

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IN ADULT EDUCATION

The Persons in Relation Perspective

**In Counselling, Psychotherapy and
Community Adult Learning**

Colin Kirkwood



SensePublishers

THE PERSONS IN RELATION PERSPECTIVE

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IN ADULT EDUCATION

Volume 9

Series Editor:

Peter Mayo, *University of Malta, Msida, Malta*

Scope:

This international book series attempts to do justice to adult education as an ever expanding field. It is intended to be internationally inclusive and attract writers and readers from different parts of the world. It also attempts to cover many of the areas that feature prominently in this amorphous field. It is a series that seeks to underline the global dimensions of adult education, covering a whole range of perspectives. In this regard, the series seeks to fill in an international void by providing a book series that complements the many journals, professional and academic, that exist in the area. The scope would be broad enough to comprise such issues as 'Adult Education in specific regional contexts', 'Adult Education in the Arab world', 'Participatory Action Research and Adult Education', 'Adult Education and Participatory Citizenship', 'Adult Education and the World Social Forum', 'Adult Education and Disability', 'Adult Education in Prisons', 'Adult Education, Work and Livelihoods', 'Adult Education and Migration', 'The Education of Older Adults', 'Southern Perspectives on Adult Education', 'Adult Education and Progressive Social Movements', 'Popular Education in Latin America and Beyond', 'Eastern European perspectives on Adult Education', 'An anti-Racist Agenda in Adult Education', 'Postcolonial perspectives on Adult Education', 'Adult Education and Indigenous Movements', 'Adult Education and Small States'. There is also room for single country studies of Adult Education provided that a market for such a study is guaranteed.

Editorial Advisory Board:

Paula Allman, Research Fellow, University of Nottingham, England

Stephen Brookfield, University of St Thomas, Minnesota, USA

Phyllis Cunningham, University of Illinois, Urbana Champagne, USA

Waguida El Bakary, American University in Cairo, Egypt

Budd L. Hall, University of Victoria, BC, Canada

Astrid Von Kotze, University of Natal, South Africa

Alberto Melo, University of the Algarve, Portugal

Lidia Puigvert-Mallart, CREA-University of Barcelona, Spain

Daniel Schugurensky, OISE/University of Toronto, Canada

Joyce Stalker, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand/ Aotearoa

Juha Suoranta, University of Tampere, Finland

The Persons in Relation Perspective

In Counselling, Psychotherapy
and Community Adult Learning

By

Colin Kirkwood

With an Introduction by Judith Fewell, an Afterword by Tom Steele, and
contributions by Emilio Lucio-Villegas, Anna Other and David Tait



SENSE PUBLISHERS
ROTTERDAM / BOSTON / TAIPEI

A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-94-6091-907-7 (paperback)

ISBN 978-94-6091-908-4 (hardback)

ISBN 978-94-6091-909-1 (e-book)

Published by: Sense Publishers,
P.O. Box 21858, 3001 AW Rotterdam, The Netherlands
<https://www.sensepublishers.com/>

Printed on acid-free paper

All rights reserved © 2012 Sense Publishers

No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

To Gerri, with love and gratitude

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	ix
Introduction <i>Judith Fewell</i>	xv
SECTION I: DEFINING THE PERSONS IN RELATION PERSPECTIVE	
Chapter 1: The persons in relation perspective: Towards a philosophy for counselling and psychotherapy in society	3
Chapter 2: The persons in relation perspective: Sources and synthesis	19
Chapter 3: The persons in relation perspective: Counselling and psychotherapy in the contemporary world	35
SECTION II: EXPLORING DIALOGUE	
Chapter 4: Some notes on dialogue	49
Chapter 5: Dialogue in its larger context: Only connect!	57
SECTION III: APPLYING THE PERSONS IN RELATION PERSPECTIVE IN COUNSELLING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY	
Chapter 6: The role of psychotherapy in the in-patient treatment of a teenage girl with anorexia: A dialogical narrative <i>With three letters by Anna Other, and a reflection by David Tait</i>	65
Chapter 7: Counselling as personal and social action	99
SECTION IV: APPLYING THE PERSONS IN RELATION PERSPECTIVE BEYOND THE COUCH	
Chapter 8: Beyond the couch: An introduction to the work of John D. Sutherland	111

CONTENTS

Chapter 9: Robert Burns in the counsellor's chair: A psycho-socio-cultural analysis of the Burns myth	123
Chapter 10: Scotland as a learning society: Identity, difference and relatedness	133
SECTION V: APPLYING THE PERSONS IN RELATION PERSPECTIVE IN ADULT EDUCATION AND ADULT LEARNING	
Chapter 11: Challenging education, creating alliances: The legacy of Paulo Freire in the 21 st century	149
Chapter 12: Freirean approaches to citizenship: An interview with Colin Kirkwood <i>Emilio Lucio-Villegas</i>	165
Afterword <i>Tom Steele</i>	175
By the same author	181
Biography	183

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The title of the present book is adapted from John Macmurray's *Persons in Relation*, first published by Faber and Faber in 1961 as the second volume of his Gifford Lectures on *The Form of the Personal*. The first volume, *The Self as Agent*, was originally published in 1957. The extent of the influence of John Macmurray's life and work on my own will become apparent in the first chapter, in which his ideas are discussed and applied. In this connection I acknowledge with gratitude the contribution of John E. Costello, on whose *John Macmurray: A Biography* (Floris Books, 2002) I have drawn extensively. I have been influenced also by the writings of Macmurray scholars David Fergusson and Michael Fielding. To Ronald Turnbull I owe a special debt of gratitude, because it was Ronnie who reawakened my interest in Scottish philosophy in the late 1980s, first by drawing my attention to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, then to John Macmurray and finally to Alexander Broadie. In the penultimate chapter of Broadie's *A History of Scottish Philosophy*, in which he discusses twentieth century contributions, he gives pride of place to Macmurray's work, illustrating it with reference to his influence in the fields of psychotherapy and interpersonal relations in the work of Ian Suttie, Ronald Fairbairn, John D. Sutherland and R.D. Laing, with the first three of whom my own contribution is concerned.

The Persons in Relation Perspective aims to articulate, in a new synthesis, the ideas that underlie my own practice and that of many others in the fields of counselling, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, adult education, community development and community action. In doing so, it touches on many overlapping fields of theory and practice, including theology and religion, psychiatry, psychology and nursing, health and well-being, politics and sociology, social work and social care, education, literature and social geography.

The linking ideas are personalism and the practice of dialogue; and the best known personalists of the 20th century were John Macmurray, Martin Buber, Emmanuel Mounier and Paulo Freire. The influence of Paulo Freire on my work and that of many adult educators is discussed, with appropriate acknowledgements, in *Living Adult Education: Freire in Scotland* (second edition) (2011), by Gerri Kirkwood and myself. The Freirean dimension of my synthesis is explored in the last two chapters of the present book. Chapter 11 contains a Freirean bibliography.

It is usually the case that acknowledgements at the beginning of books such as this one are concerned with intellectual sources, and make reference to authors and their published books and papers. But ideas expressed in writing, however vital, are not the only source of illumination. What I have in mind, in terms of influences to be acknowledged with gratitude, is the profound impact the many women with whom I have collaborated have had on my orientation and practice. This influence

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

has entered me directly through their personalities, their presence, their ways of being, doing and relating, and their resourcefulness and inventiveness in carrying out the work. They include my wife, Gerri Kirkwood, through our marriage, our work together in Barrowfield and Castlemilk in Glasgow in the 1970s, in the Adult Learning Project in Gorgie-Dalry in Edinburgh from 1979, and in our lives as parents and grandparents. I acknowledge with gratitude the influence of Margaret Jarvie in counselling and counselling training, through what I have learned from her and her husband David of their involvement in the Iona Community and the Gorbals Group, and through our work together in Shetland. I am grateful for the long collaboration I have enjoyed with Judith Fewell in a variety of projects and settings also related to counselling and counselling training. I remember with appreciation how much I have received from working with Mary Walker, Tom Frank, Mhairi Macmillan, Jo Burns, Alison Shoemark, Dave Mearns, Andrina Tulloch, David Morgan, Siobhan Canavan, John McLeod, Gabrielle Syme, Liz Bondi and Jo Hilton.

From my apprentice years as a psychotherapist at Wellspring, I acknowledge with thanks the influence of Di Bates (Dr Diana Bates, Director of Wellspring and daughter of Winifred Rushforth, founder of the Davidson Clinic). Di's personal being and relating spoke more deeply to those of us who worked with her than a ton of words could ever do.

In my counselling and psychoanalytic psychotherapy training at the Scottish Institute of Human Relations, I am grateful for what I learned in many different ways from Alan Harrow, Mona Macdonald, Judith Brearley, John Evans, Una Armour, Cathy Smyth, Bobbie Fraser and Neville Singh. I am grateful, also, for the help and support of Chris Holland, Penny Holland and Norah Smith. Gerri and I will never forget the strength we drew from the support of Janet Hassan. I express my appreciation of everything I have read by Colwyn Trevarthen.

In the latter part of the 1980s I was fortunate to work with the Scottish Association for Counselling in their collaboration with the Scottish Health Education Group, and benefitted from lasting collegial and friendship relations with Ronald Beasley and Ian Thompson, and with Bill and Ingsay Balfour. In the later 1990s and the first decade of the new century, I have appreciated working with Stewart Wilson, Marilyn Cunningham and Brian Magee of COSCA, the professional body for counselling and psychotherapy in Scotland, with Gabrielle Syme, Elsa Bell and Craig McDevitt of the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy, with Malcolm Allen of the British Psychoanalytic Council and with Mika Haritos-Fatouros of the European Association for Counselling.

After retiring from the University of Edinburgh I did a five year stint as psychotherapist at the Huntercombe Edinburgh Hospital, working with women and girls with severe eating disorders. I learned an enormous amount from our patients and my fellow members of staff, for which I am very grateful. Selection is invidious, but I must mention with special gratitude the hospital's first Medical Director, David Tait, its manager, Diane Whiteoak, and my psychotherapeutic colleagues Michelle Conway and Laura Thomson. It was an inspiring and challenging experience.

Turning now to the contents of the book itself:

For her generous Introduction, I thank Judith Fewell, Honorary Fellow of the University of Edinburgh, and for his insightful Afterword, I thank Tom Steele, Senior Research Fellow of the University of Glasgow.

Chapter 1 was first published in *Counselling and Psychotherapy Research*, Volume 3, Number 3, September 2003. A few minor modifications have been introduced in the present version. My thanks to John McLeod, then editor of CPR and now Professor of Counselling at the University of Abertay Dundee.

Chapter 2 was first published in its full form in *The Legacy of Fairbairn and Sutherland: Psychotherapeutic Applications* (Routledge, 2005), edited by Jill Savege Scharff and David E. Scharff, Co-Directors of the International Psychotherapy Institute and Teaching Analysts at the Washington Psychoanalytic Institute. (My thanks to Jill and David are expressed more fully in the introduction to Chapter 8.) The version included here has been shortened, excluding a section on the work of John Macmurray, and modified in various other ways.

Chapter 3 is a modified version of a keynote presentation given in Athens in the spring of 2006, at an international conference entitled *Counselling in Europe: Theory, Research, Practice and Training* organised by Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, the Greek Association for Counselling and the European Association for Counselling. Special thanks are due to Professor Mika Haritos-Fatouros of the conference organising committee and then President of the EAC.

Chapter 4 was first written for the Counselling Studies Team at Moray House School of Education in the University of Edinburgh, and first published in the Spring 2002 issue of the COSCA Journal, *Counselling in Scotland*. It is published here in a modified version. My thanks to my fellow team members and to Brian Magee, Chief Executive of COSCA.

Chapter 5 was written as a follow-up to the paper that became Chapter 4, again for the members of the Counselling Studies Team. It has been revised and expanded several times, and was first published in the Spring/Summer 2004 issue of the COSCA Journal, *Counselling in Scotland*. The version published here is significantly different from the 2004 version. Once again, I thank the team and Brian Magee.

