The Handbook of Moral Motivation offers a contemporary and comprehensive appraisal of the age-old question about motivation to do the good and to prevent the bad. From a research point of view, this question remains open even though we present here a rich collection of new ideas and data. Two sources helped the editors to frame the chapters: first they looked at an overwhelmingly fruitful research tradition on motivation in general (attribution theory, performance theory, self-determination theory, etc.) in relationship to morality. The second source refers to the tension between moral judgment (feelings, beliefs) and the real moral act in a twofold manner: (a) as a necessary duty, and, (b) as a social but not necessary bond. In addition, the handbook utilizes the latest research from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives, wishing to suggest by this that the answer to the posed question will likely not come from one discipline alone. Furthermore, our hope is that the implicit criticism that the narrowly constructed research approach of the recent past has contributed to closing off rather than opening up interdisciplinary lines of research becomes in this volume a strong counter discourse. The editors and authors of the handbook commend the research contained within in the hope that it will contribute to better understanding of humanity as an inherently moral species.
Handbook of Moral Motivation
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Series Editors: Fritz Oser (fritz.oser@unifr.ch)
University of Fribourg, Switzerland
Wiel Veugelers (W.M.M.H.Veugelers@uva.nl)
University of Amsterdam/University for Humanistics Utrecht, the Netherlands

Editorial Board:
Nimrod Aloni, Kibbutzim College of Education, Tel Aviv, Israel
Marvin Berkowitz, University of Missouri-StLouis, U.S.A.
Pietro Boscolo, University of Padova, Italy
Maria Rosa Buxarrais, University of Barcelona, Spain
Helen Haste, University of Bath, U.K./Harvard University U.S.A
Dana Moree, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
Clark Power, University of Notre Dame, U.S.A.
Kirsi Tirri, University of Helsinki, Finland/Stanford University, U.S.A.
Joel Westheimer, University of Ottawa, Canada
William Wu, Hong Kong Baptist University, China

‘Moral Development and Citizenship Education’ is a book series that focuses on the cultural development of our young people and the pedagogical ideas and educational arrangements to support this development. It includes the social, political and religious domains, as well as cognitive, emotional and action oriented content. The concept of citizenship has extended from being a pure political judgment, to include the social and interpersonal dynamics of people.

Morality has become a multifaceted and highly diversified construct that now includes cultural, developmental, situational and professional aspects. Its theoretical modelling, practical applications and measurements have become central scientific tasks. Citizenship and moral development are connected with the identity constitution of the next generations. A caring and supporting learning environment can help them to participate in society.

Books in this series will be based on different scientific and ideological theories, research methodologies and practical perspectives. The series has an international scope; it will support manuscripts from different parts of the world and it includes authors and practices from various countries and cultures, as well as comparative studies. The series seeks to stimulate a dialogue between different points of view, research traditions and cultures. It contains multi-authored handbooks, focusing on specific issues, and monographs. We invite books that challenge the academic community, bring new perspectives into the community and broaden the horizon of the domain of moral development and citizenship education.
Handbook of Moral Motivation

Theories, Models, Applications

Edited by:

Karin Heinrichs
Goethe-University Frankfurt, Germany

Fritz Oser
University of Fribourg, Switzerland

and

Terence Lovat
University of Newcastle, Australia & University of Oxford, UK
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1
*Karin Heinrichs, Fritz Oser & Terence Lovat*

Models of Moral Motivation 7
*Fritz Oser*

## PART 1: FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL MOTIVATION

I. “Why Be Moral?” A Philosophical Taxonomy of Moral Motivation 27
*Thomas E. Wren*

II. Moral Motivation and the Four Component Model 49
*Stephen J. Thoma & Muriel J. Bebeau*

III. Deontic and Responsibility Judgments: An Inferential Analysis 69
*Gerhard Minnameier*

IV. Motivation as the Readiness to Act on Moral Commitments 83
*Theresa A. Thorkildsen*

## PART 2: MOTIVATIONAL THEORY AND MORAL MOTIVATION

I. Ultimate and Proximal (Attribution-Related) Motivational Determinants of Moral Behaviour 99
*Bernard Weiner*

II. Moral Motivation from the Perspective of the Self-Determination Theory and the Person-Object Theory of Interest 113
*Andreas Krapp*

III. How Different Motivational Aspects Can Affect Moral Behaviour 141
*Regina Vollmeyer, Konstanze Jenderek & Tahmine Tozman*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

IV. Justice as a Moral Motive: Belief in a Just World and Justice Sensitivity as Potential Indicators of the Justice Motive 159
Anna Baumert, Tobias Rothmund, Nadine Thomas, Mario Gollwitzer & Manfred Schmitt

V. Temporal Construal and Moral Motivation 181
Jens Agerström & Fredrik Björklund

PART 3: MORAL SELF, IDENTITY AND MORAL MOTIVATION

I. Moral Motivation Through the Perspective of Exemplarity 197
Lawrence J. Walker

II. Moral Motivation, Responsibility and the Development of the Moral Self 215
Tobias Krettenauer

III. The Self and the Management of the Moral life 229
Augusto Blasi

IV. Practical Mysticism, Self-Knowing and Moral Motivation 249
Terence Lovat

PART 4: DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS, EMOTIONS AND MORAL MOTIVATION

I. Moral Motivation and the Happy Victimizer Phenomenon 267
Gertrud Nunner-Winkler

II. The Development of Moral Identity and Moral Motivation in Childhood and Adolescence 289
Bettina Doering

III. Moral Emotion Attributions and Moral Motivation 307
Luciano Gasser, Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Brigitte Latzko & Tina Malti

IV. Neurobiology and Moral Mindset 323
Darcia Narvaez
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART 5: GOOD AND BAD MORAL MOTIVATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Moral Value Evaluation: A Neglected Motivational Concept in Externalizing Behaviour Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Marinus G.C.J. Beerthuizen &amp; Daniel Brugman</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Juvenile Delinquency: Lack of Moral Motivation or Moral Ambivalence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Stefan Weyers</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Moral Motivation and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Clark Power &amp; Kristin K. Sheehan</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. From Ethical Hostility Toward Cooperative Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Klaus-Jürgen Grün</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. How Powerful are Moral Motivations in Environmental Protection?: An Integrated Model Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Christian A. Klöckner</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART 6: MORAL MOTIVATION IN PROFESSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Moral Motivation in Different Professions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Muriel J. Bebeau &amp; Stephen J. Thoma</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Moral Motivation of Military Professionals: A Military-Philosophical Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Edwin R. Micewski</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Ethical Intentions and the Moral Motivation of Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Elizabeth Campbell</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Female Principals’ Moral Motivation and the Moral Atmosphere of Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chi-Ming (Angela) Lee</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART 7: MORAL MOTIVATION AND MORAL EDUCATION

I. Moral Reasoning, Moral Motivation and Informed Social Reflection 551
   *Janet Kwok & Robert L. Selman*

II. Character and Civic Education as a Source of Moral Motivation 567
   *Wolfgang Althof & Marvin W. Berkowitz*

III. Moral Motivation and the Role of the Internship in Professional Preparation 585
    *Sharon Nodie Oja & Patricia J. Craig*

IV. Why Moral Education is Motivating by Nature 607
    *Francisco Esteban Bara & Maria Rosa Buxarrais Estrada*

Moral Motivation in the Light of Action Theory: Perspectives on Theoretical and Empirical Progress 623
   *Karin Heinrichs*

Index 659
INTRODUCTION

Immoral behaviour is omnipresent: In the daily news, we read about aggressive behaviour, delinquency, sexual abuse, assassinations and racism, sexism and all forms of persistent violence. We hear about banking bonuses, about structural injustice towards immigrants and substantial egocentrism with respect to animals and plants. At the same time, however, we complain about a lack of civility, civil courage, care, responsibility or tolerance in everyday life or we try to find appropriate solutions to ethical problems like immigration or mobbing. What is the force that pushes people to act morally or not? Is there a motor that inhibits morality? Is there a power that – even beyond judgment and rationality - shakes the will to be fully moral? Are there situations or emotional states that make people forget the standards of morality that civilizations have developed over thousands of years?

In spite of all our knowledge and progress, and partly owing to overwhelming problems like pollution, population increase or climate change, and economic injustices, we are still not able to provide sufficient answers to the following questions:

– Why don’t people act morally even though they have such great knowledge, so many insights and/or are personally concerned? And what causes them to behave immorally?
– What prevents them from acting consistently, according to their moral judgment, about what should be done?

The editors of this handbook believe that the construct of moral motivation can – at least partly – answer these questions. Even though motivational psychology has achieved many insights into what drives people to behave and to act in general, our knowledge is much less specific about what urges us to cope with and solve moral problems appropriately. The drive to do the good is not the same as the drive to win in sport. The need to help another is not the same as the need to perform well in a test. And the external conditions for maintaining a rule of justice or to take responsibility for a socially deprived person is not the same as listening to a well-known musical piece.

The Handbook of Moral Motivation aims to present currently explored approaches and the state of the art in research about what drives, urges and impels humans to moral judging and acting, as well as about the inner and outer conditions preventing us from acting consistently with our judgments or moral norms. In order to understand the basics, it is good to be aware of Kohlberg’s, Rest’s, Colby & Damon’s, or Blasi’s
work, but also to understand some philosophical bases like Kant’s metaphysik, Arendt’s moral philosophy, Rawls’ justice, or Habermas’ procedural morality concepts. On these bases, we have attempted to collect important results and insights from the fields of moral and motivational psychology, and related fields, in order to elaborate and discuss whether we have already gained answers to the questions above. Moreover, we wanted to point to the lack of adequate research and develop perspectives for further projects in order to get closer to answering the basic questions about why people are willing and manage to do the good or the bad and to act morally or immorally.

What do we already know? Moral psychology has been searching for explanations of immoral behaviour for many decades (see Garz, Oser & Althof, 1999 on the issue of the judgment action gap). As Oser explicates in his paper (this volume), we know at least 12 models are developed in this field that help to explain (or explain partly) why people manage to be good and feel urged to act in ways considered as morally adequate (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Rest, 1999; Bebeau & Monson, 2011; Blasi, 1980; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988; Colby & Damon, 1992; Walker, 2002; Krettenauer, 2011; Haidt, 2001). Though Rest himself admitted in 1999 that moral motivation was the worst elaborated component of his model and lacked appropriate empirical evidence (Rest, 1999, p.109), we notice that there has been much progress in theoretical and empirical research on this issue during the last decade. Approaches to moral motivation (MM) have been more and more elaborated and interlinked with one another. Nonetheless, the current state of the art still points to there being many different perspectives on moral motivation. Comparing the results of related empirical research on moral motivation would be too difficult because different studies refer to varied types of moral problems, moral contexts or psychological preconditions of these, as well as focusing on differences, for example according to age, cultural background, developmental state or personal experience. The scientific landscape on this issue elicits a kind of atomistic topology and the discussion on moral motivation has to be considered as disconnected from fields in other psychological sub-disciplines. So, in line with Lapsley and Narvaez, we would claim that moral psychology is at the crossroads (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). There is an unsatisfied demand for enriching research on moral issues and especially on moral motivation and responsibility in the Kohlbergian, Selmanian, Nuccian, and other traditions, for broadening perspectives, thinking ‘outside the box’ of moral psychology and crossing disciplinary borders.

The concept of MM is unique. Here are three examples: When Arendt (2003) asks who was motivated to resist in World War II, she answers that you find people in each life setting, within poor and rich, within educated and non-educated, the ‘holy’ and unholy, the naturally heroic and unheroic; people in differing circumstances but all reaching the point where they knew that they couldn’t live anymore without acting. Or, when Gibbs (2010) speaks about “the mutual help” approach, asking who were the ones who went forward to challenge those “who regularly victimize others and society” (p. 153). The motive was that the power of such people, for
example, alcoholics had to be turned around and thus the drive becomes a different, now positive goal. Or, Damon in “The path to purpose” (2008) states: “Others are involved in civic or political causes, such as lobbying for stronger gun control or environmental regulation, and rallying support for Middle East peace… The clarity of purpose generates in them a prodigious amount of extra positive energy, which not only motivates them to pursue their goal passionately but also to acquire the skills and knowledge they need for this task” (pp. 79-80). All this is motivation, or, in other words, a search for the reason to act. And it is of course not only from one dimension but from a whole cluster of dimensions that a person is driven to fulfill agency.

In the book, we thus intend to induce a sophisticated discussion on moral motivation across disciplines and lines of research - convinced that research on “why be good?” and “how to be driven towards moral action?” is a very important and emerging field of research endeavour.

We encouraged authors from different disciplines to contribute and present their perspectives on how people act morally for the good or bad or how they are driven or impelled to fulfill either the one or the other.

Within our book, we tried to group the chapters into seven parts, referring to different perspectives and models of moral motivation, on the one hand, and two stand alone chapters, on the other hand, providing an umbrella perspective in order to summarize and discuss the presented chapters:

- The book begins with Oser’s chapter in order to open the reader’s mind to how different currently discussed approaches to moral motivation are. Oser identifies and differentiates 12 different models of moral motivation, summarizing currently discussed concepts of moral motivation. This chapter is followed by seven parts, collecting all the chapters on moral motivation.
- In Part 1, we look for basic foundations on how to conceptualize moral motivation, approaches that are broadly in line with Rest and Kohlberg, as well as other critical and enriching conceptions.
- In Part 2, different concepts of motivation developed in motivational psychology (attribution theory, expectancy-value models, theory of interest, self-determination theory, volitional psychology) are applied specifically to the issue of motivation, as well as motivational deficits in morally relevant situations. Additionally, authors provide a social psychological perspective insofar as they discuss how temporal distance or perceived injustice could contribute to moral motivation.
- Part 3 opens the way to pointing to the personal determinants that are relevant to being driven to act morally by having developed a “moral identity” or a “moral self”.
- In Part 4, we raise the question about how moral motivation could develop from early childhood to adulthood, focusing on cognitive, emotional and situational aspects.
- In Part 5, the authors provide approaches to the issue of people who lack moral motivation or conduct themselves immorally, and how they decide between “good” and “bad”.
— In Part 6, we followed Rest’s advice to study moral motivation in the professions and present different approaches to moral motivation in different professions: dentistry, law, the military as well as teaching and school leadership.
— In Part 7, all chapters concentrate on the field of education and ask how to develop or foster moral motivation.
— As a counterpoint to Oser’s chapter at the beginning, Heinrichs provides a chapter at the end that offers a systematic discussion of the presented contributions in parts 1 to 7. She refers to an action-theoretical framework that offers an umbrella-perspective in order to compare the presented approaches on moral issues systematically and to clear the way for an integrative approach about the study of motivational processes and moral action. This chapter could be regarded as an attempt to take a further step forward towards closing the judgment-action gap.

As described, the book offers a contemporary and comprehensive appraisal of an age-old and yet to be fully determined and satisfactorily answered question about motivation to do the good. It utilizes the latest research from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives, wishing to suggest by this that the answer to the question, if to be found at all, will likely not come from one discipline and that the narrowly constructed research approach of the recent past might have contributed to closing off rather than opening up the interdisciplinary lines of research necessary to tackling an issue of such proportions. We commend this research to you, the reader, and we hope it contributes to better understanding of ourselves as a moral species.

REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION


INTRODUCTION

The issue of Moral Motivation (MM) has, on the one hand, a long and deeply ingrained history but, on the other hand, is possessed by very few clearly defined conceptions. This makes it difficult to declare whether our generation is merely repeating formulas of the past or, as is often claimed, is on the verge of paradigm change or at least the formation of a paradigm shift allowing for an acceptable model of MM that might supersede former models and sub-models. Motivation is a scientific notion with three focuses: a) goal orientation, b) energizing processes and c) perseverance (Rheinberg & Vollmeyer, 2008, 391). Historically, MM starts with the famous “daimonion” of Socrates that tells humans what not to do and pulls them away from the wrong things that sometimes develop in their minds. The daimonion does not however indicate what to do, but merely indicates the probable wrongness of the agent.

In the Middle Ages, it was Thomas Aquinas who developed the concept of two consciences, one titled synderesis (inborn force), the other conscientia (learned rule sensibility) both of motivating the person to do the right, but sometimes contradicting each other. A wonderful tractatus on the foundations of morality stems from the philosopher, Schopenhauer, in which he describes “egoism” as the strongest moral motivational force including in its capacity for organizing a life of survival and happiness. This is why he conceives of a moral deed as moral if it is free from any self-centred needs fulfillment. The absence of egoistic motives makes an act in itself moral. In the elimination of self-centric motives, morality begins to develop a face. Freud’s notion of the “superego” is another important model for explaining why people act morally or immorally. The superego is a learned or socialized inner force that reacts alarmingly if wrongness supersedes rightness. Furthermore, the motivational concept of Tugendhat (1986) speaks about indignation as the motivating force for fighting for justice, care and truthfulness. If someone suffers indignation, he/she is able to stand up and act morally in a solid and convincing way.

All these models are metaphors of the human search for what moves persons to be just, caring and truthful. Most of these traditional concepts mix moral knowledge, judgment and feelings, and, only in recent decades, have researchers tried to disentangle these capacities, taking into account situational influences and personal differences. Thus, the issue of moral motivation is not the only notion relevant to the question “Why be moral?”; many other moral concepts are essential to explaining this, especially moral reasoning, moral self-efficacy and moral responsibility.

