of scientific problem-solving rationality. Although there is a clear value-orientation, such as democratic values and the prevention of coercion, the epistemological and methodological assumptions of Lasswell and his contemporaries are clearly positivistic (that is, it is possible to reveal the nature of policy and decision making based on objective, empirical data or logical reasoning) and instrumental (to engineer policy based on positive knowledge of how it should be). (Simons et al., 2009a: 4)

Policy scientificity 1.0 became a very productive time for higher education and a strategic means to legitimate the academy itself (Simons et al., 2009a: 5–6). Fabianism, Keynesianism, and state policy, for example, were part of the welfare dispositif and at the same time deeply implicated in the management of the population. 1.0 continues merrily along today, in many ways, including in critical educational policy work using Geographic Information Systems (Taylor, 2007) and, as mentioned above, in repeated calls for “scientifically based” studies in education (Eisenhart & Towne, 2003). Much of this work continues to use ideas of ‘school effectiveness’ as a whipping boy to maintain the “capitalistic axiomatic” of schooling (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 214). This ethos continues into what we discuss as the next iteration in education policy studies – policy scientificity 2.0.

Policy scientificity 2.0 emerged in the mid-to-late 1980s, and continues today. We would be remiss if we designated a single moment or event that signalled a switch from 1.0 → 2.0. Even the idea that a ‘switch’ occurred is specious. We are not contending that the practices and assumptions of 1.0 have somehow been displaced with additional approaches to policy analysis. Instead, we suggest that 2.0 has had a kind of ‘hardening effect’ upon 1.0 as the latter defends itself from the critiques of the ‘soft’ and ‘human’ sciences.

We are contending that the policy sciences became an expanded field that incorporated new ideas involving the assertion of criticality, reflexivity and the precarious creation of multi-disciplinary approaches to policy studies. A set
of interrelated factors contributed to rethinking the positivistic, technicist, and instrumentalist approaches of 1.0 by focusing on questions of how analysis could and should be done; including, but not limited to:

- the deliberate design of neo-liberal states,
- the uneasy relationships between government and academics – including the splitting of sociology of education into critical policy studies and school improvement studies in the UK (Ball, 2007),
- (multi) disciplinary feuds about ‘science’, and
- a rethinking of the relationships between criticality and methodology.

For our purposes, *policy scientificity 2.0* is the assertion of criticality and the precarious creation of multi-disciplinary approaches to policy studies, marked by three important turns, in addition to the shifts listed just above, including:

(a) new demarcations of heterogeneous locations of policy making, i.e., policy contexts, and for our purposes, ‘policy spaces’ where important political and power struggles occur in response to so-called ‘implementation’ attempts (e.g., the micropolitical, cities, districts, schools, classrooms);

(b) an explosion of theoretical and inter-disciplinary frames, especially from continental philosophy, from which to critique positivism (e.g., post-positivism, feminism, post-colonial, post-structural, etc. (e.g., Bensimon & Marshall, 1997); and

(c) a questioning about the nature of instrumental research and its relation to different educational milieus (and a questioning of whose utility it serves), including contestations between the discourses of ‘improvement’, ‘reform’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘critique’ (and all the clever heroic moralizations contained within these discourses).

In general, *policy scientificity 2.0* emerged as a shift concerned with mapping the “contradictions, tensions, or general patterns and contingent or structural assemblages” of *policy scientificity 1.0* while noting an explicit “concern with education, power and with social regulation” (Simons et al., 2009a: 15). Policy sociology is emblematic of thinking about policy as a practice, rather than only a discursive instrument or technology, an overlooked and scourged scientificity within articulations of 1.0. *Policy scientificity 2.0* then continues with the 1.0 trajectory of ‘science’, although in decidedly different ways, and refutes the claim that policy analysis is a neutral technical activity brought about to improve society.

Of course, the challenge to neutrality of knowledge reflected the great paradigmatic wars that were waged in educational research during this time (e.g., Gage, 1989) and that continued into the 21st century (e.g., Jacob & White, 2002). One of the key moves here was that psychology, or the ‘psych’ more generally, were displaced in education studies during 2.0, but only to be replaced with an ascendency of sociology and anthropology (‘ethnography’) as a way to better understand and regulate ourselves (Rose, 1999a).
With a move to critical policy studies (Prunty, 1985) came the disciplinary entree of ‘policy sociology’ and its emphasis on power, politics and difference. This entree effectively layered additional meanings to policy with the activities that accompany both the development and uses of policy (i.e., the politics of education policy). Policy scientificity 2.0 was concerned with “what do people do in the name of policy?” (Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005: 35); that is with people as subjects and objects – as constituted in and by policy – rather than merely implementers, makers, and solution providers. Here, Jenny Ozga (1987) (to name just one) highlighted sociology as one of the multi-disciplinary approaches used previously in Lasswell’s policy sciences. Ozga (1987: 14) noted that an education policy sociology was “rooted in the social science tradition, historically informed and [drew] on qualitative and illuminative techniques”.

Policy sociology did “borrow a few techniques” from ethnography (Wolcott, 2008: 44), psychology (i.e., mixed methods, J. W. Creswell, 2013), and the Chicago School of Sociology (symbolic interactionism) in order to conduct such analyses, indicating, perhaps, an emergence of multi- and inter-disciplinary work in 2.0. During this time Tom Popkewitz (1991) would introduce variants to the scientistic orientation that are worth noting, particularly his inter-disciplinary idea regarding a “political sociology” in education that historicizes the politics of policy concerned with education reform. Also included were critical implementation studies (Simons et al., 2009b) that reoriented studies of policy away from the state as primary actor and removed policy from the pedestal (Vidovich, 2007). This involved increasing use of theories of micro-politics and included the take up of Foucault (Ball, 1994) with an exploration of the contingent practices of policy research (Ozga, 2000).

Of course, (gender) ‘trouble’ emerged during this time that challenged ‘coherent’ categories of the policy subject (Butler, 1990). Such ‘trouble’ refracted some of the techno-rational assumptions contained in the educational categories concerning ‘the subject’ (e.g., ‘girl’, ‘boy’, ‘at-risk’, but also ‘teacher’, ‘student’, ‘researcher’). This ‘trouble’ also highlighted some of the most pernicious policy ideas in education regarding the subject as ‘human capital’. We examine the contemporary neo-liberal equivocations of education policy and ‘human capital’ ideas in Chapter Six, including the challenges to liberal conceptions of multiculturalism, representation, and recognition. The seductions of ‘entrepreneurial subjects’ and education policy produce any number of practices committed to forms of care and other educational self-investments.

For now, policy scientificity 2.0 has become mired in debates about recognition, identity, representation, and difference as a way to produce labor educated people (Bauman, 2001; Fraser, 2000; Gilroy, 2000; Hall & du Gay, 1996; Honneth, 1995; Spivak, 1988; Taylor, 1994; West, 1993; Willig, 2012). Finally, 2.0 maintained disciplinary frames in relation to the policy sciences which expanded how one might conduct such work. We take this up in just a moment, in our discussion of policy scientificity 3.0.
CHAPTER 1

Coffee Break

Amidst the very real sufferings of, and in, education, we would note that policy scientificity 2.0 is “an active point of escape where the revolutionary machine, the artistic machine, and the scientific machine, and the (schizo) analytic machine become parts and pieces of one another” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 322). We apologize if these are not the words you would use, but to a large extent, policy scientificity 2.0 resurrected enduring questions about the purposes of schooling, and placed such questions under a plethora of competing disciplinary sciences that deal explicitly with issues of power. The takeaway is that discussions concerning 1.0 → 2.0 are almost entirely epistemological which obscure analyses of the different educational machines that are produced from these conflicts and which perpetuate schooling as sites of biopolitical catallaxy (e.g., state and provincial governments).

