Decolonizing Democratic Education
Trans-disciplinary Dialogues

Ali A. Abdi
University of Alberta, Canada

and

George Richardson (Eds.)
University of Alberta, Canada

The essays in this edited collection open up a hopeful dialogue about the existing state of democratic education and the ways in which it could be re-imagined as an inclusive, democratized space of possibility and engagement. Proceeding from a critique that questions the dominance of Western liberal understandings of democratic education as a series of rational, culturally neutral acts undertaken by individuals who conceive of democracy and ‘the common good’ in universalist and fundamentally exclusionary terms, the contributors give voice to those whose ideas, histories, cultures and current understanding of the world is not highlighted in the dominant relationships of schooling.

From a variety of theoretical and pragmatic approaches, the chapters in this collection engage the dialectics of history, power, colonization and decolonization, identity, memory, citizenship, Aboriginal rights, development and globalization, all in the context of providing a critique of educational systems, relations, structures and curricula that seem badly in need of reform. While the contributors who have diverse scholarly interests are not in a direct dialogue with one another, their different foci should, nevertheless, inter-topically inform each other. The book should interest students and researchers in the general foundations of education, democracy and education, citizenship education, comparative and international education, postcolonial studies in education, and cultural studies in education.
Decolonizing Democratic Education
Bold Visions in Educational Research:

Series Editors:

- Kenneth Tobin, The Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA
- Joe Kincheloe, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

Editorial Board:

- Heinz Sunker, Universität Wuppertal, Germany
- Peter McLaren, University of California at Los Angeles, USA
- Kiwan Sung, Woosong University, South Korea
- Angela Calabrese Barton, Teachers College, New York, USA
- Margery Osborne, Centre for Research on Pedagogy and Practice Nanyang Technical University, Singapore
- W.-M. Roth, University of Victoria, Canada

Scope:

Bold Visions in Educational Research is international in scope and includes books from two areas: teaching and learning to teach and research methods in education. Each area contains multi-authored handbooks of approximately 200,000 words and monographs (authored and edited collections) of approximately 130,000 words. All books are scholarly, written to engage specified readers and catalyze changes in policies and practices.

Defining characteristics of books in the series are their explicit uses of theory and associated methodologies to address important problems. We invite books from across a theoretical and methodological spectrum from scholars employing quantitative, statistical, experimental, ethnographic, semiotic, hermeneutic, historical, ethnomethodological, phenomenological, case studies, action, cultural studies, content analysis, rhetorical, deconstructive, critical, literary, aesthetic and other research methods.

Books on teaching and learning to teach focus on any of the curriculum areas (e.g., literacy, science, mathematics, social science), in and out of school settings, and points along the age continuum (pre K to adult). The purpose of books on research methods in education is not to present generalized and abstract procedures but to show how research is undertaken, highlighting the particulars that pertain to a study. Each book brings to the foreground those details that must be considered at every step on the way to doing a good study. The goal is not to show how generalizable methods are but to present rich descriptions to show how research is enacted. The books focus on methodology, within a context of substantive results so that methods, theory, and the processes leading to empirical analyses and outcomes are juxtaposed. In this way method is not reified, but is explored within well-described contexts and the emergent research outcomes. Three illustrative examples of books are those that allow proponents of particular perspectives to interact and debate, comprehensive handbooks where leading scholars explore particular genres of inquiry in detail, and introductory texts to particular educational research methods/issues of interest to novice researchers.
Decolonizing Democratic Education

Trans-disciplinary Dialogues

Edited by

Ali A. Abdi
University of Alberta, Canada

George Richardson
University of Alberta, Canada
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preface</th>
<th>vii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Decolonizing Democratic Education: An Introduction&lt;br&gt;Ali A. Abdi and George Richardson</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The End of Development as We Know It: Fukuyama on Democracy Promotion and Political Development&lt;br&gt;Michael Peters</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Subjective Violence of Decolonization&lt;br&gt;William F. Pinar</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Decolonizing Democratic Education: Marxian Ruminations&lt;br&gt;Peter McLaren</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Feminism Confronts Democracy: Challenging Universal Citizenship and Democratic Education&lt;br&gt;Jennifer A. Tupper</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Peddling 'Humbug and False Piety': Reflections on the Road to Educating Global Citizens&lt;br&gt;Graham Pike</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Decolonizing Social Studies and Global Education&lt;br&gt;Merry M. Merryfield</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Globalization as an Educational Framework of Convergence: Globalizing the Local and Localizing the Global&lt;br&gt;Ali A. Abdi &amp; Ayaz Naseem</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Globalizing Education or Educating Globalization?</td>
<td>David R. Loy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Within the Liminal Space: Re-positioning Global Citizenship Education as Politics of Encounter, Disruption And Transcendence</td>
<td>George Richardson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Closing the Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal Academic Achievement Gap: Why School Reforms Alone Are Not Enough</td>
<td>Yatta Kanu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Translating Western Democratic Education in the Chinese Context</td>
<td>Yangsheng Guo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Sankofa: In Search of an Alternative Development Paradigm for Africa</td>
<td>Paul Adjei &amp; George Dei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Decolonizing Research Practices at South African Universities</td>
<td>Sal Muthayan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index 195
PREFACE

With this far-reaching collection of essays, Ali A. Abdi and George Richardson provide a timely and valuable service as well as an informative read for concerned educators and researchers. The authors gather here bring together a rich variety of educational themes at the intersection of postcolonial and democratic educational concerns. These works attend closely and critically to the weight of the past. It skilfully finds within these hard-earned lessons a basis for believing that we can move toward a more democratic future in the ways that we learn and educate. Each in their own way, the essays provide a means for thinking through and against the legacy of education’s earlier and still persistent colonial mission. This scholarship, much of it informed by the history of imperialism, has become a means for these authors to envision the democratic and educational possibilities of a postcolonial future.

The lessons they offer in moving toward that future are not easy formulaic takes on how to entertainingly engage students in basic skill development. Rather, a different sort of lesson and a different range of critical skills are invoked here: lessons and skills that will take courageous and committed teachers to bring to the classroom. It will take teachers and students who are willing to face what is not otherwise being addressed in or allowed from this history, even as this history, as this book makes clear, remains present within the scope of teachers’ and students’ lives. The richness and reach of this collection allows us to see clearly how the urban classrooms, colonial museums, folktales, children’s games, reading lists and novel summaries that figure in these chapters are set against a complex history that may often have been something more than a massive multinational campaign of imperial aggression and hegemony that spread over the face of the earth, but that was never less than that.

This book approaches both past and present aspects of this history without assuming that it is enough to study the sins of this past as if such study, in itself, was inherently decolonizing or democratic. At every turn, the authors draw out new lessons from the struggle against imperialism, colonial revolutions, postcolonial identities and post-apartheid institutions that are directed toward the work that lies ahead. These are lessons guided by what still needs to be addressed and achieved in the schools and other educational settings. They are lessons that speak to a greater openness in pursuing this history, in the susceptibility of such work to debate and critique, within the broader spirit of what might be thought of as moving toward a more democratic education. Not that this future is likely to be any simpler or less contested than in the past; in what follows, there is certainly no consensus to be found in what defines a decolonized democracy or in the precise form that democratic education should take.

Rather, the spectre of Derrida’s democracy to come could be said to haunt this book. The democratic ideals that are invoked in this work are at once particular to the circumstances of time and place, and yet speak to what has yet to be realized politically or educationally. We are not offered a system for how to teach and live in some generally democratic way. It is only clear that in the face of something so
amiss, we need to rethink assumptions and practices, much in the manner of the chapters that make up this book. There is no arrival point in this, no culminating lesson to be mastered. The work represented here takes us a step forward at every point in realizing what that democratic promise might be, but it also leaves us aware of how much still needs to be done in other areas. We must continue to think through, for example, the most basic notions of what counts as equal treatment before the law, equal opportunity in the schools, and equal say in government.