© 2013 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.
Rather, moral motivation is about “what forces us to act?” after moral deliberation of personal and societal consequences.

There are two ways of seeing and framing MM. The first consists in forming the researched construct from classical motivational theories such as expectancy value theory (Heckhausen, 1987), attributional theories (Weiner, 1988; 2006), self determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1993), flow concept (Csikszentmihalyi, M., 1990) and interests theories (Schiefele, 2011; Krapp in this volume). Here, as suggested, goal orientation, intentionalities, energizing processes, perseverance, and similar theories constitute general topics. In this case, the moral content is just one application field, such as being motivated to drive a car or to study music, or being motivated to solve a mathematical task or do sport, etc. One of the basic aspects of all these theories is that the general concept can be isolated from different application settings and academic or professional fields. For this first way (see Krapp, and/or Weiner in this volume), we can learn how measurement issues, with respect to general motivational theories, can be solved. Expectancy theories for instance work within the construct “hope for success” versus “fear from failure”.

The second way to study moral motivation is different. The framing here starts by analyzing the specific content of a social or moral situation and its intentionalities, such as to be just, not to lie, to help the poor, to invest in supererogative forms of political actions, etc. (see Youniss & Reinders, 2010). The specificity of the moral ought and the situational moral claims offer another picture about why we should act morally and how we are pushed or pulled to keep a rule, a promise, or to balance care, justice and truthfulness, or else to look for excuses and for pretexts not to do so. MM, in this sense, is the drive to fulfill (or prevent from) a basically human demand by the fact that rules of moral conduct (like the ten commandments) are taken as guidelines for realizing a good life, but also connote personal obligation. Thus, the combination of a) inner readiness and willpower, b) outer situational concrete circumstances and conflicts between two goods and, c) a more or less accepted abstract rule system of a society, only makes clear how much MM is also – besides being a personality construct – an educational claim. The distinction between a) MM, b) moral motives and, c) moral claims, as Wren proposes it (in this volume), is pre-conditional for a profound understanding of this tension. The first refers to a psychic power, the second to an external influence, and the third to a good life, in respect of a better world. All three go together, but it makes sense for analytical purposes to disentangle them.

Often forgotten, but central to the issue, is (within or outside of the concept of MM), a moral motive. To assign a motive to someone means to understand the reason for an act, attributionally or predictively; it is a stimulus towards central moral ideas that are guiding humans. Motives to perform well or to be competent (performance motive), to be dominant (power motive), to have new relationships and be part of the group (affiliation motif), and, of course, to be just/ to help others (general moral motif) are more or less strong predictors for moral agency (Haste & Locke, 1983; introduction). Motifs are situation-independent, but are more easily activated in motif related specific situations, such as hope and fear for performance...
MODELS OF MORAL MOTIVATION

motivation (see Rheinberg & Vollmeyer, 2008, 2012). Many of the chapters in this volume stress moral motifs. A moral motif is a central ethical value that guides a person in a morally relevant situation. A motif can be covered with excuses or hidden or just pseudo accepted, quasi as a pretext for not doing the expected action. Situated stimulation of the motifs, striving to fulfill a motif or struggling to reach a motif, are all referred to as motivation. The motif to keep the Ten Commandments because of religious belief leads to MM in the sense that fulfilling one of these commandments in a critical situation is central to a person’s morality. One specific aspect of MM is that the core moral motif is negatively framed. Not to lie, not to steal, not to harm, not to discriminate, etc. are important moral motifs which can be grouped under the guidance of the goal “to realize justice”.

In this handbook, different models of MM are proposed. Some go back to the Kohlberg/Candee paradigm, many to Blasi’s moral self-concept approach, while others merely propose elements or preconditions of MM. In my own contribution, I try to reconstruct them and, at the end of this chapter, I offer a synopsis that includes other important aspects of what might be classed as MM. In general, we understand by MM three types of meaning, namely, a) to act morally instead of immorally, b) to be forced (pushed or pulled) to consider the moral point of view, even if we do not act on it, and, c) to consider sentiments or feelings of being responsible (for instance, to accept a sense of ethics in a situation of fear, or to keep hope in a contingent situation of danger or to see pro-social necessities as relevant and central (Staub et al., 1984)).

Since we have carefully selected, in this volume, chosen authors who are specialists on research in moral psychology or a related field, our goal was to address the question of whether motivation as the psychological force for taking certain action is a content specific issue (e.g. Selman, or Thoma & Bebeau, in this volume) or merely a generalized driving force pushing or pulling people in a certain direction (e. g. Weiner, or Krapp, in this volume). From the point of view of moral psychology, we have to connect motivation with a specific content, namely moral demands, moral norms, moral values, and, from a domain specific point of view, from social, political, religious or personal values. From the perspective of educational psychology, we have to consider – as suggested before – different types of motivation.

In my contribution, these models will be presented in an attempt to clarify the different concepts by looking at the respective distinguishable criteria.

A STORY TO BEGIN WITH:

In order to circumscribe the phenomenon of MM, Curcio (2008) uses a convincing story: It is Friday evening. The solders want to leave for the weekend. The commander of the company discovers that, after the exercise with live ammunition, three hand grenades are missing. A certain commander stops the weekend leave and orders a search for the missing weapons. Other commanders disagree with this action.

The commander who chooses to retain the 300 soldiers, albeit with all the problems of dissatisfaction and grumbling, has – what we call - responsibility
motivation. He is motivated to change the situation and to ensure that children should not be exposed to the danger of an explosion. The other commanders do not have responsibility motivation. As Curcio shows, however, most commanders are at the same stage of the DIT measure (see Rest, 1986), the same intelligence characteristics, similar social contexts, similar status in the military force, and even similar status in the private job carrier (Switzerland has no professional army but only a public militia army), etc. Thus, if the personality constraints are the same, yet the action differs so fundamentally, responsibility motivation, or MM as a general construct is at stake. Interviews elicit that: all people have motives for acting or not acting (cognitive disequilibrium); all have situational knowledge for accepting or denying its seriousness; all reflect about possible consequences (cognitive equilibrium gap); some do not see the action possibilities (seeing the action as impossible); some are denying the sense of necessity (no necessity for acting); some show the will to act against resistance; some try to overcome the fear (very high emotional fear or shame blocking the action); and, some do or do not use their moral identity concept to balance justice, care and truthfulness in this situation. Furthermore, some even show no effort aimed at accomplishing the perceived goals (no volition).

A similar phenomenon was found with regard to small children: (Gasser & Keller, 2009) found that young children do have knowledge about rules, do know about the consequences of bad acting, are at the same stage of moral development, but still differentiate, the one group engaging in mobbing, for instance, the other not.

Thus, in critical situations, political, military and school leaders, but also CEOs of banks and business institutions, might or might not take responsibility for a believed necessary action that is felt under their charge. They are or are not morally motivated. If motivated, they feel accountable; if not, they feel irresponsible. The interesting case is seen where they feel motivated but do not act on it. The question thus is about how these subjects react in a pre-decisional phase, in the decision phase and, afterwards, with respect to their responsibility judgment, and with respect to their felt accountability towards the content, the persons and the methods for solving the respective problematic issue. As Curcio (2008) proposed, we use, on the one hand, aspects of an extended motivation model of Heckhausen (2003) and Rheinberg (2002) and, on the other hand, philosophical elements of a responsibility ethics (Jonas, 1986; Bayertz, 1995) in relation to moral judgment issues of the Kohlbergian and the post-Kohlbergian frame (Kohlberg, 1984; Thoma, 2006) and, finally, central elements of the model of procedural morality. Leaders, similar to children in what are doubtlessly personally concerned critical incident situations, take or do not take responsibility when they refer to the imagined consequences of their action or their non-action and/or to a more or less orthodox rule and principle-orientation. If the consequences are strong, they mostly use a forward strategy of action. If the consequences are low, they often use a rule based strategy, (eg. delegating the responsibility – see Garz, 1999, on week and strong norms in the judgment action context). These facts illustrate the high complexity of MM as a dynamic concept.
MODELS OF MORAL MOTIVATION

Before starting into the models (or the elements of models), we of course know that some of the selected chapters fit with different approaches. For instance, Althof and Berkowitz (in this volume) are relevant certainly for model 1 and model 11, as they rely on a vision, but also deal with content, virtues and moral motifs. This is important because we accept the fact that, the more complex a concept is, the more overlapping models are needed for its causal explanation. The simpler a concept, the more experimentally framed the central determinants can be. If we were to strengthen our investigation into the differentiation between intrinsic and extrinsic MM, many of the chapters would overlap and include both in the same situation.


Most of the papers in this volume treat MM as if we know what the good and the bad is in each situation. However, human existence is framed by the fact that often-conflicting values do not restrict the outcome to one clear act. Kohlberg (1981) already stressed this by his simple Heinz-dilemma test, namely, that the outcome itself is often ambiguous. Being motivated to do the right thing means a search for the right thing, accompanied often with doubts and crises. Thus, in this volume, we often do not distinguish between motivation for doing the right thing and motivation for doing the wrong thing. Doing something bad can have at least three motivational dimensions: a) we do it because we are not motivated to do the right thing (e.g. if we do not help because helping will take too much time and it is merely a non-obligatory duty anyway); b) we do it because we are motivated to do the wrong thing (e.g. to sell drugs because of the possibility of an enormous money gain); and, c) we do it because we are the victim of a psychological fallacy, as Zimbardo (2007) infers through his ‘Lucifer effect’ in which people turn into villainous actors treating others with painful methods and harmful and torturous techniques. This distinction, combined with a theory of domain specificity, would give the concept of MM a new face. In this volume, however, we have merely set out to define and ground the status of the concept in order to generate later a possible new theory of MM.

12 MODELS (OR ELEMENTS OF A RESPECTIVE MODEL)

Model 1: A Vision as MM

Maybe the most simple and most common, but also most powerful moral motivational concept is to build up a vision for the better functioning of a system and then interpret pathways and steps towards the fulfillment of that vision as absolutely necessary. For this model, the following elements are offered:

a) there must be a feeling of insufficiency with respect to moral standards (students in a school steal, cheat, mob, lie, do not clean their study places, do not show helping behaviour, are unfriendly);
b) there must be a general view that we should overcome this state and start a new
politic, realizing a (often not very precise) vision;
c) the practical view is “we can have a socio morally better school” that entails
more respect, more responsibility, more shared norms (note: the saying is not
less cheating, less stealing, less lying, more helping, etc., but it contains a general
view of change towards human virtues);
d) there are imagined sources of possible action that, it is believed, can lead to
change. These action possibilities are also decided openly and often standardized
as rule enforcement.

MM here means a tension between a visionary moral state of a system and the daily
struggle for reaching, at least partly, this state. Campbell (in this volume) speaks
about a dual expectation, first, exacting ethical standards and, second, a concern the
teacher has as an educator and model. Building up such a professional moral sense
is an example of a learning process. Teachers’ internships can be a place to become
morally motivated through practising ethical decision-making (Oja and Craig, in
this volume). In a new study, Varghese (2012) investigates the effectiveness of
civic education programs, comparing teachers of Karela (in India) with teachers in
Switzerland, the former having such a vision, the latter not. Turnaround schools are
other good examples for such a motivational concept (Leithwood et al., 2010) in
which classroom and school management techniques are believed to lead to moral
and pro-social change. “Just community schools” are basically also bound to such
a change vision. The title is “How deconstructing the American school system
will reconstruct the American school” (Pittella, 2011). In this volume, Lee offers
an example of such a basic moral motivational concept, all examples with subtle
differentiations. Additional elements like “temporal distance” (see Agerström &
Björklund, in this volume) or subcultural norm systems (see Weyers, in this volume)
frame this model in the notion of embeddedness in whole correction, school, or
work-systems. Measurement is mostly based on a pre- post- follow-up research
design.

Model 2: The Moral Act as the Criterion for MM (Kohlberg & Candee)

The presentation of this model is given in Fig. 1 of Minnameier in this volume. In
his four steps, Kohlberg thought that moral action depended not only on moral stage
/type, but also on the deontic choice (that means yes he/she should or should not do
what is at stake), then on a sort of judgment of obligation/responsibility, and finally
non moral personality variables like ego controls, IQ, attention, delay of gratification,
etc. Kohlberg & Candee presented this model for the first time in 1984 when the
criticism in regard to the judgment action gap became central. We have, looking at
this model, the possibility to interpret the judgment of responsibility as the moral
motivational force. Because when I feel responsible, the probability to act in the
desired way is much higher than when I am not obligated. Interestingly, Kohlberg
MODELS OF MORAL MOTIVATION

does not speak about MM. So we can see the motivational part either - as mentioned above - as “judgment of responsibility/obligation” - or as one of the ego-controls. If we see it as judgment impelled by obligation, the moral motivational concept would be typically ethics oriented with a special moral feature, namely, precisely to be pushed by one’s own personal commitment for being moral. Responsibility/obligation, in this sense, becomes a moral construct in itself. It is different when we see MM as a personality trait, such as being impelled by ego-controls, self-efficacy or general emotional reaction. In these circumstances, motivation would be outside of the moral realm, namely, as generally being impelled by chance. Even if the model of Kohlberg is plotted as phases, we think that Kohlberg & Candee rather thought of something like factors having simultaneous influences. The measurement of this model is seen in looking at the different factors and comparing or correlating them with the frequencies of an expected moral act. Especially in stage level concepts, measurement of felt obligation and types of moral agency are combined.

Model 3: Deontological and Responsibility Judgment in One as MM

There is an argument that each moral judgment in Kohlberg’s stage theory is in itself a moral motivational motor, or, in terms of the Kohlberg/Candee model, each deontic judgment includes or is accompanied necessarily by a responsibility judgment (see Minnameier, in this volume). This position uses a kind of moral internalist argument, suggesting that moral judgments are self-motivating rather than in need of a special force of moral commitment. The logic behind this is that each moral judgment already includes a tendency to act, shown through the concepts of induction, abduction and deduction. One important argument is that all moral motivational concepts include action judgments that are consistent with a serious moral judgment itself. In this model, therefore, the issue is that judgment of morality (ie. what should I do?) and judgment of responsibility (ie. is the act consistent with my moral self?) go together and are separate from phase IV, as Minnameier suggests, namely ego control, delay of gratification, IQ, etc. The phases are: phase I, interpretation and selection of principles; phase II, decision making; phase III, follow through (moral judgment); and, phase IV, follow through (ie. non-moral skills).

Because moral motivation must be possessed of moral grounds, it falls under the command of moral judgment, while “selecting values” (Rest’s component III) falls also under the category of judgment. “What Rest calls ‘moral motivation’ is, in reality a question of moral judgment” (Minnameier, in this volume). In addition, the judgment of responsibility can be seen as a special form of moral judgment itself. This argumentation is related to the hypothesis that any emotional reaction is centrally concerned with content, and that content is part of the judgment structure itself. Thus, according to this model, the three first phases of the Kohlberg/Candee scheme are aspects of moral judgment, and nothing else. Questioning these reflections, we can say that even if so, it is possible to distinguish, not just phases but causal elements of the same judgment. For instance, in terms of multiple regression analysis, we can
enquire about how much each of these elements accounts for the explained variance. Then, instead of phases, we can just survey one and the same structure of judgment but this time focusing on deontic, responsibility, value and sincerity (emotional) elements. One problem may be that Rest was turning his components into phases instead of regarding them as terms of causal factors.

**Model 4: The Component III (of the Four Component) Model of MM**

In this volume, the four-component model of Rest (1983) is often cited and scientists frequently refer to it. The four components are: a) moral judgment, b) moral sensitivity, c) moral motivation, and, d) moral will to act. Originally, the four components resulted from meta- and factor analyses. These components were relatively independent of each other and could be – depending on the situation – more or less adapted and applied.

As Thoma and Bebeau suggest (in this volume), component III is first described as a bridge from a moral situation over the imagined or felt ‘ought’ to the question of what to do and what decision is the one on which to act. Within the possible alternatives, often conflicting with each other, Rest’s component III prioritizes the person’s capacity to act under difficult circumstances. Decision making models are substantial parts of component III because, as Rest suggests, the moral action is a precondition for any judgment about others or about societal morality. Additionally, as Thoma and Bebeau (in this volume) stress, Rest developed the four components using a bottom up method, relying on a broad mass of empirical literature.

Component III includes control and competency, but also effective strategies of action planning. If we admit that moral judgments, in the Kohlbergian sense, are prescriptive and that the obligation to act is implicitly given, the moral motivation is something like an inner state, a mechanism leading to act or not to act morally. If the situation is understood as morally necessary and if the action possibilities are coded as worthwhile versus not worthwhile, then moral motivation is the impelling force that determines what has to be seen as good, helpful and appropriate with perseverance. Overcoming resistance and hindering matters are parts of the motivational force. Even if we do not have yet a measure for moral motivation, Rest’s model is developmentally framed. This becomes visible if we consult the DIT, which includes at least some moral motivational parts. An excellent application is seen in the work of the Bebeau group, showing precisely this force in professional settings. Related to the clear ‘oughts’ in the profession, the distinct elements are: …”(1) ‘see the ought’, a deficiency in moral sensitivity, (2) ‘understand the ought’, a deficiency in moral reasoning and moral judgment, (3) see the self as responsible ‘to do the ought’, a deficiency in moral motivation and commitment, or (4) have the will and competence to ‘do the ought’, a deficiency in moral character and competence”. (Bebeau & Monson, 2008, and in this volume). If this is based on the expectations that a society has to the professions and the professions have towards its members, we begin to understand how MM could be framed on the basis of component III and on the basis of what we know from the
MODELS OF MORAL MOTIVATION

professional responsibilities. Excellent measurement work in this direction has been
done by the Thoma group (Thoma, 2006).