Chapter 6 has a complex history. Some of the material was first presented at a meeting of the Scottish Institute of Human Relations Tayside Group, in Perth in 2007. A longer version was given at a meeting of the Scottish Association for Psychodynamic Counselling in Glasgow in 2010. It became possible to write the present version when I rediscovered the three letters sent to me by the patient with whom I had worked. I made contact with her again and sought her permission to include a selection of my reflective process notes on our work, together with her letters, all suitably anonymised. She was happy to agree. I then invited Dr David Tait, in his capacity as Medical Director of the Huntercombe Edinburgh Hospital when the work was being done, to write a Reflection on it from his own point of view, and he did so. This is possibly the first time that a verbatim account of an intensive psychotherapeutic relationship from three points of view has been

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

published. I should add that I also asked David Tait and the patient (Anna Other) to go through the text carefully and propose alterations to anything with which they disagreed or which misrepresented the work of the Hospital and its staff. They did so. I express my deep gratitude to both Anna and David for their collaboration. I believe this chapter is worthy of the description A Dialogical Narrative, and that it makes a strong case for restoring psychotherapy to the place it formerly occupied in in-patient psychiatric treatment. I thank Tom Leonard for his permission to reproduce a line from his poem *This Island Now*. (Poems, Dublin, 1973)

Chapter 7 was first given as a paper at a conference held in Edinburgh in June 2003, organised by the Counselling and Society Research Team of the University of Edinburgh. I thank Professor Liz Bondi and our colleagues Judith Fewell and Arnar Arnason. The paper, which has not previously been published, has been significantly modified. Again, I thank Tom Leonard for permission to quote from his poem *This Island Now*, referred to above.

Chapter 8 is the most recent piece of writing in the present book. Full acknowledgement of the key contributions is given in the text of the chapter and in the bibliography, so I will not repeat them here. The chapter originated out of an initiative taken in 2007 following the publication of Jill Savege Scharff's selection of papers by Jock Sutherland in her book *The Psychodynamic Image: John D. Sutherland on Self in Society* (Routledge, 2007). The Sutherland Trust, of which I was then co-convenor, the Scottish Institute of Human Relations and the Centre for Counselling and Psychotherapeutic Studies of the University of Edinburgh combined to run a successful course introducing younger people to Sutherland's work. This chapter brings together two of my own contributions to that course.

Chapter 9 was delivered as the Immortal Memory of Robert Burns at the Moray House School of Education Burns Supper in January 2000, and first published in the November 2000 issue of *Psychodynamic Counselling*. The text here is almost identical to the previously published version. I acknowledge with thanks the contributions of my old school and University friend, the Burns scholar Kenneth Simpson, drawn from his book *Burns Now* (Canongate, 1994).

Chapter 10 was given as a contribution to the conference Scotland as a Learning Society: Issues of Culture and Identity held at the University of Edinburgh in February 1995. It was first published as Occasional Paper No. 9 by the Centre for Continuing Education, University of Edinburgh, 1996. I thank Tom Leonard for permission to quote from his poem *Tea Time* (Outside the Narrative, Etruscan Books/Word Power Books, 2009).

Chapter 11 was first published in *The Scottish Journal of Community Work and Development*, Volume 3, Spring 1998, both as a memoir of a conference in honour of the 70th birthday of Paulo Freire held in New York in 1991, and as a reflection upon Freire's life and work following his death in 1997.

Chapter 12 was first published in *Citizenship as Politics* (Sense Publishers, 2009) edited by Emilio Lucio-Villegas. It is the text of an interview by Emilio with myself, and I express my gratitude to him for his permission to reproduce it here.

In conclusion, I am deeply grateful to Jill Savege Scharff, Ian Martin, David Tait, Tom Steele and Judith Fewell for taking the time to read the whole text of the

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

book in draft, and for giving me honest and helpful responses to it. Many of their comments have been incorporated into the final text. But the responsibility for its form, style and inadequacies is my own.

I thank John Shemilt and John McLeod for their appreciative endorsements of the book.

And finally, without the help of Jane-Ann Purdy of Geordie Mac, my struggle with wordprocessing and formatting would have failed utterly. She is responsible for extracting from the mind and index finger of a technically challenged interlocutor a document that now appears, at least to its author, very satisfactory indeed. Many thanks, Jane-Ann.

Colin Kirkwood
Edinburgh, Scotland
May 2012

JUDITH FEWELL

INTRODUCTION

In 1986 I sat in a room with twenty-four other participants at the Scottish Institute of Human Relations (SIHR) in Edinburgh anticipating the start of the Human Relations and Counselling Course. Looking round the room I noticed that there were few men, four I think. One stood out, although now looking back across the years I'm not sure why I was drawn to him, perhaps it was his deep laughter, his friendly beard or the warmth that exuded from him. Whatever it was we ended up being both adversaries and lifelong friends and colleagues for the next 25 years of our working lives.

I was a Jewish Glaswegian radical feminist immersed in a PhD on gender and education with a growing interest in psychodynamic theory and counselling practice. He was a Scottish Nationalist, with Presbyterian Northern Irish parentage, a community activist and adult educationalist. Throughout the two years of the course we discussed, debated and fought intensely. He was one of the most interesting, stimulating and infuriating people I had encountered. Little did I know then that we were about to enter a working relationship that would dramatically change the shape, direction and nature of my working life. But my task in this introduction is not to write about the profound influence that Colin Kirkwood has had upon the way in which I think and my creativity but rather to try and offer up the flavour of the man which is so evidenced on every page of this book and to say something about his significant contribution to the world of counselling and psychotherapy in Scotland in all its different forms throughout these last 25 years.

Counselling in Scotland in the mid-80s was just about to blossom. There was no accreditation, no regulation, little training, few stakeholders, not many private practitioners, little research, hardly any competition and no randomised controlled trials (RCTs). The professionalisation of counselling had barely been considered. There was much freedom and many spaces into which a person with vision and creativity could insert himself.

However there was a lot of pent up demand for practical and theoretical frameworks to make sense of relationships of all kinds, with our selves, family, friends and intimate partners, colleagues and groups, and our relationships with our communities and the wider social and cultural contexts in which we were embedded. From 1986, Colin Kirkwood spearheaded many of the subsequent developments: researching and writing a directory of the provision of counselling services and counselling training in Scotland for the Scottish Health Education Group (SHEG) and the Scottish Association for Counselling (SAC); developing and delivering, with me, training courses in counselling skills for the Scottish Council of Voluntary Organisations (SCVO) across Scotland, and for the social work department of Lothian Regional Council; taking counselling training to

Shetland; supporting the development of therapeutic services at Wellspring, one of the oldest centres of therapeutic practice in Scotland; and helping the core organisation representing counselling in Scotland, COSCA, through its growth towards maturity, as its chair for four years.

All this time he was honing his craft, practising as a counsellor, starting at the counselling service of the Edinburgh Association of Mental Health, then as a couple counsellor at Lothian Marriage Counselling Service, now Couple Counselling Lothian, and then as a psychotherapist at Wellspring. At the same time all this was going on Colin and I were involved in the intensive training to become psychoanalytic psychotherapists at the Scottish Institute of Human Relations.

Eventually he joined Moray House Institute of Education in Edinburgh, in 1994, as Senior Lecturer in Counselling, a new post where he established the Centre for Counselling Studies in which I joined him a year later. Together we developed the postgraduate Certificate in the Counselling Approach and the postgraduate Diploma in Counselling, which was to become one of the premier professional trainings for counsellors in Scotland at that time.

I shared many of Colin Kirkwood's endeavours and I have been witness to his thinking and action. In my view these found their fullest expression in the philosophical framework Colin developed which informed and underpinned the courses and relationships at the Centre for Counselling Studies: see especially Chapters 4 and 5.

We were presented with a dilemma. How were we to honour the richness of ideas and practices in the trainings already on offer at Moray House under the creative leadership of Margaret Jarvie, whom Colin succeeded, whilst finding a place for what we too could offer? And how were we to respond to the academic requirements of postgraduate work at university level which seemed to some antipathetic to the values of counselling? This became especially important when Moray House merged with the University of Edinburgh.

The notion of dialogue gradually emerged out of many discussions. At its most obvious, a dialogue between two historically antagonistic theoretical and therapeutic practice frameworks, the humanistic tradition of the person-centred approach on the one hand, and psychoanalytic perspectives on the other. This notion of dialogue was about being able to have meaningful conversations about and around profound differences and values, the very different ways of understanding what it meant to be human and how to be in relationship with oneself and others. These were questions that Colin had been pondering for many years, from his undergraduate studies of English Language and Literature through his work in working class communities in Glasgow and in adult education at the Workers Educational Association (WEA) in Edinburgh. The learning from all these different sites of action and thought came to fruition in the Centre for Counselling Studies. Colin was also explicit in his understanding that his engagement and deep interest in dialogue came from experiences of sectarianism in Northern Ireland and Scotland, and the many attempts to find ways to bridge what at times seemed the unbridgeable.

If we were to fully live dialogue in our relationships, our internal worlds and external realities, in our interactions and teaching, then we had to find ways to talk, explore and reflect across the divides of position-taking and defensive investments in identifications. Colin had the vision (an overused word but apposite here): he led the way, always inviting, encouraging, interested, always challenging the other to experience, to think, to explain, to elaborate. At times this could be very trying and tiring especially when I just wanted a cup of tea and not to have to think or feel or reflect. But this was also and always exciting and at times exhilarating as we walked down the corridor together on our way to the cafeteria, Colin telling me what he had been reading and thinking the night before, continuing the conversation we had yesterday, continuing the conversation as we sat down, Colin involving and inviting other colleagues to join in and later on the next day or the day after, Colin letting me know that he had reached a kind of synthesis of the disparate ideas and conversations. Dialogue was not just a theoretical premise upon which to hang some interesting ideas, for him (and for me) it was a daily, lived experience.

Nor was this dialogue restricted to theoretical debates in the corridors, cafeteria and classroom. It informed every encounter, with student, colleague and practitioner; how we conceptualised the learning/teaching environment and even how we approached assessment. It informed how we thought about and structured each learning experience to maximise 'knowledge of' rather than 'knowledge about' (see Chapter 1). Here Colin was able to draw upon his extensive engagement with Paulo Freire's work, always starting from the students' experiences and their views of the world. We sat in circles, we didn't give lectures, we offered inputs where the students' contributions were encouraged, we moved from experience through reflection to theory and practice. We engaged in the assessment process as if we were in a continuing dialogue with the student. Colin's spontaneous, ongoing and extensive comments on the text of a student's essay as if he were having a lively conversation with her exemplified this. And his students loved him for this, for the time, attention and respect he gave to them and especially their written work.

When Colin discovered John Macmurray's writing it was as if he recognised that what he had been involved in creating was a living embodiment of Macmurray's thinking about persons in relation, as he discusses in Chapter 1. This chapter and the following two in the section 'Defining the persons in relation perspective', on Suttie and Fairbairn, exemplify that quality of Colin's thinking and writing which is about how to embrace an idea, a conceptual framework, interrogate it, turn it this way and that, work out his understanding and his response, making it his own. I remember talking with Colin about how he studied for his English degree at Glasgow University. He said that he wanted to discover how he felt and what he thought about the text he was reading first, before he read any commentaries or critiques of it, be it poem or novel or play.

This independence of mind and capacity for originality as well as an underlying commitment to persons in relation can be found in every chapter of this book. I

want to comment on a couple that capture for me the depth and breadth of Colin's passionate interests.

Therapeutic accounts of working with a client where the client's voice is given parity with the therapist's are rare in the psychotherapeutic literature for a variety of reasons, not least because of issues to do with confidentiality and ethical practice, since the therapeutic work is for the benefit of the client. Making clinical material available in the public domain is problematic. Having said this, to read accounts of therapeutic work in practice from both the perspective of the client and the practitioner is always illuminating. We can learn a lot through reading these kinds of accounts. Their rarity makes the ones that do become available even more valuable

In Chapter 6, Colin offers us one such account. Here he puts together a narrative of how he and Anna worked to try and make sense of her anorexia. Whilst the storyteller is the therapist, the voice of the client is given equal place in the story that they, client and therapist, construct together. What emerges is not a story of triumph, or of getting better, or even of failure but rather one of time being taken, of what we might call internal continuity where the therapist has been taken in as an empathic, deeply interested listener. This has a real impact over time even after the therapist is no longer present in the client's external life. Thus after leaving the hospital and leaving her therapist, Anna was still making use of her internal experience of him. He is internally present in her search for meaning and in her story making. And what an extraordinary story she has to tell of her relationship with anorexia. What is so moving about this is that Anna feels able to return to Colin, in the form of a letter and, I would suggest, in her continuing dialogue with him, the next chapter of her story. This is an extraordinary gift from Anna to Colin. As therapists we rarely get to hear what happens next. I think that Anna felt able to let Colin know because of the particular kind of therapeutic relationship Colin was able to offer her, one that deeply embodied his persons in relation perspective, one where her story of control and survival and her struggle to have an intact sense of self was witnessed and honoured as having validity however painful and life threatening it might be. This chapter alone makes two important contributions, to the literature on anorexia and the literature on what goes on in the consulting room between therapist and client because it offers us the voices of the client and therapist in dialogue together.

