"I could easily say, what a timely book, but the truth is that Kohlberg is for the ages, which means
any time is worthwhile to revisit his work. So, in that sense, let us ask, what aspects of his work
in Moral Development and Moral Education are timely today? One answer can be found in the
Kohlberg Lounge on the sixth floor of Larsen Hall, which I have the privilege to visit every day.
Placed there in 1987, a plaque in his honor states: In memory of Lawrence Kohlberg:

In this room where ideas are born through discussion and tested through debate Let us
listen and speak with the same respect that he gave to all

In 2015, the emphasis on discussion and debate has reached beyond moral development to
all aspects of pedagogy, from literacy to history education and beyond. And, in an era of fast
and slow thinking, this book reminds us that ethical reflection, self-awareness, and a social
conscience are the three malleable developmental skills that allow us all to be truly human,
Kohlberg then, Kohlberg now, Kohlberg forever.” –
Robert L. Selman, Harvard University
(Roy
Edward Larsen Professor of Education and Human Development, Professor of Psychology in the
Department of Psychiatry)

"This book about one of the giants of psychology is very timely. There is a whole generation of
students and scholars that is growing up with a knowledge about moral development without
learning about the roots of the field. This is not a matter of nostalgia or ‘attributional justice,’
but one of missing out on a fountain of knowledge and insight that has not been surpassed in its
depth and breadth. This book should become required reading for students in the social sciences
that should begin to ask the questions that would require their teachers to ‘read up.’” – Gil Noam,
Harvard Medical School (Founder and Director of the Program in Education, Afterschool & Resiliency
(PEAR))

"Kohlberg’s theory of moral developmental might be more relevant today than ever, given
increasing worries about the fragmentation and declining solidarity in modern Western society.
But does the theory hold up in light of old criticisms and new questions and methods? The
chapters, by leading scholars in the field of moral development, introduce new generations of
moral psychologists, philosophers, and educators to Kohlberg’s work, by addressing strengths and
weaknesses and suggesting ways to move forward. A must read for anyone interested in moral
education.” – Jan Boom, Utrecht University (Chair of the Kuhmerker Dissertation Award Committee)
Kohlberg Revisited
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Volume 9

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Scope:

‘Moral Development and Citizenship Education’ is a book series that focuses on the cultural development of our young people and the pedagogical ideas and educational arrangements to support this development. It includes the social, political and religious domains, as well as cognitive, emotional and action oriented content. The concept of citizenship has extended from being a pure political judgment, to include the social and interpersonal dynamics of people.

Morality has become a multifaceted and highly diversified construct that now includes cultural, developmental, situational and professional aspects. Its theoretical modelling, practical applications and measurements have become central scientific tasks. Citizenship and moral development are connected with the identity constitution of the next generations. A caring and supporting learning environment can help them to participate in society.

Books in this series will be based on different scientific and ideological theories, research methodologies and practical perspectives. The series has an international scope; it will support manuscripts from different parts of the world and it includes authors and practices from various countries and cultures, as well as comparative studies. The series seeks to stimulate a dialogue between different points of view, research traditions and cultures. It contains multi-authored handbooks, focussing on specific issues, and monographs. We invite books that challenge the academic community, bring new perspectives into the community and broaden the horizon of the domain of moral development and citizenship education.
Kohlberg Revisited

Edited by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword  
_Wiel Veugelers & Fritz Oser_  
vii

Introduction by the Editors  
_Boris Zizek, Detlef Garz & Ewa Nowak_  
1

Evolutionary Paradigm Shifting in Moral Psychology  
in Kohlberg’s Penumbra  
_Dawn E. Schrader_  
7

Lawrence Kohlberg’s Legacy: Radicalizing the Educational Mainstream  
_Ann Higgins-D’Alessandro_  
27

Just Community Sources and Transformations: A Conceptual Archeology of Kohlberg’s Approach to Moral and Democratic Schooling  
_Wolfgang Althof_  
51

Reconstructing Moral Development—Kohlberg Meets Oevermann  
_Boris Zizek and Detlef Garz_  
91

Kohlberg’s Stage 4½ Revisited—Or: From Halves to Wholes in the Theory of Moral Stages  
_Gerhard Minnameier_  
111

Lawrence Kohlberg in Finnish Social Psychology and Moral Education  
_Klaus Helkama_  
129

Kohlberg’s Unnoticed Dilemma—The External Assessment of Internal Moral Competence?  
_Georg Lind & Ewa Nowak_  
139
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral Judgment Competence in Pragmatic Context: Kohlberg, Dewey, Polanyi</td>
<td>Anna Malitowska &amp; Mateusz Bonecki</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Change is not a Birthday Journey: The Stop-and-change Model of Moral Education</td>
<td>Fritz Oser</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Kohlberg: The Vocation of a Moral Educator</td>
<td>F. Clark Power</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Understanding of Human Rights and Rule of Law from the Perspective of Kohlberg’s Theory</td>
<td>Stefan Weyers &amp; Nils Köbel</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

No one has influenced research and thinking on moral development and moral education in the 20th century more than Lawrence Kohlberg. His stages of moral development, his work on moral reasoning and autonomy development, and his ideas about ‘just community schools’ became well known. Kohlberg’s work is still stimulating many moral psychologists and educationalists in their research on identity development and educational practices. In particular his social-constructivist perspective on moral development and his efforts to measure both the cognitive elements of moral development and the moral values itself have generated a lot of research and psychological and educational practices. Kohlberg’s worldview, with a strong sense for justice and democracy, was clearly visible in his ideas about education. In the ‘just community schools’ Kohlberg intended to develop in students the cognitive and social skills for moral reasoning and to facilitate the flourishing of the moral value social justice.

Kohlberg is still influencing many researchers: old collaborators and students at Harvard, but also many other researchers in all parts of the world. It’s now 25 years ago that Kohlberg died. In those 25 years many books and articles have focused on his work. But we think this volume is unique because it reflects on the legacy of Lawrence Kohlberg. Eighteen authors from the United States and Europe present in twelve chapters what they learned from the work of Kohlberg and how they are using his methods, concepts and ideas in their contemporary research. It is interesting to see that these researchers use his methods and concepts in a creative way and that they try to link these with new academic research perspectives.

Some of the chapters include more personal reflections on the life and work of Kohlberg, these reports show the situatedness of Kohlberg’s work in academic, social and political life in the second part of the 20th century. Kohlberg’s work raised appraisal, but also many debates: was his approach too intellectual and too male-oriented instead of based on the moral value of care; did he have a value-relativistic position or was he in favour of social justice; were his moral values universalistic or western-oriented? These issues were widely debated between scholars and are also analysed in this book.

Many of us have also a personal remembering of this scientist and human being, Lawrence Kohlberg. He was incredibly truthful, he gave all his ideas to others and he shared his time with us in a way that we felt really home in whatever critically, but well accepted paradigm.

The book editors, Boris Zizek, Detlef Ganz and Ewa Nowak, did an amazing job in putting this volume together. They invited experts from the field and succeeded in covering a broad range of topics.
FOREWORD

We think this book will enhance the research on moral development and moral education strongly. As series editors we are very happy that we can include this volume in our series. We recommend this book to all those who are interested in research and practice of moral development and moral education.

Wiel Veugelers
Fritz Oser
Series Editors
Kohlberg’s approach to moral development and moral education continues to stimulate researchers and educators worldwide. His work still offers knowledge, methods and inspirations for understanding moral cognition and behavior, and how to foster it. This volume examines aspects of Kohlberg’s moral stage developmental theory and his theory of moral education to revisit their strengths and weaknesses in light of new questions and methods.

Reasoned and reasonable moral judgments, made in the context of freedom, autonomy, individual and social self-governance (with the principle of one man - one voice) is the essence for Kohlberg of moral development and moral learning (cf. Garz, 2009). Kohlberg used his empirically derived stage theory to describe socio-moral cognitive development, and the acquisition of what Georg Lind refers to as moral competence. For Kohlberg, morality is developed through living with other individuals, groups and cultures, and developing a sense of justice from the “moral point of view” of respect for persons.

