Changing Notions of Citizenship Education in Contemporary Nation-states

Klas Roth and Nicholas C. Burbules (Eds.)
CHANGING NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN CONTEMPORARY NATION-STATES
EDUCATIONAL FUTURES
RETHINKING THEORY AND PRACTICE
Volume 7

Series Editors
Michael A. Peters
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
J. Freeman-Moir
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

Editorial Board
Michael Apple, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA
Miriam David, Department of Education, Keele University, UK
Cushla Kapitzke, The University of Queensland, Australia
Elizabeth Kelly, DePaul University, USA
Simon Marginson, Monash University, Australia
Mark Olssen, University of Surrey, UK
Fazal Rizvi, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Susan Robertson, University of Bristol, UK
Linda Smith, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Arun Kumar Tripathi, Dresden University of Technology, Germany

Scope
This series maps the emergent field of educational futures. It will commission books on the futures of education in relation to the question of globalisation and knowledge economy. It seeks authors who can demonstrate their understanding of discourses of the knowledge and learning economies. It aspires to build a consistent approach to educational futures in terms of traditional methods, including scenario planning and foresight, as well as imaginative narratives, and it will examine examples of futures research in education, pedagogical experiments, new utopian thinking, and educational policy futures with a strong accent on actual policies and examples.
Changing Notions of Citizenship Education in Contemporary Nation-states

Edited by

Klas Roth
Stockholm Institute of Education, Sweden

and

Nicholas C. Burbules
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

SENSE PUBLISHERS
ROTTERDAM / TAIPEI
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction: Understanding the Meaning of Citizenship Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Klas Roth &amp; Nicholas C. Burbules</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Cosmopolitan Learning</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Klas Roth</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Deliberating Publics of Citizens: Post-national Citizenship amidst</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Public Spheres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Stacy Smith</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kathleen Knight Abowitz &amp; Joseph Wegwert</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Securing Equality and Citizenship under European Integration</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Andreas Föllesdal</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cultural Diversity and Alterity: Central Prerequisites and Issues</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of European Citizenship Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Christoph Wulf</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Rashid Ahmed, Yusuf Sayed &amp; Crain Soudien</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Globalisation, Rescaling and Citizenship Regimes</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Susan L. Robertson</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

The meaning of the concept of citizenship education is dependent upon the conceptual schemes or web of beliefs of which it is a part, and since these schemes or webs of beliefs vary, the meaning of the concept also varies. This follows from the principle of holism – that is, that the meaning of a complex utterance is dependent upon the meaning of other beliefs. The notion of a citizen, for example, is linked to the concept of human being, rights of different kinds, institutions, nation-state, politics, duties and so on. The notion of citizenship education is linked to concepts such as knowledge, values, aims, purposes, syllabuses, schools, students, teachers and many more. And since the combination of these and many other concepts vary the meaning of the different webs of beliefs of which these and other concepts are a part also varies.

The meaning of a complex expression is also dependent upon its parts and mode of composition. This follows from the principle of compositionality: “The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and its mode of composition.” Take the utterance: “A citizen is a patriot”, for example. If, instead we said “A patriot is a citizen”, it would not necessarily have the same meaning. A patriot is a citizen, but a citizen is not necessarily a patriot. From the standpoint of cosmopolitanism, for example, the values of citizenship and patriotism may be in tension with each other.

Since the parts of an utterance can obviously be different and the mode of its composition as well, and an utterance can be a part of different conceptual schemes, the meaning of a complex expression that includes the notion of a citizen or citizenship education can be interpreted differently. Moreover, utterances can be interpreted differently in principle. This follows from the simple fact that we can form an infinite number of sentences from a finite number of words in any natural language. And as we will see in this book, ‘citizenship education’ is not only conceptualised differently in different nation-states due to differences in social, cultural, economic, political and religious terms, but its meaning is changing in our era of globalization.

Different language-speakers might also have different intentions with using expressions that include the notion of citizenship education and hence ascribe different meanings to the expressions used. A speaker could, for example, say
“Children and young people should be educated as citizens” and another language user could agree. However, the first person could have the intention that children and young adults should be educated as liberal-democratic citizens, while the other person could have the intention that children and young people should be educated as citizens within a communist nation-state.