At issue is a democratic interest in learning how to live and learn together amid difficult history lessons on the flawed democracy that has prevailed and on the democracy still to come. It is a story about that history which continues to be written in the court decisions, political platforms and educational policies, as well as in classrooms and schoolyards. It is also a story that is resisted and denied by more than a few who do so from within that democratic process. One has only to consider the struggles over initiatives that seek to redress the continuing lack of democratic opportunities in the schools through the most carefully qualified measures of affirmative action. Such measures continue to face long, unpredictable court battles in a struggle to create more democratic opportunities, a struggle which is being actively resisted by those whose interests lie in leaving things much as they have been for too long.

But then this book’s take on the educational state of these democratic themes also seems all the more timely as the United States and Great Britain continue to use military force to ostensibly spread and protect democracy, unleashing violence and destruction and leading to violations of human rights and international law. This occurs in the period of democracy’s triumphant historical moment over the oppressive regimes of the Soviet Union. It can seem that the fragile and vulnerable hold of democracy on the world is everywhere exposed to measures, often in the name of national security, that compromise its promise, even as it is often under siege from intolerant religious beliefs. It means that little can be taken for granted today in what democracy means and what part school systems play in those democratic claims. In these extraordinary times, not only do democracies pursue military goals abroad in the name of peace at home, their schools pursue achievement scores in the name of accountability, as if such scores were the full educational measure of what it takes to advance the democratic quality of the state.

In such times as these, this book stands as a healthy counter-measure to what can only seem a simplistic regard for democracy and education (if it is not something far less innocent) by those in power. The book offers the sense of a history that matters to education, a history from which we have much to learn. It challenges the popular political reduction of schooling to a singularly testable dimension. It refuses to abide by the idea that concentrating educational energies on improving test scores can redress persistent differences in “achievement” between historically advantaged and disadvantaged groups within a nation, while at the same time increasing its international competitiveness in the sweepstakes of the globalized economy. These same testing regimes for schools also tend to set impossible goals for teachers and schools—the US goal of national proficiency in literacy and mathematics by 2014, a case in point—as if through extra practice time and better test preparation, teachers could remedy what is a far deeper historical
and economic aspect of this society that leads to growing economic inequities that are not otherwise being addressed. Large-scale implementation of standardized examinations may be an expedient means of seeming, in a political sense, to bring the schools to account. It certainly verifies, for example, how greatly the quality of education varies across poor and well-off communities. Yet what this book makes clear is that this approach to accountability consistently sells what teachers and students can achieve strikingly short. It fails to acknowledge how teachers and students can come to understand the historical differences that separate these communities, and how they can contribute to the democratic quality of their communities and the globe at large.

Yet this book is no less concerned with accountability, that is, with providing an account that reflects both on what has passed and on what is today a more responsible form of democratic education. Against the current educational focus on test-assessed accountability, this book offers a clear and compelling picture of what is at stake in the lessons that students and teachers currently learn and what more they could begin to learn. It is a history, after all, that bears on all of our lives, as inheritors of this past. It is not that such lessons are about blaming anyone, but about moving forward together out of this divided past. Nor is it that such lessons need to be taught every day or form the whole of the curriculum; it is only that such lessons should not, as happens too often today, go completely missing from education systems. Such lessons will have their democratic effects as they enable a way of thinking about the world that would move the schools well beyond what is too often the goal of producing economically competitive, politically loyal citizens in what is imagined to have been the nation in a golden age of singular identity and character.

The essays gathered here take on this sense of the imagined nation, just as surely as they turn on imperialism’s global educational designs that became the model of social studies’ inquiry into the exotic and distant. They offer, in its place, a way of returning to a global vision, motivated in part by common planetary causes, from poverty to the environment, for which global initiatives seem the only hope. The book offers a strong educational sense of responsibility and opportunity for contributing to—not just learning about—the very shape of that world. There are new jurisdictions at work now that need to figure in our learning: new jurisdictions for international justice, for establishing fair trade practices (around, for example, eliminating agricultural subsidies in advanced industrial nations), and ensuring fair working conditions on a global basis.

This book helps us, then, to realize that to live in this world today is to be already globalized in many ways, whether that globalization is driven by the market forces of new economies or the democratic hopes for a reduction in poverty and disease, or even the convergence of the two somewhere around alternative energy sources in response to global warming. It reminds us that on stepping into the classroom, the world is not to be imagined as “out there,” as something, someone or somewhere to be studied. The world is already always present in the classroom, caught up in a rapidly expanding capitalism that extends the interdependencies of economies and the reach of information systems, all of which is taking place amid political turmoil and international tensions. The students bring
parts of this world to school each day, even as the classroom is wired to that larger world. It is time, then, to make a greater part of this global presence part of the program, to stop ignoring the presence of this worldliness in the languages, cultures, histories, and experiences that students bring to class. Many students are living out the hybrid and post-national identities discussed in this book; they know some small part of the postcolonial histories featured in the pages that follow.

Many have cosmopolitan interests in global alliances that hold some promise for a brighter future than seems in store if it is to be “business as usual.” Many are in a position to contribute to the expanded and extended public sphere that is forming online with a strong educational glow to it. Many are ready to learn how to use their technical skills to assist the public in exercising their right to know, now that governments and other agencies are making such information freely available online (with my hope and efforts devoted to ensuring that the same will be said of academic research and scholarship one day). Decolonizing democratic education poses a challenge for educators and scholars, but students have much to bring to the table in helping us move toward this goal.

Each of us has to find a starting point, a place to begin rethinking what has been made and what can be made of education. For that reason and for many more, it is fortunate that the authors and editors of this book have found such telling lessons within this history, lessons that may yet move us toward a more democratic future for education and the world at large. I invite you to consider in all that follows, how well the authors make good, ultimately, on democracy’s great educational project as a way of imagining how we might work on the past as a means to a better future.

John Willinsky
Stanford University
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is being produced through the collective efforts of all its contributors whose excellent submissions are topically cogent and timely in responding to the perceived need to decolonize the way we see and practice educational systems and relationships all over the world. In focusing on ways of decolonizing democratic education (basically education that serves interests of all people and selectively enhances the lives of those who are marginalized in given contexts), we wanted to shed some light on the potential complacency that might permeate many educational platforms where the perception may be that as long as we have some education, the rest will be fine. We believe this is a dangerous proliferation of the non-factual and, as things are now, conventional learning programs are simply reproducing the current social order with all its rigid class categories and, at times, extensively alienating classroom as well as extra-curricular experiences of those who cannot fit the neoliberal model of educational success, thus delinking so many from the overall schooling process.

While that is the case in many learning intersections, one attached interesting point should be the widespread social assumption that ‘school is right’, and whenever things do not work out, it is the so-called problematic learners and their families that are ‘naturally’ at fault. At a more dangerous level, in terms of the durability of ideas and their praxes, is the ongoing clash of perspectives where progressive educators and educational researchers face the established order that calls, generally with the explicit support of state institutions and their ideological sponsors, for the technologizing of all education (i.e., counting and measuring all educational intentions and outcomes) so as to account for the benefits that schools were supposed to bestow upon the economistic paradigms of globalization. As should be gleaned from the pages of this book, this collection aims to confront these directly and derivatively dehumanizing notions of education. And it was with this urgent need to establish what may be selectively called counter-hegemonic possibilities of education, that the contributors dissect and analyze the terrain of contemporary learning platforms and critically locate less ideological and pragmatically more inclusive conceptualizations and theorizing that point to new pathways of teaching, learning and social well-being. It is in the spirit of these possibilities that we are grateful to the contributors, and it is via their writing that we hope readers will ascertain and eventually harness more that what is officially prescribed in the situation. We would also like to thank Lois Edge from the University of Alberta for her excellent editing and formatting work, and Peter de Liefde of Sense Publishers, for his support and patience. Finally, we thank our families for their continuing support; without their love and understanding, we would not have completed this work.
1. DECOLONIZING DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

An Introduction

Education, as other general categories of life, may sometimes have an air of innocence about it, and without some notions of criticism to enhance both its philosophical and structural categories, could become a petrified societal block that does not disturb the clustered realities of inequity and marginalization that crisscross our existentialities. The type of education discussed here generally conforms to formal education systems which have become the norm of instruction and training since this type of learning was exported from Europe and, via the colonizing mission, imposed on the rest of humanity. And while there is little question that schooling has improved the lives of more people now than ever before (Nelson, Palonsky & McCarthy, 2007, p. 10), the aim of this book’s contributors is not to dwell on observed improvements but to analyze the problematics as well as the prospects for achieving horizontal and socio-culturally inclusive democratic education for all. At the extreme point of the positive constructions of this idea, one might actually talk about non-neoliberal and more humanist notions of the ‘No Child Left Behind idea’, but beyond the numbers, the emphasis here is on the quality of what is achieved and the prospects of decolonizing the conceptual, philosophical, epistemological and cultural locations of learning. It is by decolonizing these locations, we contend, that the desired outcomes of education leading to genuine social development might be achieved. If, on the other hand, education continues favouring those with higher socio-economic status in almost all societies of our world, then educational researchers and other social scientists should attend to the important task of critiquing existing educational structures and understandings.