Within his Just Community Approach to moral education, individual moral reasoning expression and dialogue both develop the sense of justice, and remedy against indoctrination, ideological brain washing, moral indifference, and moral relativism. Although values and norms may multiply and change with social norms, cultures and historical events, moral principles of justice are universal and prescriptive.

The question for this next century in the study of moral psychology is, what is the next step in moral psychological inquiry and in moral education? Should justice still be the aim of education and the endpoint of prescriptive moral psychological development? Do we need prescriptive moral theory at all, given the evidence emerging that we all have “a moral sense” and are driven by evolutionary-based moral foundations? Is there a place for Kohlbergian prescriptions—in theory and in practice—when social and evolutionary psychology governs actual moral actions? Other new questions posed by the field are: Are Kohlberg-inspired cognitive structuralism and neurocognitivist approaches compatible? How might there be a distinction between, or separate inquiry into, emotions on the one hand, and on the other, cognitive moral competence—defined as the ability to apply one’s moral principles?

Kohlberg’s work dominated moral psychology for so long, that it is worth thoughtful critical examination in light of the current movements in the field. All the chapters in this volume address strengths and weaknesses of the Kohlbergian
tradition. They introduce new generations of moral psychologists, philosophers, and educators to Kohlberg’s work, and suggest ways to move forward.

In *Evolutionary Paradigm Shifting in Moral Psychology in Kohlberg’s Penumbra*, Dawn Schrader describes a paradigm shift in moral psychology that looms on the horizon as an evolutionary and moral foundations theory of morality assumes prominence. She contends that this does not make constructivist, social constructivist, developmental, and meaning-making approaches to moral psychology obsolete; that such a dualistic view of the two paradigms is misguided. She describes various aspects of Kohlberg’s moral development, education and action theories, some that are obsolete, some that are stealth, and some that transcend time. Schrader analyzes Kohlberg’s 1) interdisciplinarity, 2) constructivist moral worldview and epistemology, 3) definition of morality and articulation of his moral psychological theories, and 4) dialogue, discussion, and reflection and concludes that cross-paradigmatic thinking is required to further enlarge and advance understanding of the moral domain.

In *Lawrence Kohlberg’s Legacy: Radicalizing the Educational Mainstream*, Ann Higgins-D’Alessandro focuses on Kohlberg’s two radical claims. On the one hand, development should be the aim of education, and on the other, education should explicitly focus on the moral, which is not indoctrinating if embedded in fair and open school structures, namely, those comprised with justice and democracy principles. Kohlberg regarded the Just Community school concept as a middle-step context and process to developing a more just and compassionate society. Two aspects of Kohlberg’s vision for schools are well supported and in vogue in current research literature: prosocial education and positive school climates. Higgins-D’Alessandro argues that newer, more rigorous evaluation strategies should be incorporated into Kohlbergian-based moral education interventions to account for historical cultural meaning making systems.

In his retrospective chapter *Just Community Sources and Transformations: A Conceptual Archeology of Kohlberg’s Approach to Moral and Democratic Schooling*, Wolfgang Althof familiarizes the reader with original methodology of dilemma-discussion as a radical moral, inclusion-, responsibility-, justice-, participatory and democracy experience established by Kohlberg’s and, in particular, Blatt’s research, and implemented by themselves and other practitioners in the classrooms. Althof also highlights justice and democratic education as sine qua non of doing and living democracy. He presents the career of Just Community in prison projects, high schools, alternative schools, and elementary schools. Socratic dialogue-based discussions and meetings strengthen moral reasoning and respectful discourse. However, elementary students also need the spirit of friendship, belonging, and community, as research shows. Therefore, Althof et al. (2003, 2008, and 2009) call the elementary variant of Just Community “just and caring communities.”

Detlef Garz and Boris Zizek’s chapter *Reconstructing Moral Development—Kohlberg Meets Oevermann* focuses on biographical research and holistic concept of moral biography as core elements of Kohlberg’s late approach of morality. They invoke Oevermann’s theory of “probation of oneself” in order to reconstruct the
INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITORS

transition between conventional and postconventional reasoning. They demonstrate the fruitfulness of Oevermann’s theory for instances when conventional and postconventional judgments come into conflict with each other, as in the case of civil disobedience. Garz and Zizek’s case study focuses on a young Jewish Israeli woman. They conclude by discussing the transition between the private, the political, and the universal (humanitarian) on the one hand, and the tension between loyalty and authenticity on the other hand.

In his chapter Kohlberg’s Stage 4½ Revisited—Or: From Halves to Wholes in the Theory of Moral Stages, Gerhard Minnameier discusses the so-called transitional or intermediate stages used to score “unscorable” answers in the Colby & Kohlberg coding manual of the Moral Judgment Interview. He asks why one should score unscorable data and how to account for those “unequilibrated states of mind.” Following Eckensberger, Minnameier considers the Stage 4½ as “a stage in its own right.” Following Kohlberg’s structural-developmental theory, he claims that it is “a main cornerstone in the overall developmental hierarchy.” Subsequently he works out how the structural developmental process works, what conflicts arise within a certain frame of reference, and how these conflicts are resolved at the higher stages.

Klaus Helkama’s Lawrence Kohlberg in Finnish Social Psychology and Moral Education begins with an (auto)biographical narrative on his last meeting with Lawrence Kohlberg before his suicidal death in 1987, and makes a retroactive journey to the times he collaborated intensively in workshops and editorial works as being a visiting researcher engaged in value, moral, emotional, and personality education between 1976–1987. Helkama engages the reader step by step into the Kohlberg - Finnland connection (Kohlberg’s cure, friendship with Erik H. Erikson and with Helkama himself, and with Soviet political control called “Finlandization” versus Kohlberg’s theory). He calls the latter an incarnation of bourgeois “false” consciousness. Helkama gives an overview of the impact of Kohlbergian ideas in Middle- and East-European countries including Soviet Union, Poland, and the former East Germany. Helkama’s own experiences with moral judgment sensu Kohlberg, focuses on value and moral judgment in the forefront of sociomoral problems in medical contexts in particular.

In Kohlberg’s Unnoticed Dilemma: The External Assessment of Internal Moral Competence?, Georg Lind and Ewa Nowak confront Kohlberg’s internal definition of morality as following one’s own moral principles. Originally, Kohlberg (1964) defined moral competence as “the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments” (p. 425). However, when he conceived his scoring system for the famous six moral stages, he included in his approach to measurement “a normative component… I assumed the need to define philosophically the entity we study, moral judgment, and to give a philosophic rationale for why a higher stage is a better stage” (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 400). As the authors show, the philosophers on which Kohlberg has built his approach, such as Spinoza, Kant, and Arendt, have argued against an external definition of morality. Therefore, no progress in moral psychology and education can be achieved, Lind and Nowak argue, unless the
external mode of measuring moral competence is fully aligned with the internal
definition of moral competence. They point at Lind’s (2008) method of
measurement, the Moral Competence Test, in which a participant’s moral
competence is scaled in reference to the participant’s own moral orientations.

Anna Malitowska and Mateusz Bonecki consider the pragmatist aspects of
Kohlberg’s developmental morality approach in their chapter Moral Judgment
competence is needed to solve problems and dilemmas in social situations. The
authors find situations in Dewey’s epistemological contexts in which decision
makers should transform difficult conflicts and dilemmas into the resolvable ones.
In such contexts, intuitions, habits, culture, and environmental conditions can
conflict with one another. Their resolution requires deliberated, discussed, and
justified reasons; that is, requires personal cognitive abilities such as moral
judgment competence and the tacit ethical knowledge. In the light of this insight,
the authors discuss Dewey’s and Kohlberg’s progressive approach to ethics.