The other chapter I wish to touch on is Chapter 9, *Robert Burns in the counsellor's chair: a psycho-socio-cultural analysis of the Burns myth*, but rather than write about it I want to explore the memories it brought to mind which I hope will illustrate something of Colin's literary sensibilities amongst other things.

When we were attending the required seminars for the adult psychoanalytic psychotherapy training at the SIHR there was one evening when we were trying to really understand the emotional experiences of jealousy and envy and the psychoanalytic theories that attempted to explain them. Quietly from Colin came this quote:

For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds:
Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds.
(William Shakespeare, Sonnet no. 94)

Later in the pub Colin quoted the whole sonnet. I was to have this experience with him over and over again especially when we were teaching together. There might be a moment's confusion in the room with the students, or one of silence or of non-comprehension, and then out of his reverie Colin would quote a line or more of poetry. This was not a party trick or Colin being clever. Rather it was evidence of the extent to which Colin had taken in, absorbed and understood the writings of others that had moved him, had meant something to him, that he had studied and internalised, so that 35 or 40 years later this poem, that quotation, was still available to him and therefore to us.

Judith Fewell
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapist
Honorary Fellow
University of Edinburgh

SECTION I

DEFINING THE PERSONS IN RELATION PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER 1

THE PERSONS IN RELATION PERSPECTIVE

Towards a Philosophy for Counselling and Psychotherapy in Society

Key words and themes: personalism, persons in relation, the self as agent, knowledge of, knowledge about, the good other, friendship in community.

This paper is the first in a planned series which aims to articulate and synthesise the persons in relation perspective in counselling and psychotherapy, drawing together the contributions of the philosopher John Macmurray (1891–1976), the psychotherapist Ian Suttie (1889–1935), and the psychoanalyst Ronald Fairbairn (1889–1965). The present paper introduces the persons in relation perspective, derived from Macmurray’s work. It outlines the historical and cultural context leading to the emergence of modernism, and the response of personalism. It summarises John Macmurray’s life and philosophy, focussing on his account of knowledge, its relation to the senses and the emotions, and his view of persons, society and religion. The paper goes on to develop a hypothesis about the rise of counselling and psychotherapy in Britain, linking it to the decline of religion, the conflict between individualism and collectivism, and the re-emergence of the persons in relation perspective. It concludes by posing challenges for the person-centred and psychodynamic orientations, and for counselling and psychotherapy as a whole.

INTRODUCTION

This paper has a personal significance for several reasons. First of all, I come from a northern Irish Presbyterian family, although I was born and grew up in Scotland. My father was a minister of the Church of Scotland who died in January 2003. He is very important to me, but the relationship is complicated because, as a child, I was in awe of him, and because from my early teens I knew that I did not believe in God. It was not until I came across the work of John Macmurray in 1989 that I began to entertain the idea that belief in God might not be the core of religion. This discovery has been slowly exploding in my soul, like a benign bomb, ever since. You can perhaps imagine my emotions when, sifting through his possessions with my brothers and sister, I came across two of Macmurray’s books from the 1930s, with red underlines and the occasional marginal note in my father’s handwriting. It was clear he had been deeply touched by Macmurray, as I have been 60 years later. In one of our last conversations – we were talking about the institutional church

and its doctrines – he said to me, ‘Of course, I don’t believe in a lot of that stuff now. But I believe in Jesus’.

The second reason for its personal significance is that, ever since I took up the post of Head of the Centre for Counselling Studies at Moray House Institute (now the School of Education of the University of Edinburgh), I have been committed to the idea and practice of dialogue between the person-centred approach and psychodynamic perspectives in counselling and psychotherapy. We were the first postgraduate centre to adopt this orientation to counselling training. I have been challenged by the question of how best to express the common ground between them, coming as they do from such apparently different sources. In the present paper, and those to follow, I see myself as helping to excavate that common ground.

The third reason is frankly political, as well as religious. The global failure of communism in the 20th century lies not in the poverty of its original vision, but in its failure to put the personal at its heart. Instead, it put its faith in technology, in large-scale social structure and in an impersonal, coercive and frequently murderous collectivism, treating human beings and their relationships as disposable objects to be bulldozed aside. Personalists like John Macmurray entered into sustained dialogue with communism in the 1930s, but they were not heeded. We can still hear the voice of John Macmurray today, and we can learn and apply his lessons in the 21st century.

This paper was first presented at the joint *International Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy/European Association for Counselling* conference at Geneva in April 2003, on the theme of the counsellor and social responsibility. It begins with a question, an old-fashioned theological play on words: what is the ground of all our being as counsellors? I suggest that many of us do have such an orientation, which is indeed the ground of our being counsellors, but we are either unaware of it in the sense that we have never said it to ourselves out loud, or else we are diffident in talking about it, especially when speaking to those with political, economic or institutional power. We tend to talk their language, and tack towards their objectives, so that we can persuade them to make use of our services.

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

In what follows, I identify some of the key features of the persons-in-relation perspective. This entails outlining the thinking of John Macmurray, whose work provides the basis for it.

To do this I need to start with a very short history of the 19th and 20th centuries, mainly in Europe. The 19th century was characterised by rapid urbanisation, industrialisation and the flourishing of capitalism; the emergence of modern nation states in Germany and Italy; the weakening of the Austro-Hungarian empire; and the growth of British, French, and later German imperialisms. The cultural backcloth was romanticism, which began in radical iconoclasm and ended in regressive sentimentality. Grudging but significant advances were made in the direction of the representative version of democracy. The Christian religion got

involved in a battle with positivist science about the creation of the world and the evolution of species, a battle it was bound to lose. In philosophy, Friedrich Nietzsche excoriated Christianity for hypocritical sentimentality, announced the death of God, and hailed the emergence of the superman. In personal life, the dominance of men over women and reason over the emotions and the senses had reached such a pitch by the 1890s that Sigmund Freud was driven to adapt such concepts as hysteria, repression and the unconscious in order to help make sense of some of the experiences of middle-class women in Vienna. Around the same time, Robert Louis Stevenson was writing *Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, offering a way of explaining related phenomena in the male psyche, an analysis pointing in the direction of the concept of dissociation then being developed by Pierre Janet, and later adapted by Ronald Fairbairn. The end of the century saw the deepening immiseration of the urban proletariat, the spread of trade unionism among semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and the growth of organised social democratic, labour and communist movements.

This boiler-room of tensions exploded in various ways: revolutionary uprisings in Russia, Germany, and Austria, the suffragette movement, and above all the First World War. The 20th century proceeded as a three-way struggle between fascism, communism and representative democracy, accompanied by the emergence of modernism as a cultural theory, the creation and growth of the welfare state, and the decline of religion. After the Second World War a golden age of relative social security opened the way to the decline of deference, accompanied by the take-off of science and technology, and the hybrid radicalism of the 1960s and 70s, with its disparate strands of laid-back libertarianism, militant trade-unionism, marxism, student revolt, feminism, and gay liberation. The next phase saw the forward march of labour halted (to use E. J. Hobsbawm's phrase), and the rise of free-market economics and laissez-faire individualism. Radical intellectuals hailed the failure of the grand narratives and the emergence of post-modernism. That is the story line we have got used to hearing.

PERSONALISM

I want to add another story, a more creative and affirmative story, which starts with a significantly different response to the horrors of the First World War. The intellectuals of the 1920s were united in their view that the society and culture they had inherited was discredited. Ezra Pound summed it up in a terse phrase: 'a botched civilisation'. Pound, like many of his contemporaries, turned to fascism. Others turned to communism, others to a more moderate but still statist kind of social democracy. These are the stories that get told over and over again. What gets lost sight of is a story, which is of special interest to us as counsellors and psychotherapists, the story of personalism. I will argue that the narrative of personalism, far from having failed, has re-emerged, certainly in the UK, in the form of the popular turn to counselling and psychotherapy in response to the Thatcherite individualism of the 1980s and 1990s.

What is personalism? Briefly, it is a response to the distortions and hypocrisy of society and religion in the 19th century, which does not discard religion but seeks both to rediscover and reinvent its core meaning and revitalise its practice. The key ideas are that human beings are persons, that the heart of their being lies in their relations with other persons, and that the self-realisation of persons-in-community is an end-in-itself which should not be subordinated to other ends. Personalism is a radical social perspective, which shares the ends of human liberation and social justice with communism and social democracy, but holds that these ends cannot be achieved by subordinating the personal to the structural or by worshipping the state. To conclude this outline it is important to emphasise that these are normative, not descriptive statements. Personalism is grounded in positive values. It is not about going along with social trends in a rudderless fashion: it offers an orientation for living our lives. Personalism has its roots in the life of Christ and in aspects of the Jewish tradition, and takes a very specific, relational view of God, as we shall see.

I first came across personalism in the early 1970s in the work of the Brazilian adult educator Paulo Freire. I had been drawn to Freire because of concerns about people being treated as objects, as means to future ends, even within struggles for human liberation. Freire's work is a synthesis of many elements. The core of it is his commitment to the idea that oppressed people can engage with the world as subjects who know and act, not objects which are known and acted upon. He developed an approach to popular education, which centres around the practice of dialogue as a way of engaging with oppressive social reality. The personalist influences on Freire were Martin Buber and Emmanuel Mounier. There is no reference in his work to that of John Macmurray, and it wasn't until I read a remarkable essay by Ronnie Turnbull, entitled *Scottish Thought in the 20th Century*, in 1989, that I came to realise his importance. It is worth pointing out that Martin Buber knew and admired John Macmurray, seeing no significant difference between their ideas.

Throughout the following sections, I make extensive reference to John Macmurray's own work. His key books in order of first publication are:

- *Freedom in the Modern World* (1932)
- *Reason and Emotion* (1935)
- *The Clue to History* (1938)
- *The Self as Agent* (1957)
- *Persons in Relation* (1961)

With the exception of *The Clue to History*, these have all been reissued recently. I have also drawn widely from John Costello's excellent biography of him, published by Floris Books in 2002. John Costello is a faculty member of the University of Toronto, where he is director of the Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice.

JOHN MACMURRAY'S LIFE

Macmurray was born in 1891 and died in 1976. He grew up in a Presbyterian family in Scotland. Presbyterianism is not a quietist faith which poses individual against society. On the contrary, it combines communal and private prayer with family and congregational worship, stressing the social responsibility of the person to embody the values of their faith in community, work and the wider world. John Macmurray's youthful personal journal shows how fully he internalised its values of fellowship and altruism. He studied philosophy and toyed with pacifism as the First World War approached, opting first to join the Royal Army Medical Corps and later becoming an officer in a fighting regiment. Immediately on his arrival in the trench where his platoon was stationed, a shell exploded killing two of the men he had just been talking to. Towards the end of the war he was seriously wounded and invalided out. Before that happened, on a visit home, he preached in a Presbyterian church in north London, urging the congregation not to adopt a spirit of vengeance towards the Germans, and pleading for reconciliation. This message was received with hostility. No-one would speak to him after the service. Reflection on these and other experiences radically reshaped Macmurray's view of religion. He was never tempted to abandon it, but from then on he distinguished between personal Christianity and the spurious Christianity of religious organisations, which he called the national religions of Europe. He never subsequently joined an institutional church, until he retired in 1959, when he relented and joined the Quakers, perhaps the least institutional form of Christianity.

John Macmurray had a successful academic career at the Universities of Oxford, Witwatersrand, London, and Edinburgh. He lived a life of commitment, broadcasting, opposing fascism, in dialogue with communism and the Soviet Union, and engaged in the struggle for world friendship and justice through the Christian Left. He affirmed *friendship* as the core value, analysing the causes of the First World War not primarily in terms of imperial rivalries, but in terms of distortions in values and actions. He highlighted pervasive hypocrisy, sentimentality, the substitution of gross materialism for spiritual yearnings, the myth of progress, and the deliberate cultivation of hatred of other nations: as his biographer John Costello puts it,

The demonisation of the 'other' in order to hide inner contradictions and to enhance a self-image of moral rightness. (Costello, 2002)

Against this, he affirmed an apparently simple alternative: cultivation of the personal life.