2.0, then, introduced a nagging splinter into policy analysis regarding the extent to which the very enterprise of education should be, and could be, ‘repaired’ through analysis and activism.

2.0 focused on the important shifts in understanding the changes to previous accepted links between education and society, and provided a re-articulation of the aims and possibilities of critique and transformation. Troyna (1994), for instance, insisted that critical social science ought not wholly be concerned with critique but with the act of political transformation. This does, however, come with a caveat. Simons, et al. (2009b) proposed that crisis of the welfare state and neo-liberal globalisation carry challenges to the normative function of critical policy studies.

The connection being made between education and policy is traditionally a two-way connection; on the one hand studying the policy context of education but on the other hand studying how policies could be used to improve education and its role in society. The background for this critical orientation is clearly the modern welfare state that conceives of education as a major component of public policy. The general principles of welfare policy, often taken for granted by critical scholars, are ‘the change of education through change of public policy’ and ‘the change of society through change of education’. What we want to stress is the importance of being aware of a sort of ‘critical/advocacy parochialism’ at the level of these principles. Facing the crisis of the welfare state and state government, these principles are no longer evident. Or to formulate this in a positive way, a major challenge will be to discuss what ‘the public, and its education’ is about in today’s global context, and how education and policy are related and should be related. (Simons et al., 2009b: 37–8)

In this sense of 2.0, education and education policy are not ameliorative activities, at least not in their current practices and usages. Some of 2.0 masked the instrumentalism contained in 1.0 and repackaged it as educational ‘reform’
or educational ‘improvement’ through a sense of ‘criticality’ that insisted on ‘transformation’ with its heroics and impositions.

With 2.0 still immersed in a form of (critical) instrumentalism, we note, along with Sarason (1990), that many attempts at educational reform and/or education improvement were zombie policies, lifeless and doomed to fail. Policy instrumentalism staggered forward in 2.0 amidst the apocalyptic wars concerned with ‘science’ (Jacob & White, 2002), ‘culture’ (Hall & du Gay, 1996), ‘the subject’ (Butler, 1990; Foucault, 1982b, 1994b), and the persistence of instrumentalist notions of ‘critique’ deeply embedded within the field of education (Ellsworth, 1989).

Please note, we are not disavowing 2.0, for we are as implicated as the work we have noted, but we are positing that 2.0 faces similar problems to those which St Pierre (2011: 613) noted about qualitative research. In proposing a ‘post’ qualitative research, St Pierre contends that qualitative research “has been so disciplined, so normalized, so centred…that it has become conventional, reductionist, hegemonic, and sometimes oppressive and has lost its radical possibilities…”. Education was considered a heretical act some time ago. It doesn’t seem so anymore.

In the next section we suggest that policy scientificity 3.0 might provide new radical possibilities for undisciplined policy studies.

POLICY SCIENTIFICITY 3.0

There has been proliferation of rich, single and multi-disciplinary approaches to policy analysis that have been developed over the past two decades – Scheurich (1994) created “policy archeology”, Gale (2001) developed “policy historiography” and Shore and Wright (1997) proposed “policy anthropology”.

We identify these disciplinary approaches as necessary contributions to what we are positing as policy scientificity 3.0.

In this final part of the chapter we outline four characterisations of 3.0, and these are proposed as emergent ideas that are not clean breaks from 1.0 and 2.0, but rather start to provide a mapping of a becoming-policy-analysis. We will not provide an exhaustive list of recent disciplinary developments in policy studies, nor review any of these recent policy sciences because your coffee might be getting cold, or dripping down the wall. However, like Patti Lather (2006b), we do believe that it can be instructive to think with proliferation. As such, if you do not see yourself in 3.0, we believe that if you wait just long enough you will likely find yourself within a disciplining frame soon enough.

Or, you can develop your own. As recipients of various biopower subjugations – ‘the knowledges’ – it will not take long to find an articulation of your own disciplinary trajectory if you haven’t already (although we can’t insist enough that you don’t let this popular task distract you from working with the ontological!). We may not believe in what others unabashedly declare as ‘free markets’, but we are firm believers that “the subject who desires can be made to desire its own
repression” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 105). What the following policy scientificity 3.0 indicates are provocations, ruminations and abutments – unfinished thoughts and struggles about what constitutes the theories and methodologies for an emerging set of analyses; policy scientificity 3.0 may include any or all of the following, or, in fact, be something completely different.

### 3.0.1: Parochial Pleasures of the Disciplines

Policy scientificity 3.0 is characterised by the competing epistemologies, or the lack of discipline of the disciplines – what some have characterised as the “science wars” (Lather, 2004b). The biopower techniques and the liberal epistemes that we have been discussing (i.e., the disciplines) are not a happy family; indeed they are in crisis (Hall, 1990). For instance, Stuart Hall (1990) proclaimed that he was happy to chair a sociology department now that sociology was dead. Likewise, Paul Rabinow (2003) read anthropology’s obituary. Wendy Brown (2010) has informed us that political science and political theory are intending to eliminate each other. Philosophy, of course, has had a particular nasty feud with itself ever since Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) continentally (i.e., linguistically) questioned himself. His analytical feud left him brown and blue (1965).

Moves to an inter-disciplinary approach to education policy studies are not, we suggest, a strategic move to avoid the disciplinary crisis. What does interest us in these types of approaches that can be typecast as 3.0 is that they use the disciplinary crisis and its multiplicities deliberately in its conception, particularly with respect to uncertainty and discord. In this regard, the inter-disciplinary approaches to policy studies that constitute 3.0 are attempts to avoid the disciplinary “parochialism” (Lingard, 2006) that haunts educational policy, and that reinforces “methodological educationalism” (Roberston & Dale, 2008) and/or “methodological individualism” (Bonta & Proveti, 2004).

In addition to disciplinary parochialism, critical parochialism is a key conceit in conceptualizing education policy. A third option of ‘transdisciplinarity’ has been offered as an alternative to forms of disciplinary and advocacy parochialism. However, any form of transcendence is not something that can be offered to readers in good faith: “a transcendent source of order ‘rescues’ a chaotic matter, is equivalent to the sort of ‘vampirism’ in which a higher-level constraint claims credit for reciprocally generated emergent order” (Bonta & Proveti, 2004: 35).