In the general literature, the main analyses of education usually discuss schooling as an agent of social reproduction where learning and teaching relations reproduce society as it is (Bourdieu & Passerson, 1990; Apple, 2003). Here, the points weigh heavily on policy, linguistic and socio-cultural capital, which is the ensemble of all linguistic and expressive skills children learn from their family and social environments and the related human networks, including school-based relationships, that result from these spaces of schooling. With educational intentions, structures, and contents mainly designed by and for the middle class, the outcomes of education favour middle and upper-middle class contexts, while
marginalizing those segments of society that come from working and lower class families.

As we look at our world of the early 21st century, it should still be clear that the findings of Paul Willis’ (1981) now classic study, *Learning to Labour*, remain as valid as they were more than a quarter of a century ago. The case is not only that working class students are being trained, via the politics as well as the certification and reward systems of schooling, for less prestigious, lower paying jobs, but in many situations, both educational affordability and attainment have actually been decreasing for those who are not of the right economic class and cultural stock. In affirming the continuities of Willis’ analyses, with clear intergenerational realities that are also socio-cultural, Davies & Guppy (2006) write:

> While everyone values education, lower class families have been found to be less achievement-oriented and to place less priority on educational attainment. Recognizing difficult hurdles ahead, students from poorer backgrounds have lower expectations about their likelihood of graduating from Oxford, Harvard or some other elite university. Their ‘frames of reference’ are narrower than those of middle- or upper class youth. For some researchers, this narrower cognitive horizon for judging what is possible stems from a lack of role models. Without role models who have gone through higher education, many working-class families simply lack knowledge about how schools operate. The result is a more limited ‘cognitive map’ that serves to limit status striving among working-class youth (p. 105).

So, not much seems to have changed from previous expectations of dominant cultural transmission and human capital constructions of society that are attached, from a theoretical point of view, to the position of the structuralist-functionalists who described education as fulfilling already established spaces that represent the economic and social development of all, and, later, to liberal theorists who prioritized the patronizing use of education by dominant groups to enhance the life situations of the marginalized. Undoubtedly, the structuralist-functionalist/liberalist perspectives of education will continue benefiting those whose relationships with these learning paradigms are already privileged and who understand well how to climb the contemporary socio-economic and political ladder.

DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION: CRITICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL REFLECTIONS

As things are now, what constitutes ‘democratic education’ in schools and society is highly contested, poses significant analytical challenges, and may not be as immediately operationalizable as one would like or expect. Democratic education could also selectively present some conceptual and explanatory contradictions, which, as Jennifer Tupper points out in her chapter in this book, could invoke for those who have been marginalized by schooling a counter-reality of undemocratic education that oppresses them vis-à-vis the rest. Commenting on the nature of this ‘paradox’, Chantal Mouffe has written that notions of consensus and reasoned engagement underlying Habermasian “deliberative democracy” too often obscure
“the dimension of undecidability and the ineradicability of antagonisms which are constitutive of the political” (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 104–5). While we should be cognizant of these concerns within and outside schooling, we have decided to still claim some viability in the presence as well as the expansive possibility of democratic education in the lives of people. As we intend it in this collection, democratic education speaks hopefully about democratizing spaces of schooling for all. That is, if democracy is aspirationally about the inclusion of all in the governance of their societies, then democratic education aims to give voice to those whose ideas, histories, cultures and current understanding of the world is not highlighted in the dominant relationships of schooling, thus selectively undemocratizing the lives and by extension, the futures of these people.

As we imagine it, democratic education should be a type of learning that aims for the horizontal decolonization (both in the national and international spaces) of both the physical and mental being of individuals and groups, and qualitatively establishes clusters of pedagogical plateaus that uncompromisingly ‘equitize’ (not just equalize) both the comprehension and interactive contents of the in-class contexts of life. This should be complemented by the de-hegemonized pragmatics of a less isolationist and more horizontal hidden curricular context that does not conspire on the marginalization of different minorities (Richardson & Blades, 2006). In the way we are defining it here, minority designation is not necessarily based on numerical inferiority, but more practically on power relations where those who come from the dominant economic and political class will possess more socio-cultural capital, not only in the classroom where they are already similar in social status, orientation and perception to their teachers, but also in the school yard, around the sporting events and in the overall competition for status and recognition.

Moreover, democratic education conceived as genuinely inclusive would be seen as an extension of democratic societies that have established policy and program realities that attempt to enfranchise all those who see themselves as members of a given sovereign state. And even though it is clear that democracies rarely achieve a level of democratic practice that matches popular expectations (Shapiro, 2003), in terms of democratic education, a central goal should be the expansion of viable and relevant learning possibilities to all segments of society. That expansion, in turn, could sustain both the qualitative and quantitative prospects of democracy, and lead to a situation in which it would be possible for, as Dewey (1926, p. 87) noted, “the devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. ... A democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; this can only be created by education.” And to this cardinal principle, we would also add that the type of education that sustains democracy must be democratic itself (mainly in the ways we have defined above); otherwise, it will maintain democracy only for the dominant groups, and, as in many parts of our world today, will either be illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 2004), where, as in post-Cold War Africa, it simply confirms the reconstitutionalization of the old order, or, as in the older democracies of the West, partial democracy, where large sections of the populace are so
deprived of possibilities that there is little real prospect of upward social mobility that improves their lives.

An interesting example of the limitations of partial democracy in the West can be seen in the case of the victims of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005. By living in a country where democracy does not guarantee democratizing spaces of schooling, these mostly African American communities were doubly victimized by the system of governance in place (in the context of emergency policies and programs and the aid programs that were not mobilized), and by the quality of education they received in their country of birth. Here, both American democracy and American education assured the downward mobility of these communities and the terrible spectre of the victims themselves being blamed for their problems. Once again, Dewey’s (1927) observations in the early part of the last century can explain something about the complacency of the political democracy that characterized the Katrina experience. In *The Public and its Problems*, he emphasized how we do not need to blindly adhere to the promise of democracy but, via our critical faculties, criticize it and remake it so it fits with the political interests of the people.

From this understanding of democratic education, it is clear that the overall approach to learning hitherto deployed either in Western developed countries or in the previously colonized zones of our world, is not enough to introduce viable projects of the type of democratic education that Dewey envisaged. To challenge the “normalized” but problematic structure of democratic education, critical theorists of schooling should point out how the built-in persistence of the inequities of education must be tackled. With schools positioned as the main agents in the reproduction of the dominant perceptions and practices of life, the societal hierarchies created and sustained by education must be viewed as overwhelmingly counter-democratic, and therefore must be considered as deserving of any deconstructive and reconstructive possibilities that can be undertaken. Some of the most important educational reconstructive projects in the overall context of general critical theory would be found in such sub-disciplines as critical pedagogy, critical multicultural education and democratic education itself. In these contexts and interactions, some of the most important critiques emerge from the works of the two main pragmatic philosophers of education: John Dewey (1902, 1926, 1963) and Paulo Freire (1985, 1998, 2000 [1970]). Here, the historico-actual positioning of Dewey and Freire speaks about the continuities of the important criticisms that argued that education was not fulfilling the promise of its elemental categories, i.e., aiming for, and achieving the best possible outcomes for all who partake in it. The interesting and ironic thing is that on the first day of schooling, all children are welcomed and are told that learning well and studying hard will be the door that opens their prosperous futures. Yet we know, as indicated above, that each child’s social capital and linguistic skills, upon his or her first encounter with a teacher, will more or less determine that child’s learning success. It was Dewey who, many decades before Bourdieu, spoke about the need to create a viable transitional space between the world of home and what happens in the classroom. In addition, Dewey emphasized the importance of locating children in learning contexts that do not alienate them from the cultural contexts in which they grew, thus anticipating the
work of today’s critical multicultural educators who should speak about the creation of more fluid boundaries between learners and what is being learned.