HIS PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION: THE STANDPOINT OF ACTION

He starts from a rejection of Descartes' *I think, therefore I am*. Macmurray argues that it is a standpoint which isolates the self from others, splits mind from body and the spiritual from the material, and separates thinking from sense experience, feeling and action. Against the egocentric assumption that the self is an isolated

individual, he puts forward the view that the self is a person, and that personal existence is *constituted* by our relations with other persons. He substitutes the ‘You and I’ for the solitary ‘I’ (Macmurray, 1995c, pp. 11–12).

Against Descartes’ disembodied subject, who observes and thinks in isolation, he proposes the primacy of the self as agent, an agent confronted with other selves, each of whom reflects upon his or her activity. Action is primary. Thinking is vital but secondary: a subordinate activity which serves action. Reason, or rationality, which is much wider than thinking, begins in sense perception and crucially involves the emotions, which are the sources of our motives and our evaluations. In a memorable phrase, he defines reason as

the capacity to act consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves, [whether that is an inanimate object, an organism or another person]. (Macmurray, 1995b, p. 21)

In adopting this standpoint, Macmurray sought to overcome dualism, egocentricity and objectification of the other. He is not denying that persons are subjects, nor that they are and can be known as objects:

A personal being is at once subject and object both; but he is both because he is primarily agent. As subject he is ‘I’, as object he is ‘You’, since the ‘You’ is always the ‘Other’. (Macmurray, 1995a, p. 27)

I can isolate myself from you in intention, so that my relation to you becomes impersonal. In this event, I treat you as an object, refusing the personal relationship.’ (Macmurray, 1995a, p. 28)

KNOWLEDGE, THE SENSES AND THE EMOTIONS

Macmurray argues that the history of philosophy discloses three forms of knowledge:

- knowledge of the inanimate material world, which he links with mathematics, physics, the use of mathematical and mechanical metaphors, and formal logic;
- knowledge of the organic world, expressed, for example, in biology, linked with the use of evolutionary and organic metaphors, and dialectical logic;
- knowledge of the world of the personal whose form he set himself the lifelong task of articulating. He argues that the highest and most comprehensive form of knowledge is the mutual knowledge of two persons.

Personal knowledge, he argues, subsumes or includes the material and organic forms of knowledge. It does not supplant them, but it does put them literally in their place. They are vital dimensions of the personal, but personal life cannot be reduced to them. Personal knowledge is radically different from impersonal *knowledge about* something or someone. He makes a sharp distinction between *knowledge of* and *knowledge about*. Intellectual knowledge, which relies on concepts, gives us knowledge about things, not of them (Macmurray, 1995b, p. 43).

To understand more fully what Macmurray means by personal knowledge, and *knowledge of*, we need to return to his view of the relationship between knowledge and action.

To act and to know that I am acting are two aspects of one experience ... if I did not know that I was acting I should not be acting ... I must know to some extent what I am doing if I am doing it. There cannot be action without knowledge. Yet action is logically prior to knowledge, for there can be no knowledge without an actual activity which supports it ... (Macmurray, 1995c, pp. 102–103)

This leads him to consideration of the part played by the activity of sense perception in knowing:

[it is] through sense perception [that] I am aware of the Other ... the Other may be another thing, another organism or another person. (Macmurray, 1995c, p. 109)

He takes touch, rather than sight, as the paradigmatic sense perception:

Tactual perception, as the experience of resistance, is the direct and immediate apprehension of the Other-than-myself. The Other is that which resists my will. (Macmurray, 1995c, p. 109)

Knowledge of is more than intellectual knowing: it begins with the senses which he calls the gateways of our awareness (Macmurray, 1995b, p. 39). To be fully alive we need to increase our capacity to be aware of the world through the senses, cultivating it for its own sake. As well as the senses, we need to cultivate our emotional life: our emotional life is us. He talks about emotional reason. All our motives, he argues, are emotional:

Emotion stands directly behind activity determining its substance and direction. (Macmurray, 1995b)

though he acknowledges, with a nod in the direction of Freud, that quite often the emotions which motivate us are hidden from our conscious awareness. The cultivation of our emotional life is the cultivation of our direct sensitiveness to the reality of the world about us. Its aim is to develop

the capacity to love objectively, ... the capacity which makes us persons. (Macmurray, 1995b, p. 32)

Not only do our emotions provide the motives for our actions, we depend on them also for our determinations of value.

As the picture builds up, we can see the inclusive view of knowledge that Macmurray is developing. We know the world through our senses (which, we need to remember, are directed both inwards and outwards), through our feelings, which are a deeply orientational form of knowing, and finally through the intellect. Intellectual knowledge is vital, but it is partial. It contributes *knowledge about* from the standpoint of the observing thinker, but it is incapable of generating the

knowledge of that can only be achieved by persons as agents through cultivation of their senses and their emotions, and through their encounters with other persons. All thinking, concludes Macmurray, is for the sake of action, and all action is for the sake of friendship.

It should be noted at this point that far from being hostile to empirical science, Macmurray was an enthusiastic and informed supporter of it. He was keen to promote dialogue between the sciences, the arts and religion, which he saw not as antagonistic, but as involving different and mutually necessary forms of knowledge. He saw scientific knowledge as an abstraction from the full field of personal knowledge, and described it as involving knowledge of fact only.

REINVENTING RELIGION

Macmurray's reflections on his experience of the First World War, together with his passionate sincerity in personal relations and his commitment to freedom and social justice, led him to a radical reinterpretation of the meaning of religion.

According to John Costello, his Canadian biographer, his reading of Marx and Trotsky led him not to abandon but to reinvent his Christianity in a new, non-idealist form. He concluded that the institutional churches had abandoned any concern for the material dimension of life, substituting pie in the sky when you die: they had become purely spiritual. Macmurray observed that

modern Communism might well be that half of Christianity ... dropped by the church ... coming back to reassert itself against the part that had been retained. (Costello, 2002, p. 199)

But this was not the statement of a man fighting a rearguard action to defend the indefensible in Christian tradition, dogma and doctrine: on the contrary, that is what he jettisoned. In its place, he puts what he calls the spirit of Christ, the personal, and the core value of friendship-in-community. By the personal, he is referring not to you and me in a cupboard, or in the nuclear family, or even in a nation, but to you and me in the world. In effect, Macmurray is re-translating the rallying cry of the French revolution as freedom, equality and friendship-in-community.

It is clear that Macmurray's conception of the personal is communal and political as well as religious. Religion is '...the personal life of humanity: it is bound up with the experience that makes us persons' (Macmurray, 1995c, p. xi). He writes:

any community of persons, as distinct from a mere society, is a group of individuals united in a common life ... its members are in communion with one another; they constitute a fellowship ... the self-realisation of persons in relation. (Macmurray, 1995a, pp. 157–158)

He is not talking of a bounded, particularistic, localised community but of

a universal community of persons in which each cares for all the others ... (Macmurray, 1995a, p. 159)

religion is the pressure to live in terms of the reality of persons who are not ourselves ... the urge to enter into full mutual relationship with other persons ... It is the force which creates friendship, society, community, cooperation in living. (Macmurray, 1995b, p. 62)

friendship is the fundamental religious fact in human life. (Macmurray, 1995b, p. 63)

religion [is] the slow growth of emotional reason in us. (Macmurray, 1995b, p. 65)

Communion is the keyword of religion. (Macmurray, 1995b, p. 65)

THE GOOD OTHER

Macmurray's mother was a powerful influence in his life, one to whom he remained deeply attached but from whose emotionally constricting and fundamentalist qualities he struggled to separate himself. John Costello gives an amusing account of Macmurray's attempts to answer his mother's demanding question: 'John, where is God in all this?' It is my view, though Macmurray might not have agreed, that the idea of God as an objective existent has become superfluous in Macmurray's vision of religion. Yet in each of his books, he finds a place for God. Here is one example of this process as it occurs in *Persons in Relation*. He is giving an account of the meaning of communion, which he sees as a celebration of fellowship, involving a communal representation or reflection of the community to itself. Consistent with the centrality of the personal, what has to be represented is the relation to a personal other. Macmurray continues:

how can a universal mutuality of intentional and active relationship be represented symbolically? Only through the idea of a personal Other who stands in the same mutual relation to every member of the community ... the universal Other must be represented as a universal Agent ... the idea of a universal personal Other is the idea of God. (Macmurray, 1995a, p. 164)

As the last step in this wholly intelligible but increasingly attenuated sequence of thinking, Macmurray finds a place for God as the universal personal other. In my view, this is convincing as an account of how our ancestors came to infer or invent the existence of God from their profound need for a universalised good other. As a proof of the existence of God, it is unconvincing. To put the matter positively, John Macmurray has by his passionate pursuit of the logic of the personal, discovered that 'God' symbolises and represents nothing more and nothing less than our universal need for and love of the good other.

SOCIETY AND THE DECLINE OF RELIGION

How, then, does Macmurray view society? This, I believe, is where John Costello is right to argue that he is a philosophical voice for the 21st century. Macmurray developed his key ideas in the 1920s and 30s, the period of the rise of fascism and communism, although it was not until the late 1950s and early 60s that he gave them their fullest formulation in his two series of *Gifford Lectures*, jointly entitled *The Form of the Personal*, and published by Faber and Faber as *The Self as Agent* (1957) and *Persons in Relation* (1961). His reflections on the societies he knew are just as relevant to the societies of the 21st century. He believed that the failure of contemporary societies could be explained by their disregard of the personal in favour of material and organic forms of knowledge, structure and action. He argued that the cultural crisis of the present is a crisis of the personal. To explain what he means, he refers to two aspects of the contemporary situation: the tendency towards an apotheosis of the state; and the decline of religion. As far as the apotheosis of the state is concerned, he sees it as involving the subordination of the personal aspect of human life to its functional aspects. John Costello is surely right to argue that Macmurray's assessment is relevant not only to the communist, fascist and democratic societies of the west in his day, but equally, and perhaps more strongly, to the current tensions between liberal democratic, social democratic, and traditional societies in the first decade of the 21st century.

On the impact on society of the decline of religion, his views are best represented by an extended direct quotation from the first chapter of *The Self as Agent*:

The decline of religious influence and of religious practice in our civilisation ... betrays, and in turn intensifies, a growing insensitiveness to the personal aspects of life, and a growing indifference to personal values. Christianity, in particular, is the exponent and guardian of the personal, and the function of organised Christianity in our history has been to foster and maintain the personal life and to bear continuous witness ... to the ultimacy of personal values. If this influence is removed or ceases to be effective, the awareness of personal issues will tend to be lost, in the pressure of functional preoccupations, by all except those who are by nature specially sensitive to them. The sense of personal dignity as well as personal unworthiness will atrophy, with the decline in habits of self-examination ... Success will tend to become the criterion of rightness, and there will spread through society a temper which is extraverted, pragmatic and merely objective, for which all problems are soluble by better organisation. In such conditions the religious impulses of men will attach themselves to the persons who wield political power, and will invest them with a personal authority over the life of the community and its members. The state is then compelled to perform the functions of a church (for which by its nature it is radically unfitted) and its efforts to do so will produce ... a crisis of the personal ... If we remember that history has brought us to a point where we must think of human society as a whole, and not limit our outlook to the confines of our own nation, then there

must be few who will fail to recognise ... that we are involved in such a crisis. (Macmurray, 1995c, pp. 30–31)

COUNSELLING, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE PERSONS IN RELATION PERSPECTIVE

But what has all this got to do with counselling and psychotherapy? Here I will have to confine myself to a short outline of a hypothesis concerning recent developments in British society exclusively. Church membership and religious practice, conventionally understood, have declined drastically across the United Kingdom throughout the 20th century. The exact pattern has varied significantly in the different nations of the union, but the broad trend is the same. The components of religious organisation and practice also vary, but the common elements are the central role of the minister, vicar or priest; the church service involving communal prayer and singing, the reading of the bible and preaching of the sermon combining exposition of biblical texts with their application to everyday living in society. To this must be added the sacraments of baptism, marriage and communion, personal and family prayer, and ministry through pastoral visitation, confession, forgiveness, and atonement.