Policy scientificity 3.0, rather than being inter- or trans-disciplinary, is a transversal politics, where “transversal lines tend to transectorally cross through several fields, they link together social struggles and artistic interventions and theory production” (Raunig, 2007). This politics would deliberately embrace multiplicity to develop new links between education policy and emergent ideas regarding the ‘public’ (e.g., Heimans, 2012). Here, we find that working with multiplicity and uncertainty to be really quite liberating in its penchant to ‘not know’, but rather ‘to think’.
3.0.2: Methodology as Perpetual War

It appears that the social sciences in general have become worried, lethargic and a bit self-loathing (Law, 2004). To borrow from outside education for just a moment, policy scientificity 3.0 is “war all the time” (Bukowski, 1984), “pure war” (Virilio & Lotringer, 1997/1993), but really a persistence concerning “war and truth” in the academy (Foucault, 2003). We are convinced, given our locations, and implications, in neo-liberal universities, that no return to an idyllic time of policy analysis or retreats into academic silos – i.e., ‘programs’, ‘departments’ – or methodological parochialism will stop this multi-disciplinary Cerberus. The question for us will be to what extent, if any, can policy scholars talk about, within and across difference (Gilroy, 2005; West, 1993).

The second characterization of 3.0, thus, revolves around the methodological wars of 2.0 that we would note have only escalated in 3.0, albeit in a kind of constant guerrilla arrangement that parallel modern military tactics of ambush, sabotage, subterfuge, jamming, and automation (e.g., drones). Proclamations of “evidence based” research, with its limitations on funding and contentions about what knowledge ‘counts’, have wound the clock back to continue the methodological wars in education (Jacob & White, 2002). And, as St. Pierre (2011) notes, an ossification and routinization of qualitative methodologies in education has re-inscribed the mechanic and instrumentalist versions they sought to disrupt. Here, some options that 3.0 might take up include post-qualitative methodologies (St Pierre, 2011) that are ‘working the ruins’ left from some qualitative predecessors (St Pierre & Pillow, 2000). In just a moment, we will briefly discuss a ‘fieldwork in philosophy’ as another option.

3.0.3: Difference, Representation, and Subject Catallaxy

The third characterisation of 3.0 addresses difference and representation, with particular attention paid to race and ethnicity as our areas of scholarship, although we note that we could have focused on other categories that are used to express subject positions; indeed, we note the veritable explosion of different subject categories, and in relation to ideas of difference and representation in education.

In many ways, the contemporary focus on performance has stretched the liberal political imagination away from forms of representation that constituted and occluded so many different groups of people in the first place. And this is the rub. For instance, West (1993) remarked that difference can be assimilated and elided in some kind of cosmopolitan fantasy (‘we are the world’), and something that has been homogenized in relation to attempts at univocal, or at least coherent, political representation (i.e., ‘identity politics’).

Here, then, 3.0 analyses, identifies, and examines ideas of difference and representation in relation to the many registers “which govern the relationships of translation between them” (Hall, 1997: 21). In this sense, 3.0 borrows from Paul
CHAPTER 1

Gilroy (2000: 34) to map the “radical forms of anxiety that flow from uncertainty about racialized identities” and to try and “recover the liberatory moment in the process of freeing ourselves from the bonds of raciology and compulsory raciality.” Chapter Seven examines the “radical forms of anxiety” produced from racialized bodies, and Chapter Eight examines how these affects and raciologies are spatialised educationally throughout cities. Again, part of what we are interested in are the ‘geos’ in education policy and a significant space in the movement of education policy is the city.

If raciology is one form of translation between difference and representation, then this is no easy task. It is also a task that is under threat as many translation mechanisms are running out of steam or are being mutated (or maintained) within neo-liberal or post-liberal raciologies, for instance the aggregate of neo-liberal multiculturalism (Hale, 2005). 3.0 maps the many different translation registers as they erode and mutate within neo-liberal, post-liberal, and/or the contemporary catallaxy of raciology in education.

‘Ethnoscapes’, for example, are real in that they organise and mediate the political, cultural, and economic futures of many (Appadurai, 1996). Moreover, some ethnoscapes may require assistance when wishing to be ‘represented’ and ‘recognised’ in the “global cultural [educational] economy” (Appadurai, 1990). However, the practices of recognition are also the very objects that organise and palpitate various ‘ethnic cleansings’ within such economies (Appadurai, 2006). And while post-colonialism has at times been identified as a sub-set of post-structuralism, Ahluwalia (2005) asserts that this denies the colonial roots of post-structuralism, and therefore, it may be pertinent to examine the ways in which post-structuralism draws on the ideas of post-colonialism concerning “otherness, difference, irony, mimicry, parody, the lamenting of modernity and the deconstruction of the grand narratives of European culture arising out of the Enlightenment tradition …” (Ahluwalia, 2005: 2). 3.0 maps theories and practices of policy difference.

Alterity is a two-way street, and importantly, an engagement with different representations simultaneously generated of the Other. Here, Bifo (2008: 24) perceptively observed that “alterity sets the limit of the existent organism.” 3.0 examines and reflects on the production of concepts that are sometimes identified as limited by their Euro-centric and occluding their connections to pernicious colonial geo-histories.

The work of Deleuze and the concepts such as nomadism, folds, and so forth, are ideas that are in a sense playful, but could be “seen to appropriate and intellectualise indigenous experience and ways of life” (Bignall & Patton, 2010: 2), which ostensibly function as an indifference to the conditions of colonised peoples. 3.0 is acutely aware that some of the concepts at play in policy geophilosophy could be seen to be abstract, and generated from a non-geography and non-history. We could, for example, note Deleuze’s “preference for virtual creativity over analysis of actually existing political situations” (Bignall & Patton, 2010: 2). This might be seen to fall into what Edward Said saw as the irrelevance of criticism that was devoid of
contact with the world. As Ahluwalia (2005: 141) noted: “[f]or Said, theory can be effective only when it is located firmly within the world”.

The criticism then of Deleuze’s work, and by default much of the work of post-structuralism as theory absent the world – as abstract – has been repudiated by Bignall and Patton (2010) (and many others) who suggest many of Deleuze’s ideas are taken up by those supporting postcolonial politics, and that there are many resonances with various postcolonial concepts (see also, for example, Burns & Kaiser, 2012; May, 2005b; Nail, 2012). Thomas Lemke (2014) has made this case about Foucault as well (and Mark Olssen too (1999)).

3.0, however, maps the contemporary translation registers of neo-liberal raciologies, whereas the contemporary catallaxy of neo-liberal education policy frays the assumptions of economic activities that strive for unitary ends and singular purposes (e.g., racial and gendered equality in education based on ‘coherent’ categories of racialized and gendered subjects). Instead, neo-liberal catallaxy, as opposed to ‘economy’, rejects unitary ends and seeks to produce differentiation with multiple ends. Our policy geophilosophy maps the various forms of difference produced in the name of neo-liberal education policy, including what we see as very serious (and seductive) problematics associated with school choice policies as a way out of the liberal inequalities of schooling and earlier forms of compulsory raciality (Rofes & Stulberg, 2004). We discuss these issues in depth in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight.

3.0 constitutes policy geophilosophy firmly within ‘the world’ that is concerned with the representations and materialities of policy. The effects, affects, disputations and re-articulations, and examples of policy processes and practices in the settler societies throughout the world that continue to (re)produce preferred colonial representations and materialities at such a rapid pace that the net effect is an erasure of many ethnoscapes (Appadurai, 1990). But, 3.0 simultaneously asks ontological questions about ‘this very world’ and the possibilities of other representations, non-representations, and those contained with developing new translation registers perhaps born from earlier forms of difference and representation but that are also not necessarily tied to those either. Again, the ‘global cultural educational economy’ is not something we believe we should be headed towards.