Model 5: The Self as a Regulating Power in MM

“The term ‘motivational ability’ refers to skills that are important variables in the
implementation of personal goals: the skills of motivation regulation (motivating
oneself to persevere), decision regulation (quickly coming to a self-congruent decision),
activation regulation (readying oneself to act), and self-efficacy (the self being able
to bring the intended behaviour to a successful conclusion despite difficulties.”
(Forstmeier et al., 2012, 353). This is a classical statement of general self-regulation
oriented motivation theory. Going a step further, however, is Blasi’s concept of the
moral self and moral self-management (see in this volume). We discover here that an
active guide of the moral functioning of a person’s life means monitoring the distance
between one’s behaviour and the respective goal autonomously. Motivation means an
adaptive conscious form of searching for consistency between the situation in which a
person has to decide and his/her moral ideal which is part of their ego. Of course, Blasi
distinguishes between judgment, the transformation of the judgment into an action and
the stability of such actions over days, month and years. Nonetheless, he positions the
desire to be moral and to do the moral right thing as firstly intentional and consciously
engaging in the realization of one’s moral goals. Furthermore, this action must be
realized in spite of obstacles, hindering conditions, and any misunderstandings of
moral goals and dispositions that a person may have. Interpreting the world through
moral criteria means always utilizing moral heuristics, preventing harm and suffering,
but striving for reciprocity, care, fairness and justice. The perception of a moral
situation, the interpretation through moral criteria, the sensitivity for distortion, errors
and self-protecting biases, the transformation into a necessary moral act through moral
self-regulation are the elements that comprise moral motivation.

This self-oriented form of moral motivation is interesting because it deals with
the fact that “the route from judgment to intention, and from intention to action,
can be hesitant, filled with delays, starts-and-stops, fraught by obstacles of different
kinds, particularly when the intention has to be realized through a long series of
activities” (Blasi, in this volume). Self-monitoring activities thus means consciously
ascertaining what is necessary for oneself and how the sense of the self is shaped by
moral ideals. Blasi does not speak about the moral personality, because this would
be a trait oriented concern; nor does he speak about moral identity which would
concern belonging to something or some groups. His moral self is a conscious form of
controlled moral identity, of constantly reflected morality and of a rational morality
in its emotional expression. Moral motivation is a concept of forced transformation
speaks about a dialogue with one’s self in which we come to a decision whereby the
self and the moral demand overlap in a way that I, as the person involved can, after
the decision, live with its consequences. Even if no measurement propositions are
made, the possible effect of this theoretical top down concept is fruitful because of its validity claim and its existential rootedness.

Krettenauer (in this volume) goes a step further again. For him, the self and morality are one and the same thing. Denying a separation of the two constructs means – at the same time – the suggestion of three layers of this self, the intentional agent, the volitional agent and the identified agent, with each having – even as interweaved elements – a different biographical development and thus stimulating different interacting motivational processes.

Weyers (in this volume) states that there is no remedy for juvenile delinquency but a change of the whole moral self of a young person, not so much a judgment and a remorseful feeling, but a self-transformation through biographical reconstruction. It includes the whole person as a moral subject in a concrete societal context, which is responsible for the possible coming-to-be of a new moral self.

Model 6: Reconciling Agency and Communion as MM

One central characteristic of model 6 (see Walker in this volume) is that it starts with the assumption that MM is always a combination of personality profiles and situational aspects. A further element is that the quest for analyzing moral exemplars is basic for studying motivational aspects of morality which yielded, in earlier work - three clusters of personality types: a) a communal cluster marked by social support and nurturance, b) a deliberative cluster marked by openness for new experiences, and, c) an ordinary cluster marked by normal personality functioning. The two first clusters, expressed through strong topics on a) communion and b) agency or, in other words, on “getting along with” and “getting ahead”, produce self-transcendent communal and self-enhancing argentic values. Years ago, both concepts were developed relatively independently of each other, and mostly one stood against the other, but had, if integrated in the one person, a greater potential for predicting MM. The new idea is that the occurrence of both, in a compatible relationship, could produce a greater force being pushed to act because of agency orientation and communion orientation as one moral functioning. Thus, Walker (in this volume) states: “Why be good? Because promoting the interests of others can be fundamentally enhancing to the self” (p. 197). The challenge of this new model is that it is generated from the endpoint of moral development, from an ethical ideal, and it would be worthwhile to investigate the developmental pathway towards its possible growth.

Interesting in Walker’s model of reconciliation of agency and communion is that it does not presuppose moral sovereignty. In most of the studies on moral exemplars, the researchers speak about a morally secure and sovereign acting. The moral hero knows what to do and he/she has no doubts about the right thing to do in the situation. To my mind, heroes and models of decision making in concrete moral dilemma situations are models precisely because they contain doubt about which is the right way to go, searching, feeling weaknesses, being insecure, feeling lost, and being internally riven. The moral hero picture is formulated in the following sentence: “Without hesitation or inner conflict and even at high personal cost these persons in their real life decisions
MODELS OF MORAL MOTIVATION

gave priority to moral concerns – because morality was constitutive of their identity (happy moralists)” (Nunner-Winkler, in this volume). In our mind, this would be not a moral exemplar, so much as an orthodox morality machine without self-reflection and critical stance and thus become obsolete (see also Thoma & Bebeau in this volume). Of course, moral quality can be conjoined with general happiness, but in general we cannot deny the basic moral core issue, namely, that we need morality only if an immoral situation leads to indignation and a felt disequilibrium.

This also appears in the chapter on moral motivation in the sport setting. As Power (in this volume) suggests, sport is a continuous conflict between a winning tendency and moral duty, team spirit and self-actualization. Models of morality thus do consider what is best for the team, the performance and the moral self. The balance of different values is not naturally given, but produces an internal conflict that must be won each and every time. Lovat (in this volume) speaks of MM as a “truly active state of one who is prepared to strike out for moral good, whatever the cost and regardless of expectations” (p. 255). This of course will not eventuate without internal conflict regarding all the costs and consequences.

With respect to measurement, excellent work has been done by the Walker group that developed tested instruments for the communion orientation, the agency orientation and moral centrality.

Model 7: Forming Intentions and Respective Actions as MM

Motivation can be seen as a force compelling action, a veritable package of active elements, by which “individuals formulate beliefs and goals, embrace desires, generate attributions to explain their experiences, and direct their energies as they act” (Thorkildsen, in this volume, p. 85). The most important elements for this model are a) beliefs, b) desires and c) actions. The belief says “I am responsible (or accountable).” The desire says “I want to be a good person/ or rather I want to have a lot of money; I want to be like others/ or I think these laws are lasting.” The action says “Let’s do this or that (readiness to act).” Instead of relying on moral self and theories of self regulation, this concept is rather intentional; the goal is to understand why people “do what they do and how intentional strategies work to elicit behaviour” (p. 88). The core issue concerns how we form intentions and how we transform these intentions into moral acts. It is important that people produce intentions and relate them to their goals and aspirations. There is a necessity to see how ethical information is used for either producing or supporting what is intended.

The measurement possibilities are given through scales of beliefs and desires, moral aspirations and civil life intentions being correlated with action readiness.

Model 8: Moral Emotion Attributions as Indicators for Individual Moral Motivation

If we take aggressive behaviour as indicative of immoral behaviour, then positive emotion attributions to a perpetrator indicate a strong motivation for one’s own
aggressive behaviour (see Gasser et al., Krettenauer, and Nunner-Winkler, in this volume). Whereas positive emotions, to oneself as the wrongdoer, are strongly related to one’s own negative behaviour; emotional attributions to the perpetrator are less clear. This means that, according to this model, most of how we feel about a perpetrator (or someone who does the good thing) is a causal reason for our own moral (or social) behaviour. Moral emotion ascriptions thus are important indicators even if no financial or material gain is in sight and even if the respective children know the rules and know that the victim feels bad. The schema of multiple sufficient causes is thus overridden by, for example, one’s mood, respectively a sufficient feeling with respect to a moral or immoral act. Nunner-Winkler (in this volume) thus concludes that moral motivation is intrinsic (because a norm is transgressed and not because someone will be punished, for example); it is formal (in the sense that subjects do what they feel to be right), and it is a second order desire (if a person does what is right) even if it is in conflict with the first order spontaneous desire. As shown in the same reflections, the transformation of the structure of moral motivation from an external or internal moral motivational authority force to an “ego-syntonic” form with a strong desire to repair makes it clear that emotion attribution is the force for doing what is demanded or for not doing it. As Arendt (1967) states that good persons can have a bad conscience, but that bad persons don’t necessarily have a bad conscience. It is indeed very convincing that the emotions attributed to facts elicit the importance that the person ascribes to them. Emotion attribution seems to be an indicator also of moral motivation with respect to actions within relationships, such as friendship, long term relationships in negotiation fields, partnerships, etc. If I consider cheating or hurting a friend in negotiating a conflicting issue, it is a different stance than merely one of winning a bigger part in that negotiation. Friendship thus would make the trading game an intrinsic issue. In this model, the discussion on passion and reasoning becomes central, as Reed (in this volume) illustrates. The different levels of personal functioning are in themselves a navigating moral force.

Measurement issues in the emotion attribution model are illustrated well in experimental work with children, presenting them with stories and material to which to react. Döring (in this volume) offers an outstanding contribution to a highly differentiated measurement process.

Model 9: Justice Motives as Bridges from the Situation to MM

There are two indicators that – according to Baumert et al. (in this volume) – are responsible for the justice motive, namely, belief in a just world and justice sensitivity. These two constructs are central forces for motivating people to act under given circumstances in a specific way, in other words, to be morally motivated. Motives are – in this model – dispositions for striving towards a certain human goal. They are directed against the reductionist model in which every human moral motivation is explained in terms of pure egoism. It includes the justice motive, the injustice experiences with respective feelings of anger, indignation, shame, etc., and
MODELS OF MORAL MOTIVATION

then urges the person to restore justice. The more central the justice motive is for the person, the more the overcoming of unjust situations becomes central as a goal. The belief in a just world is related to one’s own justice standards, and it is based on an imagined contract defending the positive illusion that everyone gets what he/she deserves, or deserves what she/he gets. Moral sensitivity however is a construct not very much related to this belief, but one nonetheless with high predictive power for acting towards justice. Thus, the individual internalizing principles of deservedness, on the one hand, and justice sensitivity as a central trait, on the other hand, are translated into moral motivation in a self-regulatory process, as further described by Baumert et al. (in this volume). The authors say: “The stronger the justice motive, the more readily justice concerns are activated and the more pronounced the effects on information processing, emotion, and consequently moral motivation are” (p. 173). This process however needs further clarification.

The justice belief is measured by high standardized scales on the “belief in a just world”.

Model 10: Informed Social Reflection as MM

Based on the fact that people often do not know their own values, their own systemic embeddedness and their own beliefs (hidden curriculum), Kwok and Selman (in this volume) developed a new theoretical approach; it is based on understanding the past becoming the foundation by which we can fruitfully “navigate our social and cultural environment” (p. 554) in the future. Selman and his group define MM as “occupying a causal role in moral decision-making” (p. 554). When an individual chooses a moral act, he/she uses a catalytic of moral reasoning as an informed justification. Informed understanding means that a person uses his/her whole past to solve a present incident; but not only this; he/she combines what he experienced in an earlier situation with his/her judgment and the respective reflection. The sources of informed social reflections are: a) “Civic orientation”, b) “Ethical reflection” and c) “Historical understanding”. These elements are mostly effective if MM precedes clearly moral action. In other words, without insight, there is no moral action. Furthermore, this insight is sourced by safety, rules/power, relationships/inclusion and civic incentives. Informed social reflection is the additional gain emanating from any decision-making, in the sense that, with it, we have the guarantee that we can detect egoisms that hinder a positive moral act. Openness thus means that transparency is the moral motivational warranty for choosing the best of the alternatives.

The measurement of informed justification is mostly qualitative in that it opens up the hidden grounding, thought and emotional character of a situation.

Model 11: Motivation by Content: Moral Motifs as MM

A classical motivational concept is interest in a given matter (Schiefele, 2011), content, task, performance or relationship. It is a powerful motor for acting towards such content
or within such content. Interest is not justifiable; it is just there. Interest in content is
the most intrinsic motivational power that we can understand. For Nucci (2008), it is
important to distinguish the so-called domains in the sense that moral, social, personal,
religious and political issues do lead to different interests and to different motivational
claims. Interests are different in different domains. For Narvaez (in this volume), there are
three different contents, namely a safety ethic, an engagement ethic and an imaginative
ethic. For Deci & Ryan (1993), it is work fulfilment, relationship (communion) and self
determination. For Aristotle, important contents are virtues like justice, courage, loyalty,
etc. Situation appropriate compassion (not too much and not too little) and imagination
(problem solving capacity) are necessary fundamentals for its realisation. Character
education derives from its normative turn: humans shall have such virtues, reflect about
their intrinsic necessities and apply them in concrete situations. That is why this movement
is targeting a concrete content (knowledge) and a concrete behaviour (competence). The
goal is that the content itself makes it worth embarking on. It is motivating within itself,
by its very nature. Other than the structural approach, the content motivational approach
asks how we can influence people to learn a certain package of important values, to
accept them and to apply them at least cognitively to conflicting situations.

Another good example is seen in Klöckner (in this volume). He discusses
environmental behaviour, which is directly influenced by, on the one hand, a basic value
system and, on the other hand, by norms expressed in expectations and obligations.
He speaks about the norm-activation theory in which moral motivation impacts on
behaviour. In general, value systems and specific environmental values enter into
personal norms and feelings of obligation. Furthermore, the value-belief-norm theory
indicates that the real motivation is norm activation, and thus it is moderated by the
strength of the knowledge of consequences. Moral motifs in this view can be strong
beliefs or weak beliefs (intensity measure); they relate to happiness, to acceptance of
oneself, to bounding, to power, or to hope of success/fear of failure; they can be near
to or far from one’s central value system. They are domain specific. They can also be
stage related stimulators of an understood necessary act because they are part of the
moral centrality system of a person (see Frimer & Walker, 2009).

This model is a neighbour of the expectation-value motivation theory of Heckhausen
(1974), in which the expected outcome and the value of the act itself were said to be
influencing directly the respective doing. Also, the approach of Micewski (in this volume)
moves – with variations - in the same direction; the value here is the responsibility in the
military engagement, thus having concrete motifs that push us to act.

Model 12: Procedural Morality and MM.

Being in a morally relevant conflict situation and anticipating the moral, societal, relational
but also financial and status consequences of the respective act, renders the need to form
an intention and then to act. This intention is based however on a searched equilibrium
between the most important moral duties, namely, justice, care and truthfulness. Often, we
experience that being just means not to care, or being caring means not to be truthful. To
overcome this conflict, Oser (1998) developed 5 types of dealing with this tension, including a single handed decision making type versus a discourse type based on deliberation and trust in the others’ capacity to solve the respective moral problem. In our study, the 5 types of reaction to ethically relevant situations were provided with high external validity attached. The 5 types were: a) avoidance, b) delegating, c) single handed decision making, d) incomplete discourse, and, e) full discourse. These forms are deliberation types. Within the construct of procedural morality, these deliberation forms make a moral problem public and thus distribute the responsibility to act. Part of this model also entails a culture of self-deliberation that is related to an invisible yes-no or neutrality decision in the face of that situation. Anticipating how we act means deliberating the potential consequences of each possible outcome and thus forming an intention. In our first tax cheating study, Oser & Garz (1998) demonstrated that different action scenarios were distinguished by subjects involved in the situation. Dependent on which one of the 5 types of dealing with this tension was enacted, we discovered that the outcome was different. This was the reason that we spoke about procedural morality. As Heinrichs (in this volume) refers to volitional power and energized self-regulation of these action scenarios, they are discourse oriented and thus include also the possible barriers for an action implementation. Thus, the most important elements rest on: a) situational awareness, b) deliberation of all types of consequences, c) the formed and imagined action scenarios, and, d) a “jump” into the act, with all the blind spots with respect to the controllability of what happens. There is in such a process a moment of blind navigating, being typical for what we call a procedural morality, with elements like a moral will that reflects the strength of moral motivation, Another issue concerns exhaustion through a deliberate process and procedural morality in the sense that the outcome is not predetermined (see Apel, 1988). As Krapp (in this volume) clearly states, within any model, the acting (or act or reaction or behaviour) is central to moral relevance. Often, it implicitly includes a loss of financial gain, or a new distribution of goods, or an omission of a habit, or a renouncement of a right, etc. The result of a moral deliberation in the sense of the theory of a realistic discourse thus remains always open. We do not know what the result of a deliberation might be, but we know that the common engagement forces the concerned persons to do afterwards what has been decided. Finally, within this model, we know that the freedom to act (one central condition for morally relevant decision making) can never be fully controlled, and that there is always an unexplained rest, the mentioned jumping into the act, a blind spot which helps us to understand the nature of morality in its special existential frame (see Jaspers, 1956, with his existentialist position on Freedom).