As religious practice has declined, two mutually opposed trends which are in tension with one another have flourished, often in the same person. The first is the complex trend towards individualisation, and I would include in this complex Thatcherite individualism linked with self-reliance, enterprise, and free-market economics, along with more obviously psycho-social features such as individuation, self-actualisation, person-centredness, and the recent emphasis on autonomy and personal space. The second is the trend towards collectivism which again should be considered as a complex, including trade union, socialist, communist, ecological, feminist and gay movements, and various forms of single issue protest such as the anti-poll tax movement, and the recent activities of the Stop the War coalition.

For the present purpose what is significant about these trends is the tension between them, often expressed in the form of highly individualistic personal styles, preferences and behaviours, in combination with often strident collectivist behaviours and affiliations. This can be understood as an attempt to resolve a deep-seated conflict between the desire for personal autonomy and the need for relatedness, social security, and justice.

Traditionally, religions had achieved a resolution of this conflict based on the primacy of the community of believers gathered around their god, their doctrine and their practice of care which acknowledged the dimension of individual conscience through self-examination, prayer, confession, repentance, faith, and good works. In this sense, the personal has always been a recognisable dimension of religious practice. But this traditional solution is no longer available to post-modern man and woman, because of its perceived authoritarianism, its *imposition* of a set of revealed beliefs, values and practices for living. This helps to explain the enormous appeal of the Rogerian conception of an internal locus (and process) of

evaluation, which appears to free the individual from imposed, or introjected, values. This trend is reflected also through the growing preference for spirituality as (explicitly) opposed to religion.

What is particularly fascinating in the British context is to note that political expressions of collectivism peaked in the later 1970s and early 1980s, just at the time when individualism, free enterprise, and the rolling back of the state took hold and began to flourish from 1979 onwards. As this dubious battle (in Steinbeck's phrase) swayed back and forth, the 70s and early 80s saw the steady growth of counselling and psychotherapy which took off in the mid to late 1980s, with spectacular increases in the demand not only for counselling, but also for counselling and counselling skills training. The trend continued upwards throughout the 1990s, dropping slightly, and then levelling off with the return of a Labour government in 1997.

Some left-wing commentators have argued that the growth of counselling and psychotherapy represents the privatisation and individualisation of care. There is an element of truth in that case, but it is a typically structuralist reading of a social trend which has much deeper personal meanings. Our research on Voluntary Sector Counselling in Scotland, (Bondi et al, 2003), which focussed on the personal experiences and reflections of about 100 voluntary sector counsellors, trainees, and counselling agency managers, has confirmed what we knew anecdotally from the outset. A significant number of counsellors and psychotherapists come from activist left-wing (socialist, communist, feminist, and gay) backgrounds, from activist religious backgrounds (Protestant, Catholic, Judaic, Muslim, Buddhist), and often from backgrounds of committed activism involving both (for example, membership of the Iona Community, whose founder, George MacLeod, was an admirer of John Macmurray). No claims about generalisability are being made here. But there is enough evidence to encourage us to offer another possible interpretation of the growth of the demand for counselling, counselling training, and the counselling approach. This interpretation connects the growth of counselling directly with the persons-in-relation perspective as articulated by Macmurray.

Counselling and psychotherapy, on the part both of client and therapist, can be seen as a popular response to the ravages of predatory individualism, materialism, and nihilism, representing *both* a reaching out for help, a search for understanding of self, other, and society and a need to be personally known, *and* the embodiment of a wish to care for and know the other in an immediate, direct, personal way. It can be understood as the altruistic giving of oneself to the other, the offer to know the other through a mutual encounter, involving a deep respect for the other person's freedom and personal meanings, on the basis of equality of regard. The therapeutic relationship can be seen as a specific form of friendship-in-community. The parallel with Macmurray's ideas is certainly striking. The same case can be elaborated with reference to the significance of counselling and psychotherapy courses as learning groups or learning communities. These can be understood as the intentional creation of opportunities for personal relating which facilitate the growth of friendship-in-community. In this setting, personal *knowledge of* self,

other, and society is informed by *knowledge about* therapeutic theory, values and practices, with the aim of cultivating the capacity to help others as you yourself have been helped.

Just as religious doctrine – and arguably also God – has been de-centred in Macmurray’s re-interpretation of religion, so too in the practice of counselling and psychotherapy training, while we see some continuation of fundamentalist attitudes in the core models or orientations of certain training courses, there is a growing trend in the direction of plurality within orientations, and dialogue between orientations, amounting to a willingness to learn, understand, and speak each other’s language and seek common ground. The truths revealed by such gurus as Sigmund Freud and Carl Rogers have been brought down from the mountain to the community learning centre for critical consideration. We are coming to appreciate them not as gods but as fallible, good-enough human beings, who struggled to understand, to accompany and to help.

CHALLENGE FOR THE PERSON-CENTRED APPROACH

In conclusion, the persons in relation perspective which I am arguing is emerging in counselling and psychotherapy, contains some very hard challenges for us. Because time is short, I will confine myself to suggesting just two of these. One is a challenge for the person-centred approach, and the other for psychodynamic perspectives. I select these two because of their pivotal importance in the therapeutic culture of today. I have no doubt, incidentally, that John Macmurray would have valued both of these perspectives and engaged in constructive dialogue with them, but his position in relation to each would not have been uncritical.

The person-centred approach, as its name implies, centres itself on the person of the client and the person of the therapist. It affirms the significance of the personal feelings and meanings of both. It holds that the task of the therapist in the psychotherapeutic relationship is to accompany the client as s/he explores these feelings and meanings in a process that is deeply respectful of the client’s autonomy as a person. If there is psychological contact between the two, and if the therapist’s empathic acceptance is consistently communicated and experienced by the client, and felt to be real, the client will come to trust her own internal locus and process of evaluation, gradually becoming able to discard introjections usually from early caregivers.

From a persons-in-relation point of view this is unclear, not so much in its formulation as in its effect. It could be (and sometimes is) understood as encouraging a self-centred and hedonistic orientation: if it feels alright to me inside, then it *is* alright. Macmurray would see this as a distortion of priorities. For him, what is vital is not the person him-or-herself, but the person in personal relation with the other. It is our relations that are actually *constitutive* of our personal existence. What we take in from and give out to others cannot be reduced to the status of introjections, but includes a host of internalisations which have contributed to making us what we are now.

Macmurray's perspective argues for the giving of the self to the other in a mutual relation of knowing. This is altruism, but not to be confused (although it is often confused) with abnegation or disregard of the self. Macmurray would, I believe, have endorsed Gerard Manley Hopkins' celebration of the self:

Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves – goes itself; *myself* it speaks and spells,
Crying *What I do is me: for that I came.*
(in Gardner, 1953, p. 51)

What both Hopkins and Macmurray mean by this is a full giving of the self to the world, to the other. It is not an egocentric being-for-self, but being-of-self-with-and-for-the-other.¹ This challenge also goes to the heart of the relationship between the person-centred approach and contemporary western society. Is the person-centred approach on the side of contemporary self-centredness and hedonism, or opposed to it? There is an ambiguity at the heart of the person-centred approach around this vital issue which needs to be addressed.

Having said that, Macmurray would profoundly value the person-centred approach, because of its emphasis on the embodiment in practice of respect for the person of the client. The emphasis on tracking and sensing the personal feelings and meanings of the client, of not imposing an understanding from another frame of reference, and of a congruent meeting of the person of the counsellor and the person of the client at relational depth, is in tune with his perspective. (In formulating the wording of this paragraph, I have drawn on the work of Dave Mearns and Brian Thorne, both of whom offer a more relational view of the person-centred approach).

CHALLENGE FOR PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES

Macmurray would be equally challenging in relation to psychodynamic perspectives. He would take issue first of all with its name: psychodynamics is a metaphor drawn from physics, and implies a completely impersonal view of the psyche as a field of conflicting forces. Macmurray would acknowledge that a person may indeed have such conflicts within them, but would reject the view that, as a person, they can be reduced to them. He would regard the 'treating' of a 'patient' conceived of as suffering from repressed drives and psychic representatives of drives, as involving the objectification of a person. While he would acknowledge that the object relations perspective is a qualitative advance on a theory based on impersonal drives, he would challenge the predominant view of the other as object implied in the name of this perspective. To Macmurray, the self is first of all an agent, in a subordinate sense a subject, and only when treated as a mere means to an end, an object. For object relations, he would insist on substituting personal relations, if the therapist/client relationship is to be a genuinely personal one.

His challenge to the psychodynamic perspective would not confine itself to the theoretical level. He would argue that ambivalence within psychodynamic perspectives as to whether the client is to be regarded as a person or as an object, has led, at its worst, to a partial depersonalising of the therapeutic relationship, in which the full self of the therapist as person is withheld from the client. For a mutual encounter in which the person of the therapist meets the person of the client, some psychodynamic practitioners have historically substituted a blank screen in which the client is denied a direct contact with the real responses, the real humanity of the therapist. He would call for a fundamental revision of psychodynamic theory and practice in this central respect. Such a revision has to some extent been undertaken, most prominently by Harry Guntrip, who explicitly acknowledges his debt to John Macmurray. That revision has been influential, but its impact is by no means pervasive.

Yet once again, Macmurray would deeply value psychodynamic perspectives, above all for their illuminating insights into the ways in which human beings are constituted by both their external and internal relations with other persons. Indeed, we know from John Costello that he drew heavily on Ian Suttie's *The Origins of Love and Hate* in developing his understanding of the relations of persons. I personally take the view that he was also influenced by the ideas of his contemporary, Ronald Fairbairn, although his biographer, John Costello, states he has not managed to find confirmation of this.

Another way of interpreting these two challenges is to suggest that Macmurray's ideas can be used to elucidate understandings that are already implicit in person-centred and psychodynamic practice. The challenges then resolve themselves into invitations to re-conceptualise that practice in the light of the persons-in-relation perspective.

CONCLUSION

Macmurray's final challenge to us as counsellors and psychotherapists considered as a whole body has to do with how we see therapy in society. We still tend to see the personal as private: we equate personal relations with relations within the family, with partners or with personal friends. The personal, on this perspective, is a private, encapsulated domain. And that is how many counsellors and psychotherapists see the concerns of their practice: as a private matter concerned with individuals abstracted or excerpted from the social matrix. We even refer to it as 'private practice'. But for John Macmurray, the personal extends in every direction. It is public, social, economic, political, ecological, and religious: it is universal. If, to revert to a useful materialist metaphor, we see persons as nodes in a multiplicity of networks, from the Macmurray perspective many of the nodes are persons and many of the lines of the networks are personal relations. (He does acknowledge that, while direct relations are personal, indirect relations are impersonal.) His is a normative, evaluative, and not a neutrally descriptive theory. The personal is primary. It is ethically of first and last importance. If we were to adopt the persons-in-relation perspective as a philosophy for counselling and

CHAPTER 1

psychotherapy in society, it would commit us to a position that gives therapy a particular kind of ethical basis, one that asserts the primacy of persons in relation in all social and global issues. Therapeutic work has a subordinate technical dimension which is important, but it is not grounded in technical rationality, nor is it primarily a method of problem solving. Its *tekhnē* is a means constitutive of its ends, and its ends are self-and-other knowledge, knowledge of the good, and the reaffirmation of the universality of the personal relation of friendship-in-community.

NOTES

- ¹ Evidence for this interpretation of Macmurray's view of the self can be found in his earliest book, *Freedom in the Modern World*, first published in 1932, especially in the chapter on self-realisation.

REFERENCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bondi, L., Fewell, J., Kirkwood, C., & Arnason, A. (2003). *Voluntary sector counselling in Scotland: An overview*. Edinburgh: The Counselling and Society Research Team.
- Buber, M. (1959). *I and Thou* (2nd ed.). Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
- Costello, J. E. (2002). *John Macmurray: A biography*. Edinburgh: Floris Books.
- Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1986) (first published 1952). *Psychoanalytic studies of the personality*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Freire, P. (1972). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Gardner, W. H. (Ed.) (1953). *Gerard Manley Hopkins: A selection of his poems and prose*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Guntrip, H. (1971). *Psychoanalytic theory, therapy and the self*. London: Karnac.
- Kirkwood, C. (2003). Reflections on dialogue between person-centred and psychodynamic perspectives in counselling training. *Newsletter of the European Association for Counselling*.
- Kirkwood, G. & Kirkwood, C. (2011). *Living adult education: Freire in Scotland* (2nd ed.). Rotterdam/Boston/Taipei: Sense Publishers.
- Macmurray, J. (1938). *The clue to history*. London: Student Christian Movement Press.
- Macmurray, J. (1992) (first published 1932). *Freedom in the modern world*. London: Humanities Press.
- Macmurray, J. (1995a) (first published 1961). *Persons in relation*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Macmurray, J. (1995b) (first published 1935). *Reason and emotion*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Macmurray, J. (1995c) (first published 1957). *The self as agent*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Mearns, D. & Thorne, B. (1999). *Person-centred counselling in action* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
- Suttie, I. D. (1988) (first published 1935). *The origins of love and hate*. London: Free Association Books.
- Turnbull, R. (1989). Scottish thought in the twentieth century. In C. Beveridge & R. Turnbull (Eds.), *The eclipse of Scottish culture*. Edinburgh: Polygon.