3.0.4: Complex and Uncertain Materials

The fourth characterisation of 3.0 is a general move to maintain or connect to a materialist orientation in education and educational policy studies. The ‘materialist turn’, a set of broad approaches that have attempted to bring together objects, knowledge, things, practices and subjects (Barad, 2007; Bennett, 2009), in “a radical ontological move that decentres the human and emphasises the co-constitutive power of matter” (C. A. Taylor & Ivinson, 2013: 666).

This materialist turn has been debated in geography as part of non-representational theories (Thrift, 2008) that Murdoch (2006: 24) suggested are part of a materialist
post-structuralism. That is, “forms of post-structuralism that are situated ‘beyond the text’ in the ‘fleshy materialities’ of the bio-social domain”, including affect, and human and non-human agency. Non-representational theory, therefore, is understood “to be a necessary response to a contemporary political moment in which various non-representational modalities – including affect – are caught up in the emergence of new forms of sovereign and bio power” (Anderson, 2008: xx). This is to simply (actually, quite complexly) wrestle with scientificity in education policy studies. Stephen J. Ball provides good examples with his ideas about policy subjects, policy enactments and policy becomings.

*Policy scientificity 3.0* does (or can) remain preoccupied by the subjugations that education policy produces. We try not to privilege the subject, only their innumerable enactments through, and of, policy – ‘fleshy materialities’. We take up questions about ‘agency’ in Chapter Two, but for now, Bonta and Protevi (2004: 25) signal what this materialist view might look like if we took it up in education policy studies, … there is no exact quantitative solution. Nor can there be any qualitative, ‘thick’ narrative (for example, a Clifford Geertz-inspired ethnographic account) or even a qualitative-quantitative hybrid approach [mixed methods] that provides a full set of instructions. Rather, [problems] are ‘resolved’ only by the irreplaceable, un-reproducible, adaptive ‘real-life operation’ [that] indicates the irreducibility of distributed spatiotemporal networks of embodied artisans in ‘resolving’ complex problems by real-life operations rather than by the solution of exact equations or descriptions.

The emphasis on materialism is to use and think through the ‘empirical’ in policy studies while noting that these ‘policy realities’ and ‘policy materialities’ are constantly changing; indeed constantly emerging. This emergence is an important part of Actor Network Theory approaches to policy analysis, in which “[a]ny changes we might describe as policy – new ideas, innovations, changes in behaviour, transformations – emerge through the effects of relational interactions …” (Fenwick & Edwards, 2011). For example, philosophy itself has begun to ‘experiment’, and a fieldwork in philosophy (Bourdieu, 1990; Rabinow & Rose, 2003) allows us to: (a) develop concepts in situ; (b) collapse the endless debates about theoretical abstraction (or, conversely, to ‘localize’ theory) while still holding it as a very important area for development, and (c) note how we are ontologically implicated with and affected by objects of analysis (rather than just epistemologically positioned) – that matter matters (Barad, 2007; Bourdieu, 1990).

**POLICY MUTATIONS**

Finally, *policy scientificity 3.0* is not an ‘evolution’ of the prior and admittedly broad epochs of policy analysis in education. No. 3.0 is its third mutation. *Policy geophilosophy* still works within, around, and through the prior scientificities of 1.0, 2.0. It is our modest attempt to contribute to Bakhtin’s ‘carnival’ – the heteroglossia
of policy studies and scientificities in education. These scientificities constitute policy scholars and their corresponding activities in different ways – as ‘analysts’ and ‘solution providers’, as ‘activists’, and as ‘policy theorists’ and ‘problematisers’. While at various time-spaces we are constituted as all of these, it is clearly in the last type of work that we locate policy geophilosophy. We see it as having a decidedly marked difference from the kinds of instrumental and techno-rational policy research that claim ‘solutions’ to policy ‘problems’. In fact, it is an attempt to map some of these sedimented logics.

Policy scientificity is also marked, for better or worse, as an inter-disciplinary approach that deliberately uses uncertainty and chaos rather than seeing them as things to avoid, sublimate, ‘control’, or neatly package away in a single discipline. We would never suggest a solution to your problems; we can barely keep abreast of our own. However, we are pretty sure that all educational problems are spatialized, temporalized and require new concepts in order for us to experiment with and muddle on.

Please move to the next chapter to see how a policy geophilosophy manifests.

NOTE

1 The singularity is often referred to as a future point in time in which a constellation of events in artificial intelligence, human-biological changes, and/or human-machine interfaces will produce an emergent and superior form of ‘intelligence’. The term refers to a moment, and for some, a thing, although it isn’t clear if the singularity is a specific form of intelligence or an environment that contains multiple ‘superintelligences’. Anyway, we consider policy to be a technology, and one that is adaptive and replacing some of our thinking.
If the protests of children were heard in kindergarten, if their questions were attended to, it would be enough to explode the entire educational system.

—Deleuze and Foucault 1977: 209

Welcome back. For this chapter, we recommend something a bit stronger than coffee; perhaps a bitter or even something heavy on tannins. This chapter explains what we mean regarding an education policy geophilosophy, an approach we initially developed out of frustration because we could not believe what was being done to education in the name of policy. Of course, we were equally stupefied to witness what was done to policy through the sanctified fantasies of education. It is easy to ignore adults – we do it all the time – but, we wondered, is no one listening to five-year olds?

Education policy analysis has left us with a preoccupation with the ‘knower’ and displaced, or taken for granted, what it is to be known. Take for instance the definitiveness in the idea of a ‘more accountable education system’. Or, ‘academic achievement’. Or, to cite a couple of classics, ‘educational equity’ and ‘educational success’. Conversely, we are interested, similarly to Lather (2009: 8),

in a scientificity that is about imperfect information where incompleteness and indeterminacy are assets, more not less, central elements of a scientific posture of getting lost as a way of knowing. Here the absence of foundations is enabling, opening us to the other. Against the received objectifying, scientific posture, this is a scientificity of engaged ethics grounded in a permanent facing of the undecidable, an ethical horizon of science more attuned to innovation than ‘the epistemological quarrel over the conditions of scientificity.’ (Dosse, 1999: 352)

As noted in the previous chapter, various scientificities have been mobilised in education policy to legitimate analysis and advocacy attempts over the past sixty years. These criteria for different forms of policy scientificity have shifted and have been debated. Mapping these three periods of policy scientificity allowed us to understand how education policy is a historical construction that is power-inscribed, and that both enables and constrains educational possibilities through various registers that simultaneously enunciate such possibilities and exclude other possibilities.
In order for us to posit a policy geophilosophy in education, it was important to note the various disciplinary frameworks that have been developed, used and appropriated for different kinds of education policy studies. We are not disciplinary apologists, but we acknowledge that the liberal construction of education produced the biopower apparatuses (i.e., ‘the knowledges’) that we simultaneously critique and use. In this sense, we do not rewrite the historical “explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations” (Foucault, 1990: 140). No. Instead, like five-year olds, we are trying to get out from under them.