OVERRIDING MORAL MOTIVATIONAL MODEL

In developing the structure and the content of this handbook, we were concerned about having too many different motivational concepts and not enough reality related added value in the sense of one or two new and rather comprehensive models. That is why I have tried to develop: a) an overview of different possible models; but b), also to bring these different elements together in one model. Important elements for such a comprehensive
essay on a moral motivational model are seen in Figure 1. Central is the moral self that must be articulated in each new morally relevant situation. The moral judgment and the moral vision are quas the first and immediate result of this morally activated self. The elements in the second column are additional pre-conditional elements (beliefs, emotion attributions, motifs and interests) for stimulating moral motivational activity characteristics. Depending on the situation and the respective moral maturity and sensibility, these elements receive different values. Column three contains the judgment about my own responsibility and the sense of duty, the former not being the same as the latter. The first would contain a judgment like “I felt responsible for the situation”, and the second “I must do it regardless of resistance.” Moral deliberation is seen in the fact that the action necessarily becomes public. The topic “free decisional heuristics” means that it is still possible that we cannot act, or decide, or engage if all the elements are given, which was called, in model 12, the blind spot of human liberty in each moral situation. Moral agency finally is the expected outcome, an act that is difficult because it contains the resistance of the context, financial loss, loss of integration into a group, etc.

Figure 1: Elements of a global moral motivational model.

This model however is probably not realisable; the task is merely to illustrate how all the dimensions could be brought together, and it represents a synopsis of this handbook. To measure it, we would need many more single relational analyses, for instance, the correlation between the intensity of “deliberation” and the amount of “sense of duty”, that is, the relationship between the central moral motive and agency, or the relationship between the moral self and the emotion attribution, or – very importantly – the relationship between judgment of responsibility and sense of duty, or the relationship between the resistance to act and the moral motif power, etc. As it is
presented here, the model has a typical differentiation bias; but only in this way does it help us to understand what it means to care about ideas (Noddings, 1992, 2006).

REFERENCES


**AFFILIATION**

_Fritz K. Oser_,  
Department of Education  
University of Fribourg  
Fribourg, Switzerland
Foundations consist of fundamental ideas about how to consider, deliberate and study moral motivation (MM). There are philosophical foundations, which basically rely on Kant’s metaphysics, general psychological foundations or moral foundations, all synthesizing what influences someone to act or not act morally.

In the first chapter, Wren asks very basically: What drives people to be good? Referring to philosophical traditions, as well as to moral psychological approaches, he shares ideas about how to grasp a person’s sources of being driven towards moral acting. His distinction between moral motivation and moral motives seems to contribute meaningfully to a basic understanding of MM.

Thoma and Bebeau refer to Rest’s model in which moral motivation is presumed to be the third component relevant for action. They show how this component has been studied in general and in the professions, as suggested by Rest himself, as an appropriate domain for getting to the core of moral motivation.

Minnnameier develops a different position in regard to moral motivation by proclaiming the provocative thesis that we do not need Rest’s third component to explain moral behaviour. In the tradition of internalism, he delivers theoretically sophisticated ideas about how to conceptualize the motivational impact of moral judgment staying within the classical stage concept of Kohlberg.

Thorkildsen, as a researcher with roots in moral as well as in general motivational psychology, builds a bridge between both schools of thinking. Based on the stance of intentions, she proclaims that moral action is explained best via a dynamic system of moral and non-moral intentions, some of them being developed intuitively, some of them by reflection. To become ready for moral acting is – in the light of this intentional approach – caused by more than motivational and volitional processes, but rather by moral as well as by non-moral needs or motives.

The editors cluster these four chapters together because they represent four classical starting points for thinking about what MM phenomenologically could be.
I. “WHY BE MORAL?” A PHILOSOPHICAL TAXONOMY OF MORAL MOTIVATION

INTRODUCTION

In the following pages I will try to clarify the concept of moral motivation by laying out a “philosophical taxonomy” of the concept that takes into account the classical and contemporary literature of philosophical ethics as well as psychological accounts of human motivation and moral judgment. I say “takes into account” because this chapter is neither a comprehensive review of the diverse literature on moral motivation nor an attempt to construct a new scientific paradigm. I will address the topic of moral motivation from my home discipline, which is moral philosophy, in the hope that what I have to say will be useful to anyone interested in the perennial question “Why be moral?”

This question can be understood in a variety of ways, all of which can be boiled down to two. The first way is to understand the question as asking why people act in accord with their specific moral judgments (or, from the opposite end, why they often fail to act on those judgments). The second way is to understand it as asking why people bother to make moral judgments at all (or, again from the opposite end, why some people feel no need to take any moral point of view whatsoever). Exactly how these two questions are related to each other, as well as whether they are indeed different questions, is a separate issue, which I will discuss at the end of the chapter.

How reasons — moral or otherwise — are related to human action is a long-standing philosophical problem as well as a major issue in contemporary motivational theory. For simplicity’s sake I will adopt the usual deontological notion of a moral principle, made famous by Immanuel Kant and deployed in cognitive developmental moral psychology, according to which truly moral behaviour is that which is grounded in some sort of normative ought-judgment to the effect that the behaviour in question is consistent with and in some sense or other motivated by a justificatory principle or rule. How cognitive developmentalists such as Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg have charted the process through which these principles take shape in the minds of children and adolescents is well known, as is the subsequent debate over how and why people who see the social world in terms of moral principles actually act (or fail to act) on them.

Less well known is how these and other moral psychologists have dealt with the second of the two questions mentioned above, namely why people bother to make moral judgments at all. Here social learning theorists have had the most to
say, providing various affect-based accounts of moral motivation that range from early cognitive dissonance theory to later social learning theories of modeling and empathy and cognitive frame theories. However, cognitive developmentalists also have weighed in on this issue, as we will see below.

WHY BE MORAL?

Let us return to the question “Why be moral?”, first considering it from a philosophical perspective. As I said above this question can be understood as asking not for an explanation of why people actually act (or think they should act) in accordance with considered moral judgments, but rather for an account of why they even bother to make such judgments. This second version of the question has a rich history in Western philosophy. Its first appearance was in Plato’s *Euthyphro*, where Plato answered the question with two alternative accounts of morality, according to which it was either what one must do because the gods command it or what the gods command because it is right. Medieval philosophers explored the first of these two accounts (often under the rubric of *divine law*), enlightenment philosophers developed the second (often under the more secular rubric of *conscience*), and twentieth century existentialists and analytical philosophers chose to question the question itself (usually under the rubrics of *radical choice* or *linguistic implicature*, respectively).

From this potpourri of ways to deal with the question “Why be moral?”, I would like to distinguish two that are, in my opinion, the Scylla and Charybdis of attempts to steer through the many conceptions of moral motivation. The first way is what A.N. Whitehead called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, and the second is unbridled nominalism. I will discuss them in turn.

*Misplaced concreteness*. The first way is to understand moral experience in causal terms, such that moral judgments are internal states or events that produce the external results that we count as moral behaviour. This approach reflects our general tendency to assume that ordinary language terms such as “conscience” represent something “really out there.” Unfortunately, it does not automatically follow from the everyday currency of the term “conscience” that it is useful for scholarly investigations. Still less does it follow that this or similar terms or concepts correspond to some power or property that is “really present” within the moral agent. Admittedly, until now there has been no shortage of philosophers, be they classical or modern, religious or secular, academic or cracker barrel, who have assumed that people really do have *epikeia*, a moral faculty, an inborn sense of right and wrong, or some other sort of wee small voice built in as part of their intrapsychic makeup. Fortunately, today no self-respecting philosopher or psychologist would subscribe to that sort of naïve psychological realism, which is only a small step away from the Jiminy Cricket picture of conscience as a moralizing homunculus. Today the consensus is quite to the contrary, favoring the other extreme, unbridled nominalism, which stands as the Charybdis to the just-mentioned Scylla of misplaced concreteness.
Unbridled nominalism. The problem with this second way is somewhat more complex. Although Anglo-American psychologists are considerably more willing now than they were in the heyday of radical behaviorism to use mentalistic categories, they quite correctly keep their fingers crossed when they use a non-scientific word like “conscience.” If pressed, many if not most contemporary psychologists, including those whose specialty is motivation theory, tend to eschew psychological realism in favor of the nominalism of those classically tough-minded theorists of a previous generation typified by the British psychologist H.J. Eysenck (1970, 1976), who fiercely rejected the notion of conscience as an objective fact, phenomenon, power, or unitary process. Combining classical nominalism with reinforcement theory, Eysenck argued that the phenomena collectively denoted by the term “conscience” are a loose array of conditioned reflexes for avoiding acts that have been punished by society. He agreed that it may be useful to take a single term like “conscience” as a shorthand designation for a particular group of learned inhibitions, just as labeling a set of actions as “evil” streamlines the moral educator’s task by encouraging the child “to react in the future with anxiety to everything thus labeled” (1976, p. 109). However, for Eysenck and those who have followed him in Britain and elsewhere, a term such as “conscience” has no objective reference. In spite of their convenience in everyday discourse, the argument goes, such terms have little or no heuristic value in the sense of helping us discover something about how morality itself really works.

I have called this general approach to psychological matters “nominalistic” because it continues that powerful British tradition by regarding abstract terms as more or less arbitrary designations or “names” rather than as objective categories that carve reality at its joints. To be sure, Eysenck is hardly the first British theorist to take a nominalist line toward conscience. (It goes back to Ockham.) On the contrary: he stands in prestigious philosophical company. Over a century earlier, Jeremy Bentham tried to demythologize moral sense theory by calling conscience “a thing of fictitious existence, supposed to occupy a seat in the mind” (1834/1983, p. 9). The notion of conscience was thereby reduced to what Bertrand Russell would later call a “logical construction,” such that meaningful statements about conscience are supposedly translatable without residue into statements about more fundamental entities or processes of another sort such as the conditioned reflexes mentioned by Eysenck. Unfortunately, that view shares the weakness of all nominalisms, namely its silence about why those and only those fundamental entities (or reflexes or whatever) are gathered under a single name. For these and probably also other reasons, the actual practice of most psychologists who discuss both morality and motivation stops short of the extreme nominalism of Bentham and Russell. As Eysenck’s definition of conscience as a socially specified and socially conditioned set of inhibitions illustrates, when psychologists do discuss those topics, the logical-constructionist approach to conscience is usually accompanied by an unspoken but supposedly reality-based consensus regarding the criteria for inclusion in the class “moral.” Like most nominalisms actually subscribed to, theirs stops short of the
Humpty-Dumptean conclusion\(^1\) that there is really nothing in common among things bearing the same name other than that they are called by the same name.

**The Functions of Conscience**

I turn now to the question of whether an intermediate position can be found between these two extremes of reifying conscience as a wee small voice and dismissing it as nothing more than an incidentally useful but basically arbitrary labeling device. The history of moral philosophy suggests that some such middle ground can be found. True, there are enormous substantive differences in the ways philosophers have conceptualized conscience, one of the most crucial being the shift from the Aristotelian notion of an intellectual virtue (*phronesis*) to the 20th century emotivist view that reduced conscience to internal exclamations of “Boo!” or “Hurrah!” By and large, though, the philosophical history of “conscience” has revolved around the role conscience is thought to play, from which has arisen a conception of conscience that is not so much substantive as function oriented.\(^2\) Ever since Plato, it has been thought of as an internalized conduct control that commends, blames, and otherwise regulates one’s overt and covert behaviour by means of self-monitoring evaluative cognition. This idea is eminently compatible with western theologies, as Augustine’s *Confessions* and Joseph Butler’s *Sermons* demonstrate. However, it is also quite compatible with naturalistic theories of human behaviour, as Justin Aronfreed tried to show in the opening pages of his watershed theoretical study *Conduct and Conscience* (1968; see also Aronfreed, 1971). This function-oriented notion retains the valid insight of the old moral sense theorists and other philosophers who have reified conscience, namely that there really is something special about moral cognition, and that it is more than just a general feeling tone, a specific kind of behavioral output, or any other empirical feature of conscience.

In the following pages I will try to show how that insight is present in various types of moral psychology. In order to do so I will consider the function of conscience as itself having two aspects or sub-functions. The first can be thought of as the tendency or (better) a set of tendencies to act in conformity with one’s moral judgments. These compliance tendencies include other-oriented motives such as love or gratitude and self-oriented ones such as the need for acceptance and approval. In what follows, I will refer to them as *moral motives*. The second role of conscience can be thought of as an underlying sense of conscientiousness or moral care, which in the following pages I will call *moral motivation*. Although its role is really distinct from the first role of conscience, what I have in mind here is a general disposition or metamotivation, cutting across the historical and conceptual manifold of moral situations and their diverse sorts of actions and moral principles, in such a way that the deliverances of moral judgment are understood by the agent as providing *exciting* as well as *discriminating* reasons for action.

The interrelation between these two aspects or roles of conscience is complex, but it can be articulated as a matrix formed by combining the two pairs of contrasting
terms already mentioned. The upper part of the matrix is formed by the intersection of two rows, representing moral motives and moral motivation, and two columns, representing the above-mentioned contrast between noncognitivist and cognitivist ways of regarding the subject matter of psychology. The four cells generated by the intersection of these rows and columns refer to the epistemological and metaethical views that can be taken toward each of the two main motivational concepts. In the next few pages I will briefly describe these views under the headings of the summary and constitutive conceptions (of moral motivation) and the externalist and internalist perspectives (on moral motives). However, what is especially distinctive about these two rows is their common reference to the moral domain. This is hardly a simple concept, and so beneath them I have added a third row, whose two cells refer to alternative ways of conceiving the moral domain. As we will see at the end of this chapter, these ways are not so much theories as definition-generating views, oriented respectively toward either the contents or the core features of the moral domain. Thus the full picture of our matrix looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MORAL MOTIVATION:</th>
<th>NONCOGNITIVISM:</th>
<th>COGNITIVISM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MORAL MOTIVES:</td>
<td>Summary view</td>
<td>Constitutive view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORAL DOMAIN:</td>
<td>Externalist view</td>
<td>Internalist view</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are, of course, many other philosophical categories and distinctions that could be mentioned in connection with morality and motivation. The ones I have singled out here show the general philosophical framework within which the brief psychological audit offered in the following pages will be carried out.

*Moral Motives and Moral Motivation*

I turn now to the views represented by the six cells of our matrix, with an emphasis on the top row (moral motivation). I will begin with a closer look at the pivotal distinction that structures the top part of the matrix. As already indicated, I am using the first of these two terms of art, “moral motives,” to designate a loosely linked set of relatively distinct conative dispositions, many of which bear the same names as the virtuous action patterns they generate, such as kindness, courage, fidelity, and piety. Since they are assumed to function as mediators between thought and action, they are sometimes characterized as dispositions that a moral person “acts out of” (e.g., charity, loyalty, or gratitude). The second term, “moral motivation,” refers to their conative foundation or (to borrow a phrase from generative linguistics) a *deep structure* whose function is much like that which Butler and Kant assigned to the so-called “natural faculty,” “irresistible impulse,” or “instinct” of conscience. I have
elsewhere (Wren, 1991) characterized the latter function, whose very existence is indeed disputable, as moral care. It can also be characterized as the cross-situational disposition to take a moral point of view, from which specific action tendencies present themselves as moral motives, all charged with moral significance and overriding urgency for the agent as well as for any evaluating onlookers.

I have called the two elements of this distinction “terms of art” because they are ad hoc stipulations and as such are not really subject to debate. However, it remains to be seen just how useful the distinction they portray is to moral psychology — or, more exactly, how relevant it is to what contemporary moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and moral educators are up to. Bearing in mind what was said above about the tendency of psychologists to take a nominalist approach toward folk categories such as “the voice of conscience,” one may well ask whether from their perspective the proposed distinction between moral motives and moral motivation could possibly be useful or meaningful. Furthermore, even if it is allowed as meaningful, one may nonetheless ask how sharply the distinction can or should be made, as well as whether the meaning of one of the two terms of the distinction is parasitical on that of the other. Predictably, how one answers such questions will depend on one’s other theoretical commitments, sympathies, and orientations. The most important of these probably is the cognitive or noncognitive quality of the orientation from which one theorizes, which for most psychologists is a matter of degree and not fixed by any a priori rule or methodological principle.

I have already suggested that even relatively noncognitive moral psychologists (e.g., Eysenck) assume that there are grounds for grouping certain psychological processes or phenomena under certain labels, and that these grounds amount to something more than merely ad hoc convenience for the theorist. In the present context, this means that, allowing for differences of idiom, among moral psychologists it is generally recognized that to some extent a moral agent “really has” certain dispositions — that is, moral motives — such as a tendency to engage in helping behaviour, a readiness to stand by friends, to tell the truth, and so on.5

This is not to deny that psychologists often construe the motivational dimension of morality nominalistically. For instance, in the now-faded controversy over cross-situational personality constructs (which include moral dispositions), what was really under attack was not the idea that people have more or less robust and stable tendencies (moral motives) to comply with moral norms but rather the idea of what the social psychologist Walter Mischel (1976, p. 103) has called “a unitary intrapsychic moral agency like the superego or … a unitary trait entity of conscience” — which of course corresponds to what I am calling “moral motivation.” Social psychologists and social learning theorists like Mischel and (more recently) Martin Hoffman (2000) might argue that my distinction between moral motives and moral motivation is purely linguistic. For them the problem with the latter term is not that it fails to refer but only that what it refers to in the singular is the same set of dispositions that is referred to in the plural by the first term, “moral motives.”
MORAL MOTIVATION: ITS SUMMARY AND CONSTITUTIVE CONCEPTIONS

To put it mildly, hard-headed moral psychologists like Mischel and Eysenck, as well as their philosophical forebears such as Bentham and Russell and contemporary philosophers such Michael Slote (2007), would not endorse the distinction I have just made. Nor would they be alone in their reaction. A construct as open-ended as moral motivation is sure to raise eyebrows, if not hackles, among most behavioral scientists, and with good reason. After all, to suppose that a construct is isomorphic or even indirectly correspondent with reality exposes a researcher to the risks of violating the principle of parsimony and, ultimately, of having nothing to show for one’s efforts. Hence inquiry into “the” structure of moral motivation might very well turn out to be a snipe hunt, or, to borrow a well-known characterization of metaphysics, a search by a blind man in a dark room for a black cat that isn’t there.