In Moral Change is not a Birthday Journey: The Stop-and-change Model of
Moral Education, Fritz Oser underscores the revolutionary power of Kohlberg’s
education approach which he maintains is oriented toward human development as
its main goal. In the 21st century, Kohlberg’s approach is still the most progressive
one when contrasted with methods like knowledge transfer, ideological
indoctrination, and cultural transmission. It is also the most humanist one,
comparing it to the posthumanist theories focusing on brain research and artificial
intelligence. Oser argues that we need to see Kohlberg’s concepts of moral
development and education in an ethnographic perspective, to study how mothers,
fathers, teachers, and peers really educate, and how educational settings such as
Just Community schools really educate.

F. Clark Power begins his chapter Lawrence Kohlberg: The Vocation of a Moral
Educator by referring to Kohlberg’s book epilogue “Education for Justice. The
Vocation of Janusz Korczak” (Lawrence Kohlberg, 1984). Korczak’s book Little
Republics was pre-cursory to Kohlberg’s Just Community programs and his
vocation as a moral educator. Kohlberg’s developmental-psychological approach,
Power shows, is rooted in his personal experiences and engagement in educational
experiments. “There is no cookbook for moral education” Kohlberg used to say.
Power also revisits the metaphorical Stage 7 as a stage of love beyond justice, and
of an “ought” transformed in “is” and the lived moral behavior. This post-
deontological manner of being moral indicates at Korczak unitary life-and-work
project as well as at Richard Rorty’s postmodern ideas. Power portrays Lawrence
Kohlberg as a virtuous, charismatic, and missionary educator.

In their chapter The Understanding of Human Rights and Rule of Law from the
Perspective of Kohlberg’s Theory, Stefan Weyers and Nils Köbel apply selected
Kohlbergian methodologies in legal and human rights context. Human rights and
children’s rights are integral part of moral and democratic education today. The
authors unveil the necessary cognitive-developmental conditions of becoming
enabled to reason at the human rights level. They claim that for Kohlberg, the
conceptual understanding of human rights emerges at the postconventional level of
moral judgment since his scoring manual does not contain any references to human rights at moral stages 1 to 4. Such reasoning needs precursors if the theory is to be held to be valid. Thus, the concept of human rights cannot be defined as universally innate, inalienable, and egalitarian equipment in every human mind. However, the rational and developmental aspects of human rights have much to do with moral psychology. The authors discuss samples of human rights-oriented reasoning in Kohlberg’s hypothetical dilemmas.

For this volume, the editors invited contributions to consider Kohlberg’s legacy from different interdisciplinary perspectives. The book was conceived to add a theoretical analytic backdrop to current moral psychological inquiry, and to recognize that the world today is in dire need of a complex picture of moral psychology. In today’s world, people strive for participation, right, just, suprastatutory, and supranational rules and procedures. They seek constitutional patriotism, ratification, and observation of the human rights, and the recognition of marginalized minorities, animal rights; for global peace and justice for all. New procedures of moral discourse, argumentation, and justification are being developed and applied in moral education programs that lead to addressing these issues well and morally. These processes require structured moral cognition and competence.

Such cognitive and analytical processes do not refer to the moral evolution of our species, but to the interpersonal, social, and institutional learning and application in contexts. If and how persons construct just rules for their coexistence and cooperation, if and how good persons are able of apply them in the new individual or collective decision contexts, still presupposes the relation of moral judgment to moral action. Both judgment and action have a social character, though, which may admittedly be stimulated by some basic factors developed during human evolution and emerging sociality.

But evolution, and in particular moral evolution, seems not to be oriented towards clear goals and directions apart from, perhaps, enlightened self-interest. Evolution does not provide justice for people in terms of developing sociomoral self-awareness, critical thinking, and democratic procedural thinking. Evolution mostly explains primitive moral motives such as ingroup/outgroup affiliations and cooperation as embedded in utilitarian and pragmatic interests or in mutual responsibility for our close others whose importance is determined by instincts, intuitions or emotions. But what about distant and foreign others who we will never love, like and even know? Human beings are able to develop the term dignity, normative protection, and consensual social relationships with all living beings regardless of their natural, instinctive, emotional bonds, despite hostility and inability of loving every one. In a culture of growing individualism, human beings can maintain social systems and institutions that encourage protection, justice, and care all living beings from past, present and future. This is what evolution does not, and cannot do. But evolutionary and foundations theories can do other things. Combined together, constructive developmental and evolutionary theories can
complement each other to create a fuller picture of moral psychology, and still maintain an endpoint of Justice for All.

We now offer some words of appreciation for those who helped us in the development of this volume. Dawn Schrader and Georg Lind thoughtfully revised the Introduction and Hanna Piepenbring edited the final version of the manuscript. We thank them.

REFERENCES


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INTRODUCTION

Lawrence Kohlberg’s moral developmental psychological theories dominated most of the 20th century and continue to influence moral psychology today. Yet “times they are a-changin’”—to quote American singer-songwriter Bob Dylan circa the same era. The constructivist, social constructivist, developmental moral psychological paradigm is under threat of obsolescence. Brain research and evolutionary theories endeavor to secede constructivist paradigms (cf., Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2003). Whether explicitly or implicitly constructivist, most moral theoretical contributors of the last century such as Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1984), Selman (1971), Turiel (2008), Gibbs (2014), Nucci (2001), and Gilligan (1982), to name a few, hold the worldview that people actively cognitively construct meaning of their experiences. Even if each theory has its own form of such meaning-making, each focuses on an epistemic knowing agent interacting with their social and physical environment as they biologically mature.

The cacophony of voices in moral psychology research today underscores the imminent paradigmatic moral evolution. Reflecting back, the first major overture to a new order beyond the Kohlbergian-orchestrated paradigm was Gilligan’s introduction of the “different voice” women used in making moral decisions. Her work suggested a transformation of methods, hierarchical assumptions, and moral orientations resulting in enlarging moral psychology’s definition of the moral domain beyond justice reasoning and prescriptive morality. Currently, brain research and evolutionary theories appear to be supervening the constructivist moral meaning-making paradigm that had been dominating moral psychological theorizing. This is not the first regime change in psychology, and will not be the last. Paradigms shifted in the study of mental processes and behavior throughout the history of psychology and included various forays into and out of reflective introspection, self-consciousness of thoughts, sensations, and feelings; problem solving, decision making and mental representations; gestalts, structure and thought organization; neurology, biology and learning. Haidt described some of this in his reflective history of moral psychology (Haidt, 2013). The evolutionary (in both senses of the word) paradigm shift looms large. The survival of myriad insights and aspects of Kohlberg’s theories of development, action, and education, within and throughout this paradigm shift, will signify the validity and relevance of his view of the nature of moral psychology.
This paper describes a few of these transcendent aspects of Kohlberg’s paradigm that still stand the test of time. I address perceived obsolescent features of Kohlberg’s theories as well as what has been mischaracterized, mistaken, or superficially understood. I reveal that which has been stealth—or “under the radar” in Kohlberg’s work. By stealth I mean that which Kohlberg either identified but did not prioritize in his theoretical work, was perhaps himself less aware of regarding the implications or importance of what he articulated, or, the psychological paradigm and/or technologies that were non-existent at his historical moment. I conclude with suggestions for the future of moral psychological inquiry that derive from Kohlberg’s original work—from both his insights and oversights; from his myopia as well as his broad vision.

KOHLBERG’S MORAL WORLDVIEW

What of Kohlberg is still relevant? Kohlberg’s constructivist moral dynasty may be overthrown by the aforementioned evolutionary psychologists, neuropsychologists, cultural psychologists, post-modernists, post-structuralists and/or character enthusiasts. Is his justice reasoning, his constructivist legacy, antiquated or are there aspects of Kohlberg’s theories and insights that remain germane to current issues in moral psychology and education? What of Kohlberg’s moral theories and epistemology—his paradigm—is worth bringing into this new century; what of his moral “Weltanschauung” (world view) should be overthrown?