Policy geophilosophy has an affinity, though not equivalence, with “political informed use of complexity theory” (Bonta & Protevi, 2004: 3), which only means that “an education that is understood in complexity terms cannot be conceived in terms of preparation for the future. Rather it must be construed in terms of participation in the creation of possible futures” (Davis & Sumara, 2008: 43). These are wonderful ideas; particularly that we might be included in developing our futures – even at the age of five, and that the plural of ‘futures’ is not just some science fiction idea but a very real likelihood within the multiverse (Greene, 2011; Gribbin, 2010). Policy geophilosophy includes the ideas of space and concept in education policy studies so that they may be employed as strategies against the technicians of school behaviour, administrators of curricular subjectifications, and the education leaders of population control. Thus, our policy geophilosophy shares in some of the possibilities involved in kindergarteners’ questions about exploding the education system.

We propose that a policy analysis needs a critical ethos committed to analysis as situated, spatial, contextual, and material. We find the term ‘geophilosophy’ a rich one that reflects our individual interests in geography and philosophy. If we look at our object of interest in this book, ‘policy’; and hence a ‘policy geophilosophy’, we are fascinated by three things: one, the way in which policy as concept and action both endures (stabilizes) and mutates in and through space-times; two, the ways in which policy analysis attempts to deal with, and constitutes, the ontologies and epistemologies of policy; and, three, how policy shapes, constitutes, and enacts subjects. Specifically, our policy geophilosophy is designed to examine how education policy spatialises and constitutes objects and subjects through emergent and adaptive policy arrangements that simultaneously influence how policy is sensed, embodied, and enacted.

We work with ‘non-representational’ theories, broadly part of poststructural geographies, that tend to deal with types of questions and problems in which we are interested. Anderson and Harrison (2010: 23–24) posed questions such as,

how do sense and significance emerge from on-going practical action?; how, given the contingency of orders, is practical action organised in more-than-human configurations?; and how to attend to events – to the ‘non’ that may lead to the chance of something different or a modification of an existing ordering?
For our purposes, and we hope perhaps yours, a policy geophilosophy produces alternative and multi-disciplinary ways of understanding education policy, including a transversal politics (see Chapter One) which are so desperately needed. How much longer can we endure policy machines – i.e., 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 – that do not listen to kindergarteners? Please, do not misinterpret us. We are not entirely sure we like kindergarteners, but we think they may have a point. Would it really be so terrible to explode such a disciplining and overtly capitalist structure as the educational system? At the very least, maybe we might “cease to celebrate the creation of state schooling and see it instead as an ‘inglorious moment’ in the ‘modern play of coercion over bodies’” (Ball, 2013: 118; quoting Michel Foucault, 1979: 191).

Because we suspect we have had our ‘inglorious moments’ in our collective and respective work, we are obliged to state that a policy geophilosophy can produce new formulations of education for emergent futures. Within such logics, we note a rapidly devolving disconnect between the parochial instrumentalism of education policy and the state. Our inter-disciplinary approach to policy studies, our policy geophilosophy, is not, however, an attempt to salvage that particular link, but is rather an attempt to develop additional links between education policy and the state that capture the many different ways education policy is being used, by whom, and for what purposes. Peters (2004: 218) stated that for Deleuze and Guattari, “philosophy cannot escape its relationship to the City and the State. In its modern and postmodern forms it cannot escape its form under industrial and knowledge capitalism”. Sorry kids, you still have to go to school, for now.

And, right from the start, we have no qualms in jettisoning a techno-rational policy ‘scientificity’ and anything remotely connected to it. Well, the last part is not entirely true. We are interested in techniques and rationalities, and we still like to count things, but only because counting reminds us of the different flows that travel around and through sedimentations that have been brought to rest. We also count things because of the constant changes – indeed speeds – through which these movements produce space. Zeno brought this to our attention awhile back; Rene Magritte provides a constant source of inspiration and laughter here; and Gilles Deleuze reminded us of the beautiful potential of becoming more recently.

We are interested in the possibility of uncertainty and emergence in transversaldisciplinary frameworks that examine ideas of difference, non-representation, unpredictability and chance in education policy and policy studies. This is to work from and with the ‘onto-epistemes’ of policy scientificity 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 discussed in Chapter One. The subsequent sections discuss the ideas of ontology and materiality, spatiality, agency, and emergence. These sections illustrate an indicative sense of a policy geophilosophy that we attempt in this book through concepts of policy prolepses, policy intensions, and policy folds (e.g., Chapters Four and Five). Policy geophilosophy is one way to understand complexity and uncertainty in education policy, and to connect with others who are developing a variety of multi-, inter-, and post-foundational analyses of educational policy (e.g., Heimans, 2012).
CHAPTER 2

CRITICAL PAROCHIALISMS, OR “WHERE DID MY ONTOLOGY GO?”

We propose *policy geophilosophy* as part of a critical ethos committed to analyze specific policy issues from situated, contextual, spatial and materialist points of view. A policy geophilosophy, as a form of ‘criticality’, offers “a critical attitude … and thus a way of relating to the present” (Simons, Olssen, & Peters, 2009c: x) that, create[s] a public, not in view of finding agreement (on facts or values), but by gathering people for whom something is at stake … that is, to help constitute ‘matters of public concern’ by transforming what policies or researchers regard as matters of fact into ‘an issue to talk about’.

Our critical ethos may be a virtue (Butler, 2001), and is certainly aimed at developing an interdisciplinary “art of not being governed like that and at that cost” (Foucault, 2007: 29). Our concerns pertain to governance, and the changing nature(s) of education policy in relation to the varying modes of the state, especially the configuring of relations between the market, the state, ‘civil society,’ and its regulation (Ball & Junemann, 2012). Here, our sense of ‘critique’ is not aimed at transformation guided by ideas of transcendence (Torres & Van Heertum, 2009; cf. Foucault’s genealogy of critique). We do not claim, as such, that what we (re)present is the only way to understand a *policy geophilosophy*, nor do we claim that *policy geophilosophy* is the only inter-disciplinary approach to education policy studies, or transversal politics. We do claim, however, and hope to demonstrate throughout this book, that a policy geophilosophy can assist scholars to examine the spatio-temporal aspects of education policy and to link to and create concepts that assist others understand education policy materialities differently (e.g., policy becomings; Ball et al., 2011).

*Materiality and Ontological Politics*

As we mentioned in Chapter One, the materialist ‘turn’ is an important one for us to recognise. While we draw on Deleuze in this book, Deleuze did not consider himself a materialist but he did see his work as ‘vitalist’ (Coole & Frost, 2010). We draw on the idea of ‘lively’ matter – especially regarding policy and objects such as schools in this book (see our discussion about ‘agency’ below). We are interested in the ‘material turn’ not because it is ‘new’ as such, but rather that, as Coole and Frost (2010: 6) suggested,

[i]n terms of theory itself … we are summoning a new materialism in response to a sense that the radicalism of the dominant discourses which have flourished under the cultural turn is now more or less exhausted. We share the feeling current among many researchers that the dominant constructivist orientation to social analysis is inadequate for thinking about matter, materiality, and politics in ways that do justice to the contemporary context of biopolitics and global political economy.
The ‘material turn’ fits with our desire to delimit a set of ‘ontological politics’ that has been displaced in education policy analyses by an insistence on epistemology that strives for certainty, predictability, and instrumentalism. Law (2004) discussed “ontological politics” in ways that deliberately set out to destabilize onto-epistemes that strive for techno-rational singularity. According to Law, traditional ontology assumes (at least) five characteristics. It is: (a) independent of people; (b) ‘out there’ (spatial assumptions of the world); (c) anterior and precedes people (i.e., statements from God, truth, or science); (d) definite and singular (including constant and universal); and, (e) able to be represented.