CHAPTER 2

THE PERSONS IN RELATION PERSPECTIVE

Sources and Synthesis

Key words and themes: innate need for companionship, tenderness, interest-rapport, play, love and its vicissitudes, development of a social disposition, the taboo on tenderness, psychotherapy as reconciliation, internalisation, inner world, ideal object and central ego, rejecting object and anti-libidinal ego (internal saboteur), exciting object and libidinal ego, dissociation, passive tolerance of contradictions, true freedom.

INTRODUCTION

This second paper moves towards a synthesis of the contributions of three great 20th century Scots: the philosopher John Macmurray (1891–1976), the psychiatrist and relational psychotherapist Ian Suttie (1889–1935), and the psychoanalyst Ronald Fairbairn (1889–1965). Here I discuss the contributions of Suttie, indicate briefly the significance of Fairbairn’s contributions, and identify some key themes of the emerging synthesis. Reflecting on progress so far as if it were a football match, I would say that at this point we’re about two thirds of the way through the first half.

Ian Suttie created an interpersonal and socio-cultural psychology in the 1920s and 30s, one which has been unjustly neglected yet is widely influential. A longer version of this second paper was first published in *The Legacy of Fairbairn and Sutherland: psychoanalytic approaches* (Routledge, 2005), edited by Jill and David Scharff. The section of it omitted here is the summary of the ideas of John Macmurray, which are fully covered in the previous chapter. The third paper, which follows this one, is concerned with Ronald Fairbairn’s revolutionary account of the interpersonal nature of the basic inner situation, and takes further forward the task of articulating the synthesis.

Macmurray, Suttie, and Fairbairn all served in and were affected by World War I. They all drew deeply (and in different ways) on Scottish Christian traditions. They benefited from the Scottish educational tradition of training in philosophy, which enabled them to challenge Freud’s thinking with confidence and authority, without devaluing his contributions. Lest we might imagine that Ian Suttie is the odd man out, the one who has gate-crashed the party, we must note that it was on Suttie’s book, *The Origins of Love and Hate* (Suttie, 1935) that John Macmurray based some of his own thinking about persons in relation. Although Fairbairn makes no reference to Suttie in his published work, we know from his biographer, John D. (Jock) Sutherland, and from Fairbairn’s friend and analysand, Harry

Guntrip, that he was influenced by Suttie's writing. Harry Guntrip records that Fairbairn said to him: 'Suttie really had something important to say' (Guntrip, 1971, p. 24). We learn from Fairbairn's daughter, Ellinor Fairbairn Birtles, that he and Macmurray knew each other and may have collaborated, and we know that Harry Guntrip was deeply influenced by both of them and attempted to integrate their ideas in his own synthesis.

The last 20 years have seen renewed recognition of the contributions of Macmurray, Suttie and Fairbairn. Their works have been republished. There have been critical reassessments of Fairbairn and Macmurray, and ground-breaking biographies of Ronald Fairbairn by Jock Sutherland, and of John Macmurray by John Costello. Their perspectives are now influencing thinking and practice worldwide. John Bowlby described Ian Suttie's book as:

a robust and lucid statement of a paradigm that now leads the way,

adding:

his ideas never died: they have smouldered on, at length to burst into flame ... *The Origins of Love and Hate* stands out as a milestone. (Suttie, 1988, pp. xv, xvii)

THE CONTRIBUTION OF IAN SUTTIE

I am deeply indebted to Dorothy Heard for her painstaking excavations and lucid account of Ian Suttie's life and ideas (Heard, 1988). Ian Dishart Suttie was born in Glasgow in 1889, the third child of a family doctor. He graduated in medicine in 1914 and worked as a psychiatrist in Govan before joining the Royal Army Medical Corps. He saw service in France and in what is now Iraq. After working at Gartnavel Hospital in Glasgow, and hospitals in Perth and Fife, he became a psychotherapist at the Tavistock Clinic in London in 1928, continuing to work there until his untimely death in 1935. His wife Jane was also a psychotherapist there. They shared an interest in the ideas of the Hungarian analyst Sandor Ferenczi whose work Jane translated. Ian Suttie was by all accounts a vigorous, kind, brilliant, and intellectually combative man who was deeply missed by his colleagues. In his obituary, J. R. Rees, Medical Director of the Tavistock Clinic, describes his boyish gusto, and his passionate advocacy of ideas. Dorothy Heard quotes Jock Sutherland as saying that

Ian Suttie could be assertive and confrontational in a way that was not always in his own best interests. (Heard, 1988)

I will offer a summary of Suttie's ideas, followed by close-ups of a selection of his core themes. Essentially, Suttie was engaged in an impassioned – and (sadly) one-sided argument with Freud, challenging Freud's instinct theory and replacing it with one based on the innate need for companionship and love. Suttie's only book, *The Origins of Love and Hate*, was written in a great hurry. His themes criss-cross, but the author's insight and passion carry the reader along. I have spent several

months reading it closely, and have named the key themes in his own words as far as possible, organising them in a sequence in which the one leads easily into the next.

Suttie's key themes:

- the innate need for companionship: love, tenderness, interest-rapport, and fellowship
- psychic weaning and the development of a social disposition
- play and the development of cultural interests
- self and not-self
- consciousness and social mind
- the emotions, expression, and communication
- the taboo on tenderness
- culture and society
- society and the jealousies
- women, children, and men
- the critique of Freud
- science and the scientific attitude
- religion as social psychotherapy
- psychopathy as disturbance of the social disposition
- psychotherapy as reconciliation

In reading this sequence, you may have noticed certain significant features. First, there is an emphasis on interpersonal and socio-cultural dimensions throughout. Second, these are seen as closely related to each other: they are not in separate compartments. Third, there is an attempt to develop an overview, the sense of a vision of the whole of society, culture, disturbance and psychotherapy. The jigsaw pieces fit together, and the picture that emerges is integrated and comprehensive.

The innate need for companionship

Here, I offer a selective summary, starting with the ground-base of Suttie's perspective, the innate need for companionship, embodied in love, tenderness, interest-rapport and fellowship. In positing this innate need for companionship, Suttie is rejecting Freud's conception of the infant as a bundle of instincts generating tensions which require discharge, a process in which other persons, if they are needed at all, are needed only as a means to an end. What goes on between people, for Suttie, is more than the satisfaction of appetites. Suttie sees the baby as seeking relationships from the start of life, bringing with it the power and will to love, a love which has a special quality of tenderness, embodied in the devoted, loving ministrations of the mother, and the reciprocal emotion of tenderness in the infant. This loving tenderness requires for its satisfaction the awakening of an adequate response of appreciation on the part of the other. Enjoyment, appreciation, and company are sought on both sides: this is the interpersonal context in which bodily needs arise and are met. The vital point here is that love is social, not merely sexual, in its biological function. Suttie holds that there is an

organic basis to non-sexual love: it creates feelings of satisfaction in the respiratory, circulatory and digestive systems.

This love-need is directed towards the nurturing other, usually, but not necessarily the mother. The interactions involved are communicative as well as nurturing. The relationship involves mutual giving and getting, and generates a reciprocal sense of security. When this love is thwarted, the first result is anxiety. And when the thwarting persists, it can generate the frustration-reaction of aggression.

The development of interest-rapport

The early love relationship, before weaning, is fundamental to everything that comes after. It influences the baby's view of other people, which Suttie calls the social disposition. At this early stage, self and other are not discriminated. The baby loves its own body, its immediate concerns, the mother's loving attentions and the mother herself. Suttie argues that 'the bodily self ... is the first plaything shared with her' (Suttie, 1935, p. 37). In the course of these interactions, interest-rapport develops. As the not-self is gradually discriminated, play and fellowship grow. If things go well, the extension of interest from self-and-mother to other persons and physical objects broadens to include, potentially, the whole socio-cultural field. The implication of this account is that love generates interest-rapport, which gradually extends beyond the original love relationship. Love doesn't necessarily cease with the growth of interest-rapport, but the latter can become highly differentiated from the love in which it originated. New interest-rapport relationships with playfellows can now be established without the preliminary establishment of love.

As this picture unfolds, the nature of Suttie's achievement comes into focus. With his concept of the growth and spread of interest-rapport, he replaces Freud's concept of aim-inhibited sublimation of the sexual instinct as the explanation for the development of culture, prepares the ground for the work of Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Bowlby, and opens a door for interpersonal, and socio-cultural perspectives in psychology and psychotherapy.

Just in case the reader is tempted to conclude that Suttie idealises love, it is important to emphasise that the account, up to now, is based on relationships going well enough before weaning. They do not always go well enough, as we know: Suttie understands that love is an equivocal as well as a positive factor in human society. This becomes clear in his account of the process of psychic weaning, and the development of a social disposition, to which we now turn.

The development of a social disposition

The golden age of infant-mother absorption and responsiveness, in which love is unconditional, is brought to an end by weaning, the birth of another baby, cleanliness training, and the need for the working mother to leave her babies. The infant now develops an ambivalent experience of mother, a mixture of love-

longing, anxiety, and anger, in which love is increasingly experienced as conditional. The child now adopts a life-role, a stance towards others and the world which seems to it preferable both to itself and others: this is what Suttie means by the development of a social disposition.

If the frustration of the love-need is very great, frustrated love converts into anxiety, guilt and finally into hatred. But to hate a loved person, at this early stage, is felt to be intolerable. The child therefore adopts one or more of the following interpersonal strategies:

- keep mother loveable now
- abandon mother as she is now, and replace her with mother as she once was
- seek a good substitute for bad mother (e.g. father)
- engage in love protest: anger, aggression, coercion
- become what is wanted.

These strategies produce certain intrapersonal and interpersonal results. The first can lead to feelings of inferiority or to melancholia. The second can lead to regression, fantasy satisfaction, or turning away from reality. The third can lead to paranoia, feelings of persecution by the bad other. The fourth can lead to the self-important exacting of services from others. And the fifth can lead to a denial of what one really is, and the substitution of a false self. In all of this, Suttie again anticipates Fairbairn and Winnicott.

It is worth emphasising that Suttie's account of development turns entirely on the actual, ongoing interpersonal situation between the child, the mother or primary caregiver, other loved persons and the whole physical and socio-cultural environment.

The emotions as transformations of love

Like Antonio Damasio, Suttie ascribes a crucial role to the emotions, arguing that they are nearly always socially related. In other words, the expression of emotion is a means of communication with others, and is designed to elicit a response. Its function is to keep individuals in rapport with each other: it is essentially social, communicating meaning and maintaining nurturing, playful and cooperative association. The means of emotional communication include the voice, crying, laughter, and all kinds of body language. These elements are apprehended together, not separately.

Suttie sees the emotion of love as primal and pivotal: all the other emotions are interconvertible forms of the urge to love. These transformations of love occur under the stimulus of changing relationships with the loved person, and include the following:

- love denied turns into hatred
- love threatened turns into anxiety
- love supplanted turns into jealousy
- love rejected turns into despair
- loss of the loved person turns love into grief
- sympathy for the loved person turns love into pity

- love thwarted turns into the quest for power, the quest for admiration, or the quest for possession, resulting in unstable, unbalanced and unilateral relationships.

The taboo on tenderness

The unity of the interpersonal and the socio-cultural in Suttie's thinking is demonstrated most clearly in his concept of the taboo on tenderness. For Suttie, tenderness is a primal reality, one modality of love. It is embodied in the activities and feelings involved in the non-sexual fondling relationship between baby and mother, and in the need for companionship with her. The repression of tenderness in our culture begins in the process he calls psychic weaning, in which the tender attentions previously enjoyed by the baby are withdrawn. This is experienced by the child as a withdrawal of the mother's love, and also as meaning that the child's love is not welcome to the mother. This thwarting of the child's tender feelings, grief over the loss of the mother, and anxiety caused by the change in her attitude, together strike at the root of the child's sense of security and justice. The child is now faced with a number of options: it can develop companionship with others; fight for its rights; regress; find substitutes; or submit and avoid privation by repression. The last of these options, repression of longings, is the major source of the taboo on tenderness.