One way to avoid these risks without giving up the convenience of using umbrella terms such as “moral motivation” (not to mention more familiar terms such as “conscience” and “conscientiousness”) would be to adopt a purely summary view according to which moral motivation would be understood as nothing more than a shorthand device, a collective noun that has no content or meaning beyond that of the individual entities to which it refers. In that case the construct of moral motivation could be characterized as verbally but not logically different from that of moral motives. For a motivational account in which the contrast between moral motivation and moral motives is a distinction with a difference, we should look to more cognitive forms of moral psychology, of which the most prominent are the cognitive developmental models of Piaget (1932/1965) and Kohlberg (1969/1984). In those accounts the function of what I am calling moral motivation is often (though not always) understood “top-down,” by which I mean as a determining factor or regulative disposition that constitutes the stage on which more specific motives provide the transition from moral judgments to moral actions. For this reason I have labeled this view the constitutive conception of moral motivation.

Here as in the previous comparison with linguistic theory, we can say that cognitive moral psychologists see moral motivation as a deep structure, without which there would be no determinate, specifically moral inclinations. Their approach stands in sharp contrast to that of noncognitivists, who understand the role of moral motivation “bottom up,” which is to say as a purely summary concept, an aggregate of prosocial or other typically moral action tendencies. It is surely no coincidence that as we move toward the cognitive end of the spectrum of moral psychologies, nominalism fades into realism, much as in linguistic theory one finds Chomsky and others working at the mentalistic end of that spectrum arguing for innate structures that in some distinctive sense “are really there.”6

Another use of the contrast between the summary and constitutive conceptions of motivation can be found in a debate among existentialists that took place in the mid-1900s over the notion of a “fundamental project.” Jean-Paul Sartre (1969), who
made that term the center of what he called “existential psychoanalysis,” believed that day-to-day choices are governed by some sort of super-choice, operating in the wings so to speak and endowing specific projects with value and intelligibility. In contrast, other existentialists of his era such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2012) used the term to refer to the aftermath of more specific choices, which is to say as the resultant of one’s specific, articulated projects rather than their source or cause. Like noncognitive moral psychologists who have a purely summary notion of conscience, they believed that the concept of a life project was simply a matter of convenience, and that the distinction between day-to-day choices and a life project was purely verbal. For them there was no real difference between moral motives and moral motivation.

The Plausibility of a Real Difference

It should be clear from the way I originally introduced the distinction between moral motives and motivation that I regard the top-down or “constitutive” conception of moral motivation as the more useful of the two ideas. However, it should be equally clear that its extreme form is just as untenable as the naive pictures of conscience dismissed above. When drawn along lines analogous to Sartre’s picture of a super-choice, the picture of a master motivation holds little promise, though if we regard moral motivation more as a structure (Chomsky’s approach) than as a mental act, it may be possible to stay within the limits of plausibility. Here as with so many metatheoretical questions, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The best way to argue that there really is a difference between the concepts of moral motive and moral motivation, and that this difference is important for psychological theorizing about morality, is to take a look at some moral psychologies and see whether somehow they include these two concepts or their functional equivalents. (For a discussion of the difference between functions and foundational structures in domains other than morality; see van Haaften, Korthals, & Wren, 1997.)

MORAL MOTIVES: INTERNALIST AND EXTERNALIST PERSPECTIVES

The distinction I have drawn between moral motivation and moral motives should not be confused with the distinction between moral judgments and moral actions. Judgments about moral right and wrong or moral good and evil are judgments formed as a result of one’s having taken a moral point of view, which is itself not a moral judgment but rather an interpretive tendency, a readiness to process reality in moral terms. Furthermore, from the simple fact that a person is disposed to cognize reality from a moral point of view nothing follows as to whether that person will act morally, either in general or on specific occasions. There is considerable debate among philosophers concerning the logical structure and other formal features of the passage from moral thought to action, just as there is considerable debate among psychologists concerning its more concrete structures. Among philosophers, the
debate takes the form of an argument over whether any motivational component is built into the very notion that a given cognition is a moral judgment. Among psychologists, the debate takes the form of an argument over whether moral cognitions are intrinsically motivating. The two sorts of debate do not map perfectly onto each other, but since they share many of the same basic concerns the position a person takes in the first debate usually determines the position he or she takes in the second, and vice versa. Thus, philosophers and psychologists can be of some use to each other, notwithstanding the enormous differences in their jargons, methodologies, and ways of carving up human experience.

The corresponding philosophical (or better, metaethical) debate has been conducted in Anglo-American circles under the billing *Internalism vs. Externalism.* As the second row of our matrix indicates, these terms represent two alternative views of moral motives, or more exactly, two ways of understanding the relationship between moral motives and their cognitive counterparts, moral judgments. The views in question are metaethical, not normative, in that they are views about how ethical thinking itself works. Presumably they have been held implicitly as long as ethical theories have been around, but the distinction between them was not explicitly formulated until the mid-1900s, first in W. D. Falk (1947-48) and a few years later in a well-known article by William Frankena (1958). Externalism, Frankena wrote, is the view that it is not only possible but also commonplace “for an agent to have, or to see that he has, an obligation, even if he has no motivation, actual or dispositional, for doing the action in question” (ibid, p. 40). Internalism, by contrast, is the view that such a radical disconnection between judgment and action would be paradoxical, anomalous, or even logically impossible. This description was subsequently picked up and refined by Thomas Nagel, who defined internalism as the view that in moral action “the necessary motivation is supplied by ethical principles and judgments themselves,” and externalism as the view that “an additional psychological sanction is required to motivate our compliance” (1970, p. 7).

The contrast between the internalist and externalist accounts is easily seen by putting the matter schematically as follows. Internalist theories of morality are those which hold that a proposition like

P1: “Eve believes that abortion is wrong”

*entails* assertions of the form

P2: “Eve is at least somewhat motivated to oppose abortion.”

Or more simply, the thesis of internalism is: *P1 entails P2.* Externalist theories, in turn, are those which implicitly or explicitly deny this entailment, no matter how much importance they otherwise attach to the motivational features of moral living.

Most philosophers who discuss the issue turn out to be internalists, and I am no exception. Some hold what I have elsewhere (Wren, 2010) called the “causal internalist” view, so labeled because they ascribe causal efficacy to the intellectual component of moral judgment (P1). Others take the “expressive internalist” view;
believing that the moral judgment articulates motivational structures (P2) already in place within the agent. Still others, including myself, combine these two versions of internalism in various ways (Wren, 1990, pp. 18-28; see Nagel, 1970, pp. 7-8, and Sytsma, 1990). However, this is not the place to ring the changes on this highly formal and no longer current debate. I mention it only to observe that externalist theories rely on a conception of moral discourse and moral cognition that is proper to observers, such as visiting anthropologists trying to catalogue a tribe’s mores, whereas internalist theories employ a conception of moral discourse and moral cognition characteristic of the participants themselves. The externalist puts mental scare quotes or inverted commas around moral terms, in much the same way that R. M. Hare (1952) did when he allowed that the word “good” could sometimes be used sarcastically or in some other non-commendatory way. Because the scare quotes sense of a term is meaningful only if its straightforward sense is known, externalism is logically parasitical on internalism. This conclusion suggests in turn that the latter is the more suitable metaethical perspective for conducting a study of the motivational dimension of morality — which after all is an inquiry into the psychology of moral agents, not cultural anthropologists.

Until now the internalism-externalism issue has remained undiscussed outside the ranks of professional philosophers. I know of no psychological study of morality that has referred to it, even though such studies proceed, usually unwittingly, from one or the other of these metaethical perspectives, as we will see.7

THE MORAL DOMAIN: CONTENTS AND CORE FEATURES

Philosophers have written so extensively and differently about the complex referential range of the term “moral” that it can be difficult for them to realize that most people do not regard it as especially ambiguous. In contrast, most psychologists who discuss morality share the general public’s confidence that the basic meaning of the term “moral” is self-evident. This confidence has led many psychologists who investigate the moral domain (especially social learning theorists) to ignore its formal properties and instead to understand it only in terms of its contents. Not surprisingly, the less cognitive a moral psychology is, the more strictly is its research confined to those moral contents that either are entirely overt behaviours or, in the case of covert behaviours and attitudes can be easily operationalized and measured. In general, these contents are prosocial acts or attitudes such as beneficence or obedience, whose prosociality is itself usually assessed by looking at the objective consequences of such deeds rather than at their subjective intentionality. I say “usually assessed” because as the third row of our matrix suggests, some moral psychologists — usually the more cognitively oriented ones — do look at the intentionality of the behaviours in question, as provided by interviews or self-reports. In doing so, they begin to move from a content orientation toward a more formal understanding of morality. Or, as I prefer to put it, toward an increasingly definite appreciation of the core features constituting its conceptual structure. At the far cognitive end of the spectrum stand
Kohlbergian and post-Kohlbergian stage structuralists who are explicitly concerned with the way subjects understand the formal features of morality. That is, they focus their inquiries on other-regarding attitudes and values that, when operationalized as prosocial actions, turn out (not surprisingly) to be the standard contents of the moral domain.

Both approaches have their philosophical problems. As I noted in the last section, philosophers are divided among themselves as to what a consistent and otherwise adequate formal definition of the term “morality” should look like. However, it is impossible for scholars to do without any formal definition at all, since otherwise there would be no way of bringing new cases, actions, or attitudes under the rubric of morality. What usually happens, of course, is that resemblances are noted thanks to which new cases are assigned the same moral labels that older ones already wear. However, sometimes new cases are too novel, or their moral salience too weak, for the case-by-case method of labeling to work. When that happens general, non-nominalistic principles of classification come into play, usually without being formulated very clearly or systematically in the minds of the classifiers. Thus moral worth is conventionally assigned to both virginity and conjugal sexuality, to prudent self-restraint as well as courageous intervention, and so on, not because these practices exhibit a single quality or essence called “morality” but because they are perceived to be members of a domain of human activity that has features that are counted by our linguistic community as more or less necessary conditions for the application of terms such as “moral.” I have identified three salient features that seem to be stereotypical or “core” marks of the moral domain (there may also be others), which I will describe here in the briefest possible terms. They are: the executive character of morality, the value it places on impartial reasoning, and the seriousness with which it is taken by those who practice it.

The first core feature. I have already alluded to the first of these core features, when I noted that morality involves self-regulation. This feature corresponds to the notion of morality as an executive function. It falls under the category of what some philosophers have called “higher level motivation” (Alston, 1977) or “second-order desire” (Frankfurt, 1988; Taylor, 1976, 1989). In contrast to the nonreflective desires and aversions we have for things “out there,” the objects of reflective desires and aversions are themselves intentional states, namely first-order desires, affections, and other psychic states that influence a person’s action in and with the world. Thus I may have envy, anger, and other sorts of hostile attitudes toward you, and at the same time take a disapproving point of view on those attitudes from a higher, second-order perspective. In doing so I evaluate my own conscious life and hence shape or regulate it, not mechanically as is the case with homeostatic self-regulating systems such as thermostats but rationally, by means of evaluative cognitions or reasons.
The second core feature. The fruits of these cognitions are moral judgments, formed according to criteria that are themselves parts of our culture’s moral heritage. Of these the most important and least culture-specific is probably the criterion that moral judgments must be acceptable from perspectives other than one’s own, which in our own time and culture usually means they must be fair, just, other-regarding, etc. This criterion is intertwined with the second core feature of the moral domain, namely its emphasis on objective reasoning. It is true that deep personal commitments can have moral weight and even overriding seriousness, but it seems impossible to deny that part of the stereotypical or core meaning of morality is the impersonal perspective from which one recognizes situations in which everyone’s claims have equal weight and no one is more important than anyone else. It may well be that, as Nagel claims, “transcendence of one’s own point of view in action is the most creative force in ethics” (1986, p. 8). Exactly how this perspective is related to the subjective perspective from which one says “I” and “you” is a complex philosophical matter that we cannot unpack here, though I cannot resist adding two observations to Nagel’s comment. The first is that the impulse toward objective thinking originates deep within our subjectivity; the second is that objective thinking is not a bringing of the mind into correspondence with an external reality, as crude moral realists would hold, but rather bringing it into conformity with the demands of its own external view of itself (see Nagel, 1986, p. 148). Some philosophers have chosen to limit the very word “moral” to the impersonal realm of duties and rights, focusing on impartial considerations of justice, fairness, or human rights, and to reserve the term “ethical” for answers to the general question of how one should live. However, that terminology seems not only forced but of little use to the current practice of moral psychology. Suffice it here to note that regardless of what we call the well-lived life, in western moral discourse impartial concepts such as “fair” or “just” are closely associated with such a life as far as most persons and most moral psychologies are concerned.

The third core feature. The final core feature of morality I will discuss is seriousness. The philosopher Mary Midgley has captured this point a bit differently but to the same end: “Moral,” she tells us, is the superlative of “seriousness,” and a serious matter is defined as one “that affects us deeply” (1981, pp. 124-125). Seriousness is what other contemporary philosophers call an agent-relative concept, although it is not an exclusively self-regarding one. (One can also take another person’s interests seriously.) That is, a moral issue deals with matters that are perceived as central among our hopes, needs, and so on — which is to say with our web of purposes. Some of these purposes are unique to the individual, but many are common, either because of our shared genetic endowment and overlapping cultures or because (to speak commonsensically, though the same point could be made in the more cumbersome post-Kantian language of “transcendental conditions of possibility”) they are just matters that anyone would have to take seriously. For example, we may consider how important it is to sustain conditions of fellowship and mobility and, inversely, how drastically serious it would be to find oneself in utter solitude or complete
communicative paralysis. The task of discerning what are truly serious matters is, of course, problematic, and requires cognitive skills that are seldom discussed in the literature of moral psychology, e.g., analogical thinking, responsibility judgments, and autobiographical interpretation. Although I will not try to fill this gap myself, at the end of this chapter I will try to show that self-interpretation of this sort is the moral dilemma, one that moral agents and moral theorists alike must reckon with if the rest of their moral reasoning is to matter.

This quick tour of the moral domain is just that, a tour, and not a philosophical or empirical argument. It is not meant to advance, much less settle, the ongoing debate among philosophers over where the boundaries of morality should be drawn. The point I have tried to make in this section is essentially negative as well as fairly modest: I have called into question the idea that morality is any single, sharply specified set of behaviours, attitudes, or principles.

**TAKING STOCK**

In the foregoing pages, I have tried to set forth a number of philosophical claims about moral motivation. Much of what I have said may have seemed to non-philosophers inhospitably arid, and so I will now summarize it by citing a few common-sense reasons for thinking that the “exciting function” of conscience includes a general posture of concern for the moral point of view (moral motivation) as well as compliance tendencies (moral motives).

First of all, it seems very significant that in our everyday discourse about morality we can and often do separate moral agents of all types from those otherwise normal persons who we say “have no conscience.” Furthermore, we can speak of the former as having consciences that are weak, strict, tender, and so on, all without regard to the contents or deliverances of those consciences. It is even possible, though often difficult, for us to esteem and commend people for being faithful to consciences that are radically different from our own. Moral tolerance is a special hallmark of today’s liberal ethic of living and letting live. However, it is of a piece with the more general expectation, standard throughout the whole history of our western moral tradition, that the truly conscientious person, which is to say anyone with a well-developed conscience, will be solicitous, committed — in a word, motivated — not only to pursue whatever he or she determine is a moral course of action, but also to take the trouble to determine it.

This observation echoes the way two great 18th century moral philosophers have described conscience. In his important early work *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant defined conscience as “an involuntary and irresistible impulse in our nature” that makes the continual, often very intrusive demand that we judge not only our actions but also the dispositions leading up to them (1775-1780/1963, p. 69). Butler had made a similar point a few decades earlier in the second of his *Sermons upon Human Nature*, where he called conscience “a superior principle of reflection [that] magisterially exerts itself” (1726/1983, p. 37). Kant and Butler may have gone too
far in thinking that conscience is a universally distributed part of human nature as such. However, it seems clear that part of what it means to have a “moral nature” is that one takes one’s morality seriously. That idea shows up in various versions. Besides deliberating over issues of right and wrong, one takes morality seriously by undertaking the task of morally educating one’s child. One also takes morality seriously when one concedes, however grudgingly, that other persons sincerely following a different moral drummer have moral worth because “it is better to have some principles, even if they sometimes lead to decisions which we regret, than to be morally adrift” (Hare, 1952, p. 73). Each of these versions of the general idea of taking morality seriously is relatively open-textured or content-free, and can be considered as expressions of the general concept “moral motivation.” To them we can add those innumerable content-specific instances of moral concern in which an agent takes morality seriously simply by heeding his or her conscience in times of temptation.