A comprehensive treatment of all aspects of Kohlberg’s theories—the psychological developmental theory, education theory, and action (moral self and responsibility) theory—is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this first step toward that more comprehensive analysis shall be to highlight some fundamental frames, assumptions, and claims that were innovative and constitutive of Kohlberg’s theories, research and education practices, and both implicitly and explicitly definitional of the field of morality. These include his 1) interdisciplinarity, 2) constructivist moral worldview and epistemology, 3) definition of morality and articulation of his moral psychological theories, and 4) dialogue, discussion, and reflection.

Interdisciplinarity as the Foundation of Kohlberg’s Moral Development Theory

Foundation of Kohlberg’s Moral Development Theory. Kohlberg’s vision of moral developmental psychology began with the exploration of the psychological understanding of the cognitive considerations when making decisions—his stages of moral reasoning, with the ultimate goal of facilitating more moral thought and action in the world. His work was decidedly interdisciplinary, grounded in the philosophy of Emmanuel Kant, James Mark Baldwin, and John Rawls, in the pragmatism of John Dewey, the sociology of Emile Durkheim, the psychology of William James, the political theory of John Rawls, and the communication theory of Jürgen Habermas. Others also contributed significantly to his thinking, creating depth and complexity in his interdisciplinary roots.
Kohlberg was among the first interdisciplinary psychologists. It is tempting to say he was interdisciplinary before it was fashionable to be interdisciplinary. But that is an untruth. It was well within the academic paradigm of early psychology to be so, like his predecessors William James and Jean Piaget. Such integration across knowledge fields is only now coming again into favor at the turn of this 21st century. After about a half-century of psychology’s laser-focus, today’s universities and granting agencies recommend, if not require, interdisciplinary collaboration. Incidentally, this also reflects general epistemological development, reflecting an epistemic position of cross-paradigmatic systems (Commons, Richards, & Kuhn, 1982). As such, complex development of knowledge itself is occurring within the field as well as in individual cognitive developmental psychology.

In revisiting Kohlberg’s moral development theory, we see that despite his wide-reaching interdisciplinarity, he constrained his incursion into moral psychology by co-opting cognitive moral developmental “Weltanschauung” at the time. Relying heavily on Kant and Piaget at first, Kohlberg adopted the definitions, assumptions and/or approaches used by them. The assumptions of rationality, prescriptivity, structuralism, phenomenalism, and constructivism thus constrained his moral inquiry (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). He adopted the Piagetian individual rational reflective epistemic knower, following Kant, and embraced autonomy, rationality, and agency as core to developing moral maturity. He espoused the language of “operations” from Piaget, and articulated a developmental psychology of justice operations development toward a Platonic endpoint of justice and fairness (Kohlberg, 1981). Not unlike Piaget’s cognitive developmental movement toward formal operations—with compete and reversible operational systematic thinking—Kohlberg’s moral operations are comprised of reversible, universalizable judgments. Critics such as Gilligan (1982) and Straughan (1986) pointed out that this rationality was dissociated from “self” and was so formalistic that one could be “Stage 6 and remain a bastard”—as the title of Straughan’s article proclaims.

Imagine what would have occurred in the study of morality if Kohlberg decided to attend to Piaget’s originally (1932) perceived gender differences, or his biological, genetic epistemological roots that seem to share something with an evolutionary-based psychology of the present time. Gilligan and Haidt would have fewer grounds for revolution, and moral psychology’s paradigm may have been more metasystematic—to use Michael Commons’ term—and less in need of a cross-paradigmatic shift. Rather, throughout his career Kohlberg kept his interdisciplinarity, even as he was unwittingly too narrowly Piagetian constructivist. Gibbs (1977) once stated that Kohlberg was “more Piagetian than Piaget” and “In moral judgment, Kohlberg had the courage of Piaget’s bolder convictions,” Gibbs, 2014, p. 83). John Gibbs adds, “I just wish Larry had retained the best of Piaget in his theoretical formulations; in that sense, he was less Piagetian than Piaget” (Gibbs, 2014, personal communication). Being both constructivist and structuralist, Kohlberg focused on “relations among ideas” and the “pattern of connections,” as he attempted to “delineate” “the organization of
moral thought” (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 2). Even so, many underlying assumptions were borrowed from Piaget’s genetic epistemology and had biological parallels in mental development (e.g., the equilibration process).

It was his interdisciplinarity that ultimately led Kohlberg to his theory of moral education. Even though his education work first began in response to a dare from a Cambridge, Massachusetts (USA) school principal to see if his theory worked in practice (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989), the educational practice opportunities helped to develop moral psychology. They presented the perfect venue for integrating Kohlberg’s sociology, psychology, and philosophical orientation into one comprehensive paradigm. Further, the education component additionally augmented the narrow Piagetian focus of his psychological theory.

The challenge of doing moral education according to his Just Community Approach revealed his need to bring social perspective taking and coordination (Selman, 1971), dialogical discourse (Habermas, 1980), and social processes such as culture and climate into his moral stage psychological theorizing. Ultimately, the marriage between developmental theory and educational practice resulted in the articulation of the “structure versus content” distinction (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) and the development of Moral Types (Tappan, Schrader, Kohlberg, Higgins, Armon, & Lei, 1987).

Researchers continue to use Kohlberg as a starting or deflecting point for their work, or as scaffolding for their own theories. Take, for example, the vast body of work by such educators and theoreticians as John Gibbs’ with at risk, incarcerated and delinquent populations and his EQUIP program (Potter, Gibbs, Robbins, & Langdon, in press; Gibbs, 2014; DiBiase, Gibbs, Potter, & Blount, 2012) and Socio-moral Reflection Measure (SRM), or Georg Lind’s Development of Moral and Democratic Competence, the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) based on Kohlberg’s MJI, and the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD). All these theories and practices use rational reflection and thoughtful judgment on what is just, fair, responsible, universalizable, reciprocal, and otherwise “considered” moral reasoning; a rational reflection on how one thinks about what is moral and right; a beautiful synthesis of philosophy, psychology, and sociology. Even so, we should not overlook the psychology of emotion undercurrent beneath this dominantly rational psychology. Indeed, simply being within such a domain as justice requires attention to emotionality; as people have a natural investment and moral sense of injustice, disrespect for persons, exploitation and harm. This stealth undercurrent appears both in the education theories and practices mentioned above, as well as in his theory of how moral meaning making development takes place. But again, this does not deviate much from the relatively obscure Piagetian treatise Intelligence and Affectivity.

The power of a theory’s influence can be measured by how it continues to be cited and utilized as an explanation in many research enterprises. The continued legacy of Kohlberg is evidenced in the chapters in this volume, as well as in his impact factor and citations. These demonstrate that Kohlberg’s interdisciplinarity
EVOLUTIONARY PARADIGM SHIFTING IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

continues and is an essential cornerstone and inspiration for current work. In essence, it is a foundation for building a complex and comprehensive future of the moral domain that utilizes insights across disciplines and fosters understanding of human morality.

Constructivist Moral Worldview and Epistemology

Kohlberg’s interdisciplinarity was part and parcel of his worldview. His own construction of the world was predicated on the belief that people are inherently and naturally motivated to “make meaning” or “sense” of their world; meaning does not exist outside one’s interpretation of it. He believed in self-agency, and respected moral thinking and meaning-making as being one with that agency. He adopted Piaget’s basic epistemic assumptions, and with that, adopted Piaget’s family of moral and cognitive assumptions. As such, Kohlberg’s moral psychology was comprised of, and made with, this worldview, however powerful or imperfect.

It is instructive to examine Kohlberg’s epistemological standpoint to contextualize the reason behind this framework he used to develop his moral psychological theories of development, education, and action (Charmaz, 2014; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2008). He, like all theorists, was influenced by the historical moment at the time of inception—both in the political world as well as the politics of psychology. Of particular bearing were his father’s McCarthyistic politics, his personal and educational experiences, and his particular adoption of Jean Piaget’s The Moral Judgment of the Child—that itself was interdisciplinary and migrated morality from the domain of philosophers to that of psychologists. These influences, particularly Piaget’s philosophical social psychology, provided the paradigm, assumptions, methodology, and definitions of morality that begat the development of his theories. For better or worse, the field of morality was shaped by Kohlberg’s contributions, with subsequent theories and research building on his definitions and methods, interdisciplinary roots, and social-cognitive moral stance, or by tearing them down, obviating omissions, or renovation—keeping some of the old Kohlbergian insights while adding something new.