Furthermore, since we cannot come to know completely what beliefs a speaker has and the meaning of a complex utterance can be interpreted differently, we will not be able to determine the meaning of citizenship education conclusively. What we can do, however, is to interpret each other as charitably as possible and deliberate over our interpretations in order to understand or try to understand each other, and create conditions for charitable interpretation and deliberation in citizenship education. And charitable interpretation presupposes that we attribute largely the same or similar meaning to utterances, otherwise we would not understand each other. Deliberation, then, is needed when we want to understand or come to understand the meaning of the utterances we use, in particular when we are not in agreement with each other, and requires a willingness to express our beliefs to each other. Moreover, deliberation is needed when we want to inquire critically into the meaning and legitimacy of the participants’ expressed beliefs or attitudes. Deliberation also requires openness to handling and/or resolving problems constructively, where the participants in deliberation strive to legitimise the outcomes of decision-making procedures motivated by the force of the better argument. Davidson says:

To understand the speech of another, I must be able to think of the same things she does; I must share her world. I don’t have to agree with her in all matters, but in order to disagree we must entertain the same propositions, with the same subject matter, and the same concept of truth. Communication depends on each communicator having, and correctly thinking that the other has, the concept of a shared world, an intersubjective world. But the concept of an intersubjective world is the concept of an objective world, a world about which each communicator can have beliefs (Davidson 2001a, p. 105).

It seems, then, that we have to agree upon a large number of beliefs and upon judgements and their definitions in order to communicate successfully with each other. The opposite would not hold. We would not be able to understand the utterances of others if we did not agree upon a large number of beliefs and the meaning of utterances. Agreement also requires that the meaning of utterances is publicly available and open to deliberation among those concerned as participants in deliberative procedures. Agreement, then, seems essential for communication. And it has been and still is one of the basic aims and/or purposes of citizenship education to achieve agreement concerning, inter alia, knowledge about ourselves, others and the world. However, since the conditions for achieving such an agreement in citizenship education differ in different nation-states, as do the effects of such agreement, the success of such an education also differs not only within nation-states, but also in nation-states throughout the world.
It is, however, not enough that citizenship education amounts to understanding. It also has to give children and young adults the possibilities and rights to deliberate about the meaning and legitimacy of the utterances used in communication. If, for example, citizenship education in different nation-states has as an aim to further patriotism – that is, a sense of loyalty, moral commitment, and a shared understanding of themselves as citizens within a specific nation-state – it does not necessarily follow that those so educated hold that sense of loyalty or moral commitment to citizens of other nation-states (because the concept of a patriot is related to symbols and attitudes, which vary among nation-states, and because being a patriot is an expression of a pro-attitude to symbols used within a specific nation-state). It does not even mean that they would hold that sense of loyalty or moral commitment toward all the citizens within their own nation-state (as the pseudo-patriotic refrain “love it or leave it” communicates to dissident groups within the United States). Moreover, it does not necessarily include the possibility and right for children and young adults to inquire critically into the value of “patriotism” relative to other values such as cosmopolitanism or education for deliberative democracy.

It may be noted, however, that citizenship education had and still has as an aim to shape the loyalty and moral commitment of children and young people so that they became loyal and morally committed, not only to their families, neighbourhood or other like-minded affinity groups, but also to a more abstract political unit – the nation-state. Such an education could be described as assimilating or integrating members of the nation-state within the majority-culture – an idea that has its roots in the eighteenth century. It can be seen as a part of a conceptual scheme or web of beliefs that furthers a common identity within the political unit of a nation-state and its assimilationist ideals. However, a reaction against conceptual schemes that inherit ideas of assimilation and integration and of furthering a common identity took place in particular around the nineteenth century as discussions on the value of recognising multiple identities within nation-states began to arise. The uncoupling of cultural identity and politics was also discussed as authors both within political theory and educational theory argued for the recognition of diversity of identities within nation-states, and as they discussed ideas for multicultural or dual citizenship and multicultural education7, (the European Union (EU) can be seen as an example in which citizens have a dual citizenship, that is, a citizen within a nation-state which is also a member of the European Union is also a citizen of EU8). Other conceptual schemes or webs of beliefs for thinking about citizenship education have been developed in terms of globalisation and cosmopolitanism.7 Transformations and changes in social, cultural, political and economic terms around the globe, and not only within nation-states or between them, raise the possibility of a more inclusive notion of citizenship education. Furthermore, conceptual schemes or webs of beliefs in terms of deliberation are being developed and discussed more and more today in, inter alia, political-theoretical as well as educational discussions.8 Not only are changes and transformations around the world challenging earlier notions of institutions such as education and their role and function within nation-states; even the
conditions for deliberation, the character of the processes of deliberation, as well as
the quality and outcomes of deliberation in pluralist societies are being rethought:
How can young people be educated to interact peacefully with each other in order
to solve their common problems constructively?