To sum up, the question “Why do people care about being moral?” can be focused through a wide-angle lens or a narrow-focused one. In the first case, the question is asked in some broad, open-ended sense. Thus I have represented it as a query about the constitutive conditions of that common experience which Kant called feeling “compelled” to pass moral judgments on ourselves. In the second case, the question is asked in a narrow, content-specific sense involving passages from moral judgments to actions. For instance, it could be asked why someone not usually active in social issues has decided to protest against gender discrimination, or why certain members of Greenpeace take their beliefs in the rights of animals or other environmental considerations so seriously that they are prepared to act on them at great personal cost or risk.

PERSONS IN RELATION

In this final section I will return to the title question of this chapter, “Why be moral?” I have already examined two ways in which it can be understood, namely as asking what motivates us to act on our moral judgments and, more fundamentally, what motivates us to make such judgments in the first place. I will continue to suspend any direct discussion of the hard question of to what extent one can be indifferent to moral issues and still be considered a normally functioning human being. Instead I will ask why it is that most people really care about morality. In other words, I will move from the question “Why [should we] be moral?” to “Why [in fact] are we moral?” This is a philosophical question as well as an empirical one, as psychologists and social scientists have often acknowledged, either expressly or, more often, by implication. My own view is that the most promising philosophical approaches to the question are those that regard interpersonal relations as constituent of all forms of evaluation and even of the sense of one’s own personhood. The theme of interpersonality has been developed by many important philosophers, several of whom have been explicitly acknowledged by psychologists and sociologists who deal with topics such as moral
development or personality theory. For instance Ludwig Binswanger has drawn from Martin Buber’s foundational concept of a primordial I-Thou relationship, John Shotter was deeply influenced by John Macmurray’s account of persons-in-relation, and Kohlberg frequently acknowledged the influence of George Herbert Mead’s interactionism and Jürgen Habermas’s model of communicative action.9

The idea shared by these otherwise very different authors is that the interrelatedness of human beings is both a matter of fact and a necessary condition of agency. Or better, it is a necessary condition for our having anything at all, here using the word “having” in the sense of ownership, where having is a result of specifically human activity. This fundamental conditionality is nicely illustrated by the methodology of archaeological anthropologists, who generally take evidence of culture as one of the criteria for deciding whether skeletal remains are human.

If, as many philosophers, psychologists, and social scientists believe, it would be self-contradictory to speak of action where there is no interaction, then the supposition of a totally isolated agent makes no sense. It is utterly different from, say, the case of Robinson Crusoe, who had interacted with personal others before his shipwreck and then modeled his new solitary life on his previous societal life. In a thought-experiment in which an agent is totally isolated — and this means that no interagential considerations of any sort are available, including memories — there could be no proper names or even any sense of gender. This anonymous, genderless creature would live in an otherwise completely impersonal universe, sans memories, anticipations, or fancies of the presence of a personal other. Also absent would be any concern about such things as deformities or feebleness, since these are objects of concern only in a society where public standards of beauty, agility, and health evolve as its members make comparisons among themselves.

A similar distinction applies to hermits, who are not truly acultural since the very decision to be a hermit is taken within a social milieu. Such decisions would be positive when made, say, in the hope of achieving certain religious benefits that they know through their society’s traditions, and negative when made out of contempt or even fear of society for having rejected its values. Of course, occasional isolation can be attractive, but as William Cowper wrote in his poem “Retirement,”

I praise the Frenchman; his remark was shrewd,—
How sweet, how passing sweet, is solitude!
But grant me still a friend in my retreat,
Whom I may whisper, Solitude is sweet.

I would add that without a friend, or at least some fellow participant in the institution of language, Cowper’s own line “Solitude is sweet” would be a mere flutter of sound. Language, whether it is spoken or thought, is essentially social, and if it is true that all thought is in some sense linguistic (Fodor, 1975), then it follows that thinking is not an interior monologue but rather incipient dialogue. In short, the notion of a totally isolated thinker is chimerical, mainly because such a creature would have no reason to use symbols as well as no conceptual schemes to share with others.10
Being rational, like being moral, involves creating formulations which, upon being communicated to other agents, would be recognized and accepted by them. When a formulation or even an entire theory is unacceptable, then the agent who proposed it can only assume that something is wrong, with either his rational judgment or that of his forum. This is true of the aesthetic use of rationality as well as its pragmatic exercise, since both activities involve generalizations and representations by means of symbolic forms. And what is symbolic form but a vehicle for communication?

In other words, valuation always presupposes the existence of other agents because totally isolated agents could not know their choices as good or their judgments as true. They could, perhaps, react to their environment with appropriate responses, but there would be nothing in their reaction that could recognize that appropriateness. They would not be able to evaluate what they were doing, because to do so would require stepping outside themselves and into the shoes of an observer. But ex hypothesi, no such observer is present, not even imaginatively. The nuclear physicist’s counterpart to all this is the ideal case of an isolated particle. It makes no sense to speak of its “motion” in an empty space, since there is no way to fix a point relative to which the particle is moving. It is only with a plurality of particles that distances can be discriminated and motion is possible, and it is only in a field of discourse that happenings become facts and facts become values.

With this we come to a profound truth about the nature of moral agency. The standpoint of the agent includes as a necessary condition the taking of a point of view toward one’s self — that is, taking the standpoint of the spectator. A purely subjective being (should there be such a creature) could never perform truly human actions, i.e., be rational and not simply reactive. In other words, if what I am doing is to have meaning for me, I must know my action from the outside as well as from the inside. This is most easily seen in the case of speech: my saying “cat” is meaningful to me the speaker only if I have reason to think that my listeners can know as well as I do what the word refers to or how the saying of it matters. A purely private language is an absurdity, as modern linguistic philosophy has made clear.

This general postulate recalls the essentially transitive nature of action, in which whatever change in the world you or I bring about is a change in the world, not merely in your or my world — or, even more to the point, it is a change in our world.

From this it follows that I know my actions partly through your eyes. This is why we bother to justify our actions and motivations to others as well as to ourselves. Like all linguistic transactions, reason-giving presupposes intersubjective grounds of relevance. There have been extensive epistemological discussions about what makes some cognitive structures count for speaker and hearer alike as truths and, beyond that, as justifications. What is usually only hinted at in these erudite discussions is the possibility of a subject’s refusing to play the reason-giving game altogether. Such refusals are neither uncommon nor abnormal when specific games are proposed, such as refusing to justify to others my decision to marry someone I love. The typical way of making such a refusal is to supply a pseudo-answer such as “Because I wanted to” when queried for an account of one’s action, though the
“WHY BE MORAL?” A PHILOSOPHICAL TAXONOMY OF MORAL MOTIVATION

blunter reply “None of your business” also works on most occasions. Even so, as the philosopher Herbert Fingarette (1967) once observed, there is something ominously odd about such a refusal when it amounts to the refusal to enter into any reason-giving communication whatsoever:

If an individual will not play a game with us, we can still fall back on the intelligible framework of everyday life outside that game. But what if he will not enter life’s fray itself in the spirit in which we enter it? To face such a person, such a reality (and not merely to think it) is to experience a deep anxiety; a queasy helplessness moves in our soul. (Ibid., p. 37)

In the same vein, Gauld and Shotter (1977) have described the anxiety pervading the converse situation: that of an individual who cannot justify (however speciously) his actions:

The point we are trying to make here is that in ordinary everyday life people have, if they want to do anything, to be able to justify it to others. If they cannot, then … they have lost that attribute which gives them autonomy in relation to others, the ability to reject criticism and to show that their actions do in fact accord with the values and interests agreed to by all in their society. To be unable to justify oneself is to risk being an outcast, a non-person; it is to lose one’s personhood. (Ibid., pp. 192-3; italics added)

I leave it to that branch of psychology sometimes called personology to delineate the affiliative tendencies and other prosocial dispositions that constitute the conative foundations of what might be called the drive-to-justificatory-discourse. It is enough here to appreciate the great importance we spontaneously assign to interpersonal reason-giving and, by extension, the intrapersonal reason-giving that takes place in the internal forum of an agent’s conscience. This importance is a matter of moral seriousness, in the sense that failure to give reasons for one’s actions can be a moral failure, an irresponsibility that is itself a form of contempt for those who share one’s world. As Habermas (1984, 1990) has shown, the fundamental procedures or conditions of human communication are continuous with the moral norms that make interpersonal life possible, especially the norm of respect for persons.11

As I have presented the matter here, the antecedent identification of oneself with the ideal of reasonableness and related ideals and values such as fair-mindedness and nonarbitrariness makes it possible for evaluative cognitions (such as the rules of distributive justice) to serve as moral motives. In turn, these rational ideals are rooted in certain primitive tendencies such as a deep-seated aversion to the prospect of being ostracized for refusing to engage in the practice of justifying one’s actions. These are perhaps the most important of our identity-constituting tendencies or “basic desires.”

However, this is only one of several ways of representing moral motivation. For instance, the personal roots of one’s ideal of being a reasonable person might be represented as mastery strivings rather than as desires for affiliation.
Neuropsychologists might prefer to say that people are naturally hardwired to be logotropic, such that they have ingrained propensities of varying strengths to follow the most formally consistent rules of conduct, much as when Hercule Poirot entered a room he felt an urgent need to straighten any pictures that were hanging out of line. However the ideal of reasonableness is packaged, though, it is always understood as an antecedent tendency or basic desire that is relevant and motivationally significant for reasons that go beyond its logical status.

CONCLUSION

Which of these representations is the best hypothesis for studying the moral motivation of the contemporary ethical worlds (including non-Western ones) is a psychological question that can be raised in a philosophical essay, like this one, but it cannot be answered without empirical investigation. Furthermore, similar hypotheses can be proposed for other ideals besides those of reasonableness. Basic desires for the well-being of others may underlie the ideals of benevolence and justice (and their corresponding deontological principles), basic mastery strivings may be the conative deep structures that are displayed as temperance and courage, and so on. The story is undoubtedly extremely complicated, since there is no reason to expect a one-to-one correspondence between basic desires and specific moral ideals or principles. Thus affiliative tendencies (which are probably best thought of in the plural) might be articulated as justice ideals or principles in one context and as loyalty ideals or principles in another context. Furthermore, we may expect that moral actions will often be overdetermined by several complementary ideals, as well as by intermediate tendencies and articulations that should be included in any ethical account: thus one tendency can itself be an expression of another, deeper tendency, and some principles or ideals may be derived from other ones. Finally, we should note that not all moral ideals or principles are authentic self-articulations, even though they might be heavily laden with affect as well as with respectability. Ideals can be cognized (at least by the agent who conforms to them) as general social practices having nothing to do with his or her personality structure. Thus a young person whose socialization has been entirely a matter of external inducements may regard the ideals represented in the Scout Law as correct recipes for social acceptability, but not as integral to his (or her) own self-concept. For a norm to have the urgency of a moral ideal, though, it must be one’s “own” in the special sense just described.

NOTES

1 Portions of this chapter originally appeared elsewhere and are presented here in revised form with the gracious permission of the publishers, namely Routledge/MIT Press (for Wren, 1991) and Transaction Publishing (for Wren 2010).

2 To illustrate the concept, Russell showed that a national entity such as England was a logical construction out of entities such as its nationals, and hence that facts about England can be expressed
more “ultimately” though often less conveniently by a set of statements about Englishmen, etc. (see Russell, 1905, 1921).

“When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master — that’s all.”

Note that “function-oriented” is used here without the behavioristic connotations of “functionalism,” as the latter term was used earlier in this century in the bitter psychological debates between the partisans of introspection and phenomenology (structuralists) and those who eschewed any such attempts to get inside the black box of the mind (functionalists).

True, such “motivational realism” is often laden with qualifications, and with good reason, given the studies by Hartshorne and May (1928–30) showing the extent to which seemingly established virtues such as honesty wax and wane depending on situational factors. The notion of moral motives as personality variables is still alive and well in the literature of social psychology, in spite of the now largely-spent blasts (e.g., Mischel, 1968) against personality theories about cross-situational dispositions. There may be a lingering wariness among motivation theorists concerning especially broad motivational dispositions such as “obedience” or “reverence,” but for the most part their wariness is based not on nominalist suppositions but rather on suspicions that such categories are not so much moral motives as screens behind which people hide in order to rationalize improper and even atrocious behavior.

This is the view that Chomsky made famous in his Aspects of a Theory of Syntax (1961). He has since modified his position considerably (see Chomsky, 1995).

The one favored by most moral psychologists is — regrettably, in my view — the externalist perspective.

It may seem a mistake to omit from this list other-regarding features, such as concern for the well-being of others. After all, the Golden Rule is the paradigm of morality for many, perhaps most people (at least in Western cultures). However, if it is the case that human existence is inherently interpersonal, then care, altruism, etc., can be seen as matters of supreme importance or seriousness, and on that last account deemed part of the moral domain. I will make this point below, but only cryptically. The classic discussion of the arguments for and against building other-regardingness into the formal concept of morality is found in Frankena (1958).


This point has been made by philosophers of many orientations, from Aristotle (1998) to John Dewey (1928) and John Searle (1969).

It is worth noting that Kohlberg claimed Habermas’s “discourse ethics” was fully compatible with his own constructivist view of moral autonomy (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984, pp. 375–86; Kohlberg, Boyd, & Levine, 1990).

REFERENCES


"WHY BE MORAL?" A PHILOSOPHICAL TAXONOMY OF MORAL MOTIVATION


AFFILIATION

Thomas E. Wren
Department of Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago
Chicago, USA
II. MORAL MOTIVATION AND THE FOUR COMPONENT MODEL

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1980s, Rest proposed a Four-Component Model of moral functioning in which moral motivation is featured. Although less well articulated than the other three components, Rest suggested that moral motivation influences moral action directly and in interaction with the other components of the moral system. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and summarize the empirical literature generated by Rest’s model.

MORAL MOTIVATION AND REST’S FOUR COMPONENT MODEL

Prior to Rest’s Four Component model, the cognitive developmental approach to moral motivation was at best a secondary consideration. To Kohlberg and his colleagues, moral motivation could be explained in large part by the moral judgment process (Kohlberg, 1969). In this view, moral judgments were by definition prescriptive—once a situation was understood within a moral framework, the obligation to act was presupposed. The motivation to act, therefore, was associated with the individual’s moral understanding of the situation. Kohlberg assumed that the relationship between moral understanding and motivation was not constant across the stage sequence, but that it strengthened with development. Thus the upper stages, by virtue of their alignment with moral ideals, were more closely linked with the motivation to act in concert with moral reasoning (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Kohlberg was aware of other factors (e.g., ego strength) that influenced the link between moral reasoning and action, but these processes were viewed as moderators of this relationship and not central to the motivation to act. Furthermore, Kohlberg described the impact of these personal attributes as decreasingly influential across development; this parallels his notion of the how stages and motivation were linked across development (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). Although Kohlberg later added the importance of living in a just world as a condition for enabling moral motivation and development, he never pulled back from the view that moral stages—especially the higher stages—were inherently prescriptive and the most salient aspect of moral motivation (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). His view mirrored the Platonic notion—one has to “know the good” in order to “do the good.”

During the 1980s, critics (following Kurtines & Grief, 1974) began to question Kohlberg’s perspective on the assumed strong ties between the moral reasoning...
process and moral motivation. These concerns were often associated with the growing interest in moral action and questions about the ways in which moral judgment measures could be validated. Specifically, Kohlberg and colleagues focused their efforts on demonstrating that their measurement of moral stages conformed to developmental expectations such as sequence invariance (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Increasingly, critics questioned the view that moral judgment measures could be judged solely by demonstrating a fit to developmental criteria (Blasi, 1980). For these critics, it was important to supplement information on the developmental properties of the moral judgment measure with information demonstrating that the measure was linked to theoretically meaningful criteria outside of the measurement system—such as moral action. Of particular significance to this debate was Blasi’s (1980) review of the judgment and action literature. In this review, Blasi emphasized the importance of testing the Kohlbergian model by focusing on moral action. Indeed, Blasi suggested that moral action was the ultimate criterion for measures of moral judgment. Furthermore, and most significantly, Blasi noted that the evidence for a strong relationship between moral judgments and action had not been established. A gap existed between reasoning and acting and Blasi suggested that the field ought to address it.

Rest’s work on developing the four component model was very much in the spirit of Blasi’s position. Like Blasi, Rest came to the conclusion that moral judgment processes were necessary but not sufficient for moral action. He noted that reviews of the moral judgment and action research, using his Defining Issues Test (DIT) of moral judgment development, indicated only 11% of the behavioural variance could be accounted for by DIT scores. Like Blasi, Rest recognized the importance of moral action as a primary validating criterion for any measure of moral thinking. Rest often noted (Rest, 1986) that an interest in moral phenomena would quickly erode if the field failed to support a linkage between judgments and actions. However, unlike Blasi’s approach to fill the gap between judgment and action, Rest’s work took a markedly different direction. During the early 1980s, Rest was commissioned to write the chapter on morality for an upcoming Mussen Handbook of Moral Psychology. His approach to the task was to review the literature from varying theoretical perspectives of the field—broadly defined—with an eye toward information that might be helpful in understanding moral action. By viewing the field from multiple theoretical perspectives and focusing on moral action, he deduced four clusters of findings that represented conceptually independent sources of information that could be claimed to support moral action. These clusters ultimately became the Four Component Model. It is important to note that Rest’s approach to filling the judgment and action gap was quite different from other attempts. He developed the model from the bottom up, relying on a broad empirical base to suggest central processes supporting moral actions. Others (e.g., Blasi) approached the task from the top down by focusing at the person level to identify the mechanisms leading to moral action. Some have criticized the Four Component Model as being incomplete or ill-defined (Minnameier, 2010) and often point to the
MORAL MOTIVATION AND THE FOUR COMPONENT MODEL

Moral motivation component in the model as particularly incomplete. We would agree that moral motivation is probably the least structured of the components but would point out that this lack of specificity was an accurate reflection of the field. It was also a weakness that Rest readily acknowledged (Rest, 1983). In his various descriptions of moral motivation, Rest noted that the field had little to offer in the way of a well-articulated developmental model of moral motivation (Rest, 1986).