Whereas Dewey spoke of the possibilities of democratic education for all students, Paulo Freire, in his magnum opus *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (2000 [1970]), which is complemented by a number of other outstanding works, focused on education and literacy for the immediate well being of marginalized populations. As social thinkers and philosophers are products of their social environment, Freire critically responded to a Latin American context that is characterized by one the widest gaps between the have and have-nots. In fact, his native country of Brazil is reputed to have one of the highest Gini-Coefficients (the measurement between the rich and the poor) in the world, along with South Africa and Mexico. It was, indeed, in these realities that Freire (in the 1960s) saw literacy and education as, in the same way we see them today, the main learning and development outlets for people who have been subjected to multiple and intergenerational schemes of oppression. As importantly for us is the fact that the oppressed in Freire’s Latin America were not actually deprived of all education but were instead mis-educated. That is, the oppressed were forced into a type of mostly informal education that misrecognized them, deformed their identities and created in them a counter-praxis or false consciousness that inculcated in their minds the expansive regimes of inferioritization that were not dissimilar to those experienced by colonized populations (Memmi, 1991; Fanon, 1967). To overcome this, Freire’s project of democratic literacy and education focused on first decolonizing the imagination and later the actions of the internally colonized, thus expounding his seminal project of *conscientizaçao* which had the potential to spark the needed action and reflection upon the world to transform it. In terms of Freire’s disavowal of the continuing neo-liberalization of education and development, he wrote the following in *Pedagogy of Freedom* (1998):

> My abhorrence for neoliberalism helps to explain my legitimate anger when I speak of the injustices the rag pickers among humanity are condemned. It also explains my total lack of interest in any pretension of impartiality. I am not impartial; not a fixed observer of facts and happenings. I never was able to be an adherent to the traits that falsely claim impartiality or objectivity (p. 22).

Undoubtedly, Freire’s was a humanist program of democratic education that spoke about the educational equity that was to be established on behalf of all. In appreciating Freire’s powerful pedagogy of identity liberation through literacy, Abdi (2001) wrote how Freire might have had his greatest impact via providing the oppressed with “the means to free themselves from false identity and, in the process, from unwarranted economic and political imprisonment in a ‘no-go’ deprived landscape and culturally/existentially depriving borderland” (p. 191).

Generally speaking, theories of critical pedagogy by Freire and others, mainly as discourses of schooling that challenge the learning status quo, continue their important foci on the inequitable power relations in education and society, and extend their analysis and observations to the important categories of empowerment
and disempowerment as these are also located in the contours and the intersections of race, class and gender oppression. As should be expected, the pragmatics of educational, and, by extension, socio-economic and political inequities among groups in advanced Western societies disturbs the expectations of many critical pedagogy educators who urgently call for the inclusive operationalization, not just the academic discussion, of the project to achieve the still elusive forums of equity and development for all. In this regard, McLaren (1998) writes:

The critical pedagogy to which I am referring ... needs to be less informative and more per-formative, less a pedagogy directed toward the interrogation of written texts than a corporeal pedagogy grounded in the lived experiences of students. ... I am calling for a pedagogy in which a revolutionary multicultural ethic is performed— is lived in the streets— rather than simply reduced to the practice of reading texts (although the reading of texts with other texts, against other texts, and upon other texts is decidedly an important exercise). Teachers need to build upon the textual politics that dominates most multicultural classrooms by engaging in a politics of bodily and affective investment, which means “walking the talk”, and working in those very communities one purports to serve (p. 13).

In the global situation, it is also important to talk about the performative nature of democratic education and the need to decolonize huge spaces of schooling that have been continually experiencing imposed programs of learning which have not been effectively modified since the era of European colonialism. From our understanding, therefore, a viable space of counter-hegemonic criticisms should be achieved to deal with the continuities of colonial philosophical and ideological provisions of schooling in most postcolonial societies in the world. While colonialism effectively destroyed the colonies’ educational and developmental projects, portraying them as retarded and untenable (Abdi, 2002; Rodney, 1982; Nyerere, 1968), we also know that whatever it created does not serve the interests of the population. What colonial powers did not understand or were not willing to understand was the fact that different peoples who reside in diverse zones of our world would generally design and develop their unique platforms and relationships of learning, which will always be responding to their own understandings of survival, sustainability and intergenerational growth. If colonialism’s ideas that these societies did not have any viable programs of education were true, then these nations would have vanished long ago. As Chinua Achebe (2000) once stated to his audience at Harvard University, “I was never an uncivilized, primitive and backward creature, if I was so, then I wouldn’t be here speaking with you” (Achebe, 2000). More directly, Tanzania’s former philosopher-statesman, Julius Nyerere (1968) wrote:

The educational systems in different kinds of societies in the world have been, are, very different in organization and content. They are different because the societies providing the education are different, and because education, whether it be formal or informal, has a purpose. That purpose is to transmit from one generation to the next, the accumulated wisdom and
knowledge of society, and to prepare the young people for their future membership of the society and their active participation in its maintenance and development (p. 268).

With education not democratized, in the sense that it did not respect and build on local structures and understandings of civic communities in former colonies, the ushering-in of organized globalization has been particularly disastrous. It actually introduced more economized realities in the realm of education, which continually marginalize the rights of those who would benefit most from education. Hence, globalization’s lack of correspondence to the Durkheimian notion of “schooling as a statement to create more cohesive societies and as a tool to combat the rising culture of individualism” (Davies & Guppy, 2006, p. 5). Today, then, with English already the global lingua franca, and the resultant focus on the commodification of education, technology and labour, the pressures of globalization dictate that nations and societies can only compete with the rest based on the knowledge clusters that are achieved by their people.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

Beyond this introductory chapter, the book contains sixteen other chapters that together locate and problematize both the intentions and outcomes of educational systems that on the surface might not be different from each other. From a variety of theoretical and pragmatic approaches, the contributors engage the dialectics of history, power, colonization and decolonization, identity, memory, citizenship, Aboriginal rights, development and globalization, all in the context of providing a critique of educational systems, relations, structures and curricula that seem badly in need of reform. While the authors, who come from diverse disciplines and areas of research, are not in a systematically structured dialogue with one another, the topics they address clearly and directly inform each other and challenge readers to reexamine what is understood and intended when we speak of “democratic education.” It is also the case that in assembling this collection, we wanted it to assume a dialogic perspective where, through the pages of the book, more analyses and observations are exchanged and shared.

Following this introduction, Michael Peters, in his chapter “The End of Development as We Know it: Fukuyama on Democracy Promotion and Political Development,” critically responds to Francis Fukuyama’s book America at the Crossroads (2006) by discussing an alternative possibility in decolonizing educational platforms. In doing so, Peters affirms how Fukuyama, at one point one of the stars of neocervative intellectual circles, might have, via the intervention of his current observations, actually ‘resigned’ from that movement. In chapter 3, “Decolonizing Canadian Literary Education: Reflections on the Changing Roles of African Literatures in School Reading Projects,” Ingrid Johnston focuses on the problematique of the less transformational contents of the secondary school curriculum. Johnston notes how the curriculum is heavily coloured by the presence of the main canonized texts from Western traditions. She relates how this reality is
common to most (if not all) places colonized by Great Britain. Johnston welcomes the expanding, post-empire debates about the issues.