Today we are witnessing the impact of global economic transactions and
processes, neo-liberal policies in Western democracies, and shifts in governance of
education. We are also witnessing how trans-national institutions, migration, the
changed notion of labour, technological developments, and environmental issues
transform notions of citizenship education within nation-states. Even the
construction of a common identity is challenged, whether in terms of educating a
reliable and disciplined workforce for production in industry, or for becoming
knowledgeable and responsible citizens within the nation-state.9 These changes and
much more call for the development of new and more inclusive understandings of
citizenship education; understandings that emphasize interconnectedness,
cosmopolitan values, and the value of deliberation. Such conceptual schemes or
webs of beliefs can help to develop the capacities needed for people to interact
with each other peacefully and resolve problems constructively.

If children and young adults can be educated as citizens within nation-states by
being educated within more inclusive conceptual schemes, it remains to be asked
how such conceptual schemes or webs of beliefs function to organise or fit their
experiences on the one hand and regulate their behaviour on the other. The first
point suggests that a conceptual scheme or web of beliefs functions to organise or
fit an unorganised stream of uninterpreted content; systematizing or classifying
children’s and young adults’ unorganised experiences in a way that would allow us
to give an account of or predict their experiences. If this were the case, then such
an understanding of citizenship education would be false or, in the words of
Donald Davidson, a “dogma of empiricism, the third dogma” (Davidson 2001f, p.
189). He continues: “The third, and perhaps the last, for if we give it up it is not clear
that there is anything distinctive left to call empiricism” (ibid., 2001f, p. 189).
Davidson argues, however, that there is no thing or experience that makes our
theories true, and he puts forward the “slingshot argument” to show us why.10 It
shows that if logically equivalent sentences have the same reference and singular
terms do not change their reference when replaced by another “with the same
reference … any two sentences have the same reference if they have the same truth
value. And if the meaning of a sentence is what it refers to, all sentences alike in
truth value must be synonymous – an intolerable result” (Davidson 2001d, p. 19).
This means, according to Davidson, that an empiricist notion of truth melts down
into the one great fact, and that the dualism between scheme and content is no
longer defensible and cannot be used to predict or give an account of our
experiences. This suggests that an understanding of citizenship education that
serves to organise or systematisate children’s and young people’s experiences is no
longer tenable. This does not, however, exclude the value or importance of
sustaining agreement or creating the conditions for deliberation in education.

The idea that citizenship education would function to normatively regulate the
behaviour of children and young people in a strong sense is not defensible either. It
INTRODUCTION

could mean that the way in which language users within a specific community use
language determines whether a language user is using a specific utterance correctly – and that a speaker uses an utterance correctly if and only if he or she uses it in agreement with other language users within a specific community. This seems to suggest that citizenship education within a nation-state amount to teaching children and young adults to use utterances in the same or similar ways as other language users, and in this sense to regulate their linguistic behaviour. However, sameness in use does not explain or determine the meaning of utterances. It does not necessarily even show us how to go on in every single case. At best, it amounts to showing that the uses of the utterances may be the same, but not that the content or the meaning of the utterances is the same; nor that the thoughts expressed in the utterances are the same. Similarities in use in relevantly similar situations only show that there is semantic agreement, but not that those concerned mean the same things or ascribe the same meaning to the utterances in use in every single case. We may in our natural attitude interpret each other charitably, but we cannot be certain of the meaning of utterances, and we cannot predict with certainty what other beliefs, attitudes, desires, wishes or intentions speakers have. If this were the case, it would presuppose a false equation between similarities in use and meaning. Semantic correctness also seems to exhaust the meaning of utterances exclusively in terms of social factors. But the meaning of utterances does not seem to be exhausted by social factors. Davidson argues that the meaning of an utterance also depends upon the “features of the world that make [certain thoughts] true” (Davidson 2001g, p. 2). The triangular situation between at least two people interacting with each other in an environment with objects and events to which they respond similarly are necessary conditions for thought, according to him.11 He argues that an explanation of meaning or thought needs to take into account both knowledge of our own mind, the minds of others, and of the world in order to be meaningful.12 It is only when this triangular situation is taken into account that we can explain not only the meaning of utterances but also errors in meaning. In order to judge whether an error has been made, the speakers in communication must take their own beliefs as well as the beliefs of others into account, along with their reactions towards objects and events in the world. Without such knowledge it would not be possible for those concerned to judge whether they understand each other reasonably well or not. If this is correct, then it seems that conceptual schemes or webs of beliefs in which the notion of citizenship education is a part must take such conditions for understanding and deliberation into account in order to make it possible for those concerned within such an education to come to understand each other and deliberate over matters that affect them, particularly when they disagree with or do not understand each other.

It seems, then, that the meaning of utterances used within citizenship education in nation-states cannot be determined conclusively and that different nation-states educate children and young people differently. We have also seen that it seems reasonable that citizenship education has to maximise agreement and create the necessary conditions for all those concerned to come to understand and deliberate about knowledge, values, and norms of action. It also has to be concerned with