This is precisely what Kohlberg did throughout his own career, and would have continued to do. In fact, his published revisions, one of which is “The Current Formulation of the Theory,” (Kohlberg, 1984) demonstrate that he looked upon his own understanding of morality as evolving when new questions, information, research and results appeared. Kohlberg viewed himself as an epistemic subject—constantly taking in and seeking new information to assimilate and accommodate his thinking about moral theory. Critics as well as contemporaries have failed to fully recognize the changes he made in his theories (by citing only old versions), or derided that fact that his theory changed as “proof” that his theory was not “right” in the first place. (The latter critique itself reflects a positivist scientific view of Truth, which Kohlberg rejected).

To further contextualize Kohlberg’s epistemology: he developed his interest in morality in his late teens and early twenties, as he has told audiences in many interviews throughout his life. After finishing high school at the elite Phillips
Academy as the only person of Jewish descent in his dormitory, he gained real-world experience as a merchant marine during World War II and smuggled Jews from Europe into Palestine on banana boats to escape persecution and death. He himself was captured, placed in a concentration camp, and escaped. He later soared through his University of Chicago bachelor’s degree studies in one year and began his subsequent training as a clinical psychologist shortly thereafter. Kohlberg became “enamored” (his word) with Piaget’s *Moral Judgment of the Child* and other work in his theoretical studies while being simultaneously disillusioned in his professional experiential work. The final straw that returned him to theoretical and empirical inquiry in morality was brought about by his disillusionment in clinical psychology and the unjust treatment of patients on the psychiatric ward on which he was working. A paranoid patient was subjected to electric shock treatments by the clinic director for complaining that the director was against her (Kohlberg, 1984 Harvard Lecture). He deliberated on the injustice of that, along with other injustices he witnessed by organizations and society, and pivoted his attention to social instead of clinical psychology.

Kohlberg’s interest in injustice was entrenched not only in his intellectual life, but in his lived experience as well. In his own formative years he learned the importance, and reality of the interconnections between disciplines from his mentors and the foundational scholars from whom his theories evolved. Like those interdisciplinary scholars, his own ideas about morality, thought and action combined sociology psychology, social influence and philosophy. Grounding his work on that of Piaget (1932/1965), Durkheim (1925/1973), and Dewey (1913) as well as Kant (1785), Baldwin (1895), other early philosophically inclined psychologists and psychologically inclined philosophers, morality emerged newly in the psychological realm after historically residing primarily within the sphere of philosophy and religion. His dissertation was both visionary and traditional: an insightful, creative interdisciplinary examination of socially isolated and integrated boys in school settings who make sense of philosophically-grounded moral problems. He located this work traditionally in a frame reflecting the epistemology of the time in social psychology when including so many variables such as emotions, caring, responsibility judgments, and both girls as well as boys was thought to be “confusing” or not “rigorously controlled.” He did the best, most important work on moral psychology at the time, creating a new psychological field, a method of investigation, and theoretical and empirical data analysis techniques that served as a springboard for other work in this a constructivist paradigm.

Kohlberg’s ideas were also, and continue to be, condemned for omitting or backgrounding care, response, women and context, and for foregrounding justice. The fault was not entirely his; he was the victim of his current epistemic historical moment. His dissertation committee suggested he choose one gender and not two to “control for variance” (Kohlberg, personal communication, 1984). Later, his stellar work into the structure/content distinction to get to the cognitive “operations” in moral psychology led him to “hold constant” and juxtapose the content of the moral issues in a dilemma such as life versus law to “control for” the
content under which reasoning takes place to compare such reasoning across persons (Kohlberg, personal communications, 1982–1987). For these “mistakes” of succumbing to then-current science, Kohlberg paid dearly. Today’s social science of moral understanding acknowledges cognitive complexity and complex systematic thinking, and thus can be “messy” (Schrader, 1999). The Social Intuitionist Model looks at myriad interactions of reason and emotion, with interactive elements not easily considered mutually exclusive nor sequential (Haidt, 2001).

Even with these epistemic challenges to Kohlberg’s vision of moral development, Kohlberg joined the Piagetian-initiated seismic shift in thinking about morality to create a moral psychology. That is, Piaget began the transformation of morality from philosophy to psychology, created the mechanisms of the constructive developmental approach to understanding cognitive processes in the moral domain, and the mechanisms by which developmental transformation takes place. I contend that the self-same Piagetian transformative equilibratory processes of assimilation and accommodation of operations within and between systems of thought as one matures and interacts with the social and physical/contextual world has expressed its parallel within both Kohlberg’s moral psychological theories, and in this current evolutionary paradigm shift in the field.

Kohlberg’s emergent psychological moral theory of the “ontogenesis of justice reasoning” was reflective of Piaget’s genetic epistemological perspective. This influenced Kohlberg’s psychological theory as an underlying epistemology as much as Dewey’s epistemology influenced Kohlberg’s educational theory. Although additional theorists—notably Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls—later significantly influenced his ideas, as should occur with any evolution of thought, it is their fundamental tenets that he held so (too?) dearly.

Despite, or because of, his openness to flexibility and re-thinking, his work was criticized for its epistemology in contrast to that in the broader psychological field. At times, adherence to his theories’ originating epistemic claims may have gotten in the way of addressing some of the challenges to his concepts. So, the question today for moral psychology and epistemology is whether to throw out the Kohlbergian baby with today’s evolutionary bathwater. Kohlberg himself admonished “behaviorists and psychoanalytic theorists who believe that there is no logical and empirical validity to moral utterances, which are simply emotive expressions, that they are throwing out the scientific baby with the emotional bathwater” (Carter, 1986, p. 9). This was his evolutionary challenge to moral psychology’s paradigm, and now it is his turn to be considered as the object of being thrown out. Kohlberg may have welcomed such an attempted tossing though, as he ultimately believed, aligning with Habermas, that his work was an interpretive enterprise (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984a, p. 219) and was under constant revision. His metaethical and normative assumptions are important contributors to the understanding of moral development, moral decision-making, and moral action today along with his embrace of justice reasoning as the definition of the moral domain.
Kohlberg’s Moral Domain and Corresponding Theories of Morality

Defining the moral domain. Grounding his work in a Piagetian social cognitive developmental tradition, Kohlberg defined the moral domain similarly to Piaget: Justice. But beyond that, due to his interdisciplinarity, he likewise drew from philosophy and sociology to complete the terms of morality’s definition. Some say that like Piaget’s before him, his theory is obsolete, but Kohlberg’s moral paradigm is worth revisiting even if only to ascertain which elements have reached their expiration date, and more importantly, which contributions stand the test of time and persist to inform moral understanding within and between people. This is particularly important to visit with a critical eye at this juncture in moral psychology’s own development.

To define morality as overarching justice, instead of only a virtue of justice, he drew from such philosophers as Kant on the moral autonomy of the person; from Rawls on when such autonomous persons relate in terms of social contracts; from Aristotle who defined justice as a virtue among other virtues, and from James Mark Baldwin (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984a) on cognitive and social-cognitive development. Indeed (relevant for the current moral paradigm turn) he implicitly held the “Baldwin Effect”—which Kohlberg only implicitly, if at all, acknowledged. Kohlberg staked his claims to embrace a definition of morality as justice rather comparable to Aristotle’s meaning of justice, without actually espousing Aristotle. He claimed justice has primacy over care or other moral considerations saying, “In a sense justice is the primary and general moral virtue for Aristotle … governs relations between a person and other persons in society…is the only other regarding virtue …” (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984a, p. 226). Kohlberg succumbed to neither relativism nor utilitarianism in his definition of moral, nor rejected care as an opposite or parallel process in the moral domain; he valued these as contributions to justice, and sought to include them in his conception of the moral domain as he defined it.