In chapter 4, “The Subjective Violence of Decolonization,” William Pinar starts with the extra-political notations and practices of colonization and decolonization by extensively recalling the works of the Martinican social-psychologist of colonialism and physician, Frantz Fanon. Pinar analyzes how the project of decolonization, especially at the personal level, is more complicated than one might have wanted. Indeed, with the educational and other structures of colonialism still present in people’s lives, decolonization has hardly been achieved, and the fragmented, de-centered lives Fanon so powerfully and eloquently spoke about should still be seeking a more positive postcolonial harvest. In chapter 5, “Decolonizing Democratic Education: Marxian Ruminations,” Peter McLaren critiques the self-fulfilling prophecies of capitalism and urges progressive forces to prepare for new ways of seeing and achieving different possibilities in educational and social well-being. At the vanguard of this struggle, for McLaren, are radical educators who have clear objectives and who intend to achieve them. In chapter 6, “Identity in Colonial and Postcolonial Contexts: Select Discussions and Analyses,” Ratna Ghosh, Ali A. Abdi and Ayaz Naseem analyze the constructions of identity with contextualizations extended to the colonial and postcolonial spaces of life. As implicated here, colonial experiences greatly damage people’s existentialities by, among other things, de-authenticating people’s identities, and rendering them misrecognized. With the physical forces of imperialism complemented by colonial languages and education, the colonized eventually adapt to their imposed identities, which continually stunt their capacity to define themselves and develop their societies. In chapter 7, “Feminism Confronts Democracy: Challenging Universal Citizenship and Democratic Education,” Jennifer A. Tupper analyzes and critiques citizenship, democracy and education with respect to the world of women, with some specialized pointers on the plight of Aboriginal women (e.g., the case of “the stolen sisters”) in Canada. Tupper correctly points out the potential miscalculation of prefixing education with the term “democratic,” when actually many educational programs are oppressive and anti-democratic. Tupper uses feminist socio-political theory to discursively and pragmatically locate women in the dominant conceptualizations and practices of citizenship via the deployment of important interventionist pointers that clarify and effectively explain the situation.

In chapter 8, “Peddling ‘Humbug and False Piety’: Reflections on the Road to Educating Global Citizens,” Graham Pike discusses the conceptual and philosophical issues that may problematize the work and the presumably benevolent intentions of those who advocate for global citizenship. By effectively explaining where the main discrepancies are in critically understanding and practicing global citizenship, Pike states the need to create a more proactive and selectively inclusive program of global education. In chapter 9, “Decolonizing Social Studies and Global Citizenship,” Merry Merryfield recounts how she first realized, when she taught in the United States and in a number of African countries, the basic discrepancies in creating young citizens. From that understanding and by proactively reading the new “posts” to overcome the legacies of the colonial and other oppressive practices of education, Merryfield discusses
select strategies to decolonize social studies and global education. In doing so, she also examines several other issues, including knowledge constructions, double consciousness and hybridity.

In chapter 10, “Globalization as an Educational Framework of Convergence: Globalizing the Local and Localizing the Global,” Ali A. Abdi and Ayaz Naseem discuss the conceptual and practical difficulties of deploying globalization as a one-way phenomenon that imposes itself on local realities that adapt to it, and are eventually shaped by its forces and exchange intentions. In chapter 11, “Globalizing Education or Educating Globalization,” David Loy starts with the meanings of the origins of education, and poses philosophical questions about why we educate people. With current trends of globalization putting more pressures on educational programs in the world, Loy looks at ways of making education better understood so there could be at least some interventions in the way we define and operationalize ‘de-economizable’ (that is, when needed) and socio-culturally relevant learning possibilities for all. In chapter 12, “Educating Globalized Citizens: Deliberative Democratic Practice in an Era of Globalization,” W. Andy Knight engages the possible conceptualizations of democracy. He looks at the ways we practice democracy, examines the beginnings of liberal democracy in Europe, discusses other forms/spaces of democracy platforms, and relays the contested realities of the democratic project. In chapter 13, “Within the Liminal Space: Repositioning Global Citizenship Education as Politics of Encounter, Disruption and Transcendence,” George Richardson examines the possibilities of educating for global citizenship and the complexity of the role of schools in achieving this. Here, the main focus of schools should be to help students understand, appreciate and practice citizenship. But as that is not a very simple thing to achieve in today’s societies, Richardson suggests the need to continually interrogate the political space so as to mediate citizenship and schooling in the real contexts of diversity which will also be interwoven with the different interpretations of civic practice.

In chapter 14, “Closing the Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal Academic Achievement Gap: Why School Reforms Alone Are Not Enough,” Yatta Kanu analyzes the continuing gap in educational attainment and achievement between those two groups in the Canadian schooling relationships. It is, indeed, the case that with the mis-education schemes that started with the programs of the early missionaries and continued through the bitter experiences of residential schools, Aboriginal peoples in Canada (and undoubtedly elsewhere) have been subjected to alienating learning corners that are still highly depriving. To overcome these, Kanu proposes new possibilities for re-culturing education, which would make it more relevant for Aboriginal learners. In chapter 15, “‘Rock Stone Under River Bottom ...’: Memories of a Caribbean Childhood,” Cecille DePass discusses how early memories of her schooling in the Caribbean developed her critical skills in more ways than one. There, colonial formations of education did not end with colonialism, but spilled into the postcolonial space. With all the elitist learning problems that could have disjunctured the development of some learners, human agency was never taken away, and those who were designated to fail, due to their socially “racialized” status, actually excelled.
In chapter 16, “Translating Western Democratic Education in the Chinese Context,” Yangsheng Guo examines the complexities of conceptually locating Western democratic education in historical and contemporary Chinese contexts. Guo starts with some etymological notations of democracy and from there, discusses a number of important transitions that characterized Chinese society. In his reflections, he points out some weaknesses in the analytical antecedents of the case, and says that whatever it may be, civic education in China is not achieving a lot for those who may need it most. In chapter 17, “Sankofa: In Search of an Alternative Development Paradigm for Africa,” Paul Adjei and George Dei look at the possibilities of decolonizing development by first understanding that the issue, in its conventional and impositional categories, is dead. To move forward, therefore, Adjei and Dei suggest a more pragmatic return to Africa’s past and harness the conceptual and practical possibilities of indigenously inclusive development. In the metaphor of Sankofa, this might ensure a more sustainable location for ascertaining our realities, appreciating the society and its needs and achieving something more representational for the well being of all. In chapter 18, “Decolonizing Research Practices at South African Universities,” Sal Muthayan discusses how the new education policies, which were intended to oppose and transform the legacy of apartheid education, are actually advancing the aims of globalization. That, Muthayan says, will add to the already expansive marginalization that is affecting the lives of indigenous peoples.

Together, we believe the 18 chapters critically locate much that informs the generalities as well as the particularities of education. Via the discussions and analyses contained here, one must hope for the development of more refined and inclusive debates around the role of learning programs in the well being of peoples around the globe. In addition, while the meanings and practices of democratic education will and must remain active, even contentious, it is also the case that for us, the methods of this kind of education would always aim for realizing the learning ideals of the democratic prospect where education is a publicly owned and operated enterprise (Mclaren, 2005). Such education would comprise programs of learning and teaching which assure that all stakeholders have equal access and are treated equally; it also aims for outcomes that are intended, not only to measure test scores, but to ensure the uplifting of those who have been betrayed by the undemocratic clusters of schooling, either within the context of a single national space, or via the intercontinental oppressions of colonialism and its neocolonial ramifications. In summary, while even the possible practices of democratic education may not themselves be as effective as we would like, they should, nevertheless, precipitate more constructive outcomes for those who have not benefited from current structures of schooling.