When we speak of ‘ontological politics’ we posit and experiment with ontologies that challenge these five assumptions. For us, ontology is: (a) enmeshed with people (e.g., ‘object-oriented-ontology’ Morton, 2010); (b) not ‘out there’ but produced in various times/spaces (Morton, 2010); (c) not anterior (Hacking, 2004); (d) multiple (Mol, 2002), and (e) non-representational (Edwards, 2012). Our ‘ontological politics,’ then, posits a different world than the one used for reference in many (all?) education policies. But there is more to our politics than just assertions of difference.

Policy is produced through what Law (2004) describes as ‘inscription devices’. The purpose of these devices is to trace or represent materiality (e.g., charts, graphs). However, within the production of policy much is deleted in order to produce preferred courses of action. For example, the use of charts in policy development almost always obscures the ‘data’ that is used. For our purposes, we are interested in what particular realities are constructed by particular inscription devices, and, more importantly, what particular realities have been erased, elided, and remain virtual as “conditions of possibility” (Foucault, 1970). Here, our ‘ontological politics’ is committed to showing and critiquing the “perspectival” (Law, 2004: 60) tendencies of education policy that seek singularity, independence, anteriority, definiteness, and representativeness. We think these tendencies are why so many people continue to clamour for singular ‘evidence’ in education. In effect, our politics seeks to thwart tactics involved in assumptions of education policy committed to singularities. Rather, our ‘ontological politics’ intends to illustrate the multiplicity, fractionality, and differences of education policy instead. We are convinced that the tracings of singular ontologies onto education policy are tantamount to erasures of multiplicities, and this, we believe, are serious political acts. Our ‘ontological politics’, then, focusses on the absences and presences within education policy, and we illustrate these ideas in Chapters Four and Five.

When we discuss notions of ontology, politics and policy we are interested in the possibility of thinking things differently. This includes the political implications of ontologies and struggles over the object ‘policy’. These struggles encapsulate and embody struggles over investments concerning what policy can ‘do’ when the question ‘what is policy?’ is answered. We are not positing a new material that we have ‘discovered’ in order to improve policy studies in education when we invoke the term of ‘ontological politics’! We will leave that task up to astro/physicists! To
content/believe that policy is techno-rational, for example, is to adhere to the idea that there is no politics to policy, it is connected to ideology, but there is no politics regarding the object and associated and produced practices. The idea of multiple ontologies provides a way of disrupting political positions that are fixed and stable (i.e., essential and universal), though does perhaps fall down in providing a way of acting in reference to these multiple realities (S. Sellar, personal correspondence, 2014).

We poise an ontological question, what is education policy and what roles does it enact in relation to the state (e.g., in relation to formal schooling)? We are interested in the object ‘policy’, as part of a “reinvigorated account of objects and … that objects present a starting point for analysis” (Ash & Simpson, 2014: 12). To return to St Pierre’s (2011) idea of reimagining social sciences, and to pay credence to the critical policy studies and critical social science of 2.0, educational policy studies has been preoccupied by an epistemological war tied to “necessary perspectivalism” (Lather, 2009) and quite cleverly displaced what Law (2004: 143) noted as the persistent war of “ontological politics”. Singh, Heimans and Glasswell (2014: 3) posited that:

what we ‘do’ as research is ontologically political. Research practices do not simply investigate or make sense of an external reality … even when putatively, this might be the aim. The doing of research is an ‘interference’ [in] reality.

We are, similarly interested in an ontological politics of policy analysis. This is predicated on a politics that deals with the representational and material aspects of policy analysis “a politics that has to do with the way in which problems are framed, bodies are shaped, and lives are pushed and pulled into one shape or another” (Mol, 2002: viii).

We certainly do not believe, of course, that education policy and its recommendations are somehow independent from the research and the researchers that produce it. In this sense, policy scholars are called to task to state their research ‘positions’ and ‘positionalities’, even though we do not need to account for how these spaces have been created for us, by us, and through us (i.e., disciplinary knowledges). How did space become the preeminent and implicit focus in educational research (i.e., positionalities) with little recourse to understanding how these spaces are produced? Might policy scientificities affect educational systems more than the recommendations generated from within them? Part of what we are arguing in this book is that confessions about perspectival and disciplinary subjugations are necessary but insufficient with regard to clear statements about the ontologies of our educational subjects/objects. And, yes, we believe that many kindergarteners are asking ontological questions; and, yes, we believe too many adults have not had compelling or plausible answers to these questions.
THE SPATIALITIES OF EDUCATION POLICY (ANALYSES)

In the following chapters we assume that the education examples we examine are unstable, chaotic, or “far-from-equilibrium” (Bonta & Protevi, 2004: 18). We aim to produce different spatial readings to account for the emergence, for example, of a school or a city. While in the twentieth century there had been multiple spatial turns in various disciplines and fields, including linguistics, philosophy and geography (Peters & Kessl, 2009), the emphasis on space in the late twentieth century and early twenty first century, closely related to notions of space-time compression, simultaneity and multiplicity identified with phenomena such as globalization and transnational migration (Warf & Arias, 2009). This constitutes a heuristic point, predicated on the notion that: “Geography matters, not for the simplistic and overly used reason that everything happens in space, but because where things happen is critical to knowing how and why they happen” (Warf & Arias, 2009: 1).

We are fascinated by this ‘spatial turn’ for it calls into question, as Thrift (2006: 139) noted,

categories like ‘material’, ‘life’ and ‘intelligence’ through an emphasis on the unremitting materiality of a world where there are no-pre-existing objects. Rather, all kinds of hybrids are being continually recast by processes of circulation within and between particular spaces. The world is made up of all kinds of things brought into relation with one another by this universe of spaces through a continuous and largely involuntary process of encounter and the often violent training that the encounter forces.

In the following chapters we work with ideas of space offered by Thrift (2006), predicated on:

1. the idea that “everything, but everything, is spatially distributed” (p. 140), an assertion that speaks to the necessary interrelations of one space with other spaces;
2. that distribution repudiates the possibility of boundaries, for “[a]ll spaces are porous to a greater or lesser degree” (p. 140);
3. that with everything being spatially distributed and with no boundaries, every space is thus in constant motion. This is not to say that movement is not challenged, and as we note in the following chapters policy is the enduring and always ultimately failed, attempt to stabilize space. Thrift (2006: 141) contended, “[t]here is no static and stabilized space, though there are plenty of attempts to make space static and stable. Process (or perhaps, more accurately, force-being) is all in that it is all that there is …”.
4. that multiplicity needs to be applied to the type of space, that there is no one kind of space. That there are indeed abstract spaces, relative spaces, and relational spaces (Thrift, 2006).
CHAPTER 2

Spatial Conceptions in Education

Newtonian conceptions of space posit a discrete and autonomous container for action, that is, abstract space contains events and actions. Relative space is conceived as a plane with implications of distance and scale – in which space is defined relative to the objects and processes being considered in space and time; that is, there is not fixed relationship for locating things (Jones, 2009).