But the process of repressing tenderness does not occur in the individual child-mother relationship alone. It has its cultural origin in the stoicism which has pervaded British culture, and British Christianity, for a very long time. Both parents, and the child's older siblings, will already be intolerant of tenderness, to a greater or lesser extent, reflecting the degree of stoicism in their own upbringing. The process is reinforced beyond the family, particularly among men and boys. The taboo on tenderness is expressed by upper-class parents who send their sons (and daughters) away from home to attend private single-sex boarding schools, and by the gang of boys who idealise manliness and repudiate any sign of babyishness and girlishness. Suttie characterises their state of mind as involving a reaction against the sentiments related to mother and the nursery, and describes these boys as 'a band of brothers united by a common bereavement'.

These attitudes and practices are transmitted from generation to generation. They appear to affect men more than women: in Suttie's view, this is because of women's nurturing role. Although the taboo on tenderness (which he distinguishes from the taboo on sex) has weakened somewhat, it has by no means disappeared. The concept of the taboo on tenderness is, in my view, a powerful tool for understanding societies and cultures throughout the world deriving historically from English and Scottish roots.

Society and the jealousies

The close interplay of the interpersonal and the socio-cultural is highlighted again in Suttie's discussion of society and the jealousies. The starting point lies in his debate with Freud. Suttie poses the question: is society a spontaneous expression of human nature, or an artefact of force? For Freud – on Suttie's account – society is maintained by the dominance of the male leader over his followers. Social behaviour is the outcome of repression by fear, and the fear involved is the fear of castration. Freud focuses on two jealousies of prime importance in the development of society: men's jealousy of male rivals, and women's penis envy of male partners, and men in general.

For Suttie, on the other hand, love is the mainspring of social life. The jealousies disrupt love and frustrate the need for it. The basic unit of society is the band of brothers and sisters under the same mother. Mother is the first moraliser, encouraging and enforcing mutual tolerance by means of the fear of loss of love. Freud, Suttie argues, only understands the effect of the fear-of-castration factor, not the fear-of-loss-of-love factor, in prohibition and inhibition. For Suttie, a physically weaker prohibitor can make a more effective prohibition. Of the two determining factors – fear of punishment and fear of loss of love – fear of loss of love is the more powerful.

Table 1. Summary of Suttie's account of the jealousies

Jealousy	Characteristics	Suttie's comments
Oedipus complex	The boy wants to get rid of father and get mother for himself. (Suttie acknowledges that Freud later modified his account of the Oedipus complex to incorporate a range of other factors.)	This holds good for patriarchal, guilt-ridden cultures, and in certain family circumstances.
Penis envy	The girl feels incomplete and inferior, and wants her father's or brother's penis for herself.	As above: Suttie adds a further comment on both the Oedipus complex and penis envy: these are neither the earliest, nor the most important, nor the most universal of jealousies.
Cain jealousy	The jealousy felt by the eldest child, of either sex, for the next child of either sex. (Cain killed his younger brother Abel while they were out of sight of their mother.)	The most universal, the earliest, and the most powerful jealousy for individual development.

Zeus jealousy	The man/father's jealousy of the woman/mother's child-bearing, lactating, and nurturing capacities. (Zeus swallowed his pregnant wife Mitis in order to bear her child Pallas himself.)	The lack of maternal hopes, anticipations, and satisfactions may account for male political and economic dominance.
Laios jealousy	The man/father's jealousy of the new child produced by the woman/mother. (Laios was the father of Oedipus, whose mother was Jocasta. Laios abandoned Oedipus on a hillside at birth.)	Suttie comments that this is the aspect of the Oedipus story neglected by Freud, and adds: the advent of the child enriches the woman's love life, but to begin with impoverishes that of the man.

It is impossible to overstate the importance of Suttie's contribution here. At the very least, he supplements Freud's narrow view. At most, he reorients our understanding of society, and socialises psychology. Having said that, I am struck by certain omissions. No mention is made of the jealousy of any child, at any point in the birth sequence, for the talents, qualities or popularity of another. Children's jealousy of their parents is also omitted. And his list is confined to jealousies within one family grouping, leaving out jealousies between individual members of different families, between families, classes or nations, and jealousies relating to inherited or accumulated differences of wealth, power and social or cultural capital. He omits any mention of jealousies, rivalries, comparisons and attractions arising among adults. He fails to distinguish envy from jealousy, using jealousy as a catch-all category. And he fails to discuss adequately the role of fathers in families: it is as if, in his polemic with Freud, he has swung too far towards the opposite extreme.

Having said all this, the general direction of Suttie's analysis is clear and convincing. It opens the way towards a social psychology based on love and its vicissitudes. In terms of psychotherapeutic practice, it shifts the weight of emphasis away from instincts and their representatives, and to some extent also from internal objects and their relations, on to actual interpersonal relationships both past and present. And it challenges us, as theorists, practitioners and researchers, to create a new balance and integration of all of these factors in psychotherapy.

Psychopathy¹ as disturbance of the social disposition

In his discussion of psychopathy, Suttie distinguishes organic impairment or disease of the brain (which produces symptoms without meaning in terms of social relationships), from psychopathy considered as disturbance in the relationship between an individual and his or her fellows, due to privations, inhibitions and distortions in the person's social or love disposition. Such disturbance generates symptoms which do have meanings, always connected with the individual's social

purpose or aim. He calls these symptoms disturbances of rapport, listing them as follows:

- loss of interest in people
- loss of interest in things
- self-depreciation
- over-estimation of self
- anxiety
- despair
- anger/aggression
- regressiveness/return to infantile dependency.

His account of psychopathy stresses the role of emotions. He is particularly insightful with regard to the individual's attempt to

increase its consequence to other people ... insofar as it feels it has no-one upon whom it can safely depend. (Suttie, 1935, p. 200)

Suttie's analysis helps us to understand the process of forming what he calls idealisms, which involve the child in imitating and seeking to emulate envied, outstanding figures in the environment. In a happy phrase for a desperately unhappy development, he describes psychopathy as

an archaic and ... inept attempt to improve love relationships. (Suttie, 1935, p. 201)

Correspondingly, he sees psychotherapy as an attempt to assist the patient or client on his love quest, and set this upon lines more likely to achieve the desired results.

Psychotherapy as reconciliation

We turn finally to his conception of psychotherapy. In considering this theme, it is helpful to bear in mind his studies in sociology and social anthropology, his interest in the links between psychotherapy and religion, and his view that human psychology is practically always dealing not with the individual alone but with his or her relations to others.

Psychotherapy is ultimately about reconciliation, and involves the restoration of love-interest-rapport between the self and the social environment. Its aim is to overcome the barriers to loving and feeling oneself loved. Suttie writes:

The ideal attitude (of the therapist) is very like that of Christ ... serene without being aloof, sympathetic without being disturbed: exactly what the child desires in the parent. (Suttie, 1935, p. 217)

He uses the metaphors of therapist as sacrificial victim (onto whom all hates, anxieties and distrust can be projected), and therapist as mediator or catalyst, by means of whose genuine engagement the alienated psyche of the client can reintegrate into society, not as an adaptation to a pathological norm, but as a person who is now capable of expressing his hate and his love.

A vital feature of this perspective on therapy is his view of the therapist as a real, ordinary human being, a product of his or her culture, with his or her own prejudices and inhibitions, and defended to some degree against his or her own needs and difficulties by the taboo on tenderness. Suttie is aware, from his own experience, of the anti-therapeutic effect of taking refuge in passivity and objectivity. He attacks those whose accounts of technique idealise passivity, arguing that they represent their relationships with their clients or patients as inhuman, impersonal and purely technical. For Suttie, the role of the psychotherapist is to offer

a true and full companionship of interest ... [the therapist] shows by his understanding and insight that he too has suffered ... so there is a fellowship of suffering established. (Suttie, 1935, pp. 211–212)

Suttie refers to the therapist as a man of sorrows. He favours activity and responsiveness on the part of the therapist, and opposes what he calls the fiction of immunity from emotion. Endorsing Ferenczi's argument that it is the physician's love that heals the patient or client, he goes on to clarify precisely what love means in the therapeutic relationship. It is

a feeling-interest responsiveness, not a goal-inhibited sexuality. (Suttie, 1935, pp. 212–213)

There is no question of the therapist using the relationship to meet his own needs, or engaging in *inappropriate* self-disclosure. Therapeutic love is an altruistic, non-appetitive love, focussing on the needs and growth of the other. What Suttie is saying is that such a relationship, if it is to be effective, cannot involve self-withholding. The therapist has to be fully present, a real human being communicating genuine emotional responses. A one-sided relationship, as he puts it, cannot be curative.

It is my contention, first, that contemporary psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and counselling have much to learn from Suttie; and second that his contribution anticipates much of what has come after, including the work of Fairbairn, Winnicott, Bowlby, Guntrip, Sutherland, developmental psychologists like Colwyn Trevarthen, our contemporary interest in attunement and attachment, and the more recent contributions of neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio who stresses the importance of internal representations of self and other in human relationships, and the vital role of emotions (Damasio, 2000).

My third contention is concerned with our human orientation towards living in the 21st century. It is analogous to the case so eloquently argued by Alasdair MacIntyre in the opening chapter of his book *After Virtue*, to the effect that, in contemporary culture, the language of morality has been fragmented and nearly destroyed. In the context of modernism and particularly post-modernism, morality, where it exists at all, has been subordinated to situational, structural and technological considerations. The dominant philosophical orientation, if it can be dignified with that name, is a self-centred consumerist hedonism, which celebrates our liberation from the dead weight of the past. Crocodile tears are shed over the

failure of the grand narratives of Christianity, Marxism, psychoanalysis and feminism. My contention is that this perspective incorporates a purely negative view of freedom. Against hedonism, I argue that being human involves the challenge of finding a way of life (see Turnbull, 1989). This is a challenge that is communal as well as personal, and normative rather than merely descriptive. It asks, 'How should I live?' and not, 'What is everybody else doing so that I can do the same as them?' To struggle for the restoration of such an orientation is not to impose a single religious perspective, but to excavate and piece together an orientation for personal living of what Ian Martin has called the common life in community (Martin, 1987). This is the ethical imperative which underlies the attempt to construct a synthesis of the work of Macmurray, Suttie and Fairbairn.

THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF RONALD FAIRBAIRN

The contributions of Ronald Fairbairn are discussed in the next chapter. Here, I confine myself to answering briefly the question: what distinctive contributions do Fairbairn and his followers make to our understanding of the persons-in-relation perspective? From Macmurray, I have argued, we take the philosophical and religious orientation. From Suttie, we take the creative shift from instincts and their vicissitudes to an understanding of the relations of persons in society, pivoting around love and its vicissitudes. What is missing from the picture they paint, Fairbairn fills in.

In swinging away from Freud's early focus on instincts, Suttie rightly emphasises real external relationships and socio-cultural values and milieux. But he has relatively little to say about our inner worlds. How do these external relationships affect us inside? Are they once-and-for-all experiences which simply accumulate in our memories like jam sandwiches or plates of porridge, or do they have an impact on us inside in some special way? Suttie's view of psychopathy implies that they do. They help to shape our choice of social disposition. But what exactly is involved, internally, in developing a social disposition? Suttie does not tackle that question in any depth. Fairbairn does.

Fairbairn gives us, for the first time, a convincing account of our inner world conceived primarily in interpersonal terms. He pictures a conscious central ego or 'I' relating to an ideal object, and a pair of split-off repressed parts of the ego: first, a rejected, persecuted part relating to a rejecting or punishing part of the object; and second, a longing, needy part relating to an exciting or tantalising part of the object. Added to that, the rejected part of the ego, which he calls the internal saboteur, persistently attacks the libidinal pairing. In all of this, Fairbairn continues to use the terms 'object' and 'ego', which in my view are better thought of as aspects of significant other persons in relation to aspects of the self. This representation of the repressive, rejective, aggressive and libidinal dynamics of the inner situation, so painstakingly pieced together in Fairbairn's *Endopsychic Structure Considered in Terms of Object-Relationships*, also applies to his unique understanding of dreams, seen as 'shorts' (short films) of conflictual intra- and inter-personal situations, both conscious and unconscious, with which the self is

currently struggling. His view of endopsychic (intrapsychic, intrapersonal) structure also has implications for our understanding of the transference/counter-transference relationship, and connects with his recasting of the concept of dissociation, of which he sees repression as a special case (Fairbairn, 1986; Sandler, 1976; Scharff & Birtles, 1994).