REFERENCES


MICHAEL A. PETERS

2. THE END OF DEVELOPMENT AS WE KNOW IT

Fukuyama on Democracy Promotion and Political Development

INTRODUCTION

Francis Fukuyama’s (2006) book America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, the latest from a prolific writer who, as a neoconservative thinker, has contributed many books on political and economic development, concerns American foreign policy since 9/11. Fukuyama argues that the Bush administration made several mistakes that constitute poor judgment in relation to American foreign policy. First, it wrongly made preventive war the central tenet; second, it misjudged global response to its ‘benevolent hegemony’; and third, it misunderstood the difficulties of establishing democracy in Iraq. These criticisms have tended to emphasize a split between Fukuyama, once the darling of the neoconservatives and one of their most astute commentators, and the ‘neocons’ and the Bush administration. In this chapter, I am less interested in Fukuyama’s criticisms or manoeuvrings than in his account of what he calls “the problem of development” (given in Chapter 5) and, in particular, “political development,” understood as the creation of formal state institutions, a subset of “democracy promotion.” It is the “decolonizing democratic education alternative” related to this central idea, which forms the basis for Fukuyama’s innovation for “A Different Kind of American Foreign Policy” (the title of Chapter 7), that I wish to discuss. First, I provide a brief account of Fukuyama’s work, contextualizing his claims concerning the “end of history” and the march of global liberal democracy. In the main section of the essay, I examine Fukuyama’s conception of “political development,” which is notable for its absence of any talk of education or its democratizing possibilities. Finally, in the remaining two brief sections, I assess Fukuyama on Wilsonian realism and also neoconservatism on its own terms.

FUKUYAMA ON “THE END OF HISTORY”

Fukuyama is the author of fifteen books, including four books he wrote about Soviet Russia before his now famous The End of History and the Last Man (1992), which is based on an essay he wrote for the National Interest in 1989. In that book, he argued:

Liberal democracy may constitute the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as such constituted the “end of history.” That is, while earlier forms of government were characterised by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual
collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions (http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/fukuyama.htm).

Drawing on Hegel and Marx, Fukuyama suggested that history—the idea of history as “a single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times”—had come to an end.

With the publication of *The End of History and the Last Man*, in the early 1990s Fukuyama emerged as a major thinker of the Right and someone who was able to handle the same sources of political thought—Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and even more recent scholars such as Kojève—in a sophisticated way that equalled Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard and Deleuze, but very much within a realism framed by American interests.

“POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT” AS THE WAY FORWARD

More than a decade later, reading *America at the Crossroads*, it seems clear that Fukuyama is at the crossroads. He has effectively resigned from neo-conservatism, a movement he says is based on four common principles: American “benevolent hegemony,” a concern for promoting democracy, scepticism of international law and institutions, and a belief that social engineering leads to unanticipated consequences. His criticism is that the mistakes of the Bush administration are errors of judgment rather than reflections of underlying principles. The Bush regime mischaracterized the threat from radical Islam; it failed to anticipate and understand the global reaction to US “benevolent hegemony,” and, finally, it was unrealistic in its assessment of “social engineering” in Iraq and the Middle East.

Fukuyama indicates the four approaches to American foreign policy: neo-conservatism, realism (of Kissinger), liberal internationalism and ‘Jacksonian’ American nationalism. Against these positions he advances “realistic Wilsonianism.” He begins from neoconservative premises: “first, that US policy and the international community more broadly need to concern themselves with what goes on inside other countries, not just their external behaviour, as realists would have it; and second, that power—specifically American power—is often necessary to bring about moral purposes” (p. 9). This form of realism differs from classical realism “by taking seriously as an object of US foreign policy what goes on inside states” (p. 9). That is to say, it is committed to both nation building and democracy promotion. It differs from neconservatism “insofar as it takes international institutions seriously” (p. 10).

To me, what is really new in Fukuyama’s thinking are Chapter 5 on “social engineering and the problem of development” and Chapter 6 on “rethinking institutions for world order.” The last, brief chapter is really a postscript that reveals the consequences of Chapters 5 and 6 for US foreign policy. Fukuyama notes that it is in “economic and political development” that neconservative principles seemingly contradict one another: the “imperative to liberate people from tyranny and promote democracy ... by reaching inside states and shaping
their basic institutions" conflicts with the well established neoconservative notion that “emphasized the dangers of overly ambitious social engineering” (p. 114). Neoconservatives who supported the war ignored the large literature on democratic transitions and on institutions and economic development, assuming that once regime change was achieved “the institutions would somehow take care of themselves” (p. 118).

The discourse of political development, Fukuyama argues, parallels that of economic development, and these discourses are “intertwined in a common process of modernization” (p. 125). In order to further apprise himself of this position, Fukuyama documents the “distinct stages” that economic development has gone through “since the dissolution of European colonial empires that began in the late 1940s” (p. 118). He reviews the Harrod-Domar growth model that pointed to lack of infrastructural investment and differences in capital/labour ratios. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a new emphasis on the promotion of human capital through the development of education (curiously, Fukuyama has nothing to say about this apart from its brief mention). He also records the rise of “sustainable development” and the emphasis on women’s empowerment that accompanied the rise of feminism. He notes that Rostow’s (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth, very much a product of the Cold War and defined in opposition to Marxism, became the “bible” during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. He maps the “return to economic orthodoxy in the 1980s” (p. 121), by which he means neoliberalism, drawing attention to the problem that “without strong institutions and political will the policies could not be adopted or implemented properly” (p. 121).

But it is now clear that debates about modernization that originated in the context of Cold War politics tended to be based more on ideological thinking than on empirical evidence and that most accounts failed to consider cultural differences per se. The critique of development is also a critique of modernization and of the tendency to assimilate all experiences and differences under one universalizing model that holds the Western experience as the apex of development to date and that prescribes an invariant, linear sequence of development based on the emulation of a particular development history.

Modernization theory has been intimately associated not only with the rise of the United States as a hegemonic world power but also with US financing of post-war reconstruction in Western Europe at exactly the same time that the process of decolonization in Africa and Asia took place as an outcome of the disintegration of the former European colonial systems. It was also associated with the emergence of “development aid” and its special blend of aid politics that blended a post-war real politik aimed at the creation of “the free world” with development ideologies crafted around ahistorical narratives of “freedom”. Development in modernization theory has tended to be depicted as a staged process impervious to history though hostile to traditional societies. It has been considered a form of Westernization, implying a kind of world convergence where societies became more like each other. Above all, from its early post-war beginnings it was tied to simple theories of capitalism and grand narratives of “progress” that demanded the adoption of capitalist relations of production that exacted a price in the short term. The price for forced or speeded-up and planned development was often heavy
environmentally and socially. Environmental despoliation became the accepted short-term cost. Rarely, if ever, was it observed that traditional societies were more environmentally balanced or more harmonious than the ever-increasingly rapacious consumer societies of the West that themselves, increasingly relied on the institutionalized exploitation of Third World “resources” and labour. This assemblage of development theory helped to legitimate “foreign aid policy,” “international development” and US expansionism and has, itself, gone through many incarnations, most recently as a doctrine of “free trade” in agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement and those of the trade round of talks characterizing the World Trade Organization activities.

It is these overly rationalist and functionalist premises that interpret “economic growth” on a naïve, unreflective, rationalist philosophy of history picturing world progress as driven by a Western historical process motivated by the values of “freedom,” (technical) “progress” and (technical) “rationality” that have come under increasing scrutiny and have been highlighted under the conditions of globalization. This is the case even for the great developmental economist Amartya Sen (1999). The way in which economic development theory as a world narrative tended to ignore the most obvious aspects of its ideological purpose deserves comment. It also requires a critique based on aspects internal to the discipline itself. In particular, the notion of rationality and its role in mainstream economics with the revival of homo economicus in rational choice theory has been subject to devastating critique. The rationality assumption of neoclassical economics has been subject to scathing treatment, for instance, by Vivian Walsh (1996) in his *Rationality, Allocation and Reproduction*. He has shown how neoclassical economics, which prided itself on its neutrality and its avoidance of all metaphysical assumptions, was merely adopting one of its latest forms, the metaphysics of logical positivism. The distinguished Harvard philosopher, Hilary Putnam (2002), has recently reviewed the history and collapse of the fact/value distinction at the heart of positivist science and economics to argue that science itself presupposes values, albeit epistemic ones, that fall into the same boat as ethical ones when it comes to questions of “objectivity.” He also effectively critiques the “completeness” assumption of rational choice theory. Philosophy and ethics are thus closer to economics than most mainstream economists would admit.