Relational notions of space, the ideas of which are our focus, are premised on notions of multiplicity and openness (Massey, 2005) and “an emphasis on the proliferation of diverse relations and strong sense that that the resulting orders are open, provisional, achievements” (Anderson & Harrison, 2010: 15). For instance, Massey (2005: 99) posited that space needs to be constituted as radically heterogeneous. She stated, “[p]osition, location, is the minimum order of differentiation of elements in the multiplicity that is co-formed with space”. Anderson and Wylie (2009: 320 cited in Ash & Simpson, 2014: 11) similarly contended,

heterogeneous materialities actuate or emerge from within the assembling of multiple, differential, relations and … the properties and/or capacities of materialities thereafter become effects of that assembling.

Space as constant emergence is intimately concerned with power rather than as a neutral container that exists a priori for activity which subsequently orders relations between humans and non-humans. As Massey (2005: 99) noted “… space is the dimension which poses the question of the social, and thus of the political (while ‘actual’ spaces are produced through the social and the political),” and, furthermore, space is “the sphere of coevalness, of radical contemporaneity.”

Throughout the book we identify some of the spatial and conceptual equivocations that the neo-liberal education project uses to propagate itself. In Chapters Four and Five, we argue that education policy is a spatial process, and that implementation processes in particular produce crucial emergent geographies. We describe how emergent geographies are produced when policy folds actors through senses and enactments of policy. The idea that policy is sensed, embodied and enacted is developed into the concept of a policy intension which extends approaches to spatial, and in particular, micropolitical analyses in policy research.

UNPREDICTABLE ‘AGENCY’: EMERGENCE AND AFFECT

It may have been clear that there is some overlap with what we are discussing and notions of complexity theory. Following Olssen (2008) there are confluences between notions of distribution and relationality in the broadly poststructural approaches we are taking, and the ideas of interactions in complexity theory. Notably, as Olssen (2008: 108) posited,

Interactions take place in open systems through ‘self-organisation’ by adapting dynamically to changes in both the environment and the system.
Self-organisation is an emergent property of the system as a whole. An emergent property is a property that is constituted due to the combination of elements in the system as a whole. As such it is a property possessed by the system but not by its components.

Interactions and emergence are part of the lack of borders and simultaneous multiplicity that constitute our (relational) readings of space. Spatialities emerge, we suggest in education policy, as forms of ordering and stabilization (see Gulson, 2011). Thrift (2008: 121) posited that,

space-times … generate many of the unactualized possibles without which they cannot be sensed and described. The distribution of space-times is complex and the response to this complexity is not theoretical but practical: different things need to be tried out, opened up, which can leave their trace even when they fail.

Complexity theory also carries with it ideas of ‘self-organization’, which admittedly, is tricky for our avowedly social purposes that rely a great deal on ideas of power and politics. Protevi (2009: vii) proposes the notion of ‘bodies politic’ as an attempt to demonstrate “the ways in which politics, psychology, and physiology intersect in socially embedded and somatically embodied affective cognition”. We wish to highlight how these ideas of ‘self-organization’ and ‘bodies politic’ assist us to map conceptions of education policy that are instrumental, mechanistic, techno-rational, and that claim to deterministically cause (or produce) a desired state of affairs. For our purposes, we will capture this conception with the term of emergence rather than ‘self-organization’, where emergence refers to the “(diachronic) construction of functional structures in complex systems that achieve a (synchronic) focus of systematic behaviour as they constrain the behaviour of individual components” (Protevi, 2006: 19). Temporality, and not just history, is crucial to our formulation of emergence and we discuss this idea in Chapter Four in the form of a policy prolepsis.

Further, we assume that emergent structures are patterned (but not normalizing), where we have “a qualitative knowledge of the emergent properties of a system” (Bonta & Protevi, 2004: 19). Emergent structures can arise through either patterned conditions or properties that are unexpected but explainable from non-linear rules, and emergence occurs through un-patterned processes that “are not deducible even in principle ‘from the most complete and exhaustive knowledge of their emergence bases’” (Biesta, 2010: 6, citing Kim, 1999: 3). Either. Both. Biesta (2010: 6) is helpful here in outlining the notion of emergence as a norm rather than exception.

What is particularly important is the ability to understand the open, recursive, organic, non-linear and emergent dimensions of physical and social processes as positive and necessary aspects of complex systems, rather than as deviations from the norm or as epiphenomena that need to be explained away. This is also the case in the field of education where complexity has provided a language for articulating the fact that educational processes and practices
tend to be characterised by nonlinearity and unpredictability. Moreover, the idea of emergence not only makes it possible to highlight that knowledge, understanding and reality are themselves emerging through educational processes rather than that they are simply represented in and through education (see Biesta & Osberg, 2007; Osberg & Biesta, 2008). Complexity also makes it possible to highlight the fact that individuals emerge in and through educational processes in unique and unpredictable ways.

We think educational organizations, institutions, and what are characterized as systems (e.g., school districts, national systems) are good examples of these ideas. Stephen J. Ball (2007, 2012; Ball & Junemann, 2012) provides excellent examples of the kinds of complex adaptive systems that we are talking about in education policy. Ball’s mapping of various private and public partnerships constitutes a form of policy emergence. We further think cities might be good examples. And people. ‘Systems’ are constituted through mutation and emergence related to events that do not, in and of themselves, ‘predict’ outcomes – indeed, produce emergent spaces, uncertain concepts, and difference. For instance, Ball (2009) noted how heterarchies and network theory functioned with these characteristics, including the slippery neo-liberal catallaxy which produces and simultaneously capitalizes on the differences it requires and produces.

A politically informed sense of complexity theory affords us the luxury to discuss ‘agency’ – but really activity – in relation to much broader, open, and adaptive environments; that is, to understand ‘agency’ in education within policy ecologies (Weaver-Hightower, 2008), policy ensembles (Ball, 2006), policy assemblages (McCann & Ward, 2012) and policy dispositifs (Bailey, 2013) that are uncertain, chaotic, and emergent. As Coole and Frost (2010: 9) contended, new materialities require that,

the whole edifice of modern ontology regarding notions of change, causality, agency, time, and space needs rethinking. … [N]ew materialists are rediscovering a materiality that materializes, evincing immanent modes of self-transformation that compel us to think of causation in far more complex terms; to recognize that phenomena are caught in a multitude of interlocking systems and forces and to consider anew the location and nature of capacities for agency.

Policy ‘actors’, for example, are simultaneously policy subjects (Ball et al., 2011) within and various dispositifs of networked governance (Metcalfe, 2010) or “societies of control” (Deleuze, 1992). We note an affinity between what we are attempting with our geophilosophy and what Thrift (2008) has noted as the complicated links between complexity and materiality. A politically informed sense of complexity theory examines traditional forms of ‘agency’ as,

an escape route from the conceptual gridlock of ‘structure’ as either a merely homeostatic self-regulation or a postmodernist ‘signifier imperialism’ and
‘agency’ as a mysterious exception somehow granted to individual human subjects in defiance of natural laws and lithely free of social structure. (Bonta & Protevi, 2004: 6)

That is one way to say it. Michel Foucault said it differently: “People know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 187). Foucault suggested that activity is generated but that it enters complex systems that are also generating action. Foucault troubles intention that is conceived as ‘lithely free of social structure and natural laws’.

