The focus of this book is on building on current liberal understandings of democratic education as espoused in the ideas of Seyla Benhabib, Eamon Callan, Martha Nussbaum, Iris Marion Young and Amy Gutmann, and then examines its implications for pedagogical encounters, more specifically teaching and learning. In other words, pedagogical encounters premised on the idea of iterations (talking back) and reasonable and compassionate action are not enough to engender forms of human engagement that can open up new possibilities and perspectives. Drawing on the works of poststructuralist theorists, in particular the seminal thoughts of Jacques Derrida, Jacques Rancière, Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Lacan, Stanley Cavell, Maxine Greene, Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and Judith Butler, it is argued that a democratic education in becoming has the potential to rupture pedagogical encounters towards new beginnings on the basis that teachers and students can never know with certainty and completeness. Consequently, it is argued that teaching and learning ought to be associated with pedagogical activities in the making, more specifically a pedagogy out of bounds, in terms of which speech and action would remain positively free, sceptically critical, and responsibly vigilant – a matter of making teaching and learning more authentic so that students and teachers are provoked to see things as they could be otherwise through an enhanced form of ethical and political imagination. It is through pedagogical encounters out of bounds that relations between teachers and students stand a better chance of dealing with the strangeness and mysteries of unexpected, unfamiliar, and improbable action.
Pedagogy Out of Bounds
EDUCATIONAL FUTURES
RETHINKING THEORY AND PRACTICE
Volume 63

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Pedagogy Out of Bounds

Untamed Variations of Democratic Education

By

Yusef Waghid
Stellenbosch University, Matieland, South Africa
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This book reflects my engagement with poststructuralist thought with the aim to think differently about democracy and education in relation to pedagogical encounters. I remain indebted to Michael A. Peters for considering this research project worthy of a book publication. His insightful and judicious comments during conversations in the short while we were both at the University of Waikato during my research sabbatical played a major part in this book reaching fruition. I am grateful to have encountered an unselfish and exemplary individual like Michael. Three other individuals who have been instrumental in shaping my thoughts about democratic education also deserve special mention as persons who supported important initiatives in relation to my encounters with them: Paul Smeyers, David Aspin and Gert Biesta have always been very responsive and supportive of the work I have been doing in relation to democracy and education. Likewise, the intellectual journey through this book would have been unthinkable if I did not encounter the likes of Penny Enslin, Shirley Pendlebury, Nic Burbules, Michael Katz, Eamonn Callan, Ron Glass, Christine Mayer, N’Dri Assié-Lumumba, Hanan Alexander, Tina Besley, Bob Davis, Jim Conroy, David Bridges, Arnetha Ball, Gerhard Zecha, Nesta Devine, Denis Phillips, Barbara Thayer-Bacon, Judith Chapman, Hope Leichter, Esther Serok, Philip Higgs and Zehavit Gross – astute intellectuals in their own right who taught me through their engagements much there is to know about democratic education. Appreciation also goes to my colleague Nuraan Davids, whose comments on an earlier draft of this book confirmed that the relationship between democracy and education is always in becoming. I am also indebted to Marisa Honey for helping untangle the language twists and turns in an earlier draft of the manuscript, and for all the other suggestions she has made to improve the manuscript’s coherence.

I acknowledge the support of the National Research Foundation and Stellenbosch University in South Africa for affording me the opportunity to work on democracy and education. I am privileged to work in the Department of Education Policy Studies in the Faculty of Education at Stellenbosch University, where the project of democracy and education has been perpetuated for the last two decades. Much praise should go to the philosophy of education communities nurtured through INPE (International Network of Philosophers of Education), PESGB (Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain) and PESA (Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia), whose conferences, where insightful ideas are espoused, have always enriched my thinking about democracy and education. The Democratic Citizenship Education Special Interest Group (SIG) of the American Educational Research Association (AERA) deserves much commendation for the opportunities they afforded me to present some of my thoughts on democracy, citizenship and education.

The ideas developed in this book are perpetually in becoming. I have borrowed several ideas from poststructuralist scholars, but my gratitude goes in particular to...
Giorgio Agamben (the radical Italian philosopher), Jacques Derrida (the brilliant French philosopher and literary scholar) and Maxine Greene (one of the foremost philosophers of education in the modern age), for teaching me through their seminal texts (The coming community, The politics of friendship, and Variations of a blue guitar respectively) to look at notions of democratic education as they could be otherwise.

My gratitude to all of the abovementioned colleagues and institutions is bottomless.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FOREWORD

Thanks to the innovative set of concepts that the author equips us with, this new book by Yusef Waghid injects a fresh spirit and inspiration into the educational philosophical literature. Delving into the research literature engaging with democratic education underlines that, even in our time—the Third Millennium, there is discernible and strong dissatisfaction among educators, philosophers and researchers in the field of democratic education. This is caused by the division between theories of democratic education that initially seemed promising— even ideal—and their practical implementation in the field of education. This divide between educational practices, and verbose theories and noble intentions, seems to be widening. Against this backdrop, the innovative and impressive work by Waghid, dealing with a *Pedagogy out of bounds*, calls for “stepping out of the box” and makes a significant contribution to dealing with that divide in diverse and challenging manners. It is a milestone on the road to redesigning the conceptual and practical aspects of democratic education and democratic culture.

The notion of democratic culture can be explained through the UN definition of a culture of peace. The United Nations defined a culture of peace as a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes in order to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation between individuals, groups and nations. A democratic culture is a hermeneutic process that involves continual adaptation, criticism and reflection. Kluckhohn (1951, p. 86) argues that

Culture consists of patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts, the essential core of culture consists of traditional (that is historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values.

Hofstede has enlarged the scope of this definition to adapt it to different settings and contexts. Hence, culture is perceived in his terminology as ‘the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another’ (Hofstede, 1991, p. 5). This conception implies that culture is a multi-layered entity that is contextually bound. Inherently, democratic culture has complex aspects of critical and autonomous thinking, wide-ranging education, political engagement, the experiencing of choice, freedom and responsibility, values education, education for pluralism, for accepting the Other, caring and nurturing responsibility for the weak and needy, a supreme commitment to human dignity, equality between people, and the uncompromising aspiration for justice. Within these understandings there is consensus in the literature engaging with democratic education that, in order to nurture students with a democratic personality, it is simply not enough to impart factual frontal knowledge to students: we must work to shape a democratic culture.
Waghid’s book offers an innovative conceptual system that is capable of nurturing a democratic culture in the deepest and broadest sense. He actually ‘re-signifies’ openness as ‘becoming’, while ‘couching’ the notion of dissonance and impossibility. Following Morrow’s metaphor of ‘bounds’, Waghid urges us to stretch our parochial limits, overcome psychological barriers and put an end to the perpetual convergence between democracy and education, which will enable us to navigate towards new educational horizons. In doing so, Waghid is ahead of his time because he asks for a paradigm shift through his analysis of the superficiality of liberal approaches to democratic education. According to his perception, a liberal conception of democratic education might not be disruptive enough to evoke and maximise students’ participation in pedagogical encounters. Waghid, a leading figure in the philosophy of education, advocates the need to extend democratic education towards the politics of friendship. He argues that this politics is the foundation of the culture of democracy. Following the Derridian assertion of friendship, Waghid suggests a kind of friendship that can guide democratic education in such a way that the potential of teachers and students can be evoked in pedagogical relations for the reason that disruption and provocation can cultivate ways of becoming commensurate with the possibility of seeing things anew. Waghid emphasises that the process in democratic education is important, rather than the final product. Hence, a major element of his argumentation is that democratic education involves the process of ‘becoming’, which is another foundation of the construction of democratic culture.

Waghid suggests the thought-provoking idea that democratic education implies that teachers and students are ‘coming into presence’ of one another on the grounds of exercising their intellectual equality. This symmetric approach requires that the teacher will ‘narrow’ him/herself in order to be able to contain the student as an equal creature that can share with them the same intellectual space. This can create a mutual process of becoming, which is the core of education. This process of becoming involves aspects of caring, as well as critical and reflective existential reasoning and deliberation. It raises scepticism and responsibility, which resonate with the practice of democratic education. It implies that sceptical pedagogical encounters establish possibilities to see things in intelligible and uncertain ways. Such encounters emphasise that teachers and students ought to demonstrate responsibility towards one another and remain conscious of human fallibility to enact tragic events, which in any case should be avoided.

Thus, Waghid suggests an innovative approach to democratic education to enhance what he calls ‘authentic learning’, which requires that teachers will enact their pedagogical roles as strangers. He believes that, when teachers remain more remote, they will become more open to the texts of students’ lived experiences. In this sense, the students themselves become the text that the teachers have to read, analyse and study, and the teachers are the texts that the students have to read, decode and encode. This is another form of mutuality that strengthens the process of becoming, which is based on symmetry and equality, thereby cultivating a sense of responsibility and caring alongside the fostering of a strong sense of justice. Waghid expands this notion and stretches it beyond the bounds by suggesting that,
through the original notion of ‘becoming minoritarian’, teachers and students can disrupt those forms of authoritarianism that potentially act as a threat to their ‘becoming’. Waghid attests that the end of teaching is that it should be linked to the idea of engaging students in colloquia where they learn to talk together in an atmosphere of (dis)trust and criticism in order to become critical enough to see things in imaginative and unfamiliar ways. This is also one of the constituents that constructs democratic culture, which needs to be fostered also through what Waghid calls the pedagogy and politics of counter-speech that make pedagogical encounters more inclusive. This paves the way for Waghid to cultivate what he calls pedagogy untamed: towards a democratic education of vigilance, which promotes attentive, ethical and culturally oriented action so that pedagogical encounters will remain out of the boxes.

Waghid concludes his original and excellent work with an analysis of the need to cultivate a pedagogy of hospitality after the demise of the repressive South African apartheid education. This book is a comprehensive, thoughtful, crafted analysis of a democratic education in becoming that is informed by disruption, rhizomatism, scepticism, positive liberty, (dis)trust, criticism, oppositional politics and vigilance. The innovative and challenging concepts that Waghid presents here make it possible to widen the canvas, push out the boundaries, and provide a broader understanding of the concept of democratic education, as well as democratic culture.

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REFERENCES

This book is inspired by four seminal texts. Firstly, Michael A. Peters and Peter Roberts’s (2012) *The virtues of openness: Education, science, and scholarship in the digital age* considers openness as a ‘virtue’ that promotes certain kinds of freedom, justice, forms of participation, transparency, sociality, collaboration, solidarity, and democratic education – all notions of human action that I attempt to expound on in this book in relation to developing the idea of a pedagogy out of bounds. Their elucidation of openness in relation to the complexities of open source, open access, open archiving and open publishing has some connection with ‘an ethic of participation and collaboration’ (Peters & Roberts, 2012, p. 2), in a similar way to how I tackled the notion of democratic education in becoming. In other words, a democratic education in becoming is always open, as it remains subjected to multiple ways of human engagement and, in the context of this book, copious pedagogical encounters. However, whereas Peters and Roberts offer a cogent argument in defence of openness as an ‘ethic of participation and peer-to-peer collaboration’ in relation to ‘the development of new open spaces of scholarship and their impact on open journal systems, peer review, open science, and the open digital economy’ (2012, p. 6), I borrow their idea of openness and recycle it in the context of democratic education – that is, I re-signify (to use a term coined by Judith Butler) ‘openness’ as becoming vis-à-vis the seminal works of Giorgio Agamben.

Secondly, Michael S. Katz, Susan Verducci and Gert Biesta’s (2009, p. 7, italics added) *Education, democracy, and the moral life* accentuates the pursuit of ‘sound educational theory in opposition … resulting in collisions [that] provide us with a different way of looking at the challenges and potential avenues for change in educating moral citizens’. My emphasis has been on the notion of potentiality (again drawing on Agamben) in much the same way the authors endeavoured to couch a notion of democratic education along the lines of dissonance and impossibility. In other words, in this book I borrowed the idea that democratic education can be otherwise – a contestation – in much the same way that Katz, Verducci and Biesta establish philosophical grounds for contradiction and the improbable.

Thirdly, Wally Morrow’s (2009) *Bounds of democracy: Epistemological access in higher education*, which uses the metaphor ‘bounds’, reflects a challenge to the notion that there should be an end to the perpetual relationship between democracy and education, and that unjustifiable intrusions that limit an enhancement of imaginative pedagogical practices should be bounded, as such intrusions will restrict new ways of such practices in the future. So, I used Morrow’s understanding of the metaphor ‘bounds’ and hence entitled this book *Pedagogy out of bounds*, in much the same way Morrow wanted to resist political, epistemological and metaphysical assumptions and parochial thinking that undermine an education for democracy.
Fourthly, and quite significantly, I have drawn on the main ideas of Maxine Greene’s (2001) *Variations on a blue guitar: The Lincoln Center Institute lectures on aesthetic education*, in which she uses phrases such as the following: ‘new ways of seeing’, ‘enlargement of possibility’, imaginative action’, ‘opening to alternative realities’, ‘charting our own ways’, ‘open questions in classroom dialogues’, ‘thinking of things as if they could be otherwise’, ‘the wonders of mystery’, ‘the power of incompleteness’, ‘... a place from which to perceive the unexplored’, and many more. These phrases resonate with a language of becoming and new beginnings to which I remain attracted enough for me to say today that the philosopher of education, Maxine Greene, was indeed ahead of her time. I am grateful to Hope Leichter for taking the time to show me around at Columbia University of New York’ Teachers College, and for giving me a complimentary copy of *Variations on a blue guitar*.

This book is organised around ten chapters and a postscript: Chapter 1, ‘On the thinness of liberal approaches to democratic education’, examines a liberal conception of democratic education that is intertwined with actions such as self-reflexive iterations, belligerent and distressful engagements, narrative pronouncements, compassionate imagining, just expressive freedoms, and caring, wherein the potentialities of students and teachers are evoked to the extent that conditions have been established whereby they (students and teachers) can engage in credible pedagogical encounters. The argument in this chapter is that reasonable, caring and compassionate speech seems to counteract the possibility of legitimate disruptive action that can be open to unforeseen and unpredictable pedagogical encounters. In other words, a liberal conception of democratic education might not be disruptive enough to evoke and maximise student participation in pedagogical encounters. Chapter 2, ‘Stretching democratic education towards a politics of friendship’, offers a Derridian account of friendship that can guide democratic education in such a way that the potentialities of teachers and students can be evoked in pedagogical relations for the reason that disruption and provocation can cultivate ways of becoming commensurate with the possibility of seeing things anew. Chapter 3, ‘Democratic education and disruptive encounters’, is concerned with the idea that teachers and students ‘coming into presence’ of one another do so on the grounds of exercising their intellectual equality. In other words, equality is considered as the starting point from which teachers and students present their speech as subjectivised selves who open up their thoughts to the world in iterative fashion. Chapter 4, ‘Democratic education in becoming: On potentiality and infancy’, makes a case for a teacher-and-student community-in-the-making where nothing is actualised, and where the potentiality for them to be ‘whatever beings in their singularity to co-belong within their impotentialities is possible. In terms of a democratic education in becoming, it is argued that the possibility is always there for both teachers and students to become others. Chapter 5, ‘Pedagogy, scepticism and responsibility’, argues that a Cavellian understanding of pedagogical encounters resonates with the practice of democratic education. It contends that sceptical pedagogical encounters establish possibilities to see things in intelligible and uncertain ways. Such encounters emphasise that teachers and students ought to
show responsibility towards one another, and to remain conscience of human fallibility to enact tragic events, which in any case should be avoided. Chapter 6, ‘Pedagogy and dialectic of freedom: Towards new beginnings’, looks at positive pedagogical encounters that engender authentic learning in terms of which students are provoked to see things as they could be otherwise through an enhanced form of ethical and political imagination. Authentic learning has in mind teachers enacting their pedagogical roles as strangers. That is, when teachers remain strange they hopefully will become more open to the texts of students’ lived experiences.

Chapter 7, ‘Pedagogy within rhizomatic spaces: On becoming-minoritarian’, posits that a Deleuzean-Guattarian conception of rhizomatic thought has an impact on pedagogical encounters along the lines of possibilities that can further enhance open pedagogical encounters between teachers and students. In addition, the chapter focuses on the notion of ‘becoming-minoritarian’ teachers and students to disrupt those forms of authoritarianism that potentially act as a threat to their becoming. Chapter 8, ‘Pedagogy and the end of teaching’, argues that the end of teaching in a Lacanian way should be linked to the idea of engaging students in colloquia where they learn to talk together in an atmosphere of (dis)trust and criticism so that they become critical enough to see things in imaginative and unfamiliar ways.

Chapter 9, ‘Pedagogy and a politics of counter-speech’, makes an argument for counter-speech as a way to make pedagogical encounters more inclusive. If hate speech were to be left uncontested it would preclude the possibility that teachers and students iterate speech, which would enable them to (re)construct a language that defuses the power of hate speech. Chapter 10, ‘Pedagogy untamed: Towards a democratic education of vigilance’, makes the move that a democratic education of vigilance promotes attentive, ethical and culturally oriented action so that pedagogical encounters will remain perpetually out of bounds. The postscript, ‘Unbounded teaching and learning: On hospitality and ubuntu in South Africa’, offers an account of how democratic education in South Africa can be more favourably articulated in relation to remedying dysfunctionality in public schools. It is argued that a pedagogy of hospitality (hospitality and hostility) and ubuntu (humaneness) ought to be cultivated to adequately address the widespread dysfunctionality that permeates South African public schooling, even after the demise of the repressive education under apartheid.

This is a book that builds on liberal understandings of democratic education in order to articulate a democratic education in becoming – one that is informed by disruption, rhizomaticism, scepticism, positive liberty, (dis)trust, criticism, oppositional politics and vigilance. It aims not only to analyse a democratic education in becoming, but also to offer unforeseen possibilities for pedagogical encounters.
CHAPTER 1

RAISING DOUBTS ABOUT LIBERAL APPROACHES TO DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

Liberal conceptions of democratic education abound. Most notably, the seminal thoughts of Seyla Benhabib (1996, 2011), Eamonn Callan (1997), Iris Marion Young (2000), Martha Nussbaum (2000, 2001), Amy Gutmann (2003) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1999) will be re-considered and challenged to foreground the thinness associated with a liberal understanding of democratic education. It might seem rather odd to highlight some of the weaknesses in the aforementioned theorists’ conceptions of liberal understandings of democratic education, as in many ways they have actually stretched the concept beyond new bounds. Nevertheless, inasmuch as this chapter is concerned with their phenomenal contributions to theories in and about democratic education, it also raises doubts about their conceptions of democratic education which, as I shall show, lays the ground for the phrasing of democratic education in becoming. In other words, I argue that liberal forms of democratic education are insufficient to maximise their engagements. Hence, a move is made to lay the groundwork for invoking more disruptive democratic encounters – those actions that can stretch the potentialities of democratic participants, and participation.

SELF-REFLEXIVE DEMOCRATIC ITERATIONS

Democratic education, as introduced by Benhabib (1996, p. 68), took a significant turn with a leaning towards ‘free and unconstrained public deliberation’ about matters in the public sphere. In other words, democratic education not only encourages free deliberation by people (say, teachers and students) in public institutions, but also unconstrained engagement by them as moral and political equals. For her, the basic idea of public deliberation as an instance of democratic education is constituted by two aspects: firstly, participation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry such that all participants have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate; and secondly, all participants have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are implemented (Benhabib, 1996, p. 70). In her words,

… [T]he reflexivity condition built into the model [of deliberative democracy] allows abuses and misapplications at the first level to be challenged at a second, metalevel of discourse. Likewise, the equal chance of all affected to initiate such discourse of deliberation suggests that no outcome
is prima facie fixed but can be revised and subjected to reexamination (Benhabib, 1996, p. 72).

What follows from the aforementioned is that deliberation is aimed at informing all participants that they can also lead individuals to advance critical reflection on their already held views and opinions, and exchange views with others. The procedure of deliberation involves articulating views that impose a certain amount of reflexivity on individuals’ preferences and opinions. Significantly, the practice of deliberation is governed by the art of persuading others of one another’s standpoints through the articulation of plausible, just and expedient reasons. And, once participants are persuaded, the condition of reflexivity is applied to ensure that abuses and misapplications of views are challenged and to make participants remain cognisant that no outcome of decisions taken is prima facie fixed and that it can be revised and subjected to re-examination (Benhabib, 1996, p. 72). The point is, deliberation occurs on the grounds of participants offering persuasive reasons, regardless of whether others might find these palatable or not. Yet the opportunity remains for participants to temporarily accept particular viewpoints and, on the grounds of revision and re-examination, actually rescind and/or amend previously held views or decisions taken on the basis of a previous consensus. That is, a conclusion ‘remain[s] valid until challenged by good reasons by some other group’ (Benhabib, 1996, p. 72).

Considering that democratic education is premised on the notion of deliberation, it further follows that non-coercion and non-final processes of opinion formation in unrestricted spaces in the public sphere should not silence dissent and curtail minority views. If this happens, consensus or unanimity of public issues would always remain subjected to the tyranny of the democratic majorities imposing their choices and norms on the minorities (Benhabib, 1996, p. 77). In fact, Benhabib (1996, p. 79) is quite insistent that public deliberation should allow ‘minorities and dissenters both the right to withhold their assent and the right to challenge the rules as well as the agenda of public debate’. Hence, democratic education, following Benhabib, is constituted by the availability of information when participants are engaged in both the expression of their arguments and the exchange of ideas; the revision and re-examination of opinions and beliefs on the basis that conclusions should be challenged and always subjected to a process of reflexive thinking; and the fact that dissent and minority opinions are not to be dismissed as a consequence of the tyranny of the majority. So, when teachers and students engage in deliberation they not only offer justifiable reasons for their opinions and beliefs, but also subject their ideas to the critique of one another. They are willing to take one another’s perspectives into systematic controversy with the aim to arrive at more plausible and expedient reasons. Likewise, teachers and students do not just disagree or reach a consensus as the final outcome of their deliberations. Rather, the outcomes of their decision making are amended and revised as a consequence of reflexivity holding sway. In the words of Benhabib (1996, p. 87),

… democratic education is informed by processes of public deliberation [that] have a claim to rationality because they increase and make available
necessary information … [that] allow the expression of arguments in the light of which opinions and beliefs need to be revised, and because they lead to the formation of conclusions that can be challenged publicly for good reasons … procedures [of deliberation] that allow self-referential critique of their own uses and abuses.

It is Benhabib’s insistence on democratic education as reflexive thought that causes her to extend the practice of public deliberation to a procedure that invokes the notion of iterations. Democratic iterations take place in communities of conversation intent on self-reflection and public defensiveness – that is, democratic iterations involve participants embarking on questioning, inclusivity, and equality of participation (Benhabib, 2011, p. 151). To question entails looking at things as they could be otherwise, and have not yet been considered; to be included means that participants’ rights to express their opinions freely should be respected; and to participate equally has in mind that participants’ voices should be listened to without them fearing intimidation. The procedure of listening, reflecting and articulating one’s views to gain attention and prominence is repeated until participants are satisfied that they have been listened to after having spoken in return – what Benhabib refers to as having talked back. In this regard, Benhabib (2011, p. 182) avers that ‘[t]he democratic dialogue … [is] enhanced through the repositioning and rearticulation of rights in the public spheres of liberal democracies’. Here, she specifically refers to examples of state repression, particularly in France, Turkey and Germany, against the banning of Muslim women’s headscarves in public, arguing that the individual’s right to freedom of conscience on account of her faith should not be subjected to state discrimination without being opposed, argued against repeatedly, reflected upon again as new counter-arguments surface, and offering a counter-response. In her words, ‘[t]he politics of the scarf has become a transnational struggle, revealing complex moves and counter-moves among ethno-cultural and religious groups, who mobilize around the symbolic markings of the female body, challenging the sovereignty of the secular state, and leading to difficult legal, and, in some cases, constitutional negotiations’ (2011, p. 172). The point that is being made is that democratic iterations cause a rupture in the patterns of thinking on the basis that views are taken into account, and reflected on, and that participants in disagreement with such views then respond by offering counter views.

Thus, democratic education framed along the lines of reflexive democratic iterations is constituted by practices that involve questioning and challenging, thinking and rethinking particular issues, engaging with one another on the basis of finding a reasonable consensus and, if disagreement prevails, the possibility is always there to work towards some common understanding – and yet this ought not necessarily be the goal. Although Benhabib insists on democratic iterations in which participants can talk back to one another on the basis of mutual respect and individual autonomy, she is not explicit on how participants can disrupt deliberations so as to provoke them to come up with more reasonable articulations, except for insisting that participants listen to one another, with the possibility that
they are always open to something new, and then to respond. Talking back iteratively might give participants in a deliberation the opportunity to say things again and again, but it does not mean that such talking would necessarily provoke them to see things anew. One can say the same thing over and over again, yet would not necessarily see the point differently. It might happen still that things could be seen anew; however, this kind of reflexive iterative talk would delay the emergence of ideas as if they could be otherwise in the sense that much time would have elapsed before the participants come up with something different and more tenable than their previously held views. In other words, democratic iterations are not provocative enough. Hence, for an understanding of democratic education of a provocative kind, I turn to the thoughts of Callan (1997).

**BELIGERENCE AND DISTRESS IN DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENTS**

Callan offers an account of democratic education that is instigated by ‘real moral dialogue, as opposed to carefully policed conversations about the meaning of some moral orthodoxy’ (1997, p. 201). Moral dialogue, in his view, cannot occur ‘without the risk of offence, [because] an offence-free school would oblige us to eschew dialogue’ (Callan, 1997, p. 202). In other words, democratic dialogue of a moral kind is informed by the practice in which students can speak their minds and no one has the right to silence dissent (Callan, 1997, p. 209). By implication, democratic dialogue must be characterised by a certain belligerence whereby truth has to unfold as a consequence of a rough process of struggle amongst participants, as well as distress – that is, a process of disturbing doubts about the importance of the differences between what participants (teachers and students) believe (Callan, 1997, p. 211). In his words,

> Ethical confrontation is the engine of collective moral enlightenment. Only by its means do we enjoy the opportunity of giving up uncritically held error in favour of truth. Without ethical confrontation, even the most profound moral truths are liable to ossify in the minds of those who subscribe to them. The persistent challenge of dissent sustains our personal investment in the truths that really matter and reminds us of their full significance by showing us vividly what it means to speak and live against them. (Callan, 1997, pp. 209-210)

What follows from the aforementioned is that democratic education is practised on the basis of a moral dialogue that is constituted by belligerence and distress – forms of ethical confrontation. Participants are provoked by rough and distressful encounters to bring out moral truths that eventually can give rise to conciliatory positions. And, a conciliation implies that participants do not engage in democratic dialogue to gain dialogical victory over one another, but rather attempt to find and enact terms of political co-existence that they can find reasonable and morally acceptable (Callan, 1997, p. 215). Such an account of democratic education foregrounds the practice of deliberation that will generate moral friction (belligerence) and distress (discomfort) with the aim to achieve moral conciliation.
It seems that, from belligerent and distressful democratic dialogue, participants are provoked into being open-minded, contend with a plurality of opinions, deal with controversies, and express themselves freely. In this way, people learn to think wisely, that is, agree to disagree about reasonable and unreasonable points of view. People hopefully will learn a judicious tolerance of ways of life that conflict with some of their demands (Callan, 1997, p. 221). Practising provocation in democratic dialogue with the intent to bring out conflicting viewpoints and to deal judiciously with such views can contribute towards a democratic education that undermines, for instance, ethnic hatred and religious intolerance – unpredictable human tendencies caused by disagreement, misunderstanding and intolerance towards difference and plurality. It is for this reason that ‘the dialogical task of common [belligerent and distressful] education is always a risky undertaking that many of us will regard with ambivalence at best’ (Callan, 1997, p. 22). Although I am somewhat reticent to dispel provocative dialogical encounters that are built on applying the practices of belligerence and distress, I share the ambivalence associated with such risky democratic encounters on the basis that some participants might be offended by exuberant provocations – perhaps inadvertently leading to the entrenchment of initially held beliefs or misperceptions. The point being made here is that, although democratic iterations have a better chance of resulting in something new – perhaps more plausible points of view, they do not rule out a possible exclusion of the other because too much provocation can result in some participants not experiencing the iteration as inclusive enough for them to remain participants in the deliberation. For example, people from cultural backgrounds in which there is an emphasis on listening to authority would find it even more difficult and inappropriate to be provoked into deeper thought if they are not engaged in a less threatening way. Although provocation is meant to bring out more nuanced speech on the part of participants, the possibility equally exists for such speech not to surface, which would in any case render the democratic iteration as superfluous. That is, provocation, particularly between less autonomous and eloquent participants, has the potential to exclude rather than to achieve deeper engagement with participants with the intent to be open to something new and different. Consequently, it seems prudent to expound on liberal democratic education further in relation to Iris Marion Young’s (2000) notion of inclusion through greeting, rhetoric and narratives – all aspects of participatory communicative engagement that have the potential to make provocative democratic forms of engagement less threatening and disruptive.

DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION THROUGH GREETING, RHETORIC AND NARRATIVE

Young’s (2000, p. 56) argument for internal democratic inclusion is premised on the notion that people are externally included in terms of numerical representation, yet they remain internally excluded because of the focus on argumentation and deliberation. In other words, democratic inclusion is often determined by aggregation – the number of participants who embark on deliberation – rather than also focusing on the participants’ association in relation to the levels of deliberative
engagement with one another. There might be several people who constitute a democracy on the basis that they are numerically included, yet they remain internally excluded because of their lack of a voice that will associate them with others in deliberation. For Young, ‘[p]eople’s contributions to a discussion tend to be excluded from serious consideration not because of what is said, but how it is said’ (2000, p. 56). So, participants can be present numerically in a deliberation, but this does not mean that they are necessarily internally included, on the grounds that a specific norm of ‘articulateness’ tends to devalue the claims some people make and the often incoherent reasons they offer. And, if such ‘articulateness’ is framed according to rules of belligerence and distress, some participants might become even more internally excluded on account of not offering, or being able to offer, provocative articulations. They simply would be stunned into silence by provocative utterances that would enhance their internal inclusion – that is, they are participating in the deliberation on the basis of sheer numbers, but they are not deliberatively engaged because they are excluded on account of their lack of voice – that is, the ability to say something in their own way that can be found palatable by others in the deliberation. In her words,

A more complete account of models of political communication not only remedies exclusionary tendencies in deliberative practices, but more positively describes some specific ways that communicatively democratic processes can produce respect and trust, make possible understanding across structural and cultural difference, and motivate acceptance and action. (Young, 2000, p. 57)

By implication, Young offers practices of greeting, rhetoric and narrative as ways of speech that can enrich any form of public deliberation. Firstly, greeting or public acknowledgement refers to those moments in everyday communication when people acknowledge one another in their particularity – that is, through saying, for instance, ‘Hello’, ‘Good-bye’ or ‘See you later’, as well as other forms of speech ‘that often lubricate discussion with wild forms of flattery, stroking of egos, deference, and politeness’, the potential for bonding on the part of participants in the democratic deliberation is highly likely (Young, 2000, p. 58). Through greeting, Young avers, ‘a speaker announces her presence as ready to listen and take responsibility for her relationship to her interlocutors, at the same time that it announces her distance from others, their irreducible particularity’ (Young, 2000, p. 59). The purpose of greeting in a democratic deliberation is aimed at people recognising one another’s presence so that they can take one another’s opinion seriously; secondly, democratic inclusion can also be secured through the affirmation of rhetoric. Rhetoric is concerned with the manner in which content is communicated, usually in a way that produces specific effects on listeners. Such effects can include the following: the emotional tone of the discourse – whether its content is passionate expressions; the use of figures of speech, such as simile, metaphor, puns, etc.; forms of making a point without speech, such as visual media, signs and banners, and street demonstrations; and other embodied and stylistic aspects of communication (Young, 2000, p. 65). In Young’s words, ‘[t]he
good rhetorician is one who attempts to persuade listeners by orienting proposals and arguments towards their collective and plural interests and desires, inviting them to transform these in the service of making a judgment together …’ (2000, p. 69); thirdly, giving voice to testimonios or stories people narrate can prevent exclusion from the deliberation. Relying on democratic deliberation alone, especially that intertwined with belligerence and distressful acts, can lead to the exclusion and silencing of others. However, if recognition is given to the fact that participants can also tell stories of their own lives and histories, this would enable listeners to learn from them, and especially from the situational knowledge associated with those who speak. In this way, narratives could allow both listeners and speakers in the democratic deliberation to develop an enlarged thought that can transform their thinking about public issues (Young, 2000, p. 76). In essence, greeting, rhetoric and narrative do not represent a substitute for argumentation. Yet these acts can contribute to, and assist participants in, the democratic deliberation to engage one another, rather than dismissing one another – often through roughness and distressful encounters. Whereas Benhabib and Callan make the case for democratic iterations and provocative, distressful engagements respectively, Young offers a view of communicative action that can keep participants engaged in deliberations through greeting, rhetoric and narrative. However, what Benhabib, Callan and Young seemingly do not consider is that people engaged deliberatively and iteratively in communication do not do so only on account of their modes of reasonable speech – as deliberative iterations, provocation and distress, and greeting, rhetoric and narrative can be considered as moments in which reasonable speech unfolds. In fact, people also engage in deliberative iterations on account of emotional states of mind, that is their feelings, convictions, passions and innuendos; more specifically, their emotions. Put differently, deliberative democratic education does not only have a reasonable side; rather, it is also influenced by people’s emotions. For this reason, liberal democratic education has taken on a different form – one that allows for compassionate action as complementary to reasonable action. It is to such a discussion that I now turn.

COMPASSIONATE DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

Democratic education, following Nussbaum (2000, p. 85), ‘must also cultivate in ourselves a capacity for sympathetic imagination that will enable us to comprehend the motives and choices of people different from ourselves … sharing many problems and possibilities with us’. And, when people begin to grasp an understanding of others’ problems and challenges they become capable of compassion, which, for Nussbaum, involves ‘the recognition that another person, in some ways similar to oneself, has suffered some significant pain or misfortune in a way for which that person is not, or not fully, to blame’ (2000, p. 91). In other words, compassionate imagining is a practice whereby a person recognises the vulnerabilities another person experiences and, by putting oneself in the shoes of someone else who is vulnerable, acts compassionately towards that person. Such a view of compassionate imagining extends the notion of democratic education
beyond understandings of reasonableness. Democratic education thus becomes a practice that is equally concerned with the ways arguments are proffered and the emotional responses involved in connecting with others. As aptly stated by Nussbaum (2000, p. 91): ‘Compassion requires one thing more: a sense of one’s own vulnerability to misfortune. To respond with compassion, I must be willing to entertain the thought that this suffering person might be me’ – hence, bringing into play the emotional encounters one experiences in relation to another.

The upshot of the aforementioned understanding of compassionate imagining is that the practice can contribute towards enhancing deliberation between students and teachers. Nussbaum’s position is that compassion ought to be the emotion that should most frequently ‘provide a good foundation for rational deliberation and appropriate action in public as well as private life’ (2001, p. 299). For her, rational deliberation ought to be occasioned by the emotion to treat others justly and humanely – with compassion. In diverse and pluralist communities, people certainly make judgements about others’ suffering, disability, distress, undeserved misfortune, injustice and disease. It is in this regard that compassion becomes a necessary condition to deliberate about such matters. Why? Because compassion not only prompts in people an awareness of the misfortune or suffering of others, but also pushes the boundaries of the self outward by focusing on others’ suffering that might be the result of no fault of their own. In other words, a person can assume responsibility for his misfortune, for instance a compulsive gambler who loses his money and home on a wager. On the other hand, a person who is a victim of a landmine and loses her limbs might not be responsible for her disability and suffering. Nussbaum’s (2001) understanding of compassion as painful emotional judgement embodies at least two cognitive requirements: firstly, a belief or appraisal that the suffering of others is serious and not trivial, and that people do not deserve the suffering; and secondly, the belief that the possibilities of the person who experiences the emotion are similar to those of the sufferer. In her words,

Compassion requires, then, a notion of responsibility and blame. It also requires, as we can now see, the belief that there are serious bad things that my happen to people through no fault of their own, or beyond their fault. In having compassion for another, the compassionate person accepts, then, a certain picture of the world, a picture according to which the valuable things are not always safely under a person’s own control, but can in some ways be damaged by fortune. (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 314-315)

I shall now discuss these two requirements of compassion in relation to how students and teachers ought to deliberate rationally, yet simultaneously cultivating in them the concern to be just and humane towards others.

Firstly, insofar as one can become serious about the suffering of others, one believes them to be without blame for the kind of undeserved injustice they might have suffered, and one therefore recognises that the person’s plight needs to be alleviated. Many students who are perhaps blameless for their inability to pay school fees due to their parents not having enjoyed economic prosperity after
decades of apartheid require the compassion of others. In such circumstances, deliberation at school should rather take the form of ascertaining what could be done to ensure that students who do not have the finances to study remain part of the school community, rather than finding ways to penalise or at times humiliate them. So compassion requires blamelessness on the part of students who are unable to pay school fees. Similarly, a teacher shows compassion for students with an impoverished schooling background not necessarily of their own creation (students who come to school without the necessary stationery, or who struggle to learn because they have not eaten for the day, as is commonly the case in some South African schools). Such a teacher recognises the need to find creative ways to assist disadvantaged students to come to grips with difficult concepts in their studies, and at the same time acknowledges that the unjust education system that these students might have been exposed to is no fault of their own. Of course, although the education system in South Africa might have been transformed away from its repressive apartheid history that emphasised rote learning and memorisation, because it was envisaged that students and teachers should not question and challenge, the new education system, which is geared towards prescription and control, equally puts learning at risks in this rising consumerist society. One could argue that all students should be treated equally and that no student should receive preferential treatment in terms of additional pedagogical support, or otherwise. But then this would be to ignore the undeserved and unequal education many students, certainly in South Africa, have been or might still be subjected to, perhaps through no fault of their own. The point being raised is that compassionate action requires that people also deliberative iteratively about the conditions and experiences of vulnerability and suffering that seemingly thwart education that can engender just change. And, that teachers in particular should connect to the vulnerabilities of those students that might still be subjected to an education system that excludes – both materially and epistemologically – that is, students might not have the resources and cognitive capacities to deal with knowledge and understanding in transformative ways. Hence, teachers ought to put themselves in the shoes of students who continue to suffer vulnerability due to the persistent injustice that confronts them through their education.

Secondly, compassion is best cultivated if one acknowledges some sort of community between oneself and the other, understanding what it might mean for one to encounter possibilities and vulnerabilities similar to those of the sufferer: ‘[One] will learn compassion best if he [she] begins by focusing on their sufferings’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 317). Again, ‘in order for compassion to be present, the person must consider the suffering of another as a significant part of his or her own scheme of goals and ends. She must take that person’s ill as affecting her own flourishing. In effect, she must make herself vulnerable in the person of another’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 319). What this recognition of one’s own related vulnerability means is that students who might have a clear understanding of, say, concepts in a literature classroom and become impatient with their peers for not grasping such concepts, should imagine what it would mean for them to encounter difficulty with concepts. Likewise, a teacher teaching literature studies
should become more aware of what it means for learners to encounter epistemological difficulty. In the words of Nussbaum (2001, p. 319), ‘the recognition of one’s own related vulnerability is, then, an important and frequently an indispensable epistemological requirement for compassion in human beings’. Teachers show compassion towards students if they endeavour to see things from the students’ perspective. It might be that students perhaps do not grasp meanings and, instead of becoming irritated and annoyed with the students, the teachers demonstrate patience by listening to the difficulties students might encounter and such teachers then think of more appropriate ways to make students see the point – a matter of doing things differently because one recognises the vulnerability of another.

Hence, compassion brings to the fore the intellectual emotions of people in ethical deliberation. It is simply not sufficient to educate by just focusing on reasonableness and justification, without also cultivating compassion. Offering a justifiable reason prompts students and teachers to question meanings, imagine alternative possibilities, modify practical judgements, and foster respect and critical engagement – all aspects of democratic education of a deliberative and iterative kind. Yet, it seldom brings into play those emotions of people that are necessary to make it worthwhile to continue the deliberative engagement. If one is going to ignore the pedagogical vulnerabilities of the weak, very little will be done in the direction of emancipatory education. So, we also need compassionate students and teachers. But compassion in relation to democratic education, without also taking into account the lived experiences of those who suffer in our society, would also constrain democratic iterations that aim to improve the conditions of the marginalised other – a matter of doing justice towards the other. In other words, liberal education as espoused above is constituted by the following aspects: deliberative iteration, provocative and distressful engagement, communicative virtues that potentially include (internally) people, and compassionate imagining that is attentive to vulnerability. At the core of such democratic deliberative and iterative encounters, participants have in mind doing justice to the other for the reason that they remain in the quest for establishing more inclusive educational contexts. It is to a discussion of doing justice to the other vis-à-vis democratic education that I now turn.

DOING JUSTICE TO OTHERS THROUGH DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

If doing justice to the other is important to democratic education, then just democratic education, following Gutmann (2003, p. 26), respects the ethical agency of individuals, where ethical agency includes the capacities of individuals to live their lives as they see fit, yet consistent with respecting the equal freedoms of others; and their capacities to do justice to their societies and the world. At the heart of doing justice to others in democratic relations is to respect the liberty of all individuals ‘to live a decent life with a fair chance to choose among their preferred ways of life’ (Gutmann, 2003, p. 27). In other words, democratic relations should not have in mind coercing individuals into accepting the dominant views, but rather
enhancing their ‘civic equality, equal freedom, or opportunity’ to speak their minds (Gutmann, 2003, p. 200). In fact, excluding individuals on the grounds that they cannot express themselves freely, as well as discriminating against them on the basis of gender, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity or religion, are unwarranted sources of civic inequality that would deem democratic education unjust (Gutmann, 2003, p. 200). In the words of Gutmann (2003, p. 200),

Many voluntary groups do no injustice by excluding various people; they support the ability of free individuals to live their own lives as they see fit. Free individuals must be able to associate as they see fit within the limits of doing no injustice to others. Problems arise, however, when exclusions are unjust, and especially when the excluded individuals are among the most vulnerable in society and lack the same expressive freedom as those who are excluding them.

Expressive freedom that leads to preventing invidious discrimination is constitutive of democratic education. Yet, as cautioned by Gutmann (2003, p. 200), an advocacy for a particular point of view that cannot be separated from excluding others is tantamount to doing them an injustice. As aptly stated, ‘[f]ree expression must not become an unconstrained licence to discriminate’ (Gutmann, 2003, p. 200). I concur with Gutmann that unconstrained expressive freedom can limit what democratic education has in mind – that is, doing justice to all individuals, irrespective of such individuals’ association. In her words, ‘the morally relevant feature of justice-friendly associations is that they similarly recognize all people, regardless of ascriptive identities, as entitled to be treated as civic equals with equal freedom and opportunity’ (Gutmann, 2003, p. 204). Since democratic education is aimed at securing justice based on respect for persons and protection of their freedoms, the practice itself cannot permit unconstrained freedoms that discriminate against others. In fact, democratic education that is bound to give rise to just relations cannot be intolerant towards non-discrimination. The promise of democratic education premised on the idea of justice ‘is to grant individuals equal freedom and opportunity to live their lives as they see fit rather than to see their identities writ large in their very own society’ (Gutmann, 2003, p. 210). Hence, democratic education involves people connecting with one another without individuals discriminating against others on the basis of over-exuberant expressive freedoms. Expressive freedoms cannot be such as to discriminate against others on the basis of their ways of being – this in itself would undermine the just orientation of democratic education. Thus, it is apposite to consider the following non-discriminatory ways in which individuals in association can continue to engage one another democratically. Such individuals as agents of a just democratic education should do the following: publicly express what they consider an important aspect of their identity; conserve their culture, which they identify with the group; and fight against discrimination and other injustices (Gutmann, 2003, p. 210). However, the counter-argument can be used that excessive expression – often considered as hate speech – is commensurate with the liberty of some individuals. And, limiting their speech even if such speech is considered as doing an injustice to
others would not necessarily be an appropriate means to enact democratic education. Hence, even though Gutmann’s position sounds plausible it does make democratic education liable to exclusion, because others’ views are considered as undesirable for human engagement. Unless the addressee of hate speech, for instance, does not consider her as undesirable, assaultive or offensive to the addressee, it does not give democratic education in its current liberal form the edge to deal adequately with such speech acts. Therefore, something else has to be thought of in relation to countering offensive speech – a discussion that forms the central argument of a democratic education in becoming later on in the book (more specifically in Chapter 9, where the issue of counter-speech as in opposition to hate speech is dealt with). I shall now turn my attention to liberal democratic education vis-à-vis caring, as espoused in the seminal thoughts of Alasdair MacIntyre, for the reason that over-excessive speech is often articulated in the form of uncurbed freedom-of-speech acts because (as liberal democratic education intimates) people do not care enough for one another – an important aspect related to making liberal democratic education more liberal.

DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION AS AN ACT OF CARE

Unlike Gutmann, who makes a cogent case for constrained expressive freedom in democratic relations – although I do not necessarily share her position – MacIntyre (1999) advocates a view of democratic education that is premised on the practice of teachers and students indulging in caring relations. Intrinsic to the notion of democratic education is the practice of the virtue of caring. It is not enough for the teacher to be affectionate towards or attached to others (students), which caring promotes. One has to be affectionate towards or attached to a student in order to care. But this does not mean that one just has to please a student, even if one’s actions are not in the best interests of the student. A student might want to go kayaking in the calm water of a lake, and later race down a stream without having been educated to manoeuver the kayak backwards and sideways, or to cope with winds and other inclement weather conditions that put his kayaking at risk. It would please the student if the teacher allowed her to paddle the kayak, which might not be in the best interest of the student’s safety. If one is really to acquire the virtue of caring for others and not just being affectionate towards them, one needs to cultivate in others the capacity to reach their own justifiable conclusions to which they are to be held accountable by and to others for those conclusions – referred to by MacIntyre (1999, p. 83) as the ability to evaluate, modify or reject one’s own practical judgments. In his words,

What we need from others, if we are not only to exercise our initial animal capacities, but also to develop the capacities of independent practical reasoners, are those relationships necessary for fostering the ability to evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical judgments, to ask, that is, what we take to be good reasons for actions really are sufficiently good reasons, and the ability to imagine realistically alternative possible futures, so as to be able to make rational choices between them, and the ability to stand
back from our desires, so as to be able to enquire rationally what the pursuit of our good here and now requires and how our desires must be directed and, if necessary, reeducated, if we are to attain it. (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 83)

As the student is initiated into the procedures on entering and leaving, paddling, steering and portaging (carrying) a kayak, as well as about the seasonal conditions affecting kayaking, and how she needs to paddle skilfully, such as taking difficult decisions in inclement weather, she has been introduced to a practice of evaluating, modifying and rejecting her judgments concerning handling a kayak. The student is cared for if she received good education about kayaking, and has acquired ways to discover her own version of the sport. In turn, the student will act prudently, that is, she will act with care as her potential to kayak across the lake has been enhanced.

To come back to the point raised about the student who received a good education about kayaking – her teachers (parents or trainers) did not just impose on her their own understanding of kayaking, but allowed her the freedom of choice to reflect on, and to modify and sustain, the practice of handling a kayak. The student developed the capacity to make practical judgments when she encountered unforeseen possibilities in water; she could reasonably make decisions that would not necessarily endanger her life and the lives of other competitors and, after every major kayaking event, she would re-educate herself to become more competitive in kayaking competitions. Caring, then, does not merely involve cultivating in ourselves ‘degrees of affection’ toward others but, when we encourage others, also to develop capacities for evaluation and modification, that is, what others consider to be sufficiently good reasons for acting and to imagine alternative possibilities so as to be able to reasonably re-educate themselves, to become practical reasoners (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 83). By implication, teachers care for students when they (the teachers) encourage students to develop capacities of evaluation and modification, that is, when the students are taught to become reflective and independent members of their societies, as well as imbued with virtues that allow them to act imaginatively as individuals and members of groups. In this regard, MacIntyre makes the point that ‘contemporary teachers have the task of educating their students, so that those students will bring to the activities of their adult life questioning attitudes that will put them at odds with the moral temper of the age and with its dominant institutions’ (MacIntyre & Dunn, 2002, p. 3). In this way, students’ cognitive skills would not only be enhanced, but also nurtured.

The kind of care that individual, practical reasoners (teachers) practise will not only help others (students) to make reasonable choices, to be imaginative and to re-educate themselves, but also to trust and rely upon those from whom they have received care. This implies that both the givers and receivers of care, in the first place, have to engage justly in democratic deliberation with one another. Following MacIntyre (1999, p. 111) democratic deliberation ‘requires among other things, first that each of us speaks with candor, not pretending or deceiving or striking attitudes, and secondly that each takes up no more time than is justified by the importance of the point that she or he has to make and the arguments necessary for making it’. I want to elucidate some touchstones of democratic deliberation: candour, the importance of the point and arguments necessary for making it (the
Students and teachers engage deliberatively and iteratively in conversations when teachers do so with care because they want to evoke the potentialities of students to become caring (if not already) themselves. This implies that, when teachers and students act with honesty in responding decently to one another’s articulations, it is indicative of them (teachers and students) caring for one another. They do so with integrity to see one another’s points of view, otherwise they would not be in a position to respond candidly.

Considering the aforementioned touchstones of democratic deliberation, it emerges that the concept is both a view of human experience and a moral value that recommends a certain attitude and response to human engagement. On the one hand, as a moral value, democratic deliberation conceives of the relationship between the self and the other dialectically, that is, deliberation is the basis for engagement based on honesty, openness, sincerity, truthfulness – moral aspects that link strongly with the notion of candour. Candour implies that deliberations should not be understood as always pleasant, willing and sharing, but also as provocations, threats and resistances that involve being honest, open, sincere and truthful in order to evaluate and sometimes abandon or alter old ways (Fay, 1996, p. 233). On the other hand, democratic deliberation as a view of human experience encourages people to engage with their differences and to present arguments to justify the importance of the point in ways that explore possibilities for productive and positive learning from each other. This involves situations in which, in the words of Fay (1996, p. 234), ‘[p]eople can learn about others and from others, thereby not only learning about them and themselves but also opening up new possibilities for themselves and other(s) in the processes of engagement’. Hence, the point about democratic education practised in a caring way involves evoking the educational potentialities of students. A teacher, following MacIntyre, cares for a student if the former’s potentialities are evoked and the students can make reasonable judgements in her interest and those of others. Of course, the argument can be used why proponents of democratic iterations ought to care. However, if caring is not instituted in a liberal form of democratic education, human potentialities might not be evoked and the point of democratic engagements for cultivating justice in relations between people might not necessarily be forthcoming. What would the point of democratic education then be if deliberations and iterations cannot lead to treating one another justly? Gutmann’s view on curbing excessive speech that causes harm to others and MacIntyre’s idea of caring to evoke the potentialities of people therefore are both actions to enhance the desirability of democratic education. But this of course also is where democratic education in a way remains bounded, because curbing speech, especially where the potentialities of people are provoked to do otherwise, might be suspended and the point of democratic education would remain dubious. Therefore, the liberal notion of democratic education revisited above might not achieve the desirable effects of making education open-ended and iterative so that there always is the possibility to come to know more and to be – a thesis I shall expound on in the chapters that follow.
In sum, in this chapter I offered a liberal conception of democratic education that is intertwined with actions such as self-reflexive iterations, belligerent and distressful engagements, narrative pronouncements, compassionate imagining, just expressive freedoms, and caring. In all the aforementioned actions the potentialities of students and teachers are evoked to the extent that conditions have been established for them (the students and teachers) to encounter one another through reasonable speech, compassionate imagining, caring, and justice. Although democratic education is not blind to the practice of disruptive action, such as belligerent, distressful and rhetorical speech, it is its emphasis on reasonable, caring and compassionate speech that seems to counteract the possibility of legitimate disruptive action – action that possibly can open up the democratic forms of engagement to unforeseen and unpredictable encounters. The concern being raised here is that liberal conceptions of democratic education might not be disruptive enough to evoke and maximise student participation and the enactment of their moral imaginations. That is, liberal forms of democratic education might be too restrictive in advancing a more disruptive kind of democratic education that can ensure that both students and teachers take risks to work towards the improbable, the unexpected, or even the unheard of. For this reason, in the next chapter I turn to Jacques Derrida’s ‘politics of friendship’ in an attempt to move beyond the limitations imposed by liberal forms of democratic education.