A further difference between Rest’s approach and more contemporary models of moral motivation is perhaps more limiting. In framing his task to fill in the judgment and action gap, Rest asks us to consider which psychological mechanisms lead to a specific moral action. As mentioned above, his response to this question is the four component model. However, by focusing on the action level, this model does not elaborate on reasons that one might be the type of person for whom moral action is prototypic or why another person characteristically prioritizes other non-moral considerations. That is, by focusing on the events leading to a particular action, Rest did not attend to the person-level factors that are associated with a more generalized moral motivation.

When one compares Rest’s model with more contemporary descriptions of motivation that do focus on person level motivational characteristics, the difference in emphasis is apparent (e.g., Schunk & Zimmerman, 2005). In these more general models of motivation, the focus is on the self’s evaluation of two main characteristics: Control beliefs—or the individual’s perception that the self is able to accomplish desired outcomes given a set of circumstances; and, competency beliefs—defined as whether the individual assumes that he/she has the means and abilities to accomplish desired goals. As Schunk and Zimmerman (2005) make clear, all established motivational models incorporate these two beliefs in some form. Rest’s model, by focusing on actions, does not emphasize a direct assessment of the individual’s perception of their own moral control and competency beliefs.

By contrast, moral motivation, as defined by research traditions that focus on the person, does provide evidence of the presence of control and competency beliefs. For instance, in the moral exemplar tradition (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Rule & Bebeau, 2005; Frimer & Walker, 2009), one notes the finding that exemplars develop highly effective strategies for implementing action plans. Similarly, these studies note that moral exemplars have a tendency toward optimism in which the individual demonstrates confidence in his or her abilities to bounce back from setbacks and persevere. Indeed, much like the student who is academically oriented and has developed a sense of the abilities and strategies necessary to maintain superior performance, moral exemplars also show a pattern of attitudes and effective strategies that maintain an openness to moral experience, that serve to keep one seeking new knowledge for implementing appropriate actions, and a faith in one’s ability to succeed.

These findings, derived from a focus on moral exemplars, suggest that Rest’s four components ought to be considered as nested within models that prioritize
the role of the person (e.g., Blasi, 1984; Frimer & Walker, 2009; Rule & Bebeau, 2005). In this view, Rest’s components represent processes that are evoked to generate a moral response within a specific situation and context but do not address the notion of the centrality of morality. Although each component process that Rest defined has connections to the more general processes captured by models of the moral person (as illustrated by the bedrock moral schema that are at the foundation of Component 2), the particular focus of Rest’s model is on specific actions and how these actions are constructed. Few studies have explored how Rest’s model is linked to other traditions that focus on the moral person. However, one can speculate on some potential indicators of individual differences in this relationship. As researchers suggest (Rule & Bebeau, 2005; Colby & Damon, 1992), individuals who define themselves by their moral identity ought to be more likely to identify moral issues in their surroundings, engage in identifying the most reasonable actions, feel obligated to act on them and develop reasonable solutions. Overall, it should be evident that an unexplored aspect of Rest’s Four Component Model is how the model relates to the psychological mechanisms advanced by research traditions which focus on the centrality of moral action and moral purpose.

Despite the need for further elaboration of the components, as well as their relationship to theories of the moral person, what Rest clearly accomplished with the Four Component model was to promote the transition from a global model of moral action to a multi-process view of moral functioning and, in so doing, pushed the field to look more broadly at how moral action is constructed and specifically how each of the contributing factors develop. Additionally, by transitioning to a multi-process model, Rest was able to propose that moral failings were not simply the result of an individual’s weakness but everyone, even well-motivated individuals, could come up short. Each of us, Rest argued, are able to miss the moral problem, fail to effectively reason about how the moral problem ought to be solved, fail to maintain a focus on the moral solution in the face of other considerations, and fail to effectively follow through. Finally, it is important to note that one of Rest’s underlying goals was measurement development and the four components were described with an eye toward stimulating the development of measures that capture an expanding view of moral functioning. In this respect, Rest’s model has been quite successful (c.f., Thoma, 2006).

**Moral Motivation in the Rest Model**

The definition of moral motivation provided by Rest highlights the need for a set of processes used to address how one transitions from coding the situation as moral and knowing what one ought to do within moral situations to the decision to act in accordance with the moral perspective. Rest suggested that, within real-life situations, there are always multiple pressures on the individual to act in various ways and often these alternatives are in conflict with the moral ideal. How then does
the individual choose? In his descriptions of the Four Component Model, Rest notes two types of studies that help identify how the individual might promote the moral course of action.

The first literature that Rest noted concerned general models of decision making. Focusing on behavioural decision theory (e.g., Rappoport & Wallsten, 1972), Rest proposed that information on how individuals generally confront complex decision making tasks might also help us understand how different claims on the individual are weighted and prioritized within moral contexts. Unfortunately, Rest found more weaknesses than strengths in the literature which, he noted, failed to incorporate affective processes that might be especially salient in moral decision making. For instance, Rest recognized that little attention had be directed towards understanding how emotions evoked by situations altered the individual’s appraisal of the situation and action choice. Similarly, Rest noted the possibility of defensive operations being particularly active in moral situations. These defensive operations could have the effect of devaluing the moral basis of the situation and, in so doing, elevate other non-moral considerations (e.g., Bandura, 2002). Finally, Rest identified the obligatory nature of moral decisions which were poorly represented in these cognitive models of decision-making. For example, Rest highlighted the notion that individuals often indicate an overarching claim to: “do the right thing” that does not seem to benefit from a deliberative process. In addition to these concerns, Rest also noted that the developmental properties of the decision-making literature were not particularly clear and very few direct applications to moral phenomena were evident in the literature. He concluded (Rest, 1983, 1986) with the observation that the special nature of moral decisions was unlikely to be easily fitted within more general models of complex decision-making.

The second literature base that Rest used to inform his Component III processes was motivational models that explicitly address moral phenomena. These perspectives on moral motivation were a diverse set of models that ranged from the sociobiological, behavioural, personality and social cognitive ones. Few of the models were supported by extensive empirical work and fewer still had a developmental focus. However, Rest made much of the fact that cognition was involved to a varying degree within these sets of models, and that these cognitions were often influenced by, or were associated with affective processes. That is, for action to occur, Rest argued that one must have some cognitive apparatus to recognize the moral goal and then some affective processes to emphasize the value of pursuing moral goals. Although Rest noted the importance of the affective component of moral functioning, the integration of cognitive and affective components is not fully explored in his writing. However, we would note that more contemporary models that seek to bridge the “gap” between action and judgment are consistent with Rest’s overall view of moral functioning. For instance, models which emphasize the self system and suggest that the development of a moral identity is the integrating mechanism which brings together the various cognitive and affective processes involved in moral functioning would be welcomed by Rest—particularly now that there are methodologies in place that can directly
assess moral identity (e.g., McAdams, 2001) and empirical support for these claims (Walker & Frimer, 2007; Rule & Bebeau, 2005).

Research Programs Influenced by Rest’s Component III

Rest’s model has directly influenced three lines of research on moral motivation. Each line explicitly relies on the description of Component III to frame their research questions and methodologies. Two of these approaches focus on moral motivation directly and attempt to identify individual differences in the emphasis placed on moral issues. The other perspective focuses on the decision-making process and the ways in which moral information is either elevated or diminished.

Models of moral motivation. There are two research programs which focus directly on moral motivation. Interestingly, both do so within the context of professional populations. This focus is not a coincidence and much is made about the advantages of working within these populations. The most important advantage is that professionals tend to be more aware that ethical considerations are explicit in their roles and learn early in their training and socialization that one must be ready to provide justifications for their actions (Rest & Narvaez, 1994). This orientation to moral phenomena can be contrasted with general populations that may be more or less experienced in considering moral issues and, thus, influenced by a broader set of considerations—both rational and irrational. Furthermore, minimized in the professional setting is the potential emphasis on self-interest that can be at odds with the moral ideals. Unlike the various roles assumed by individuals in the general population, the role of a professional tends to emphasize actions that benefit others. Of course, professionals vary in the degree to which their decisions are reflective, deliberate and resistant to self interest. However, the point is that within populations that are trained to reflect on the moral basis of their actions and place the interests of the client before the self, the range of idiosyncratic factors influencing action is, if not reduced, at least open to challenge. Thus, the development of measurement systems within professional settings is likely to emphasize the rational and reflective aspects of moral motivation and de-emphasize the irrational, intuitive, and impulsive factors.

An open question is the degree to which findings generated by these measures can generalize to non professional populations unconstrained by a professional identity and training (e.g., Walker, 2002). Clearly, one difference that researchers must address in shifting focus to general populations is the measurement of moral motivation. As described above, the common moral perspective shared by professionals allows the use of proxy measures that piggyback on the link between professional identity and moral identity. The lack of a common moral perspective in the general population shifts the measurement to more ideographic approaches that are sensitive to the individual’s moral framework. To this end, projects such as McAdam’s narrative approach in assessing a life-story model of human identity, as modified by Frimer
and Walker (2009), should be useful in framing general population measures. Of particular interest in this work is the increased focus on the developmental processes that underlie the integration of the self around moral action.

*The Professional Role Orientation Inventory (PROI)*

The PROI was the first of the measurement systems directly influenced by Rest’s conception of component 3 (Bebeau, Born, & Ozar, 1993; Thoma, Bebeau & Born, 1998). Central to the development of the measure was an assumption that professionals differ in how they view their professional role and that these differences also reflect the emphasis placed on moral considerations in their professional interactions. Bebeau and her colleagues note that some professionals focus on the privileged role that society provides for them based on their level of expertise and training. Professionals who emphasize this aspect of the profession may not recognize the moral considerations of their professions as central to their role. Others, by contrast, emphasize the responsibility to society associated with their role. These professionals appear to elevate moral and caring considerations beyond those who orient to other roles. In short, this measurement system is based on the assumption that a professional’s role is, in part, a proxy for the relative emphasis on moral criteria in professional decision making.

The PROI is designed around a dimensional conception of profession role identity. With a notion of professional identity borrowed from applied philosophy, researchers argue that different professions can be reliably defined along two dimensions: authority and responsibility. The dimension of Authority contains the view that a profession has, to a varying degree, ownership over profession specific knowledge. This knowledge is obtained through advanced training and is recognized by society as a good that is essential for health and welfare. The second dimension, responsibility, describes the assumption that the profession has an obligation to provide this essential good to society and to monitor its members to assure that expected standards of health and welfare are maintained (Rule & Welie, 2009). Researchers interested in studying professions note that where the profession is located within this two-dimensional space mirrors the relative standing of the field within society. Thus, professions high in authority and responsibility tend to be the most prestigious and learned (e.g., Law, medicine) and those in other quadrants less respected.

These researchers also note that there is within-group variability in the professional orientation. That is, not all professionals agree on the mix of authority and responsibility associated with their field. For instance, some lawyers might emphasize the value of their services and view their profession in more commercial terms (i.e., low on social responsibility but high on authority). Other professionals might view themselves as “hired guns” and are willing to advance their client’s or employer’s interests at all costs (i.e., low authority and low responsibility). Still others might view themselves as providing a significant service to society, even as they sacrifice the quality of care that is provided (i.e., high on responsibility and low
on authority). That is, how one sees his/her role may provide some insight into the individual’s motivational set and indirectly how moral criteria are emphasized.

Bebeau and her colleagues used the results of a series of studies to support the claim that the PROI measures an aspect of moral motivation and not simply some general role orientation. The first set of studies focused on a known group validation strategy. This approach focuses on groups of professionals who, by training and clearly identified selection criteria, ought to differ on a measure of moral motivation. Thus, the question asked in these studies was could the PROI reproduce the various groupings? Specifically, these researchers (Bebeau, Born & Ozar, 1993) identified three groups of dentists who differed in their exposure to, and interest in, the moral dimension of the profession. These groups included a convenience sample of upper mid-west dentists, a group of dentists who self-selected into a professional ethics seminar, and a smaller group trained in professional ethics, some of whom were also dentists. Each group was given the PROI. Findings indicated that the sample of upper-Midwest dentists presented a wide range of professional roles as evidenced by roughly equal numbers in each of the four quadrants formed by responses to the responsibility and authority dimension. This broad pattern of roles was shown to be different from the response patterns of the participants in the ethics seminar. Unlike the upper mid-west sample of dentists, the seminar participants were characterized by high ratings on the responsibility dimension with marked variability on the authority dimension. Those trained in dental ethics, by contrast, provided PROI scores that clustered near the midpoint on the authority dimension but were very high on responsibility. However, ethicists who were also dentists tended to score higher on authority—seemingly reflecting the importance of professional expertise. Thus, in support of the view that the PROI reflects a moral motivation component, Bebeau noted that dentists with a varying interest and experience with dental ethics evidenced different professional roles on the PROI in a theoretically consistent way.

The second group of studies used to validate the PROI focused on whether the measure was sensitive to an intervention that was designed to influence students’ view of professional ethics, as framed by Rest’s Four Component Model. Bebeau compared first year dental students with senior students who had the benefit of an intensive ethics curriculum. As freshmen, the students resembled the mid-west sample of dentists described earlier and produced PROI scores that ranged in all four quadrants defined by authority and responsibility. However, by their senior year, students’ PROI scores converged on the responsibility dimension and resembled the previous study’s dentists with ethics training. Their education also seemed to develop a greater appreciation for the authority of the profession, as reflected in a general increase on the authority dimension. This important finding shows that roles can be influenced by educational interventions and it is possible to help students develop a professional role that is more aligned with an ethical perspective.

In addition to studies that support the validity of the PROI, researchers have also assessed the relationships between PROI scores and scores derived from the other
MORAL MOTIVATION AND THE FOUR COMPONENT MODEL

components in Rest’s model. Consistent with Rest’s view that the four components represent non-overlapping processes which work together to support moral action, empirical studies linking the PROI to measures of the other components indicate moderate to low correlations. Across components, moral judgment development as measured by the DIT is most often related to PROI scores (Bebeau, 2009a; You & Bebeau, 2012). When the PROI dimensions are treated independently, DIT summary scores are more strongly linked to the responsibility dimension and less so to professional authority. It is perhaps not so surprising that the responsibility dimension is most related to the DIT. As mentioned previously, responsibility in this measure represents the dentist’s obligation to society at large. Given that the DIT measures a moral perspective that highlights how individuals understand cooperation as informed by society-wide structures such as the political process, legal systems and social norms, one would expect the responsibility dimension to be conceptually similar (e.g., Thoma, 2006). However, even when focused on this dimension, the magnitude of the relationship between the responsibility dimension and DIT scores is not large and accounts for approximately 10% of the variance (You & Bebeau, 2012). Unfortunately, no studies have linked the PROI individually or in combination with moral action.

Moral identity. A second strategy for exploring moral motivation explicitly derived from Rest’s model is Bebeau’s and colleagues’ (Bebeau & Monson, 2011) work on professional identity. Professional identity differs from the PROI in both methodology and level of assessment. As previously described, the PROI asks participants to reflect on various aspects of their profession, and their perspectives place them along established dimensions generally associated with the professions. Although students and professionals may recognize these dimensions, and reflect on their meaning for the self, there is no guarantee that the individual would spontaneously generate the same dimensions. Furthermore, the PROI does not directly assess professional identity but infers it by locating the individual along the different dimensions. To overcome these limitations, Bebeau and colleagues developed a measurement to assess the individual’s own conception of their professional identity. Both strategies are qualitative in nature. The original approach was a written task (The Role Concept Essay) that asked participants to reflect on various aspects of the profession. At its conception, the essay was assessed for the degree to which participants could articulate expectations of a professional and, in particular, address questions of what being a professional means to the participant and what will be expected by society once one becomes a professional. Bebeau (1994) noted that most students, upon entry into professional school, have very little familiarity with concepts of a profession, including moral considerations. However, later in the program and following instruction, these concepts become familiar and part of their understanding of a professional role.

More recently, professional identity has been evaluated using scoring criteria adapted from Kegan’s (1982) life-span model of self-development (Bebeau &
Monson, 2011). Kegan’s approach is based on constructivist notions that individuals are, by nature, engaged in making sense of the world and, in so doing, form conceptions of various social categories such as the self, the self as a member of society, as a professional, as a parent, and so on. Furthermore, Kegan proposes that there are some commonalities across individuals in how these conceptions of the self unfold, both generally and in specific contexts. Thus, Kegan and his colleagues propose a life-span model in which individuals can be located in terms of prototypic identity formation.