He identified two “senses” of the word moral. The first sense was related to the philosophical and formalistic form; the “moral point of view” (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984a, p. 229) that focuses on such characteristics as impartiality, universality, and reaching moral consensus. Kohlberg wrote, “It is this notion of a ‘moral point of view’ which is most clearly embodied psychologically in the Kohlberg stage model of justice reasoning” (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984a, p. 229). The second sense of moral was that of care, responsibility, special obligations, particularity, and interpersonal understanding and communication. Kohlberg focused primarily on justice operations and fairness yet wrote, “the scope of the domain we assess is considerably broader than is conveyed by the term justice reasoning” (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 11).

Kohlberg characterized Carol Gilligan’s contributions (cf. Gilligan, 1982) as contributing to enlarging the moral domain, and noted that her work “added depth to the description of moral judgment focused on responsibility and caring, but we do not believe that it defines an alternative morality …” (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984b, p. 370). What Kohlberg essentially ruled out was the
epistemological dualism pervasive at that time in moral psychological history that juxtaposed justice or care; being an “other” morality rather than two sides of the same moral coin. He stated, “We believe moral stage development is the development of one morality, not of two, because moral situations and choices always involve both issues of justice and care” (p. 370).

Kohlberg’s stake in this claim indemnified his own moral education theory, and was embodied by his Just Community Approach to moral education (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989) and others’ approaches to educational dilemma discussion (e.g. Berkowitz, Oser, & Althof, 1987; Lind, 2011). Kohlberg’s moral education theory was implicitly held by Kohlberg to itself demonstrate empirically the recapitulation of moral meaning-making, reflecting the ontogenetic sequence of moral development he empirically described in his stages. I state this was “implicitly held” because Kohlberg really thought of his moral education work as an application of his theory in one sense, and an extension of it in another. The “extension” was not hierarchical in a stage sense, but was of breadth—to bring in the sociological contextual contributions that participation in an egalitarian moral climate could contribute to freeing the moral mind to construct increasingly complex and better moral understanding (make moral meaning) without authoritarian and unilateral constraint, thus moving toward his ideal endpoint of reciprocal justice operations (this is also reflected in the Moral Types A and B). His moral education goal really, while seemingly altruistic in its goals for education for democracy and social justice, was implicitly self-serving of his moral development and moral action theory.

Theory of Moral Stages, Moral Types, and Development.

Some might argue that Kohlberg and the social-cognitive developmental view of moral development and education is either outdated, insufficient, or both. It has been criticized for not including women in the sample from which he originated his theory, for being constructivist and structuralist, for being cognitive rationalist, and so on, as we have previously established here and as Kohlberg himself addressed elsewhere (see Kohlberg, 1984; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).

However, ongoing criticisms are derivative from grounds that are not Kohlberg’s fault primarily. There is a continued over-reliance on early, pre-1987 descriptions of his 6 stages, seen in countless publications and textbooks, even by those within his tradition. There is continual commentary on either evidence or movement into Stage 6 morality in high school or college—even though Kohlberg himself found little or no empirical evidence of such a stage in the general population. These two points alone illustrate the pervasive misunderstanding of his stages, but there are more, which can be addressed later. In essence, scholars and practitioners alike declare the content characteristics of his stages as archaic philosophical psychology or “science fiction morality,” and not reflective of “real life” psychology. But it is their own conception of these stages that is essentially incorrect, outdated, or untrue to Kohlberg’s latest formulation of his theory. Thus,
in revisiting Kohlberg, we must take care to revisit the actual Kohlberg instead of his misapprehended ghost.

What Kohlberg was at fault for is not his corpus of research that articulated a most comprehensive longitudinal examination of the study of lives to date in the field of morality that resulted in his empirically grounded moral stage psychological theory. This is indisputable as strong empirical, qualitative constructivist research. What is at fault is his 1) continuing to hold too strongly to the necessity of a Stage 6 convergence of agreement on moral action (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984a, p. 272), 2) not focusing strongly enough on an integration of content and structure (rather, he chose separation of the two), and 3) his attention to the rational operations of justice reasoning rather than a broader examination of the socio-cognitive and psychological processes that reflected a moral point of view. This he held despite his grasp of the complexity of emotions, contextual contingencies and inherent biological influences that he both outlined in 1969, and included within his adopted philosophical theoretical framing.

Kohlberg kept his Piagetian and Stage 6 assumptions so that he could maintain that his theory would move toward something; and would be the ontogenesis of rationality and justice reasoning in the moral domain that he sought. This is, after all, the foundational aspect of his work, and his raison d’être. However, Kohlberg’s psychological theory still would stand as valid without his morally convergent, ideal Stage 6 he described if Stage 6 were defined in terms of moral process or procedure, following Habermas (Habermas, 1980). Incidentally, a parallel conclusion was arrived at by Piaget toward the end of his life in the cognitive domain (Belin & Pufall, 1992). This sense of Stage 6 as moral process instead of being a hard structural stage, I believe, is where his thinking was tending to move at the end of his life. His theory could have accepted this since the empirical evidence, though scarce, was suggesting this. However, to embrace this conception of his theory, he would have had to modify aspects of his strongly held basic epistemic assumptions underlying his theory as formulated in 1984 and affirmed in 1987 (Kohlberg, 1984; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).

Kohlberg was never one to not “eat his own words.” He indeed mollified his stance stating “The metaethical ideal of moral agreement implied by our rationalist assumption has still uncertain meaning in terms of finding empirical agreement in highly developed and experienced moral judgers in various cultures” (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984, p. 273). This opened the door to dialogical processes of finding moral agreement, rather than finding it through rationalistic logical analysis with one sole hard-and-fast conclusion. This was a threat, and one that Kohlberg very reluctantly would have had to face had he lived into this current dialogical paradigmatic age. Kohlberg’s staunch rejection of relativism, which his related to his seemingly endless insistence on articulating an endpoint to moral development, was his Achilles heel. He protected it carefully, though, in a way that reveal his own personal nature—by asserting his preferences: “At this point, our stage findings do not allow us to claim evidence for certain normative ethical conclusions which nevertheless remain my own philosophic preference for defining
an ontogenetic end point of a rationally reconstructed theory of justice reasoning”
(Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984, p. 273—emphasis added).
In regard to the structure-content distinction, this enterprise captured his
attention ever since the question of apparent regression and “sophomoritis” (Boyd,
1980) arose. If indeed stage regression existed and was not due to measurement
error, it called into question the developmental assumptions of the theory, and
threatened the rational reconstruction project. Again Kohlberg preferred (or
rationalized) this apparent regression away, stating it was the social context of
college and its introduction to moral pluralism that gave the apparent regression,
and that post-college, those who apparently regressed resumed development where
they had left off. This challenged Kohlberg, and his theories so fundamentally, that
directions of Kohlberg’s research in the 1980s advanced exponentially to examine
various psychological contributions to morality that proved to introduce depth into
his rational empirical theory. The influence of social context and the influence of
understanding of moral content-processing, known within his theory as “elements”
that supported moral norms and moral issue choice were two such directions of
depth and growth of his theory. This depth was never fully realized, but what was
projected then is still driving inquiry into moral psychology today.
The co-incidental investigating of content and structure connections (evidenced
by inquiry into Substages and Moral Types), cultural influences (evidenced via the
Just Community Approach, cross cultural studies, professional education) and
moral action and responsibility (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg & Candee,
1984) led the charge into moral education, with little attention to stage
development and focus on identity and responsibility, or on reflection and action—
which were left to his then graduate students (Cheryl Armon, Mark Tappan, Dawn
Schrader, Ting Lei, Mary Lou Arnold, and Rhett Deissner). Within each of these
projects lay the stealth role of moral emotional characteristics of care, guilt,
remorse, shame, and the like. Kohlberg had forecasted the importance of these
things in the 1960s (Kohlberg, 1969), but never got around to revisiting his own
ideas. He became too captivated in moral education and structure/content
discrimination, and too encumbered by his own illness to make the progress he
envisioned.
Work on emotions and other qualities of self and self-reflection were never fully
integrated within the Kohlberg theories of development and action as directly as
they could have been. In fact, current research in moral psychology conducted by
“The New Science of Morality” group (http://edge.org/events/the-new-science-of-
morality) including Jonathan Haidt (2001), Joshua Greene (2003), David Pizarro
(2000), and Paul Bloom (2004) focuses on “a new synthesis of evolutionary and
biological thinking” that includes intuition and emotion, but does not tie it into
Kohlberg’s rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning—that is,
Kohlberg’s moral psychological theory or his education/action theory. Instead, this
group falls into the same epistemic dualism as did Gilligan’s group before them:
the idea that there are two moral trajectories or two moral psychologies. To now
compare these two tracks in moral psychology research would be like comparing

17
apples and oranges. But eventually the future will see this all as morally fruitful, and develop a newer “new synthesis” that is comprehensive and discursive.