For instance, might all the ‘agency’ going on in the world influence subsequent action? And, might agency simply be the production of more and more rules to follow and break? Bonta and Protevi (2004: 5) crystallized this idea when they stated that “‘agency’ thinking seems mired in a quasi-existentialist affirmation of ‘resistance’”, which we would note is perpetuated by all the insistence on ‘having’ agency, which is precisely the polyvalent technologies provided by governments nowadays. A major goal of what we are trying to achieve in this book, through working through and with a policy geophilosophy in education, is to rearticulate and reorganize the spaces that influence actions rather than to insist on ‘agency’ to ‘resist’ these spaces (see also Butler, 2004; Youdell, 2010).

At the risk of making things even more complicated, neo-liberalism – the sin qua non of education policy – encourages subjects to increase ‘their’ agentic spaces (e.g., entrepreneurial, self-responsible, self-determining) within rapidly reterritorialized educational places. Neo-liberal ‘agency’ is always mediated through race and gender, and to the extent to which capital facilitates somatic mobilities to places that better mediate sexist and racist ecologies. Of course, questions about identity, difference, and representation are questions that kindergarteners also ask (McGlynn, Bekerman, Zembylas, & Gallagher, 2009). Here, our policy geophilosophy identifies the equivocations of the biopolitical subject that the neo-liberal education project uses to propagate itself through its assertions and inducements for different subjects to claim ‘their agency’ on economic grounds. We devote Chapter Six, Seven and Eight to an analysis of some these ideas.

Policy Affects and Effects: Action in the World

Educational representation appears to be a slippery slope of ‘agency-thinking’ when the need for reconstructing epistemologies that have colonized our memories and aspirations obfuscate the maintenance of the intersubjective project that organizes the preconditions for political activity in the first place. If indeed it is the case that recognition and representation have become the neo-liberal epistemologies for action, we examine the potential of policy geophilosophy for non-representational action – perhaps even an Anonymous politics (Coleman, 2013) and/or a politics of imperceptibility (Grosz, 2002). Perhaps the best we can do is examine to what extent
CHAPTER 2

‘action’ can be conceived within education policy, and to what extent indeterminacy and incompleteness can contribute to a political informed sense of movement. We understand what the intentions are for neo-liberal free markets and we are not impressed.

In another sense, however, ‘agency’ is deeply rooted in sense-making and environmental cues or triggers. A great deal of movement is produced when

at critical thresholds some physical and biological systems can be said to ‘sense’ the difference in their environment that trigger self-organizing processes. In this way, signs … are not only conceptualized as occurring beyond the registers to the human and even the organic [e.g., linguistic], but also are understood as triggers of material processes. (Bonta & Protevi, 2004: 4)

This notion of triggers is a key part of policy geophilosophy, and no amount of italics can signal how subject/object movement is influenced to various degrees when sense-making and affect are actuated by environmental cues and triggers. Here, we can see that the scientificities of 3.0, in which policy geophilosophy sits, are part of debates about the separation of affect and intention and cognition, and about ‘location’ of intentionality in relation to the subject (e.g., Altieri, 2012; Leys, 2011; Connolly, 2012). On the one hand, Leys (2011, 2012) has argued that one consequences of an adherence to anti-intentionalist theories of affect is to jettison the conceptual necessity underpinning ‘critical thinking’. On the other hand, responses to this critique (Altieri, 2012; Connolly, 2012) contend that Leys narrows understandings of emotions, affects and intentionality to a notion of concept definition (Altieri, 2012), while also using the term ‘anti-intentionalist’ to conflate multiple literatures on intentionality (Connolly, 2012).

In this book we are tending towards the multiple notions of intentionality. We are interested, as such, in two things: one, how policy organises affective life; and, two, the relational spatialities of affective policy life. As Thrift (2008: 175) posits,

affect is understood as a form of thinking, often indirect and nonreflective true, but thinking all the same. And, similarly, all manner of the spaces which they generate must be thought of in the same way, as means of thinking and as thought in action.

The focus on affect as part of policy analysis is done not to emphasise that policy generates and is a reaction to feelings or emotions, but rather that, as Thrift (2008: 173) maintains there are increasingly “diverse ways in which the use and abuse of various affective practices is gradually changing what we regard as the sphere of ‘the political’”. We also see this, like Thrift (2006: 143), as concerning relationships between sensing, affect and space, where space is “constructed out a spatial swirl of affects that are often difficult to tie down but are nevertheless crucial”.

30
WHAT IT DOES (AND DOESN’T DO)…

Here, it bears repeating, what a policy geophilosophy attempts to do. As we move through our conception of a policy geophilosophy, we focus deliberately on, to reiterate the above, the many ways policy subjects/objects are positioned spatially and philosophically by emergent and adaptive policy formations which influence how subjects/objects sense, embody, and enact policy. Like the sensing cats and dogs do moments before large earthquakes. Like the sensing of a drop in air pressure that in turn produce migraine headaches. Like the intuitions of five-year olds regarding their impending subjugations as good little capitalist labor. Butterfly effects, each and everyone of them.2

We imagine that we will be charged with a kind of neo-phenomenology with regard to policy geophilosophy. Fine, as long as the subject is understood to be producing and produced (as in reciprocating). Deleuze & Guattari (1994: 149–150) are helpful here,

Phenomenology wanted to renew our concepts by giving us perceptions and affections that would make us give birth to the world, not as babies or hominids but as beings, by right, whose proto-opinions would be the foundations of this world. But we do not fight against perceptual and affective cliches if we do not fight against the machine that produces them. By invoking primordial lived-experience, by turning immanence into an immanence to a subject, phenomenology could not prevent the subject from forming no more than opinions that would already draw the cliche from new perceptions and promised affections.

In other words, note all the instrumentalisms smuggled into ‘your’ feelings and experiences. The environmental triggers that cue policy sensings will be analyzed in this book in terms of expressions, not in terms of foundations of science, human essentializations, or phenomenology. We are interested in the question of ‘how is affective life an object-target for specific and multiple forms of power?’ (Anderson, 2014: 4).

The policy geophilosophy we envisage has an affinity with cues from ‘complex adaptive systems’ which investigate how social systems adapt to changing environments to increase survivability – which may be just another fancy way to examine how educational neo-liberalism supports itself. Again, we do not claim that we are outside of the dispositif, but that shouldn’t mean that we cannot comment on it either. And if kindergarteners can do that, so can we.

Moreover, we clearly admit that policy geophilosophy is limited with regard to modelling and predicting the spatialities and complexities of social systems and education policy in particular. While we rarely have access to definitive information in education policy, even in the best of studies, so much of education policy is levied
in relation to future imaginations that deliberately omit the attractors and bifurcations that emerge when closing particular modalities. Again, we use uncertainty in our analyses, not try to control for it.

NOTES

1 There are, of course, critiques of the connection of ontology to politics. See, for example, a somewhat humorous contribution to the debate on political ontology here, throughout the comments section, http://sites.williams.edu/cthorne/articles/to-the-political-ontologists/. Thanks to Sam Sellar for the link.

2 Butterfly effect as the sensitive dependence on initial conditions, of which, minute variations in sensing generate sizeable differences (e.g., scale) in outcomes.