Bebeau and her colleagues reworked Kegan’s model to focus on how the professional comes to understand his/her specific professional role (see Bebeau & Thoma, this volume). In short, the modifications made to Kegan’s model include a more central focus on the moral self and assess the degree to which moral concerns seem to penetrate the conception of the self. To guide these modifications, Bebeau adopts Blasi’s view that individuals differ in the degree to which moral considerations are emphasized in the self system. In this view, an emphasis on the moral dimension within the self system is associated with an increased perspective taking, a responsibility to maintain a focus on the moral dimension within situations and an increased likelihood to act in accordance with moral judgments.

Findings from the professional identity measure suggest that professional school students are varied in their self conceptions with many producing self descriptions at the level where the moral basis for the profession is not clearly recognized. However, assessments on more advanced students drawn from the same population indicate a transition to professional identities which were more in line with a society-wide perspective and a more clearly articulated ethical identity. Although these findings are consistent with PROI findings and the view that professional identity measures are sensitive to educational interventions, the evidence is only suggestive as simple maturation has not been ruled out.

In addition to demonstrating that the professional identity measure can be used to differentiate groups of professionals who reflect different training and exposure to ethical considerations, Rule and Bebeau (2005) applied the modified Kegan scheme to a national group of dentists nominated by their peers as moral exemplars. Consistent with the theoretical model, Rule and Bebeau (2005) found a pattern of highly developed professional identities, complete with a strong sense of responsibility to others. Thus, the model was able to distinguish groups who were different on objective criteria conceptually related to moral functioning.

Using a similar methodology with military cadets, Forsythe and colleagues (Forsythe, Snook, Lewis, & Bartone, 2002) found evidence of growth across the college experience and military training. Furthermore, cadets with higher scores on the Kegan measure were viewed as effective leaders by their subordinates, their peers and superiors. These findings suggest a link between professional identity and cadet behaviour over time. The authors attributed this cadet success to a self identity that enabled these cadets to attend better to the interests of others, while keeping a focus on the overall goal or mission. Interestingly, Forsythe found that officers who had
achieved significant promotions, such as made them eligible for advanced education and career development that precedes appointment to senior leadership positions, had achieved key transitions in self identity. Thus, a professional identity which emphasizes both the personal and professional dimension, while maintaining a sense of responsibility to others, is a clear advantage for professional development—both short and long-term (Lewis, Forsythe, Sweeney, Bartone & Bullis, 2005).

Taken together, the application of the Kegan model has been helpful in indicating how identity formation helps place moral motivation within the person’s moral self. This work is more conceptually rich than the PROI studies but, interestingly, provides some complementary data. In general, professionals who are identified through objective criteria as moral exemplars emphasize the responsibility one has to the larger community and society. Furthermore, both measures indicate that moral exemplars have a clear sense of professional authority and do not back off from their responsibility to the field. Finally, on both measures, individuals who emphasize moral action have an explicit sense of obligation to act and, in the case of the interview measure, take the position that their actions are not special but simply required. Additionally, on both measures, there is evidence of growth across a student’s professional development. The latter further suggests that there is a developmental aspect to professional identity which can be influenced by educational interventions.

Influences on moral decision-making. As mentioned previously, Rest also focused on a second cluster of processes to provide insight into Component III functioning. This sub cluster included various decision-making models and individual characteristics that influence the relative weighting given to moral information in determining an appropriate action. Surprisingly, only one empirical study has directly assessed this aspect of Rest’s model. Focusing on rape supportive perspectives, Carroll (2009) designed a study that assessed the role of moral thinking, setting conditions, and moral disengagement processes on college students’ decisions about a date rape incident.

Moral disengagement is a model that describes the systematic downgrading of moral considerations in formulating a course of action (e.g., Bandura, 2002). In Bandura’s view, moral functioning is a joint process of moral thinking and environmental factors that are mutually supportive. Through experiences and direct instruction, the individual learns acceptable behaviours as well as the rationale for appropriate actions. These knowledge systems become the ethical standards that one follows in order to maintain a consistent moral self and avoid negative consequences. How one maintains a focus on these moral standards is explained through affective self-regulatory mechanisms that motivate and maintain moral action. Moral weakness or transgressions occasion a negative self-appraisal and affective arousal that produces self sanctions and ultimately a behavioural correction (see Bandura, 2002).

Bandura also suggests that there are social mechanisms that can alter the moral system by disengaging one’s moral standards from action. That is, in Bandura’s
model, motivational processes are not fixed but must be activated to promote actions based on internalized moral standards. However, if not activated, other non-moral considerations take precedence and may fail to serve appropriate moral goals. Factors that lead to a failure to engage moral standards and the self-regulatory systems that promote moral action, have in common the effect of distorting the situation to avoid a moral obligation. These disengaging factors diminish the moral worth of the other individuals involved in the situation or by denying that a moral action is required. For example, Bandura makes much of how war-time propaganda tends to remove the moral worth of the enemy or competitors such that the moral standards one would otherwise evoke to constrain violence against others are never engaged. The horrific behaviour of combatants on civilians during the time of war can be modeled by noting the process of moral disengagement. Similarly, euphemistic labeling of actions can deflect moral activation by sanitizing the situation to avoid the moral component (e.g., using the term “taking out” the enemy rather than killing). In short, Bandura makes much of the setting conditions that can lead to an alteration of the moral decision making process and the subsequent disengagement of moral standards from moral action.

Noting the higher incidence of violence toward women in college students who are associated with college social fraternities, Carroll wondered whether the fraternity context might be linked to an increased likelihood of moral disengagement. Following Rest’s (1983) view that moral components interact with, and influence each other, she also speculated that moral judgment development—a component II process—might buffer the influence of the fraternity setting on moral disengagement processes. To test these hypotheses, Carroll devised a measure of rape supportive attitudes that would be less susceptible to social desirability effects. Specifically, she asked male college student participants to take the role of a student judiciary member who has been asked to consider a date rape case. The specifics of the case are described as well as statements from the aggrieved and the accused parties. The study participant was then asked to assign the degree of fault to the male and female protagonists and then make a determination about whether the case should be forwarded to the court for full consideration or terminated for lack of merit. Of interest to Carroll’s study were the decisions to terminate the case and the rating of relative fault given to the female protagonist. Rape supportive attitudes were indicated by a decision to terminate the case and assign a higher degree of blame to the female—both decisions that were at odds with expert appraisal of the case. An equal number of fraternity and non-fraternity members were assessed.

Carroll found that, compared to their non-fraternity peers, fraternity members were more likely to favour the male’s side in the case, were higher in moral disengagement scores and lower in their moral judgment scores as measured by the Defining Issues Test of moral judgment development (the DIT). Using structural equation modeling, Carroll found that DIT and moral disengagement scores uniquely predicted rape supportive attitudes. Importantly, moral judgment development buffered moral disengagement in the fraternity context. That is, fraternity members with higher
moral judgment scores were less likely to display rape supportive attitudes and had lower disengagement scores. Interestingly, the Carroll study clearly demonstrates the effect of Rest’s Component 2 processes as assessed by the DIT as a constraint on the moral disengagement relationship with an outcome variable. That is, the study demonstrates component 2 effects on the link between component 3 and the choice variable.

More generally, the Carroll study is important in demonstrating the role of setting on moral motivation processes and suggests that social groupings and the climate they create can have both positive (i.e., the just community environment) and negative effects (e.g., fraternities, athletic teams) on the moral motivational process. Additionally, this study is one of the few that assesses relationships between components and outcome variables using statistical techniques that more closely resemble the theoretical linkages between components suggested by Rest (1983). Using these statistical techniques, Carroll finds differences by group (fraternity vs. non-fraternity) on the relationship between components, as well as direct and indirect effects of the moral judgment and disengagement variables on an outcome variable. These findings support the notion that the moral components that Rest identified are highly interactive and can be expected to support action directly and indirectly through other related processes. Furthermore, Carroll’s use of two different theoretical models—Bandura’s Cognitive Social Learning approach and Rest’s Cognitive Developmental perspective—is in the spirit of Rest’s model building and his position that there is utility in attending to theoretically distinct research traditions.

**SUMMARY**

Rest’s description of Component III is informed by two types of research questions, both of which focus on the relative emphasis on moral considerations in comparison with other claims on the individual. The first question focuses on the ways in which individuals weigh information in complex decision-making and the various defensive operations that can influence these choices. The second include more general models that specifically address moral motivation. To date, there are three lines of research directly influenced by Rest’s description of Component III. Although the empirical research is not extensive there are some patterns and emphasizes that stand out.

**A Focus on Development**

Following Rest’s description of Component III, all of the studies which reference his model attend in some way to the developmental properties of moral motivation. As described above the focus of this work is primarily on what develops, what influences change, and how developmental processes promote moral functioning. These emphases can be clearly seen in Bebeau and colleagues’ work in adapting Kegan’s model to explore professional identity. Development is also evident in the
PROI literature in both the descriptions of professional roles as sensitive to change and the use of the PROI measure to evaluate ethics intervention programs. Carroll’s work attends to development through the assumption that the distortions associated with moral disengagement are minimized as moral judgment development proceeds.

This focus on development can be contrasted to other research traditions, which have placed an emphasis on personality characteristics that inform moral motivation. For instance, Walker and his colleague’s (e.g., Frimer & Walker, 2009) research program on moral exemplars has produced data suggesting that exemplars differ from comparison group participants on the ability to integrate the personality traits of communion and agency. Thus moral motivation is furthered when individuals have a sense of connection between the self and others as well as a confidence in one’s ability to affect change. The reconciliation model suggested by Frimer and Walker (2009), describe development as the shift from the person’s conscious recognition of a tension between agency and communion to an active integration of the two.

It is interesting to note the similarities and differences between the developmental and personality approaches to exemplarity. Common to both models is the emphasis on a connection between the self and others captured by the communion personality type in the Walker approach and professional responsibility in the Rule and Bebeau model. Similarly, both models highlight the sense of active engagement and confidence in one’s ability to achieve their goals. Walker’s notion of agency and Rule and Bebeau’s description of the committed professional are very similar as both address an active engagement in life events. Both the Walker and Rule/Bebeau approach highlight the path to leadership roles and to a consistent focus on serving others. Particularly evident in the dental exemplars was the ability to critically evaluate their profession while being clearly identified with it.

These similarities in outcomes notwithstanding there are clear differences in the explanations given for how individuals arrive at exemplarity. For personality models of moral functioning the operating assumption is that different personality characteristics guide the self toward moral phenomena in characteristic ways. These personality characteristics cover a wide terrain and influence the ways we present ourselves to others, react to information, motivate ourselves toward goals—moral or otherwise, and express our inner states. Additionally, personality characteristics can affect moral functioning through the ways we orient ourselves to knowledge and experience. These orientations can promote the development of moral processes through personality constructs such as those that foster openness to new experiences and promote (or hinder) the integration of moral functioning within the self system. Thus, personality operates in the background creating the conditions that influence the ways in which we function in the social world including moral functioning.

The research questions generated by personality approaches are also quite different from those framed within Rest’s approach. In short, personality studies lead to the identification of clusters of characteristic that are implicated in moral functioning with the goal of describing how the implicated personality characteristics interact to promote various moral types. These moral types may be associated with an emphasis
MORAL MOTIVATION AND THE FOUR COMPONENT MODEL

on moral phenomena or a devaluation of the moral. However the expectation is that researchers will find multiple sets of intermediate types that promote some aspect of moral functioning and not others (e.g., Walker 2004).

Developmental models of moral motivation on the other hand, locate individuals by the degree of integration, self reflection and recognition one presents in the assessment process. Personality characteristics are acknowledged in this system but often they are presented as impediments that needed to be addressed, acknowledged or overcome across the participant’s life. The focus is on the characteristic ways the individual describes the self as a window into current functioning or professional/self development. Further, groups of participants who share some common status such as entering professional students can be described by their location on the developmental scheme and this location can provide a starting point for educational interventions. A developmental description of moral motivation is clearly more aligned with Rest’s (1983) attention to developmental processes in his description of Component III and addresses his lament over the then near absence of a developmental focus in the research programs which informed this component.

A Focus on Education

Across all of the studies associated with Component III there is a sustained attention to educational applications. This focus is consistent with the longstanding applied interests that have been traditionally associated with the cognitive developmental approach to morality research dating back to Kohlberg’s early work. Clearly, Bebeau’s research program has as its goal an understanding of development and the processes that are most central in promoting growth. The goal of this line of research is that with an understanding of development processes one can then design appropriate and empirically supported educational interventions. These interventions should result in an effective way to promote in young professionals a well-established professional self system that features ethical behaviour. Although less central to its purpose, Carroll’s study also emphasizes educational interventions. She notes the need for higher education institutions to intervene in groups of students associated with a particular setting that may be expected to foster the development of a culture that is disrespectful to others. As she highlights in her study, such environments are associated with the propensity to disengage moral motivation, leading to an increased likelihood of inappropriate actions and the devaluing of other students. Further, in identifying moral processes that are associated with these settings, Carroll suggests specific types of interventions designed for all undergraduate students early in their college careers.

An Acknowledgment of Settings

Throughout this work there is a consistent finding that settings matter. Carroll’s work discusses this notion explicitly in interpreting her findings. She notes that
the fraternity lifestyle is associated with attitudes and experiences that increase the likelihood of disengaging moral processes when interacting with women across a variety of social and educational settings. Bebeau and her colleagues also highlight that the development of young professionals requires educational environments that actively engage moral phenomena. She also finds that in the absence of a sustained attention to professional ethics, the traditional educational environment is associated with moral and professional development that is much more haphazard and diffuse. Continuing to monitor interactions between social settings on moral motivation seems particularly warranted given the current findings on development and professional growth that characterizes these studies.

CONCLUSION

Rest began his work that resulted in his four component model with an assumption that much could be learned about moral functioning by noting patterns in the empirical literature across different research traditions and theoretical models. This bottom up approach was clearly helpful in organizing the field but the resulting model was only as good as the existing data. Component III and moral motivation in particular, suffered from a broad and theoretically diverse literature base that varied greatly in quality and precision. Some researchers have noted this weakness and suggest independent processes such as the four components are incomplete models of moral functioning and one must look to broader constructs such as the individual’s personality system (e.g., Blasi, 1984). In our view, the two approaches are not incompatible. Regardless of the theoretical model and level of assessment one should expect that moral sensitivity, judgment, motivation, and perseverance represent aspects of morality that need to be addressed and measured. To that end, Rest’s model offers some guidance in framing these measurements and his description of moral motivation has stimulated research programs that have improved the state of knowledge about the conditions under which moral information is prioritized.

The issue now becomes how we integrate Rest’s model and proposed measurements within a larger motivation system presupposed by traditional models of motivation and supported by researchers who study the moral self. As we noted earlier, by contrasting the Rest model with these alternative research traditions, we see the emergence of a second gap between social cognitive processes and moral action. If Blasi helped us identify the judgment and action gap (Blasi, 1980), then Rest’s model suggests that we must also attend to the gap between the more context driven processes he described by the components and the personality and developmental processes identified as contributing to the moral self (e.g., Frimer & Walker, 2009). To move forward on this agenda we suggest two basic approaches. First, we can build up from the components. That is, we can move forward by noting patterns across components in order to identify profiles that convey a coordinated approach to moral phenomena that is reminiscent of the findings derived from the work on moral exemplars. For example and using Frimer and Walker’s (2009)
reconciliation model mentioned earlier, individuals who emphasize either agency or communion ought to present a pattern across Rest’s components that highlights the lack of coordination between these two competing claims on one’s motivation. We note Walker and Frimer’s (2007) finding that statistical interactions between agency and communion do not out predict the individual main effects. Nevertheless we suggest that a lack of coordination between these themes would be evidenced not by statistical interactions, but through the identification of profiles across the components as defined by mean differences and the strength of paths between components. It is interesting to note that Bebeau (2009a; 2009b) found that dentists who were disciplined by their governing bodies did not show evidence of a failing on a particular component in Rest’s system. Instead most noticeable was a lack of coordination across components and a particular weakness in one of them. It is interesting to speculate whether professionals who fail to uphold standards of the profession do so in characteristic ways based on an uncoordinated emphasis on agency or communion.

An alternative approach to reconcile the four components with personality and self-systems models is to focus on moderators and mediators of the component assessments. For instance Seligman, (1991) defines an affective/motivational dimension labeled “learned optimism” that has been independently noted in the moral exemplar literature (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Rule & Bebeau, 2005). It seems reasonable to expect that measures that capture learned optimism may moderate the link between processes and moral action. Secondly, we suggest further exploring Kegan’s model within a broader range of populations. Bebeau and her colleagues have demonstrated how measures of identity development have clear implications for understanding how moral motivation becomes integrated into the moral self (Bebeau & Monson, 2011; Rule & Bebeau, 2005). Although this work has focused on professional populations, the consistent findings supporting a link between the development of identity and moral motivation indicates that a more representative test of these claims is warranted. Taken together we see the development of a second generation of research that helps to connect the moral self literature with the key insights from Rest’s model.

NOTE

1 The full version of the PROI has two additional dimensions: Agency and Autonomy. These dimensions have not been emphasized in the literature and are not described here.

REFERENCES


MORAL MOTIVATION AND THE FOUR COMPONENT MODEL


AFFILIATIONS

Stephen J. Thoma
Educational Psychology
College of Education
University of Alabama
Tuscaloosa, USA

Muriel J. Bebeau
Department of Primary Dental Care
School of Dentistry
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, USA