It is clear that assumptions governing disciplinary perspectives are not often examined. They operate as taken-for-granted starting points, the hard core of theory based on values, as Thomas Kuhn has argued, not open to philosophical scrutiny. And, in the realm of development studies, its prime object of study is first of all the discourse of Western developmentalism, based as it is on unexamined assumptions of cultural and cognitive Western superiority which were part of European colonialism and development, essentially as forms of economic growth based on the global expansion of the capitalist system since the nineteenth century. Where theories of development closely modeled themselves on Western modernization and industrialization, Marxisit theories that took root with critiques of imperialism and colonialism provided accounts of “dependent development” and emphasized that modernity comes at a price. Yet both neoclassical and Marxist theories of growth and development shared a set of modernist assumptions
inherited from the Enlightenment; indeed, they shared assumptions of truth, reason, progress and freedom while interpreting these concepts differently and giving them different content within a broader theory of politics and change. Most recently, the modernity–postmodernity debate has been played out in development studies as in other disciplines. In particular, the challenge from postmodernism and postcolonialism has begun to impact development studies. As Peet & Hartwick (1999) explain:

Development theories differ according to the political positions of their adherents, their philosophical origins, and their place and time of construction. They differ also according to scientific orientation, that is, whether predominantly economic, sociological, anthropological, historical, or geographical. (p. 3)

They mark out a history of development from the viewpoint of geography, acknowledging without too much historical investigation that there is a deeper conceptual history tied to the Enlightenment and to Enlightenment values. They provide a rough chronological contemporary history of development, focusing on the primacy of economic theories of growth and development, sociological theories of modernization, Marxist and neo-Marxist theories, including dependency, world systems and regulation theories, post-structuralism, post-colonialism and post-developmentalism and feminist theories of development. They end by embracing “critical modernism,” based on the prospect of radical democracy and the possibility of alternative development. They assert a “critical modernism” against the post-structural critique of development, which considers developmentalism as a discourse. They argue: “Our allegiance is to an alternative development founded on a politics of radical democracy within a critical- and not post-modernism” (p. 87). Peet & Hartwick expand their view as follows:

Postdevelopmentalism rejects modern development; postmodernism evidences the most extreme scepticism about the modern project of human emancipation; and … we do not think that the “postings,” especially Derridean deconstruction, are heirs to the democratic commitments of the Enlightenment. (p. 87)

They add that Foucault’s power/knowledge applied as a critique of development by Escobar (1995) need not lead to the rejection of developmentalism in toto. Post-developmentalism based on Foucault, taking its inspiration from the thrust of decolonization theory, aided by new post-colonial emphasis on hybridization and the importance of culture, can take different forms and may still operate as a critique of modernization theory, rather than pointing the way forward to practical strategies for “development” in a world of globalization. Yet these political forms of post-developmentalism and “critical modernism” require a more nuanced interlacing culture, democracy and education and with their radical decolonization (see Hoogvelt, 2001; Schech & Haggis, 2000), especially in the context of the “knowledge economy” (Peters & Besley, 2006), where knowledge, research and education networks and the new paradigm of social (read also cultural) production
(Benkler, 2006; Willinsky, 2006) now promise unexamined possibilities for better access and interconnectedness in a global world. Of course to talk about “political development” separate from “economic development” only serves to highlight the palpable falsity of considering the alleged apolitical nature of economic development theory.

Fukuyama argues that in the mid- to late 1990s, a new development paradigm based on institutional economics associated with the work of Douglas North came to prominence. This view emphasizes how property rights, transaction costs and rule of law function as conditions of successful development. Fukuyama embraces this account and in particular endorses and recommends the shift to emphasizing the political dimensions of development which he describes as “the creation of formal state institutions of increasing complexity and scope that serve either to promote collective action or to mitigate social conflict” (p. 125). He regards it as a superset of “democracy promotion” and indicates that it is parallel to economic development “since the two are intertwined in a common process of modernization” (p. 125).

Political development, insofar as it is a coherent theory, is driven by three dimensions: the empirical link between economic development and democracy; a form of “evolutionary competition and emulation” where societies adopt institutions that promote development or justice; and, finally “there is simply no other legitimating set of ideas besides liberal democracy that is broadly accepted in the world today” (p. 130). While there is no grand theory at this point, there is a growing literature and accumulated experience. And he turns to examine the American experience, which is peppered with “few successes and a large number of failures” (p. 131). Fukuyama examines the cases of Germany and Japan (that already had strong state), the Philippines, Caribbean and Latin American countries under the Monroe doctrine, Bosnia, and Iraq. The first case of “successful transition” was Portugal under the influence of Germany. Fukuyama asserts that America played an important role in El Salvador (brokering the end to the civil war), the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Panama (an example of successful coercive regime change) and Poland (support for Solidarity).

Fukuyama traces the “afterthought” of development in Washington and its rise as “democracy promotion” after 9/11, where the objective should be “the promotion of good governance, not just democracy” (p. 140); that is, “liberal rule of law” is more important than democratic political participation. The US “should promote the economic development of poor countries both as an end in itself and as a complement to US efforts to consolidate this against the backdrop of economic growth” (p. 141). Yet US development assistance is comparatively the lowest in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as critics like Jeffrey Sachs (2005) have long pointed out. As Fukuyama argues, the most successful engine of institutional reform has been the European Union (EU) accession process. He also argues that, as well as the reconceptualization of development around the question of institutions, the US must reform its departments and agencies to promote “soft power” in contrast to military power. “Soft power” is Joseph Nye’s (2004) concept coined to describe the use of cultural or ideological means to indirectly influence foreign states rather than military or
economic power. Fukuyama documents not only the problem of institutional fragmentation, earmarked budgets and diminishing status (especially of US AID), but also lack of understanding of how to use “soft power.” Would it be too much to talk of the institutional failure of the most highly militarized donor state that is still living the legacy of Cold War politics?

In response to the application of these ideas to present day occupied Iraq, I am reminded first of George Santayana’s (1972) comment in *Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society and Government*:

> The authority that controlled the universal economy, if it were in American hands, would irresistibly tend to control education and training also. It might set up, as was once in the American zone in Germany, a cultural department, with ideological and political propaganda. The philanthropic passion for service would prompt social, if not legal intervention in the traditional life of all other nations, not only by selling there innumerable American products, but by recommending, if not imposing, American ways of living and thinking (p. 91).

And, also more recently, I am reminded of Benjamin R. Barber’s (2003) remark in *Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism’s Challenge to Democracy*:

> The most egregious globalization has been the exploitation and abuse of children in war, pornography, poverty, and sex tourism. Children have been soldiers and victims in the raging ethnic and religious wars; children are the majority of the global cohort that suffers poverty, disease and starvation. Children are our terrorists-to-be because they are so obviously not our citizens to come (p. xxvii).

As I argued in my introduction to *Education, Globalization and Education in the Age of Terrorism* (Peters, 2004):

> Benjamin R. Barber’s [2003] *Jihad vs. McWorld*, originally published in 1995, explains the confrontation between two worlds as a struggle that has put into question the “seemingly ineluctable march” of a secularized, free-market, commercialized and materialist McWorld “into a complacent postmodernity” (p. xi). His major argument is that the modern response to the clash between Jihad and McWorld—a trope echoing Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”— cannot be simply military but “must entail a commitment to democracy and justice even when they are in tension with the commitment to cultural expansionism and global markets” (xi-xii). Democracy is the instrument, Barber argues, by which we can avoid the choice between “a sterile cultural monism (McWorld) and a raging cultural fundamentalism (Jihad)” (xiii). (p. 3)

I agreed with Barber suggesting that the fundamental challenge for the West and for Western education is in promoting a form of political education that highlights and takes into account Barber’s remark that “children are our terrorists-to-be because they are so obviously not our citizens to come.” But then, as I argued, it
MICHAEL A. PETERS

would have to be a form of political education that is not based on the logic of conversion or crass assimilation to American or Western values but to an as-yet unformulated ethos of a world civic space and concept of world citizenship. Such a vision may not be based on a simple projection of Kant’s “perpetual peace,” although it might invoke a kind of cosmopolitanism that can still be shaped through participation, dialogue and exchange of world cultures.