The careful attention which Fairbairn lavishes on understanding our inner situation has generated new insights on the part of those who have followed him. I am thinking here for example of Guntrip's dialogue with Fairbairn, leading to Guntrip's image of the repressed, regressed and withdrawn core of the libidinal ego, holed up in the schizoid citadel, inaccessible to real human contact; of Sutherland's suggestion that the links between the various self-other pairs consist of emotions; and of the Scharffs' modifications and applications of Fairbairn's model to therapeutic work with couples, families and groups (Guntrip, 1977; Scharff, 1994; Scharff & Scharff, 1991).

I want to make one final point about Fairbairn's contribution. His own analytic and therapeutic concerns are directed primarily towards understanding the interpersonal nature of the inner world, although he was also aware of the significance of the wider society and culture for inner world configurations: see, for example, his paper *The Effects of a King's Death upon Patients Undergoing Analysis* (Fairbairn, 1986). Sutherland's (1989) psychobiography *Fairbairn's Journey into the Interior* portrays Fairbairn in his socio-cultural context. Sutherland traces Fairbairn's development of theory to Fairbairn's self analysis of his own difficulties in the context of his family and culture of origin. Fairbairn's personal suffering is the suffering not only of a very private, brilliant, good man: it is also the suffering of a son, husband, and father growing up and living out his life in the Scottish and British society of his day. More specifically, his psychic suit was made of Edinburgh cloth woven out of threads of intense Christian idealism and professional devotion, episcopalianism with an undertow of Calvinism, sharply contrasting gender roles, kindness and reserve, warmth and distance, science and service. It would be fascinating to know exactly what Ronald Fairbairn had in mind when he said to Harry Guntrip:

Suttie really had something important to say. (Guntrip, 1971, p. 24)

My hunch is that he was thinking not only of Suttie's emphasis on interpersonal relationships and the role of emotions, but also specifically of his concept of the taboo on tenderness, a taboo which applied across much of Scottish society at least from the death of Robert Burns, through the Victorian period and the first two thirds of the 20th century, a taboo with which Macmurray, Suttie and Fairbairn all struggled in their different ways.

TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS

In this final section I discuss my working toward a synthesis, and I identify some of its principal themes. My aim is to integrate intrapersonal, interpersonal, and socio-cultural factors in a unified account of the theory and practice of

psychotherapy and counselling. The synthesis will be grounded in Macmurray's philosophical, ethical, and religious thinking, which I refer to as the persons in relation perspective (a term adapted from the title of one of his books). This entails clarifying the distinctions and overlaps of meaning between the terms 'personal relations', 'object relations,' and 'persons in relation'. Briefly, 'personal relations' is used to refer to the direct relationships between human beings, whether past or present, both descriptively (that is, whatever those relationships happen to be), and normatively (that is, when each person involved is genuinely trying to consider and treat the other as a person rather than as an object).

The term 'object relations', which I dislike and use reluctantly, is nevertheless meaningful for accounts of the inner worlds of persons conceived in terms of their internalised images or representations of self and other, and the dynamic relationships between and among these self-other representations, when these are unconscious and/or have become to some degree dissociated, stuck or fixed. The term 'persons in relation' refers to a broader view of human beings in society, in any and every context, seen as persons in community whose personhood is actually constituted by their relationships with other persons. Because this is a normative as well as a descriptive view, and because not all human relationships are direct, the ongoing clarification of the meanings of these three terms is essential. It leads also to a consideration of the relationships between the personal, the structural and the functional. In the course of this discussion I draw particularly on Michael Fielding's illuminating application of Macmurray's thinking to the education of children in schools (Fielding, 2004). In this connection, it should be noted that Macmurray does not deny the existence or necessity of the functional, but argues that 'the personal is *through* the functional' and that 'the functional is *for* the personal' (Fielding, 2004, *passim*).

I now turn to some of the implications of these considerations for the theory and practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, family therapy, counselling and groupwork. We should be concerned primarily and pervasively with personal relations in our work with clients, whether the focus of the moment is on external or internal situations or both, and whether what is at issue is conscious, unconscious or dissociated. As John Macmurray acknowledged, persons are indeed objects, but they are much more than objects. They are subjects who are receivers or undergoers of their experiences, and agents of their actions, who construe and reflect upon those experiences and actions, and who, in their unique experiencing, acting, construing, and reflecting, encounter other persons likewise engaged. In short, human beings are persons in personal relations with other persons. This is true not only of our external interpersonal relations, but also, in a more complex sense, of our inner worlds, constituted as they are by the internalisation of previously external interpersonal relations. I did not take in my father or mother, or my brothers and sister, as objects. They are not bits of fishbone stuck in my psyche: they are significant other persons, however exaggerated, distorted and fixed some of my earliest construing of them may have been. While they are alive, there is a complex interplay of internal and often somewhat fixed personal ('object') relations, and externally occurring, here-and-now personal relations.

When they die, I carry within me the inheritance of an ongoing – and potentially developing – interplay between myself, my values and my socio-cultural environment, and their personalities, lives and relationships, their values, and the socio-cultural contexts from which they came and in which they lived out their lives. This has huge implications for how we should relate to our clients. In this connection, it is heartening to be reminded by Graham Clarke that Ronald Fairbairn wished to call his unique development of object relations theory ‘personal relations theory’ and only refrained from doing so because of his loyalty to Freud (Clarke, 2003).

From the basic assumption that psychotherapeutic work is an intersubjective collaboration between two persons, based on equality of regard, I proceed to my second theme. Persons are constituted not only by interpersonal relations, but also by real socio-cultural contexts and values which have been internalised and become parts of the self. The challenge of acknowledging the unity, the simultaneity, of the biological, the intrapersonal, the interpersonal and the socio-cultural is not primarily theoretical. It is a matter of experience and practice. It confronts us when we encounter another person.

When I took in my parents, I did not put their personalities in one box and their significantly different socio-cultural backgrounds in another. Nor did I continue relating to them, as I grew up, in a socio-cultural vacuum: on the contrary our relationships were interlaced with direct experiences and representations of post-war austerity, the life-saving welfare state, the developing cold war, the take-off of technology, the eruption of libertarianism, the decline of religion, and so on. That our personalities, our relationships, and our disturbances incorporate the interplay of all these factors, and that all of them come into play in the therapeutic relationship, is surely now beyond dispute. This interplay has been clearly demonstrated in the work of feminist psychotherapists like Susie Orbach in her work with clients whose difficulties revolve around eating and body-image, which are partly socio-cultural, as well as interpersonal, in origin (see, for example, Orbach, 1993). It has been demonstrated by Harry Stack Sullivan in his account of the painful tensions established in his youthful soul by the different socio-cultural backgrounds and expectations of his father and mother (Mullahy, 1952). It has been demonstrated by Jock Sutherland in his account of Ronald Fairbairn’s personal development, and in his study of John Buchan’s ‘sick heart’ (Sutherland, 1989; Sutherland, 1988).

This leads to my third theme. In our psychoanalytic and psychodynamic cultures, we are sometimes too narrowly (in the cases of a few practitioners, exclusively) preoccupied with inner worlds. Without abandoning that focus at all, we need to re-examine our understandings of the relationship of clients’ inner worlds to their actual experiences of present and past external relationships, their socio-cultural milieux, their value systems and their ways of life.

This leads to the fourth, and final theme of the synthesis, which involves questioning our sometimes excessive emphasis on unconscious processes and repression as the sole source and locus of psychological distress. This is not to deny the importance of unconscious processes, but to suggest that society and

culture have changed drastically since the days of Freud and Fairbairn. It was possible, in the 1890s, 1940s and 1950s, to argue convincingly that civilisation was based on repression. In the contemporary period, an equally convincing case can be made that our civilisation is based on continuous, intentional overstimulation, and on dissociation. Among clients seeking help now, while repression is sometimes a significant factor, many ingrained conflicts and difficulties exist in the domain of conscious awareness and are – very ineffectively – coped with by dissociation and the passive tolerance of contradiction. These processes are exacerbated by the fact that most contemporary channels of communication beam out messages implying that people are consumers who should seek, and get, everything they want, whether or not they can afford it, and whether or not it is good for them. The notions of the personal, of personal responsibility, of real freedom in John Macmurray's sense of the term, of the cultivation of the capacity to ponder, to weigh up, to make positive directional choices, and sometimes to say no, have been almost obliterated. For us, as psychoanalytic psychotherapists and counsellors, there is a challenging ethical task: to reaffirm the importance and the value of the personal life, and the perspective that society consists primarily of persons in personal relations.

NOTES

1. Suttie's use of the term 'psychopathy' now seems old-fashioned, implying a distinction between mental disease (psychopathy) and the science of mental disease (psychopathology). In contemporary usage, the same term, psychopathology, is used in both senses. Many psychotherapists would now challenge the use of either term for disturbances of the social disposition, accepting Suttie's account but not this term.

REFERENCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Clarke, G. (2003). Personal relations theory: Suttie, Fairbairn, Macmurray and Sutherland. Paper delivered at the Legacy of Fairbairn and Sutherland Conference, IIORT and SIHR, Edinburgh.
- Clarke, G. (2006). *Personal relations theory: Fairbairn, Macmurray and Suttie*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Costello, J.E. (2002). *John Macmurray: A biography*. Edinburgh: Floris Books.
- Damasio, A. (2000). *The feeling of what happens: Body, emotion and the making of consciousness*. London: Vintage.
- Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1952). *Psychoanalytic studies of the personality*. London: Tavistock Publications/Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Fielding, M. (2004). Philosophy and the end of educational organisation. Paper delivered at the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain Annual Conference, Oxford.
- Guntrip, H. (1977). *Psychoanalytic theory, therapy and the self*. London: Karnac.
- Heard, D. (1988) Introduction: Historical perspectives. In Heard, D. (Ed.), *The origins of love and hate*. London: Free Association Books.
- Kirkwood, C. (2003). The persons in relation perspective: Towards a philosophy for counselling in society. *Counselling and Psychotherapy Research*, 3(3), 186–195.
- MacIntyre, A. (1985). *After virtue: A study in moral theory*. London: Duckworth.
- Macmurray, J. (1938). *The clue to history*. London: Student Christian Movement Press.
- Macmurray, J. (1992) (first published 1932). *Freedom in the modern world*. London: Humanities Press.
- Macmurray, J. (1995a) (first published 1961). *Persons in relation*. London: Faber and Faber.

CHAPTER 2

- Macmurray, J. (1995b) (first published 1935). *Reason and emotion*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Macmurray, J. (1995c) (first published 1957). *The self as agent*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Martin, I. (1987). Community education: Towards a theoretical analysis. In G. Allen, J. Bastiani, I. Martin, & K. Richards (Eds.), *Community education: An agenda for educational reform*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Orbach, S. (1993). *Hunger strike: The anorectic's struggle as a metaphor for our age*. London: Penguin.
- Mullahy, P. (Ed.). (1952). *The contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan: A symposium on interpersonal theory in psychiatry and social science*. New York: Hermitage House.
- Sandler, J. (1976). Countertransference and role-responsiveness. *International Review of Psychoanalysis*, 3(43), 43–47.
- Scharff, D., & Fairbairn Birtles, E. (1994). *From instinct to self: Selected papers of W. R. D. Fairbairn*, Vols 1 and 2. London: Jason Aronson.
- Scharff, D., & Scharff, J. S. (1991). *Object relations couple therapy*. London: Jason Aronson.
- Scharff, J. S. (1994). *The autonomous self: The work of J. D. Sutherland*. London: Jason Aronson.
- Sutherland, J. D. (1988). John Buchan's 'sick heart': Some psychoanalytic reflections. *Edinburgh Review*, 78–79, 83–101.
- Sutherland, J. D. (1989). *Fairbairn's journey into the interior*. London: Free Association Books.
- Suttie, I. D. (1988) (first published 1935). *The origins of love and hate*. London: Free Association Books.
- Turnbull, R. (1989). Scottish thought in the twentieth century. In C. Beveridge & R. Turnbull (Eds.), *The eclipse of Scottish culture*. Edinburgh: Polygon.