Kohlberg’s publication of the coding manuals that articulate the progression of his and his colleagues’ theoretical and empirical work on moral stage, moral type, structure, content, action, culture, measurement, and moral education (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) could have transformed the field of moral psychology more dramatically than they did. Sadly, they were published the year of his death, and a type of death of Kohlberg’s theory occurred concomitant with his own. Or perhaps it is simply in a deep sleep, and Kohlberg’s moral theory is awaiting re-awakening. The resurgence of a need for reasoned ethics and morality in professional contexts and in society, exemplified by ethical breaches and immoral actions spanning from Wall Street to Walmart, from Enron to Sandy Hook, is sounding an alarm calling for understanding moral reasoning, education, and action. Evolutionary psychology, and care, and moral emotions are not enough to provide us with an understanding of how to prevent moral problems and immoral actions from arising. They might explain why these problems arise, such as greed, or anger, or hate, or contempt—favorite emotions studied by the “new synthesis” group—but do not give us the goal of how moving beyond the moral temptations and social psychological challenges that threaten moral action. Perhaps these examples of moral failure are the sirens that beckon us to revisit Kohlberg to see what is right and alive about his theories, and what is dead.

Dialogue, Discussion, and Reflection

Kohlberg relied heavily on dialogue and discussion as means for both originally obtaining people’s constructed meaning making about morality to formulate his stage theory and also for creating and explaining moral stage change via his education theory. His interview methodology was dialogical and interpretive as he sought to understand moral reasoning of participants, following Piaget, and precursory to current dialogical and narrative methodology (Charmaz, 2014). Through the Moral Judgment Interview, Kohlberg came to understand the working of the moral mind as people struggled to ascertain their moral reflections about hypothetical dilemmas. These dilemmas were designed to unshackle people from natural social-psychological presses in order for them to construct the best form of reasoning available to them. This is the reason Kohlberg sought prescriptive judgments (should do) rather than the descriptive (would do). Kohlberg’s education agenda then picked up on that descriptive element in various contexts (prisons, schools, workplaces) as participants discussed their lived moral dilemmas and experiences and reflected on them in an interpersonal and often a community setting, and compared them to more prescriptive justice judgments. He claimed that democracy was essential as the form and the aim of moral education, and relied heavily on creating the atmospheres in which moral reasoning could be discussed and developed. This is worth revisiting.

First, like Dewey, Kohlberg based his moral education ideas on democracy. Kohlberg euphemistically referred to his moral education theory as “Dewey
warmed over,” and espoused that development is the aim of education, and moral education is democratic in form and structure. Thus, development refers to two main things: 1) fostering cognitive moral reasoning—that is, the processes of education in the moral domain, and 2) in moral climates that foster such participation. Reliance on the socio-moral atmosphere and collective norms of a group or community was grounded in not only Dewey, but also William James, James Mark Baldwin, and Emile Durkheim. It is a collective sociological enterprise to create a better society than what the young Kohlberg experienced as a merchant marine in World War II and a burgeoning clinical psychologist. While some of these theorists were stealth in his interdisciplinary theoretical approach to moral development, he added them overtly when constructing his moral education theory. I contend that this democratic grounding is unnecessary for moral developmental education; that the moral procedures alone are sufficient. But for Kohlberg’s moral agenda, it was necessary. First, democracy served as an endpoint for him, just as Stage 6’s moral point of view is justice and is necessary for a moral developmental theory. Democratic participation in a just society is seen by Kohlberg as embodying the “moral point of view” and is central to Kohlberg’s developmental theory. Stage development was necessary if not sufficient for attaining these democratic ideal reasons, and with stage development comes the parallel necessary but not sufficient connection between moral stage and moral action (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Blasi, 1980), and likely, moral type.

What was left out of the stage theory was moral self, responsibility, and moral action that was not the result of high stage, but rather was the result of either moral “intuiting” or moral learning (—learning being using the justice or cognitive processes, but not cognitively restructuring moral thought systems). Kohlberg relied on the development of the concept of Moral Type (Tappan, Schrader, Kohlberg, Higgins, Armon, & Lei, 1987) to connect moral content, moral procedures, and “intuitions” of the moral point of view that are contained in moral elements such as moral choice, hierarchy, intrinsicality, prescriptivity, universality, freedom, mutual respect, reversibility, and constructivism. As such, I stipulate that democracy serves a purpose in moral education only as a vehicle for Kohlberg’s preferred moral agenda for his stage theory, as well as his personal interests arising from his lived experience. I contend that Kohlberg’s insights into the elemental processes of moral decision making (that is, “intuitions” of moral processes as evidenced in Moral Type B), in a context that is social and moral, where the actual process of dialogue and conversation takes place, drives the stimulation of reconstructing moral thought—which is moral education. The democracy goal need only take a back seat. Moral Type is the driver of such educative climates (see Schrader, 2004).

This is not to say that the socio-moral atmosphere is insignificant. To the contrary. Creating moral contexts that are respectful and non-threatening promotes learning and development (Schrader, 1984; 2004). The sociological aim of education is to create opportunities for Kohlberg’s rational moral agent to construct moral meaning and the moral point of view. But such a context is beyond the Piagetian or sociological grounding of his education theory. In revisiting Kohlberg
in this way, we need to actually turn to socio-cultural psychology to examine the mechanisms of the sociocultural appropriation that Kohlberg intuited would come from social engagement with moral issues. But we need to explain it from a broader and deeper constructivist viewpoint that goes beyond the moral epistemic agent rationally reconstructing morality as justice operations; we need to look at culture. Now, Turiel (cf. 1978), Nucci (2001) and their colleagues have turned their eye toward culture and toward discerning the moral from the non-moral, normative learning embedded in culture and thus education. But that is not what I mean to discuss here. I would recruit Rogoff’s (2003) particular brand of sociocultural appropriation, based on Vygotsky’s theory, as being closer to what Kohlberg is espousing than Kohlberg realized. Interestingly, this is where the inherent roots of James Mark Baldwin become resurrected. This is the stealth theory underlying Kohlberg’s socio-moral atmosphere requirement, and is the next step for articulating new moral education programs.

A second aspect other than democracy has dominated Kohlberg’s moral education program the Just Community Approach, and thus his general moral education theory. Kohlberg’s moral education theory began with Blatt in 1969 (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975), thereafter shifted to Marvin Berkowitz (Berkowitz, Oser, & Althof, 1987), and most recently Georg Lind (2011) contributed the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion. Discussion has been central to Kohlbergian moral education practice, and has been only loosely tied to actual stage development. Thus it is either not a very powerful intervention, or, the measurement of educational growth is somehow wrong.