I went on to say, that in a world split between Jihad and McWorld, the question of education in its two dominant political forms—multiculturalism and citizenship education—can no longer be viewed simply as “therapies” of the modern state designed to enhance the workings of a pluralistic political culture. More radically, education must actively reach beyond the confines of the modern state and the project of nation building to establish an orientation to the Other in cultural and political terms as a basis of a new internationalism and world civic culture. The question is what forms “democratic education” should take in this context and whether education can help steer a course between mutually unacceptable alternatives. Certainly, the promise of Western education in the longer term is more to do with renouncing its ethnocentrism in order to debate with other cultural and educational traditions philosophical and theological questions concerning religious faith and its role in the political order and in the process of modernization. The Western academy must promote Islamic studies, Arabic languages, and engage with Islamic scholars on a broad range of topics. Ultimately, in this inter-generational struggle, philosophy and theology are more powerful tools of mutual transformation than bombs, missiles and military force (see Peters, 2004, p. 3–4).

FUKUYAMA ON WILSONIAN REALISM

In “Rethinking Institutions for World Order” (Chapter 6), Fukuyama reviews the now standard criticisms of the U.N. and the lack of “horizontal accountability” among states. He suggests that “a world of multiple competing and partially overlapping international institutions has already started to take shape over the past decades” (p. 163) that nevertheless faces the dilemma that institutions regarded as legitimate are not greatly effective and vice versa. He provides a design continuum where

at one end are formal, traditional, treaty-based international organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank, and the NATO alliance that correspond to what most people think of when they use the word multilateralism. These institutions are created by sovereign states that delegate powers to international organizations in formal legal agreements. They are transparent insofar as their rules have been explicitly negotiated and agreed to, and they are accountable insofar as they can be disciplined by the states that originally created them.

At the other end of the spectrum are informal types of cooperation that are not legally grounded in international law, that at times involve parties that are

20
These international “soft law” institutions are exemplified in corporate codes, and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). Between the extremes are many other institutional possibilities, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), which coordinates more than a hundred national standard-setting bodies and forms of intergovernmental networks, often undertaken at intermediate levels issued in MOUs (memoranda of understandings). As Fukuyama points out, multilateralism already exists. Many are private/public collaborations that have emerged to foster different forms of technical and economic cooperation. The principled trade-off between legitimacy and effectiveness is difficult to make.

The question for Fukuyama is whether global order should be based on the sovereignty of states. In adopting this position, Fukuyama follows Jeremy Rabkin (2005), who argues that the value of international agreements such as the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol must be weighed against the threat they pose to liberties protected by strong national authority and institutions. He is worried that protection of these liberties might weaken US constitutional authority. The problem with this view, Fukuyama claims, is that it is “incompatible with a foreign policy that seeks to improve governance and promote democracy around the world” and also “sovereignty in Rabkin’s sense has been constantly violated throughout history” (p. 178) leading Stephen Krasner (2004) to call it “organized hypocrisy” and to argue for models of “shared sovereignty,” where the international community provide long-term help to improve governance. Fukuyama seems to agree with the direction in which Krasner is going and points to the example of the Chad-Cameroon gas pipeline, yet he also seems to have run out of ideas.

Finally, Fukuyama argues for "A Different Kind of American Foreign Policy" (chapter 7). The Iraq war has failed as an objective of US foreign policy: it has created a training ground for terrorism, bogged down the US military in the long-term, compromised the US’s ability to deal with Iran and North Korea, created a backlash against US imperialism and may even cause another cycle of withdrawal from world affairs. The answer is Wilsonian realism, which means “a dramatic demilitarization of American foreign policy and reemphasis on other types of policy instruments” (p. 184) and the promotion of both political and economic development “by focusing primarily on good governance, political accountability, democracy and strong institutions” (p. 185). Fukuyama argues “the most important way that American power can be exercised at this juncture is not through the exercise of military power but through the ability of the United States to shape international institutions” (p. 190).

One might question Fukuyama’s notion of realistic Wilsonianism on the basis of principle and values, or trace the inconsistencies in the development of his thought, especially since The End of History. On purely pragmatic grounds, it seems highly unlikely that the kind of demilitarization he calls for will take place, even though there are strong signs that Bush’s support is dwindling and that his administration is in disarray. Given the massive US military budget of $440 billion, the small
fraction of $1.4 billion (fiscal year 2005) budgeted for human rights and democracy programming seems a mere drop in the bucket. While President Bush has recently announced troop realignment, returning 70,000 troops and 100,000 family members and civilians to the US within a decade, this implies more of a consolidation of European bases and an increase to US presence in Eastern European countries like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Uzbekistan, with the stated aim of increasing the mobility and strategic flexibility of forces to respond to new threats. In early 2007, having sacked Rumsfeld, Bush increased US forces in Iraq by over 20,000 and critics suggested this was too little too late.

ASSESSING NEOCONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLES

On more principled grounds, one might take issue with each of the four neo-conservative principles that Fukuyama outlines early in America at the Crossroads. Is US hegemony really “benevolent?” Has it ever been so? The scepticism of international law and institutions and democracy promotion might also be explained differently. The US record since 1950 has been dubious in the extreme and its record of refusing to ratify a number of international treaties has caused Kenneth Roth (2000) to observe that while the American government has actually ratified a human rights treaty on a number of occasions, it did so by making sure the treaty will not have any impact on the US domestic scene. Indeed, while the US is supposedly joining the international human rights system, it still denies the same system the capacity to improve the rights of US citizens. With the whole world clearly seeing this problematic view of international human rights law by the American government, Roth (2000) continues, there is no doubt that the US will be seen as less of a sincere and reliable supporter of human rights around the globe, and that will surely diminish America’s moral influence and stature.

Roth goes on to record how the US entered reservations for a host of international covenants and conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Where it has signed and ratified treaties on human rights, its reporting practice is tardy and sketchy, which, as Roth indicates, is tantamount to a systematic refusal to apply international human rights law to itself. Human rights treaties are embraced only insofar as they codify existing US practice. The Treaty Database: A Monitor of US Participation in World Affairs (2004) has tracked the steady decline in US participation, noting that the US Senate has only ratified around 29 percent of existing international treaties, concluding that the disquieting phenomenon of the US’s reluctance to participate in multilateral treaties presents a clear threat to existing international law and stability.

Fukuyama’s neoconservative principle—“scepticism of international law and institutions”—begins to look very sad when pitted against the record of US practice and its reasons for withdrawal. Other scholars have argued that the Bush administration has “very significantly undermined the Nuremberg legacy, by departing from the rule of law, and openly flouting international law” (Levitt,
THE END OF DEVELOPMENT AS WE KNOW IT

2006), or that the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay at times amounts to torture and violates international law (UN, 2006).

In view of this record, US complacency, its violations, the recent neocon political assault on former Secretary General Kofi Annan and the U.N., and America’s clear intentions to erode existing international legal regimes and to resist the development of new ones, to the detriment of security, disarmament, international justice, human rights and protection of the environment, it is rather ironic that Fukuyama should either talk of a principled position or rest his case on the Rule of Law. Although it is one of the founders of the modern system of international law, the US, especially under the neoconservatives, has consistently withdrawn and resisted international law out of fear that such obligations will injure US interests and sovereignty. Nor so curiously, after September 11, the US appealed for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism in order to justify a decision already taken and what many now regard as an illegal and unjust war. In light of this experience and the failure of the US to live up to its international obligations of treaties it has ratified, Fukuyama’s principle begins to look very thin indeed. His focus on a theory of inter-institutionalism also seems more like special pleading and an excuse for lack of moral leadership on international law than any real alternative program.

NOTE

While this essay does not directly address the “decolonizing democratic education alternative” mentioned in the first paragraph, it has important educational implications in as much as it provides an important intellectual counterweight to the neo-conservative constructions of democracy in the post-9/11 era.

REFERENCES


Michael A. Peters


Michael A. Peters

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign