Citizenship, Education and Violence
On Disrupted Potentialities and Becoming

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and

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The focus of this book is to offer a humane response to dealing with violence. An interpretive analysis is presented in order to think differently about violence in schools and about how a citizenship education of becoming can deal with the unpredictable consequences of violence in its own potentiality. It seems to the authors that, given the confident onslaught of violence, there is nothing left to do but to offer insight into the nature of violence itself and, by so doing, to search for unexplored ways of humane response and being. The authors are not pretending to hold a magic wand that will sanctify schools into the safe zones that they ought to be and as which they should serve in any society. This would be both presumptuous and misleading. What one is looking and hoping for, however, is a renewed engagement, a slight tilting of the perspective, so that something other than how we have always responded to violence perhaps will emerge. The authors are confident that such a deconstructive approach to violence in schools through the lens of a reconsidered view of citizenship education can assist them and others to wrestle with its potential for destruction that can be changed into options for co-belonging of a non-violent, if not peaceful, kind.
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Citizenship, Education and Violence

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FOREWORD

In the ABC Boyer Lectures that he delivered in 1997 Between Fear and Hope: Hybrid Thoughts on Public Values (1) Martin Krygier undertook a sustained analysis and exploration of the values that combined to define and constitute a decent form of life in today’s participative democracy. Included among the values that he saw as a figuring between fear and hope in shaping and characterising our democracy today, he discerned the following as key: law and government, tolerance, civility, responsibility, individual and community, survival and flourishing, freedom and restraint, nationalism and ethics, pride, shame and decency. He concluded that, in the ethics of our modern democracy, there is “room for them all and an important place for each”.

Around that time, Judith Chapman, Izak Froumin and others had worked with me to put together a collection of essays addressing the theme Creating and Managing the Democratic School (2). We tried to discern and explore some of the values listed among the norms and conventions of citizenship to be preferred, promulgated and practised in the new forms of democracy that were being promoted as key activities in educating institutions of this form of society. We attempted to define and delineate what we saw as shared and separate key features of the form of polity enjoyed by citizens in the well-established democracy of Australia and the then newly adopted and still developing democracy of Russia. We concluded that schools should have a clear commitment to the values and principles embodied in a philosophy of democratic citizenship as well as to its practices and procedures; and that the extension, communication and evaluation of public knowledge, together with a commitment to the increase of public welfare and of individual an social justice are among the prime values in education and democracy.

Now further increments of insight and understanding have been provided by Yusef Waghid and Nuraan Davids, who have taken inspiration from the adoption of a new form of citizenship in South Africa since 1994 and have argued that some recent developments in democracy impacting on the lives of citizens call for serious review and re-appraisal. One such feature that finds place in it, is the growth and appearance of forms of violence that threaten or militate against democracy’s positive elements and, in some of its forms, inhibit the lives and sense of community, confidence and self-esteem of its citizens. In this work Waghid and Davids utter a Cri de Coeur for the attention and consideration of policy-makers, educators and teachers working to promote a new model of education for citizenship, one that seeks to expand upon the current economistic concern for the cognitive in many education systems and schools, and elaborates and extends it into the realm of the social and the political. They are concerned to draw our attention to the inimical effects of the power and presence of all forms of violence on the function and direction of our educating agencies.
In this bold and important work Waghid and Davids are concerned to propose, explore and proffer a series of novel and thought-provoking contributions to the current debate about the nature, values and purposes of citizenship education and much of its current aims, emphases and orientations, with particular light thrown on its capacity to address and attack the intrusion and ill effects of the manifestation and forms of violence that we see in many parts of our societies and that affect adversely the work of our schools and educating institutions. They propose a set of approaches, initiatives and models for altering and redirecting much of the orientation of citizenship education in what they see as its potential for improving the gains of learners in life-altering directions. In this work Waghid and Davids have put forward for their readers:

• An explanation of how education – from school to university – in any modern state is in dire need of a re-orientation of those functions of its educating institutions concerned with the education of its future citizens. Their work has the potential to make a substantial contribution to the ideals and activities of citizenship education.
• It does so by making a serious and sustained contribution to the extension of thinking on this theme and thus to extending the reaches and potential applications of new work in the philosophy of education.
• It argues powerfully and convincingly in its endeavour to counteract and diminish the role currently played by the presence and effects of violence of all kinds in a nation’s schools
• It offers an informed investigation of the implications of the approaches and utility of citizenship education for supporting and advancing the imperatives of university courses in teacher education and classroom training practice.
• It develops a cogent and passionate critique of recent thinking in the critical field of citizenship education as a manifestation of the very best of thinking and writing in the philosophy of education worthy of adoption and adaptation in contemporary educational provision
• It provides an extended analysis and justification of the enhancement of moral, social and political values and processes emerging from educational theory and practice covering all aspects of the organisation, governance and application of citizenship learning as key parts of the nature, aims and purposes of educating institutions, both formal and informal, contributing to the formation of citizenship in a participative democracy.
• It develops a fine-drawn and detailed argument about the importance of non- and anti-violence approaches in enhancing the education of the attitudes and activities of the education of citizens, covering developments in schools, colleges, universities, vocational education and training, teacher education and research.
• Crucially, it raises the question as to whether a reconsidered view of citizenship education along approaches employing post-structuralist and post-critical lines and models might not suggest a way to address some of the issues about the place and power of violence that may arise in forms of pedagogy addressing the nature, aims and purposes of education for citizenship.
For teachers and educators active in these fields, this book will provide thought-provoking, demanding and refreshing reading.

Not the least of the virtues of this publication are to be found in its Appendices, where sets of provocative and stimulating scenarios are proposed for both teachers and learners to work through, in their own development and applications of the principal features and virtues of citizenship education. In a significant sense, some may see these test cases as the best part of their work – a real setting in which the motives and values of such an education are there to be worked out in the real situation in which learners may find themselves involved and needing to act.

Yusef Waghid and Nuraan Davids have done us all a signal service in the preparation and writing of this book. Their work has demonstrated a clear commitment to the emancipatory potential of citizenship learning and in particular towards its moral and social dimensions. Their argument is that the contemporary focus on education as the promotion of cognitive competencies, the transition to work and the role of vocationally useful attributes, whether for school leavers, graduates or adult learners in general, needs to be conceived more realistically and coherently as part of an ongoing and interactive process of citizenship education, one that will re-orient its approach in a direction where citizen attributes are prized and promoted. The community environment, they believe, can provide opportunities to build on and integrate learning gains in the social domain, already gained from classrooms, lectures, workplaces and community agencies of all kinds, into learning overall as a community concern. Seeking to ground learning in the roles, functions and activities of the citizen – and the inhibition or removal of violent intrusions on them - are, they argue, important parts of lifelong learning, as it is a site for personal and general forms of learning. In their view, such a re-direction will encourage the growth of further increments in our understanding and practice of the important part that can be played by adopting such an approach in the formation of a new philosophy of education for the education of citizens.

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REFERENCES
The thing about violence is that, while it might be consistent about its disruption, it is unsophisticated in who or why it harms. At times it is boldly evident in the flashing images of mutilated children caught in the Gaza conflict, or in the dead bodies of 34 miners at Marikana, or in the spine-chilling image of the Tunisian university graduate, or in the depiction of Malala Yousafzai being shot in the head by gunmen while riding on a bus to school in Pakistan, or in Mohamed Bouazzizi setting himself alight in Tahrir Square or, quite horrifically unbelievable, in the images of the killing of serving soldier Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich. At other times the violence is less bold, perhaps in disguise, but all the more cowardly. It is found in the fear-suppressed pain of the woman for whom the terms domestic and violence cannot be separated, in the suicide of the 14-year-old British girl because the violation of her dignity through the cruel passing around of a photograph of her performing oral sex on one of her peers proved just too much and, almost bizarrely, it is read in Amy Chau’s (2011) proud moment of discipline when she describes forcing her three-year-old daughter to stand outside in the bitter cold. Even in its misguidedness, then, an encounter with violence is more about a confrontation with who one is, and who one can or cannot be, than about the confrontation itself. As soul destroying as it can be, violence is about change – change in the one who perpetrates it, change in the one on whom it is inflicted, and change in those who are conflicted by what they witness. The world, therefore, is occupied by very few individuals who might claim never to have been touched by violence.

The authors’ images, memories, narrations and positions on violence have been formed by their witnessing of genocide, terror and mutilation in the news media, whether print or visual. More specifically, their memories of violence in schools go back to their years as students and then teachers in apartheid society – whether instigated by canons of teargas being sprayed into school premises by the apartheid police to disrupt protests and marches, or watching Al-Jazeera broadcasts on the suffering of victims of a nerve gas attack in Syria. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the ends of the wars in the Arabian Gulf and Bosnia, the collapse of the Oslo Accords, and the ‘war on terror’, which, although said to have been initiated to quell violence, actually emerged as ‘a staging ground for the next episode of broad-scale violence’ (Lawrence & Karim, 2007: 3). The demise of one of society’s greatest persecutions, South African apartheid, did not usher in the end of violence, as had been envisaged by most. People believed and hoped that the end of apartheid would end the insanity of violence, and that peace would define the new, democratic South Africa. Yet South Africa has seemingly become more violent – perhaps more apparently so, because in the absence of an oppressive regime, or the absence of any easily understood conflict, there can be no simple or justifiable reason for the
barrage of violence bombarding its society. Of greater concern is the perpetuation of violence at schools. That public schools in South Africa have become associated with stabbings, shootings, rapes, assault, humiliation and discrimination is deeply disturbing, but perhaps not that shocking. Schools, particularly those in apartheid-constructed communities, have always been sites of struggle, protest and violence. And so perhaps the forms of violence in a post-apartheid society have become more brutal, and less ideologically inspired, but there remains something equally strong (some would say, perverse and inhumane) that drives these acts. For now, much like the after-effects of a volcano that can simmer for years, violence in post-apartheid South African schools seems to remain intractable.

If William James, the quintessential American philosopher of the previous century, is right that violence is constitutive of human nature (1926: 258), then it makes sense for us – as native South Africans and as victims of apartheid – to offer a humane response to dealing with violence, the focus of this book. Our wish is not just to announce and renounce the violence in schools – since this would not offer much meaning or hope. It is especially hollow in the face of a growing list of statistics of both students and teachers facing untold horror in the classrooms and on the playgrounds of schools. In many instances, the renunciation of violence by education authorities and politicians, as teachers and parents will allege, has been a mere disguise for the abdication of responsibility for the violence. Whenever incidents of violence are made known to the education authorities, the response is always one of swift condemnation of the act, followed by an equally swift extension of sympathy to the victim and his or her family. The renunciation of violence in this pattern of response is devoid of understanding, and equally empty of pre-emptive recourse – routinely electing, instead, to dispatch a security guard, some electronic devices to detect weapons, or to offer conflict workshops for teachers who, in turn, are instructed to teach it to their students. Partly then in response to the violence, and partly in response to what we currently perceive to be an inadequate response by the education authorities, what we hope to offer is an interpretive analysis in order to think differently about violence in schools and about how a citizenship education of becoming can deal with the unpredictable consequences of violence in its own potentiality. It seems to us that, given the confident onslaught of violence, there is nothing left to do but to offer insight into the nature of violence itself and, by so doing, to search for unexplored ways of humane response and being. We are not pretending to hold a magic wand that will sanctify schools into the safe zones that they ought to be and as which they should serve in any society. This would be both presumptuous and misleading. What we are looking and hoping for, however, is a renewed engagement, a slight tilting of the perspective, so that something other than how we have always responded to violence perhaps will emerge. We are confident that such a deconstructive approach to violence in schools through the lens of a reconsidered view of citizenship education can assist us and others to wrestle with its potential for destruction that can be changed into options for co-belonging of a non-violent, if not peaceful, kind.
In recognising the expansive context that constitutes citizenship education, chapter one, ‘Current Understandings of Citizenship Education: Citizenship Education as a Deliberative, Compassionate and Responsible Encounter with the Other’, revisits some of the major contributions on citizenship education, in particular how the practices of deliberation, compassion and responsibility have guided the rights, responsibilities and belonging discourses that have been linked to citizenship education over the past two decades. In chapter two, ‘Rethinking Citizenship Education as a Pedagogical Encounter: On the Equal, Intelligible and Amateur Citizen’, the authors attempt to rethink citizenship education, and contend that the latter is first and foremost a pedagogical encounter intertwined with equality, intelligibility and amateurism—aspects that would situate citizenship education firmly within discourses of rights, responsibilities and belonging, and simultaneously open up pedagogical spaces for a citizenship education of becoming. In the exploration of ‘On Potentiality in Schools: Citizenship Education as Becoming’ in the third chapter, the authors’ focus is on opening up new possibilities for participation on the part of schools—an agenda that gives schools a potentiality that would strongly tie in with a renewed form of citizenship education that involves summoning others to speech, seeing things differently, and suspending a rush to judgement of issues. In chapter four the authors examine some of the impotentialities of violence, that is, what violence is not burgeoning. Firstly, we argue that, although violence is at times justified by some people, its problematic use against innocent others makes it potentially destructive and unbecoming. Secondly, the use of violence is considered by some as circumstantial and restricted to the achievement of short-term goals. Chapter five, in focusing ‘On Conflict and Violence in Schools’, examines conceptions of a violated citizenship and schools as sites of violation, and offers a re-considered view of violence in a post-apartheid democracy—one which offers unexplored options of summoning others to speech and being.

Chapter six marks the introduction of a different perspective on violence that draws on the experiences and reflections of teachers and principals. Entitled, ‘A Case Study on Cultivating Citizenship Education in Schools: An Empirical Initiative in Becoming’, the chapter reflects on the processes involved in the design, development and production of the ‘Re-imagining citizenship education manual’. In drawing on a specific project involving teachers, the authors argue that one way of dealing adequately with forms of violence in schools is to look differently at citizenship education. Chapter seven, ‘On the (Im)possibility of Building a Culture of Humanity and Responsibility in Schools: The South African Example of School Violence’, draws on conceptions of potentiality and becoming as avenues through which to (re)build a culture of humanity and responsibility not only in schools, but in all that constitutes them. It pays particular attention to specific educational policies on the cultivation of citizenship, through which to offer an amended version of responsibility and humanity is required, which the authors believe are necessary to enhance their becoming in public schools. By looking at the school as a ‘dis-enframed’ public space that is continually in dialogue with the communities and
human actors through which it is constituted, the final chapter, ‘Disrupting Violence in Schools – Establishing Potentially Becoming Schools for Citizenship Education’, offers a reconsidered view of citizenship education, one which has more to offer in terms of peaceful co-belonging and is couched in our unlimited potentiality for, and of, being. In conceding that violence in schools cannot be disrupted if citizenship education in schools is not being looked at differently – that is, if citizenship education is not being cultivated in its potentiality and its becoming, the chapter explores the conception of a ‘becoming school community’. The book concludes with a postscript in which the authors contend that a citizenship education of becoming can most appropriately be enacted within its own potentiality and impotentiality if educational leaders play a specific role. As such, they argue for a practice of authoritative caring, commensurate with the notion of ‘exemplars of the coming community’ that ought to unfold vis-à-vis educational leadership in schools if a reconsidered view of citizenship education were to be implemented.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS


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CURRENT LIBERAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Citizenship Education as a Deliberative, Compassionate and Responsible Encounter with the Other

INTRODUCTION

Literature on citizenship education abounds. In this chapter we do not intend to revisit the plethora of ideas presented on liberal conceptions of citizenship education, as that would be an arduous task on its own. Rather, we envisage to revisit some of the major contributions on citizenship education, in particular how the practices of deliberation, compassion and responsibility have guided the rights, responsibilities and belonging discourses that have been linked to citizenship education in the past two decades.

To begin with, we shall briefly examine the notion of citizenship education with reference to two significant collections published on the subject in 2008: The SAGE handbook of education for citizenship and democracy (edited by James Arthur, Ian Davies & Carole Hahn) and Global citizenship education: Philosophy, theory and pedagogy (edited by Michael A. Peters, Allan Britton & Harry Blee). Firstly, The SAGE handbook of education for citizenship and democracy comprises five sections and forty-two chapters dealing with themes such as key ideas underlying citizenship education; geographically based overviews – comparative research; key perspectives; characterisations and forms; and pedagogy. What is evident from the text is that democracy, citizenship and citizenship education ‘are complex, dynamic and controversial’ themes (Arthur et al., 2008: 1). The main concepts that seem to drive this text include globalisation, equity, democracy, diversity, justice, citizenship, education, culture, ethnicity, class and gender, teaching and learning. What becomes apparent from, and is important about the texts are the different ways in which citizenship is conceptualised – most significantly in relation to an individual’s legal and political status as connected to a nation state, identity, issues of practical engagement, as well as the guarantee of rights (Arthur et al., 2008: 1).

The text also emphasises that citizenship education is not just about knowledge transmission, but also about understanding and awareness: ‘Citizens need to know their rights, but they also need to know how these rights operate within a democracy. What students learn does not necessarily make them active citizens’ (Arthur et al., 2008: 7). On the one hand, our interest in citizenship education is to build
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on the knowledge, understanding, skills and dispositions that are connected to the public life of students in schools. On the other hand, by specifically exploring the conception of violence in relation to citizenship in public learning spaces we are also looking towards new meanings of understanding and encountering both violence and citizenship. In acknowledging the importance of building on the knowledge that is connected to the public life of students in schools, the editors, Arthur, Davies and Hahn, aptly state the following: ‘[T]he learning [about citizenship education] that takes place will need to be reviewed and evaluated although a rigidly objectives-driven system seems inappropriate when considered against the aims of citizenship education’ (2008: 9). It is in relation to the latter that we envisage to extend ideas on citizenship education in and beyond school practice, specifically in relation to how citizenship education can deal with violence.

Secondly, the *Global citizenship education* collection of thirty-two chapters offers a variety of perspectives that pursue the case of ‘meaningful global citizenship education as a contribution towards the search for an elusive yet essential conception of global civic society’ (Peters, Britton & Blee, 2008: 2). More specifically, global citizenship education offers the prospect of extending the ideologies of both human rights and multiculturalism in a critical and informed way (Peters et al., 2008: 11). The chapters presented in the collection demonstrate clearly that there can be no single, hegemonic understanding of global citizenship education, as notions of global citizenship and education are contested and remain subject to scrutiny. In the words of the editors, ‘[g]lobal citizenship education does not name the moment of global citizenship education or even its emergence so much as the hope of a form of order where the rights of the individual and of groups, irrespective of race, gender, ethnicity or creed, are observed by all governments and become the basis of participation in new global spaces that … might be called global civil society’ (Peters et al., 2008: 12). As such, the text is organised around terms such as ‘global citizenship’, ‘globalisation’, cosmopolitanism’ and ‘citizenship education’. Global citizenship education or citizenship education is ‘about cultivating an integrative attitude as much as it is about learning about systematic mechanisms that safeguard society … that [enable] individual citizens to acquire skills and encounter experiences that: promote, explore, examine, synthesise and evaluate meaning about individual lives and societal contexts, trans-nationally and cross-culturally’ (Golmohamad, 2008: 523–524). To this end, we are interested in rethinking the notion of citizenship education in relation to new challenges that emerge, particularly in relation to violence in schools.

What emanates from the above is that understanding the practice of citizenship education depends on having some understanding of both citizenship and citizen. The notion of citizenship refers to the relation of belonging that persons have to the social and political domain (De Ruyter & Spiecker, 2008: 352) – that is, a notion of citizenship in a minimal sense. In a maximal sense, citizenship also refers to a citizen as a culturally and intellectually well-developed person who contributes to the cultural enlightenment of a nation (De Ruyter & Spiecker, 2008: 354). Moreover,
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following Yuval-Davis (2011: 46), ‘the notion of citizenship can be seen as the participatory dimension of belonging to a political community’. In other words, a person has citizenship when she participates in the affairs of a political community. Only then is she expressing her sense of belonging. She cannot claim to belong to a political community if she does not participate in the affairs of a political community that have guided her development as an individual and social being. For this reason, citizenship is considered as ‘an individual contractual relationship between the person and the state’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 48). And what determines the contract and relationship respectively are the political, civil, social, economic, cultural and spatial security rights that protect citizens, and the duties and responsibilities people have to enact through participation. Therefore, to educate people as citizens (citizenship education) amounts not only to understanding what the practice means, but also to instil in them capacities for participation to come to understand one another and to engage in matters that affect them (Roth & Burbules, 2007: 5) – thus, to enhance their sense of belonging. Of course, contrasting the notion of citizenship as persons belonging and participating in the social, political and cultural domains of a nation state, with world citizenship, De Ruyter and Spiecker (2008: 352) aver that ‘[w]orld citizens are persons who are able to identify with cultural expressions and fellow human beings … [and] to be called a world citizen, it is necessary that one adheres to public rules in a minimally moral sense (not to kill or steal) and in a political sense: one has to respect the rights of other people to live according to their own world view or culture’. Thus, minimal citizenship is concerned with an individual’s social and political participation in the nation state, whereas maximal citizenship is also concerned with the cultural dimension of the nation state. And citizenship is mostly concerned with persons’ participation in the affairs of the nation state, in contrast to world/global/cosmopolitan citizenship, which is concerned with the participation of human beings beyond the affairs of the nation state – that is, citizens’ obligations to all other human beings. This brings us to an examination of various forms of citizenship education along the lines of deliberation, compassion and responsibility – all actions intertwined with the practice of participation. Our reason for looking at citizenship education in terms of deliberation, compassion and responsibility is to focus more on the participatory actions of people, whether as citizens belonging to a nation state or as cosmopolitans belonging to the global world.

DELIBERATIVE CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Proponents of deliberative citizenship education are Callan (1997) and Benhabib (2011). Callan (1997: 215) avers that future citizens should be taught to participate competently in public reason through dialogue. When students are educated to be open-minded, freely express themselves, consider a plurality of opinions and respect the limits of reasonable difference when questions of political coercion are at stake, they are initiated into a discourse of public reason. And, when they engage with others in renewed efforts to find political coexistence which they and others can reasonably
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endorse as morally acceptable, they engage in dialogue. Hence, for Callan (1997: 215), the purpose of citizenship education is to educate future citizens (students) that they need to participate reasonably in dialogical engagements. Simply put, citizenship education involves educating students to engage in deliberation. Under pluralism, Callan (1997: 206) argues, deliberation is not devoid of ethical confrontation – the latter being regarded as ‘the conflict of different and earnestly held moral views in circumstances where no one has the right to silence dissent’. And, to ensure that dissent is valued, deliberation must be characterised as a certain kind of belligerence and moral distress. Whereas belligerence signifies a rough process of struggle amongst those engaged in deliberation without rhetorical verbal abuse, distress denotes a sign of disturbing doubts about the correctness of our moral beliefs or about the importance of the differences between what we and others believe (Callan, 1997: 210–211). Hence, deliberative citizenship education is aimed at educating students (creating citizens) who share a sufficiently cohesive political identity that honours pluralism, including cultural and linguistic diversity, respects reasonable disagreement, and enacts terms of political coexistence even under conditions of belligerence and distress. Cultivating deliberative citizenship education is aimed at achieving political coexistence ‘in a diverse society when reasons of mutual advantage persuade rival groups to agree on terms of cooperation sufficiently to restrain open conflict – a matter of securing the autonomy of future citizens (Callan, 1997: 45).

For Benhabib (2011: 75), citizenship education involves learning to participate in democratic iterations whereby ‘citizens articulate the specific content of their scheduled rights, as well as making these rights their very own’. That is, citizenship education is about instilling in students communicative ways through which they can lay claim to their ‘right to have rights’ (Benhabib, 2011: 75). Benhabib argues that the fundamental moral right all persons have is the ‘right to have rights … [which means] to be recognised by others, and to recognise others in turn, as persons entitled to moral respect and legally protected rights in a human community’ (Benhabib, 2011: 60). And the communicative project through which people can be connected to their claim of having rights is referred to as democratic iterations. Democratic iterations are ‘complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextualised, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society’ (Benhabib, 2011: 129). What is important to iterations is the fact that they (iterations) are intended to transform, extend and enrich meanings. They are not just acts of repetition (Benhabib, 2011: 129). Instead, iterations are meant to enhance inclusive participation by all those whose rights interests are affected; equality of participation; the questioning of controversial issues; and achieving democratic justice, especially in relation to human rights treaties (Benhabib, 2011: 151–152). In the main, democratic iterations have in mind people listening to one another and talking back in iterative fashion – that is, people being intent on producing more authoritative (reasonable and persuasive) decisions in relation to rights arguments.
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Thus, deliberative citizenship education has in mind the achievement of the right to political coexistence by diverse individuals in pluralist communities. Likewise, deliberative citizenship education is equally concerned with the outcomes of democratic justice for all citizens. Ways in which the aforementioned can be achieved are related to advocacy for public reason, even of a belligerent and distressful nature, as well as democratic iterations that hold the promise to subvert ethical conflict and the dismissal of people’s right to have rights. Citizenship education of a deliberative kind is focused not only on the right to belong, but also ‘[on the right of people] to participate as equal adults in their political communities’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 76). It is not surprising that deliberative citizenship education often resonates with active and activist citizenship education, where deliberative engagement is often commensurable with practices of belonging.

COMPASSIONATE CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Both Nussbaum (1997) and Noddings (2002) offer an account of citizenship education that resonates with compassionate imagining. Nussbaum (1997) articulates citizenship education as pedagogical encounters constituted by compassionate imagining. That is, a person must recognise the vulnerabilities experienced by another person and, through ascertaining the suffering and pain of that person, might be more inclined to recognise that pain, and therefore extend compassion. (Nussbaum, 1997: 91). In other words, a compassionate citizen is one who not only recognises the vulnerability of someone else, but actually relates the other person’s vulnerability to her own experiences and acts humanely towards others who might experience the vulnerability. It is only when we can relate the pain and suffering of others to our own sense of being and life experiences that we can begin to understand the pain and vulnerabilities of another. Put differently, compassionate imagining involves ‘the ability to imagine what it is like to be in that [vulnerable] person’s place … and also the ability to stand back and ask whether the person’s own judgement has taken the full measure of what has happened’ (Nussbaum, 1997: 91). The idea of imagining another might experience involves acting empathetically towards that person and not considering the person as other, and therefore as one who does not deserve empathetic treatment. To educate people about their citizenship thus primarily involves instilling in them an empathetic connectedness with others, especially those who experience some form of vulnerability. The point we are making is that engaging others through public reason is not enough. People should also be taught to recognise the vulnerabilities of others and to actually do something about changing others’ situations. Mere recognition of the vulnerabilities of others is not enough. Engaging with others requires a connectedness based on a shared humanity. Only then would one act with a profound sense of empathy – that is, with compassionate imagining. Moreover, besides acting with compassionate imagining, a citizen is also one who recognises a ‘detachment from uncritical loyalty to one’s own ways’ (Nussbaum, 1997: 58). In this way, being a citizen also involves recognising
the different ways of others and not dismissing others on the grounds of otherness and difference. It is for this reason that Nussbaum (1997: 67) posits that citizenship education not only involves learning and teaching about compassionate imagining, but also that students and educators should resist the temptation ‘to define themselves primarily in terms of local group loyalties and identities’. Compassionate citizenship education evokes both empathy for and recognition of the other and of difference. What Nussbaum’s (1997: 68) notion of compassionate citizenship education actually foregrounds is ‘an awareness of cultural difference … in order to promote respect for another that is the essential underpinning for dialogue’. Consequently, one finds that compassionate citizenship education is often equated with genres of citizenship education, such as critical and multicultural citizenship education – that is, critical in the sense of recognising others’ vulnerability, and multicultural as a consequence of the recognition of others’ otherness and difference.

Similarly, Noddings’s view of citizenship education seems to be inherently connected to realising compassionate imagining. Noddings (2002: 22) offers an ethics of care that can enhance the realisation of compassionate imagining through positing that people have to attend fully and openly to one another by creating caring relationships amongst themselves. For Noddings (2002: 24), a caring relationship involves people becoming receptive towards one another so that ‘the full humanity of both parties is recognised’. For Noddings (2002: 21), when people care they recognise the humanity within themselves and in others, with an emphasis on ‘living together, on creating, maintaining, and enhancing positive relations’. Thus, for Noddings, compassionate imagining manifests in people’s actions when they realise the importance of recognising their humanity in order to live together peacefully. In this sense, citizenship education underscored by an ethics of care seems to be inextricably connected to the enhancement of compassionate imagining – that is, for a citizen to be educated about compassion also involves learning about caring relations, whereby he or she can live harmoniously with others on the basis of recognising one another’s humanity. Recognising one another’s humanity is linked to the practice of respecting people as human beings and developing caring relations that can engender respect towards the other in a sustained and less conflicting way. A genre of compassionate citizenship education connected to cultivating caring relations is illustrated in the contemporary understanding of intimate citizenship education. Here the focus is particularly on caring relationships, with an emphasis on sexual, reproductive and related rights concerning people’s bodies and intimate relationships (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 60).

RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

To talk about responsibility vis-à-vis citizenship education requires that we offer an account of what the practice means. For the purposes of articulating the notion of responsible citizenship education we draw on Derrida’s (2004: 91) seminal idea of responsibility. For him, to think of responsibility is to equate it with ‘a summons
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requiring a response’ (Derrida, 2004: 91). That is, when people are summoned or called to act in a particular way by responding to a situation, they are said to act responsibly. The way in which people should act as they respond to a particular situation is considered by Derrida as acting with ‘freedom of judgement’ (2004: 97). If they can freely judge, Derrida (2004: 105) posits, they act with unconditioned autonomy by accounting for something. And, by doing so, that is accounting for something, a person is ‘playing one risk off against another’ (Derrida, 2004: 150). Therefore, by acting responsibly, a person accounts with justification for something (renders a reason) and simultaneously takes risky decisions in order to achieve what is not there and what is yet to come (Derrida, 2004: 155). In other words, acting with justification, as well as taking risks, can lead to achieving the unexpected or the improbable. Only then can a person be said to act with responsibility. Now, if we relate the idea of responsibility to citizenship education, then it can be said that responsible citizenship education ought to engender understandings that students should be encouraged to take risks coupled with giving an account of their citizenship. For example, when students are educated to responsibly offer an account of their reasons for why immigrants should be treated justly and that they (students) should actually take risks in building relationships with immigrant communities who might be of a different culture and disposition, then the students have been educated to risk their own complacency for the sake of engaging others hospitably – a matter of exercising their citizenship. Therefore, responsible citizenship education lends itself to people taking risks to accomplish through giving an account of their reasons for the unexpected, albeit building relations with immigrant communities – a situation that, in turn, might lead to more inclusive relations amongst people.

Cavell (1979: 442) avers that human beings bear an internal relation to all others – that is, in respect of people’s fellow citizens, people are ‘answerable for what happens to them’ (Cavell, 1979: 438). This means that people are responsible towards one another. In relation to citizenship education, for Cavell (1979: 440) responsibility implies that people owe one another some unrestricted revelation of their humanity. And, showing humanity towards fellow human beings implies that one conceives the other from the other’s point of view (Cavell, 1979: 441). The point is that responsibility implies that people do not merely wish how others should be and present themselves to one another, but rather, for people to experience the other in their otherness and to be ‘answerable for what happens to them’ (Cavell, 1979: 438). By implication, responsible citizenship involves showing our responsibility towards others and involves acknowledging their humanity, which restricts us from humiliating and excluding them – that is, treating people inhumanely. For example, hatred towards Muslim immigrants in several European communities, concomitant with their increasing marginalisation and lack of access to employment (Benhabib, 2011: 194), shows the damage being done to responsible citizenship that will perhaps not be so easily and quickly healed.

Thus far we have highlighted three ways in which citizenship education in liberal democracies can be realised on a continuum – that is, through deliberation,
compassion and responsibility. In other words, the participatory dimension of belonging to a political community can be considered on a continuum from being more deliberative, compassionate and responsible to being less so. It is not that citizenship education has been realised in either a deliberative, compassionate or responsible way. Rather, existing liberal conceptions of citizenship education can most appropriately be couched as forms of education that vary from being overwhelmingly deliberative, compassionate and responsible, to being less deliberative, compassionate and responsible. Our analysis of citizenship education breaks with traditional explanations of citizenship education, which are conceived in relation to people’s political memberships in nation states. In fact, like Smith (2007: 31), we have decoupled our analysis of citizenship education from the nation state and recast the role of citizenship ‘within the multiple public spheres of global civil societies’. We have argued that the task of deliberative, compassionate and responsible citizenship education ‘is to provide young people with opportunities to deliberately practice public ways of being that allow publics of citizens to flourish and impact formal political processes, within the nation state and beyond’ (Smith, 2007: 31). Put differently, citizenship education has been recast, set apart from the nation state and newly theorised about in terms of the actions of citizens in the public spheres of civil society, such as clubs, associations, religious institutions, interest groups, and unions. Our focus on deliberation, compassion and responsibility points towards cultivating in students public ways of being, and capacities and understandings with which to navigate various complexities of political organisation.

In essence, we have given some account of how citizenship education is being realised or aspired towards in the public sphere in mostly liberal democracies. Inasmuch as deliberative, compassionate and responsible citizenship education seems plausible enough to cultivate in schools (institutions in the public sphere), we shall contend that such a form of education is not enough to engender appropriate learning that can contend with violence in schools. However, before we tackle the issue of violence in schools, we shall build on existing understandings of citizenship education in order to think differently about the practice and, most importantly, to reconceptualise the notion of citizenship education so that it can be more responsive by disrupting violence in schools.
CHAPTER 2

RETHINKING CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AS A
PEDAGOGICAL ENCOUNTER

On Becoming an Equal, Intelligible, Amateur Citizen

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter we have given an account of some of the major theoretical contributions that have underscored citizenship education over the past two decades. We have shown that citizenship education is mostly considered in terms of responsibilities, rights and belonging. In this chapter we attempt to rethink citizenship education for two reasons: firstly, so that citizenship education should not be associated narrowly with rights, responsibilities and belonging, as its pedagogical impetus often is obscured. We therefore, secondly, propose to begin with the notion of a pedagogical encounter, which we shall argue has some bearing on a reconsidered view of citizenship education that extends beyond a mere focus on rights, responsibilities and belonging. Instead, our contention is that citizenship education is first and foremost a pedagogical encounter intertwined with equality, intelligibility and amateurism – those aspects that would situate citizenship education firmly within discourses of rights, responsibilities and belonging and simultaneously open up pedagogical spaces for a citizenship education of becoming.

TOWARDS THE NOTION OF A PEDAGOGICAL ENCOUNTER

To speak about an encounter we invariably describe a relationship between oneself and others, otherwise one would not encounter them. Likewise, for others to have an encounter implies that they should be in some sort of relationship amongst themselves. Considering that such a relationship happens in a pedagogical milieu, whether at home, in the park, or at a market, shopping mall, school, work or university, we can refer to it as an encounter. This is so for the reason that individual selves and collective selves participate in some kind of relationship. As such, it would be impossible for any of us to claim that we have never had the experience of an encounter, since that would imply that we are indeed alone. The relationship that emerges from an encounter is especially pedagogical, as the possibility is always there that people can learn from one another and be informed by one another’s stances. To learn from others implies that one expresses a willingness to listen to what others have to say and, in turn, that others would listen to what one has to say – that is learning in itself is an intersubjective activity. Learning is not always achieved
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...through agreement, as that in itself would mark the end of learning. If people were to agree on everything, the possibility exists that those continuous agreements would prevent learning, as the latter is also reliant on people taking issue with one another – that is, a matter of disagreeing. New perspectives and views are always becoming and people can never exhaust understandings or even claim that their understanding of this or that is absolute or perfect. So, what makes a pedagogical encounter a learning relationship is premised on the understanding that people willingly listen to one another and respond to one another’s perspectives or points of view, in agreement or disagreement. That is, the consideration is always there for one to take the views of someone else into some sort of controversy – a matter of being critical. Simultaneously, the possibility is always there to be responded to critically as well. As has been shown in the previous chapter, there is a plethora of literature on citizenship education that emphasises the engagement of people in an encounter.

Now, in a pedagogical encounter, intersubjective relations constituted by critical learning hold sway. This is so because critical learning instigates people to challenge one another and bring new perspectives to the table. This brings us to an exploration of ourselves in relationship with others in order to further examine the notion of a pedagogical encounter. We shall offer our examination as follows: firstly, the individual self or the self within us is always in relation with her inner self, on the grounds that the self responds to other selves in particular ways. The inner self determines the way the outer self responds to others. When one thinks of liking someone innately, one responds towards the liking of another outwardly, otherwise one would actually need to pretend. Similarly, when the inner self does not respond favourably to another, it becomes equally hard not to betray those feelings outwardly – again, possibly leading to pretence. This makes the inner self attuned in a relationship with the outer self in quite a subjective way. When the self finds herself in a pedagogical encounter, she acts in relation to both her inner and outer selves. She is actually not alone. What guides a pedagogical encounter is that the inner self connects with the outer self to the extent that the self becomes subjectified – that is, the self is no longer out of reach of what one feels, desires and aspires towards. What follows is that a pedagogical encounter happens when the self is presented in the encounter, and this situation in turn immediately prompts the encounter to assume some form or the other. For instance, a self that endeavours to summon the intelligences of students does so on the basis that the self believes in the forms of inquiry others can bring to the encounter. To this end, the self acknowledges and recognises that different forms of inquiry not only create multiple encounters, but open multiple spaces of teaching and learning. But, in order for the self to summon the intelligences of others, the self has to present itself to the encounter with inner thoughts and outer experiences that can make the encounter highly pedagogical. This means that, without the subjectified self, the encounter might be deprived of real learning experiences. Of course we are not suggesting that the self could literally be divided. We are, however, offering an explanation of the identity of the self in relation to what is inner to the self, such as dreams, desires or fears – something about
which the self alone knows or has witnessed; and in relation to that which is outer and external, or that which can be checked by others – a matter of presenting the self for acknowledgement. For the self to harbour suspicion or hatred, for example, would remain inner to the self when such feelings have not been presented outwardly to others. Here we concur with Cavell (1979: 393), who posits that one becomes intelligible to others for acknowledgement on the grounds of presenting oneself outwardly. And considering that the self stands in relation to itself, reciprocity can be assured if the inner connects with or guides the outer, thus assuring the self of ‘coming into possession of something’, whether being disgusted with, or proud of ourselves, or finding or losing ourselves – that is, relations in which we can stand in association with others (Cavell, 1979: 384). Now, the reciprocal relation the self has with itself has some connection with making one’s private (inner) feelings, say about one’s suspicions of or prejudices towards others, known to others, which in a way causes the self to act freely – an important aspect of being a citizen or what Cavell (1979: 384) refers to as becoming active, free of reluctance. The point is, being a citizen involves acting through will by being commanded or driven by oneself to act freely, or to actively take a stand (Cavell, 1979: 386).

Secondly, every human self bears an ‘internal relation to all others’ (Cavell, 1979: 442). One’s understanding of oneself is read in relation to how one is also perceived by other selves. For instance, feeling humiliated is experienced perhaps in relation to how other selves rebuked one, or being prejudiced against someone else is a condition one experiences in relation to others. By implication, for the self to be in relation with others is itself an acknowledgement that there are other human beings in positions other than oneself, which of course makes humans naturally political beings (Cavell, 1979: 437). As a political being, one’s self is in relation with other selves, albeit in a relation of harmony, concord, union, transparency, governance or power (Cavell, 1979: 440). And, bearing in mind that being a citizen implies acting freely to take a stand, one does so as a political being, whereby one does so in relation to others. The point is that a citizen does not act alone. Rather, a citizen is in fact a social self – regardless of whether one defines oneself as a recluse, or not – one who acts freely in relation to others, which makes oneself and others answerable for what happens to one another (Cavell, 1979: 440). The latter involves conceiving the other from the other’s point of view, and showing oneself to others (Cavell, 1979: 443). This means that one is prepared to engage with the other from the perspective of the other. What interests us in this political relationship in which the self finds itself in relation to others, is that one as well others are actually answerable to one another on the basis of how they show themselves. At once, to be a citizen does not just mean to act freely, actively and take a stand, but also to have a sense of answerability to others and ourselves.

Thirdly, all selves are in relation to one another in the world – that is, are in attunement with one another. Of course this does not mean that they (humans) are always perfectly known to one another. What we know of others we only know on the basis of others’ behaviour – that is, how others show themselves to us. It is of
course often the case that we might only know what the other chooses to reveal or share about herself. To this end, we might only know the other to the extent the other wishes to be known. For instance, we only know the pain someone might experience if that person’s pain is shown to us through her behaviour or communication in language, or in terms on which we can make judgments by correlating the pain to our own experiences of pain. So, when a person bumps her leg against a table and then howls, we might get an idea of her pain in relation to what we might know of our own experiences of pain. The point we are making is that, in an encounter, we might never completely know others or others might never with certainty know us. This also means that, because we only know what we have been shown or shared with others, we often fill the gaps of what we do not know with our own experiences or notions of being. This of course makes our relationship with one another not one of knowing, where knowing construes itself as being certain, but rather one of how we experience one another through our presentations – that is, through showing of ourselves to others. In this regard, Cavell (1979: 357) avers that ‘knowing a physiognomy [physical appearance] is understanding what it means, having it speak to you, experiencing the meaning’.

What follows from this is that participating in an encounter is not predominantly about knowing the other, as one would merely gain an understanding of others on the grounds of what others show to one, in terms of which one correlates others’ behaviour and experiences to one’s own. At best, encounters are shaped and defined by what one presents, and what one is presented with at a particular time, and for a particular time. It will be very unlikely that one would encounter the exact same other, or have the exact same experience of the other, at another time. Encounters are by their nature momentary and fluid because of the subjectivity of the self, and because of the inter-subjectivity of the relationship that emerges from the encounter. To be a citizen is not to be concerned primarily with knowing others completely, as that might not be possible. One might get an idea of someone else’s disappointments, jealousies, fears and attachments on the basis of how others present themselves and perhaps narrate their experiences to one. But one cannot with certainty claim to know others completely. Following such an analysis of an encounter, to be a citizen is not merely about knowing others with certainty, but about connecting with others (or relating to them) on the basis of how they show themselves and about experiencing them. And, when one experiences the other imperfectly, one would invariably suspend one’s rush to judgement of them. That is, one cannot with certainty say who the other is, and hence would judge the other prematurely, considering that the other might also be unknown to her – in much the same way that one might never be known to the other.

ON THE EQUAL, INTELLIGIBLE AND AMATEUR CITIZEN: RETHinking CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

In the previous section we presented a notion of a pedagogical encounter vis-à-vis being a citizen. Such an idea is premised on the following three considerations:
driving oneself to act freely to actively taking a stand; being answerable to others; and experiencing others, rather than knowing them with certainty, on the basis of curbing one’s rush to judgement of others. It is with such an idea of a pedagogical encounter in mind that we aim to reconfigure citizenship education along the lines of Jacques Rancière’s ideas on democratic education.

Jacques Rancière (1991) offers, firstly, a view of democratic education in terms of which those who engage in a democracy do so with emancipation in mind – that is, they disrupt the way a particular social order is configured. And people who act with emancipation in mind do so by thinking, speaking and living in relation to disrupting the order of things (Rancière, 1991: 18). Put differently, acting democratically means to announce your position. And when people announce themselves they demonstrate the capacity to actualise their equality – that is, their ability to think, speak and act freely to take a stand, or what Rancière (2007) refers to as disrupting the chains of reasons. For Rancière, equality implies that all individuals are able to speak and act, and not the classic idea that all people have equal capacities or abilities, and to share opportunities (Simons & Masschelein, 2011: 83). So, a citizen who acts freely to take an active stand would be one who announces herself to speak and act with equality. And, acting with equality in a pedagogical encounter can give rise to enacting one’s citizenry. As an equal citizen one is not constrained from enacting one’s equality – that is, from considering oneself equal of thought and speech to any other person in a public space. In this way, the equal citizen is an attentive one who is in the presence of a public space and responds to that presence (Cornelissen, 2011: 29). Thus, the equal citizen freely announces her presence through thought and speech, and attends and responds to (that is, disrupts) what she encounters in a public space. Instead of just claiming to belong, the equal citizen freely announces her presence and imposes herself through thought and speech in a public space – this means that she experiences belonging through freely enacting her capacity and ability to do so. Her belonging happens as a consequence of announcing her presence through thought and speech in a public space. Put differently, her belonging is announced through reconfiguring the order of things in a public space. She is then poised to freely and actively take a stand.

Secondly, acting as an intelligible citizen actually involves summoning other people to use their intelligence – that is, ‘to remind people that they can see and think for themselves and are not dependent upon others who claim that they can see and think for them’ (Biesta, 2011a: 35). In other words, an intelligible citizen is one who obliges the other person ‘to realise his [her] capacity’ (Rancière, 1991: 15). By implication, an intelligible citizen ‘summon[s] other people to use their intelligence’ (Biesta, 2011a: 35). Summoning people to use their intelligence is in fact to remind them that they can see and think for themselves, to prompt them about their abilities and capacities, and that they should not always rely on others to see and think for them – a matter of being answerable to oneself and to others. In other words, what matters is that people’s potentialities are evoked to the extent that they are able to come to their own speech, and their own presence (Biesta, 2011a: 39).
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This is why an intelligible citizen demands speech, that is, ‘the manifestation of an intelligence that wasn’t aware of itself or that had given up’ (Rancière, 1991: 29). In other words, summoning people to speech is to show one’s answerability to them. Being answerable to others is to raise the expectation in them that they can see things for themselves without always being offered an explanation. At the heart of a reconsidered view of citizenship education, therefore, is that people’s attention is drawn to the fact that they can use their intelligence. After all, following Rancière (1991: 39), what stultifies people is not the lack of instruction, but rather a belief in the inferiority of their intelligence, or their incapacity to recognise their own abilities and capacities. And one actually demonstrates answerability to others by creating opportunities for their speech to come into presence, for their abilities to come into action, and for their capacities to be realised. Unlike traditional views of citizenship education that aim to educate people to speak, a reconsidered citizenship education starts from the assumption that a person is already intelligible, that is to say, a ‘speaking being’ (Rancière, 1991: 11). People have the capacities to use their intelligence and to speak for themselves without always being told what and how to speak. By implication, an intelligible citizen is one who utters speech and can see and think for herself, without always being reminded to come to speech.

Thirdly, an amateur citizen is not only someone who pretends to know and wants to know everything about a matter, say about her country’s democratic aspirations, but also ‘someone who cares about the matter and is [passionately] concerned about it’ (Masschelein & Simons, 2011: 161). That is, the amateur citizen inspires others to be ‘touched’ by the matter, without always pretending mastery of the matter. Rather, she wants others to be ‘touched’ by the matter themselves, that is, for them to freely use their potentialities and, out of love for the world and the new generation, offer chances for people over and over again (Masschelein & Simons, 2011: 161). The amateur citizen is not only one who recognises that everyone is able to make sense of what is put on the table without always having been subjected to the expertise of others to make sense of the matter for them, but also one who cares about how others, with their imperfections and fallibilities, experience the world. To this end the amateur citizen realises and acknowledges that the world need not be pre-experienced or pre-explained on behalf of others. It is for the latter reason that the amateur citizen does not have to be the eloquent, deliberative inquirer who belligerently and in utopian fashion puts others down and crushes others’ ill-conceived and imperfect understandings of events in the world. Rather, the amateur citizen deals with what is imperfectly put on the table by others and makes the experience of a new use possible, without authoritatively rushing to judgement, say about imperfect formulations of the concept of democracy. As such, the amateur citizen allows for the evocation and enactment of experiences that are yet to be lived and realised. It is because of the infallible, perfect and authoritative ways in which democracy has been presented by some proponents of democracy that Rancière (2007) articulates a kind of hatred or fear of democracy, especially in the light of the concept being introduced as some perfect and authoritative institution for change. Expecting citizens to participate in
an infallible and authoritative democracy not only pre-empts pre-conceived notions of thinking and being, but stultifies new ways of becoming.

IMPLICATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION FOR PEDAGOGICAL ENCOUNTERS

We have now given an account of a reconsidered view of citizenship education, specifically accentuating three interrelated aspects, namely a citizen announcing her equal presence through thought and speech in a public space; a citizen confirming her intelligibility to see things for herself without always being told how to do so; and a citizen amateurishly delaying rushing to judgement about what she imperfectly encounters and actually inspiring others to be touched by matters. This brings us to a discussion of some of the implications of a reconsidered view of citizenship education for pedagogical encounters.

Firstly, what the aforementioned view of citizenship education foregrounds is the notion that an individual who can announce her presence through thought and speech in a public space, for instance in a school, can actually develop cognitive traits and skills to speak out when her rights and those of others are subverted. This means that education would not just be seen as the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, but also as a process of developing the capacities of students to give justifiable reasons (through thought and speech) for their decisions about the issues of the day. Such a view of education would be more considered with the process of teaching and learning – with the engendered moments of talking back and listening – than with a pre-scripted checklist of external outcomes. If students are encouraged to engage, deliberate and speak out when they need to – on behalf of themselves or of others – then they indeed would have been taught to be present not only in terms of their own education, but in terms of knowing and being themselves. This would contribute to making the school become a place of democracy, which, in turn, would stimulate students in the direction of an active and responsible enactment of citizenship. Put differently, if students can acquire dispositions such as announcing their presence in schools, they would be inducted into deliberating intelligently (Roland Martin, 2013: 152). Students therefore are not told what to think and say and are continuously being challenged for their views (Roland Martin, 2013: 156).

Secondly, citizenship education that encourages students to see things for themselves intelligibly will invariably have the effect that teachers are not always required to intervene. Such schools would not shy away from encouraging the discussion of controversial topics. And, in the event of provocative and controversial discussions and debates, educators at these schools would feel confident about the capacity of students to interact and engage intelligibly. For instance, schools that encourage students to see things intelligibly for themselves would not countenance speech and actions that constitute bullying, character assassination, or racial, sexist and homophobic slurs (Roland Martin, 2013: 195). In fact, through a reconsidered citizenship education, students will not risk their schools becoming zones for the harassment, ridicule, devaluation and demeaning of others. When
schools are organised around a reconsidered citizenship education, students intent on seeing things for themselves will work together cooperatively against racial stereotyping, the oppression of girls and women, and political, economic, gender and educational inequality. Their actions against various forms of discrimination or marginalisation would not be based on prescriptions; rather, they would be informed and shaped by their intelligible sense of seeing things for themselves, of knowing when something is amiss or when a violation has happened, and of acting or speaking out against that violation. That is, students would have been initiated into intelligible speech to see the wrongs associated with stains on democracy, and would realise that the school would be at risk if such debilitating behaviours and practices are allowed to flourish. These students are intelligible and will be anxious to nip such behaviours and practices in the bud. The anxiety inculcated in these students would not have emanated from something external to them – such as a remotely constructed code of conduct – rather, it would have emerged from an intelligible understanding that they constitute the school which they inhabit, and then that any debilitating behaviours and practices associated with the school are, in fact, their own.

Thirdly, a reconsidered citizenship education that inspires students to be touched by the harassment, ridicule, devaluation and demeaning of others, be they racial or ethnic minorities, gays, lesbians, the transgendered, the differently abled, and/or the poor and homeless, will engender in them attitudes that would curtail their rush to judgement of others. Such a school would make it easier for students (and educators) ‘to create and sustain, not only a non-violent school culture, but also one that is friendly to all … [and] a school that has the will to become a zone where harassment, ridicule, devaluing, and demeaning are not allowed …’ (Roland Martin, 2013: 196), one that acknowledges societal imperfections as it prepares students for engagement in a democratic citizenry. That is, a citizenry that spews hatred and bigotry, and substitutes gossip for serious discussions about world problems and to be touched by such problems is democratic (Roland Martin, 2013: 200–202).

In sum, there seems to be a dyadic relationship between the idea of a pedagogical encounter and that of a reconsidered view of citizenship education. A pedagogical encounter guides citizenship education in particular ways and, in turn, a reconsidered view of citizenship education alters meanings that constitute a pedagogical encounter – thus offering the spaces necessary for new and unanticipated encounters and meanings. Unlike the narrow linking of citizenship education to the exercise of rights and responsibilities, and to the experience of a sense of belonging, a reconsidered understanding of citizenship education views the citizen as someone who equally exercises thoughts and speech, intelligibly encourages others to see things for themselves, and suspends a rush to judgement about imperfect others and their encounters. As we commenced this chapter with an exposition of relations amongst the self and others, premised on the notion of a reconsidered citizenship education, we shall now offer a way of thinking differently about schools, more specifically of schools as sites of pedagogical encounters with democracy in mind.
RETHINKING CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AS A PEDAGOGICAL ENCOUNTER

SCHOOLS BECOMING SITES OF DEMOCRACY

Over the past two decades in particular, the school in many liberal democracies has been expected to put an end to a nation’s social ills or even to make it a leader in the global economy (Roland Martin, 2013: 183). In our native country, South Africa, there is tremendous distrust in the school, primarily as a consequence of what is considered the poor academic performance of students in reading, writing and arithmetic. Like early twentieth-century progressives such as John Dewey, some education policy analysts in South Africa, as well as educational philosophers (including ourselves), contend that the government, homes, neighbourhoods and religious institutions are no longer performing their educational functions adequately, and have come to the conclusion that schools ‘must take them on’ (Roland Martin, 2013: 189). And, considering that schools are not islands entire to themselves, and that they do not operate in isolation from the world in which they find themselves, they cannot ignore playing some part in educating students to take a stand against the social injustices that even the next generation will have to confront. Instead of just educating students about the three R’s (reading, writing and arithmetic), schools can also play some part in inducting students into becoming democratic. Of course, we do not imagine that the school can transform the world, since not only should other institutions in civil society also contribute, but expecting only schools to transform the world would imply that other institutions are neither necessary nor meaningful. However, educating students about democracy would at least enlist the school in shaping a democratic citizenry. This brings us to a discussion of schools becoming sites of democracy.

Firstly, educating students to announce themselves involves making them aware of having to be continuously attentive – a watchfulness that alerts them to fight against and disrupt undesirable acts such as racism (Applebaum, 2013: 18). And, to disrupt racism (an impediment to democracy) is tantamount to ‘bearing witness’, where ‘witnessing involves listening not simply to confirm what is already known but rather listening to hear something new, something that is beyond our frameworks of comprehension’ (Applebaum, 2013: 19). When students announce themselves they become attentive to ‘the need for openness to others’ (Applebaum, 2013: 20). They want to hear things that are not portrayed in terms of ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’, but rather call into question any racist attitude they are confronted with. Only then will the possibility exist for them to hear something new – something that troubles race, racism and privilege. In a way, students are encouraged to forge new ways of seeing, knowing and being (Yancy, 2008: 231) – ways that transcend racism. Thus, when students are initiated into announcing themselves they invariably become attentive to forging new ways of seeing things, and to disrupting the looming dangers of ignorance and denial of racism. What this means is that it is insufficient to simply teach students about how they ought to behave when something troubles them; it is not enough to present troubling acts to them. Rather, what is needed is for them to present themselves to that which troubles them. Only then, through the presentation of
CHAPTER 2

themselves, will they encounter the space necessary to forge and engender new ways of being. Only then can real talk about democracy possibly begin. Whilst announcing oneself is an act of democracy, it simultaneously makes one watchful against any act that works against democracy. And, for schools to become sites of democracy, students should be initiated into becoming watchful – that is, bearing witness. Quite aptly, Butler’s (2005: 100) appeal to ‘giving an account of oneself’ (also the title of her book) can be understood to be an extension of this call to announce oneself in relation to bringing racism into contestation as an act of democracy.

Secondly, educating students to see things for themselves implies making them curious about new ideas and new ways of doing things. It also makes known to the students that they are trusted enough to be curious about that which interests and intrigues them, rather than presenting to them what is already known and about which there thus is nothing new to be unfolded. This would enable students to explore and disrupt assumptions about other ways in which they ‘signify their coming into presence’ (Burke & Greteman, 2013: 158). Likewise, seeing things anew for oneself also involves ‘a witnessing and positioning of the other’ (Burke & Greteman, 2013: 163); that is, engaging with the other in pleasurable, consensual activities that create possibilities to learn something new (Burke & Greteman, 2013: 158). Often the pleasurable activities are associated with what is humane and just (Burke & Greteman, 2013: 169). Consequently, seeing things anew does not only involve learning new ideas and ways of doing things, but also relates to engaging the other in their humanity – that is, not in relation to what one wants the other to become, but rather coming into presence with the other or engaging the other mutually and intimately, without having any expectation of the other in return. In a way, what one then learns as a consequence of seeing things for oneself would be surprising – simply because one could never know what one could expect to learn or know.

Thirdly, educating students to suspend a rush to judgement involves instilling in them an ethics of critique. Butler (2009: 782) defines critique as a practice that suspends judgement and involves two aspects: probing, such as excluding possibilities of thinking otherwise; and opening up possibilities of new practices. To probe and think of things anew is putting what is self-evident into question and to ask new kinds of questions. That is, critique suspends judgement about what is impossible to consider (Butler, 2009: 783). Similarly, critique also involves ‘the endeavour to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known’ (Foucault, 2002: 191). What the aforementioned practice of critique lends itself to is the caution that people cannot move too quickly to condemnation, say in a democracy – since that in itself would act as an infringement on the right of the other to be or become. Critique allows people to listen even to the anger of others – that is, listening to what is beyond recognition, such as in spaces of discomfort (anger, belligerence, distress and provocation) where new learning can occur. Only then can democracy, as a practice in which contestation and power relations are at play, have a real chance to flourish,
as critique allows moments when the new can emerge, and unasked questions can be asked.

In sum, in this chapter we have offered a reconsidered view of citizenship education without renouncing the rights, responsibilities and belonging discourses associated with the practice. A reconsidered view of citizenship is novel in the sense that we have foregrounded the pedagogical impetus of the practice, rather than restated the political, social and economic manifestations of citizenship education that have already been presented quite extensively in the literature. Having reconsidered citizenship education, we have articulated its connections to announcing the self in public spaces, seeing things differently, and suspending a rush to judgement, as there is always something or someone new to learn about and to confront. In a way, a reconsidered view of citizenship education is one that is in a constant state of becoming.