Schlafli, Rest, & Thoma’s (1985) meta-analysis demonstrated significant stage changes of a third to a half stage as successful moral stage development, using the MJI and DIT measures. But in terms of actual reasoning, what does that mean qualitatively? Such measures of moral maturity use interval rather than ordinal measures, and thus undermine Kohlberg’s original assumptions and methods, and again demonstrate my earlier point of how his epistemology succumbed to the dominant paradigms of the mid to late 20th century. Today’s narrative and qualitative methods and related methodological paradigms would have made room for Kohlberg’s original insights and may have led us to a different kind of measurement and measure of success of his education programs had they been available at the time.

But because his measurement of moral maturity in the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI)—as were the later-developed Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest) and Moral Judgment Test (MJT) (Lind)—was nominal, ordinal and interval, with an emphasis in research reports on the interval scores, the dilemma discussions were the independent variable for the dependent moral maturity scores. The interventions were designed to create “cognitive conflict” by posing dilemmas, and rationalizing two sides of issues. Further, interventions tended to utilize the “plus one” concept discovered by Blatt, where a one-stage-higher reason was thought to somehow cognitively compel higher reasoning. This change was explained by Kohlberg as either moral modeling by a peer or teacher-“exemplar,” or due to cognitive conflict.
In revisiting these explanations, observe that Kohlberg diverged significantly from his own moral psychological assumptions about stage and the ontogenetic meaning making rational reconstruction of morality. That is, rather than relying widely and deeply on his Piagetian theoretical assumptions to explain stage change in moral education, he actually shifted slightly to social learning theory (modeling via exemplars) and relied on only a few parts of Piaget’s theory: cognitive conflict and peer interaction opportunities, rather than the entirety of Piagetian psychology. He could have included elements of intelligence and affectivity, or the grasp of consciousness, or reflective abstraction. But never mentioned these things in his moral education theory. He could have explicitly coupled Piagetian processes of cognitive development as closely to his moral education theory as he did Piaget’s structural and constructivist assumptions to his moral psychology theory. But he did not. While Kohlberg had important and legitimate explanations for his moral education program and theory for why moral education did or did not take place, Kohlberg missed an important opportunity.

The opportunity he did not take was to have coupled his moral stage theoretical developments of his Stage 6 ruminations and this dialogical moral education theory. Specifically, dialogue and discourse was seen to contribute both a process and an endpoint for the moral point of view, as mentioned earlier, following Habermas (1980). In Kohlberg’s moral education program, discourse and social interaction stimulates opportunity for reflection—either through conscious reflection or unconscious reflection. William James and John Dewey similarly articulated this. My own work on moral metacognition examines real and hypothetical reasoning and the role of reflection in constructing moral thought. Building upon Kohlberg, Gilligan, Habermas and others, I have proposed the Action-Judgment-Awareness Model as central for the development of moral reasoning (Schrader, 1988; 1990b). Such a model was intuited by Kohlberg and partially explicated in his moral action theory, but not articulated as a process of metacognition and reflectivity, which comprise the constructivist, meaning-making paradigm (Kegan, 1982). So instead of democracy as the aim of education, I pose reflective awareness as the aim of education (Schrader, 2009), but with reflection on the “moral point of view.”

Kohlberg early on claimed that moral education is about the development of moral awareness first and foremost, since all else follows after that. He stated, “Increasing awareness is not only ‘cognitive,’ it is moral, aesthetic, and metaphysical; it is the awareness of new meanings in life” (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972, p. 93). His own awareness of moral awareness development, however, has been eclipsed by decades-long focus on moral discourse, dilemma discussion, and moral contexts; not on the developing awareness itself.

James Rest’s theory of moral decision making lists moral awareness as the first of his Four Component Model (Rest, 1984), highlighting the primacy of awareness for moral decision-making. And, of course, awareness predicates morally reasoning about issues in a moral problem. Medical, dental, legal and all forms of professional education require reflection, and theories of guided reflection, self-regulatory learning, and sociocultural constructivism all emphasize reflection as
paramount to understanding self in situations and to inform future actions. Kohlberg’s reliance on dialog and discussion infers that reflection upon such discourse, or metacognition occurs to effect moral stage and moral type change, as well as to rouse moral action via judgments of moral self and responsibility. Increasingly sophisticated forms of metacognitive awareness seem to be related to levels of moral reasoning (Schrader, 1988). Elaborating the concept of reflection as the aim of education was a relatively unattended to aspect of Kohlberg’s theory, but has tremendous implications for current work in Social-Emotional Learning today (CASEL).

Reflection as the aim of development education. Mindful reflectivity is as central to moral psychological reasoning and judgment as it is to education. I believe this to be Kohlberg’s central failure: to articulate the role reflection plays in moral psychology, action, education, and how developmental change occurs. Reflection is cognitive, affective, neuro-biological, reflexive, and conscious simultaneously. William James wrote that we either instinctively or consciously select what to attend to, and Kohlberg, as well as all of us, are guilty of that. We are all surrounded by a penumbra of our experience. Kohlberg was in Piaget’s penumbra, just as we are in his. William James wrote,

The significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it, — or rather that is fused into one with it and has become bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; leaving it, it is true, an image of the same thing it was before, but making it an image of that thing newly taken and freshly understood. Let us call the consciousness of this halo of relations around the image by the name of ‘psychic overtone’ or ‘fringe’ (James, 1892).

We are in the penumbra of Kohlberg’s theories, in the fringe. Moral psychology is what it is because of Kohlberg’s contributions—as either a reaction against, deflection from, a development of, or new direction, from his work. Revisiting Kohlberg’s allows us to see his theories “freshly understood” for the relevance they continue to have today.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS

Since Kohlberg’s time the moral psychology field and dominant paradigms have been shifting slowly, seeming to sidle away from Kohlberg’s moral development theory most especially, but his moral education and action theories as well. My intention here was not to defend Kohlberg or his theory, however tempting that would have been. Instead, this revisitation with Kohlberg’s ideas shed light on both his contributions and his shortcomings. His theories continue to teach us about morality and moral psychology long after his death. If we attend carefully to the richness and complexity of his work we will come to see that Kohlberg, along with Jean Piaget, John Dewey, and William James before him, intuited and mapped the future exploration of moral psychology that he could never have addressed alone.
Because people are influenced by their personal experience, I end on a note about Kohlberg, the man, known as Larry to almost everyone who may have even slightly corresponded with or met him. Jacob Gewirtz, Larry’s Chicago advisor noted that he was:

A philosopher, developmental psychologist, free spirit, scientist, person, and friend … the exceptional person whom one rarely meets in a lifetime … Larry’s home … functioned very much like the idealized salon of 19th-century Paris. During any visit, one might meet, at Larry’s, a remarkable mix of students, opinion leaders, philosophers, psychologists, neighbors, sociologists, faculty and research colleagues, visiting colleagues from the United States, Europe, or Asia, or people Larry would have met in town, on the beach, or while fishing, oystering, clamming, or sailing. A visitor to Larry’s place was always guaranteed an exciting intellectual experience (Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1991, p. 4).

A visitor to Kohlberg’s theory is likewise such a complex and stimulating experience, and it is in this penumbra that Kohlberg is revisited. This book has taken the reader on an intellectual tour in from classrooms in elementary and secondary schools to higher education, from prisons to professional workplaces, to everyday lives of citizens as they interact with one another on the street and throughout the world. Author contributors demonstrate, through reflection on their educational practice, through empirical research, and through philosophical reflection on the complexity of the context of moral life, that the revisit to Kohlberg is worth the trip, and we are in Kohlberg’s penumbra. I return to the Victor Hugo quote, in the preface of my edited book, The Legacy of Lawrence Kohlberg:

Will the future ever arrive? Should we continue to look upward? Will the light that we see in the sky soon be extinguished? The ideal is terrifying to behold, lost as it is in the depths; small, isolated, a pinpoint, brilliant but threatened on all sides by the dark forces that surround it. Nevertheless, in the end it is no more endangered than a star in the jaws of the clouds.

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EVOLUTIONARY PARADIGM SHIFTING IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY


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